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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and objectives of the study 
 
Since the end of direct European colonial rule, the post-colonial state has been beset by 
various crises, including political instability, authoritarianism, brutal human rights 
violations and ethnic antagonism. At no other time, however, have these crises reached 
more devastating proportions than during the post-Cold War period. As 
Makau Wa Mutua succinctly states: ‘[i]t is as though the African state has gone from the 
frying pan and into the fire.’1 Africa has been engulfed from north to south and from 
west to east by violent upheavals of severe intensity, with consequences that include 
genocide and the disintegration of states.  
 
In Algeria, while political violence erupted following the cancellation of the 1992 
elections, the Berbers continued their agitation and protest against the non-recognition 
of their distinct identity and the policy of assimilation into the dominant Arab culture 
that was aggressively pursued by successive post-colonial governments.2 In Mauritania, 
the largely black communities were brutally massacred and forcibly removed from their 
land, dispossessed of their property and expelled from their country while being stripped 
of their citizenship.3 Violent conflicts and even civil wars gripped Senegal and Sierra 
Leone, among others.4 In Nigeria, despite the apparent return to democratic governance, 
agitation by and the intermittently violent protests of national minority groups such as 
the Ogoni, the Atyab, and the Bajju have been on the rise.5 While the struggle of South 
Sudan against religious bigotry and ethno-cultural discrimination as well as political and 
                                                 
1 MW Mutua ‘Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together: The Dilemmas of the Post-colonial African State’ 
(1995) 21 Brooklyn J of Int L 505, 506.  
2 See M Meredith The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence (2005, 2006) 447-461; J 
McDougal History and the culture of nationalism in Algeria (2006) 184-216.   
3 See Human Rights Watch/Africa Mauritania's Campaign of Terror: State-Sponsored Repression of 
Black Africans (1994). 
4 See JB Forrest Subnationalism in Africa: Ethnicity, Alliance, and Politics (2004) 88-97; B Sonko ‘The 
Casamance Conflict: A forgotten Civil War? 3 & 4 CODESERA Bulletin (2004) 30.  
5 See OC Okwa-Okafor ‘Self-determination and the struggle for ethno-cultural autonomy in Nigeria: The 
Zangon-Kafaf and Ogoni problems’ (1994) 6 ASIL Proceedings 52. 
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socio-economic marginalisation has submerged Sudan into a seemingly never-ending 
civil war,6 Chad has had to endure civil strife that pitted ethno-regional groups of the 
south against those of the north.7 The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been 
the epicentre of much of the civil strife that has plagued other African states.8 Hostilities 
between armed groups left Somalia without a functioning government9 and led to the 
implosion of Liberia.10 The historical rivalry between Hutus and Tutsis for domination 
and control of the state degenerated into a genocidal civil war in Rwanda11 and has left 
Burundi in a vicious circle of genocidal strife.12 Others, including Cameroon, Djibouti, 
South Africa, Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya have had to endure civil conflicts of various 
proportions.   
The crises that have engulfed the post-colonial African state are not simply products of 
Africa’s authoritarian, ethnically exclusive and highly corrupt regimes. Rather, these 
regimes are the result and manifestation of the problem of the legitimacy of the African 
state.13 At the heart of this problem, in turn, is the issue of minorities. For the purposes 
of this dissertation, this term means the disconnection between the post-colonial African 
state and its ethno-culturally diverse population, and the unsuitability of the basic 
structures of governance to achieve inclusive forms of representation and participation 
by members of different ethno-cultural groups and ethno-regions. In other words, the 
issue of minorities is about the historical process of the making and management of the 
post-colonial African state, and its failure to achieve social justice and democracy in the 
                                                 
6 See FM Deng ‘Sudan’s Turbulent Road to Nationhood’ in RR Larémont (ed) Borders, Nationalism and 
the African State (2005) 33-86. 
7 See S Decalo ‘Chad: The roots of centre periphery strife’ (1980) 79 African Affairs 317. 
8 See HF Weiss & T Carayannis ‘The Enduring Idea of the Congo’ in Larémont (ed) (note 6 above) 135-
178.  
9 D Compagnon ‘Somali Armed Movements: The Interplay of Political Entrepreneurship and Clan-Based 
Factions’ in C Clapham (ed) African Guerrillas (1998) 73-90.  
10 See M Soolisa ‘Standing on Sinking Sand: ECOMOC and the Liberian Internal Conflict’ in PA 
Nyong’o (ed) Arms and Daggers in the Heart of Africa: Studies on Internal Conflicts (1993) 285; B 
Berkeley Liberia: A Promise Betrayed (1986).  
11 See The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and 
the Surrounding Events Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide (1994) <http://www.africa-
union.org/Official_documents/Reports/OUA-Rapport%20sur%20le%20genocide%20au%20Rwanda.pdf> 
; G Prunier The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (1995); Meredith (note 2 above) Chapter 27.  
12 See M Dravis ‘Burundi in the 1990s – from democratization to communal war’ in TR Gurr Peoples 
versus states: Minorities at risk in the new century (2000) 188-194; R Lemarchand Burundi: Ethnic 
conflict and Genocide (1996).  
13 See Mutua (note 1 above); MW Mutua ‘Why redraw the map of Africa: A moral and legal inquiry’ 
(1995)16 Michigan J Int L 1113,1122-1141; AM Abdulahi ‘The Refugee Crisis in Africa as a Crisis of the 
Institution of the State’(1994) 6 (4) Int J Refugee L 562.     
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context of not only ethno-cultural diversity but also widespread inequality between 
groups and ethno-regions.  
Although it is a problem that is defined by Africa’s historical, political, economic and 
socio-cultural conditions, the issue of minorities is not a problem that is unique to 
Africa. East European countries are also among the most seriously affected. The issue of 
minorities is a problem that has also challenged the legitimacy of established western 
democracies, including Canada and the United Kingdom (UK), as the cases of Quebec 
and Northern Ireland respectively illustrate. With this worldwide resurgence of ethnic-
based claims, the issue of minority rights and the accommodation of group interests and 
identity in multi-ethnic societies has come to attract enormous attention in a number of 
fields, particularly political philosophy and legal theory. At a theoretical level, the 
interest in the subject focuses on the question of whether liberalism, with its focus on 
individual rights and majoritarian democracy, provides an adequate framework for 
dealing with identity-based claims for equality and justice. For proponents of minority 
rights and multicultural liberalism, individual rights and majoritarian democracy are 
inadequate for ensuring real equality between dominant groups and members of 
minorities, and much less for resolving ethno-cultural conflicts in multi-ethnic societies. 
At a practical level, the interest in the subject focuses on the basic structure that a multi-
ethnic state ought to take in order to achieve social justice and inclusive democracy.  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the post-colonial African state is by far the most seriously 
affected, in the discourse on human rights and democratisation, as well as in the political 
framework of African states, very little attention is paid to the rights of minorities. As 
Bertram G Ramchanran observed, ‘[t]he protection of minorities in Africa is a subject 
practically untouched in the literature or in African policy documents even though it 
involves one of the core causes of conflicts and of gross violations of human rights 
throughout the continent.’14 Violent conflicts and the overall problem of the 
sustainability and legitimacy of the African state for social justice and democracy are 
not only not analysed and problematised as minority issues; more importantly, the 
                                                 
14 BG Ramchanran ‘The Protection of Minorities in Africa’ in G Alfredsson & M Stavropoulous (eds) 
Justice Pending: Indigenous Peoples and Other Good Causes: Essays in Honour of Erica-Irene A Daes 
(2002) 99, 100.  
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relevance and potential role of the framework of minority rights that is being articulated 
in normative political theory and international law is not sufficiently examined.   
 
As the civil wars and incidents of state collapse referred to above, and the continuing 
socio-economic and political ills of the post-colonial African state show, the issue of 
minorities is an essential part and a core manifestation of the crisis of legitimacy of the 
African state. As Obiora Chinedu Okafor maintains, the issue of minorities ‘has been, 
and will for the foreseeable future remain, the central problem of post-colonial African 
state craft’.15 But as political developments during the post-colonial period, particularly 
since the end of the Cold War, have made clear, the issue of minorities is not something 
that the African state can continue to ignore without incurring serious cost, including its 
own demise. Without properly addressing this issue at the constitutional and political 
level, the state cannot guarantee social justice, substantive equality and inclusion for all 
members of its diverse population in the processes of the state. According to Alemante 
G Selassie, ‘no issue is more perplexing or more critical than how African societies 
should treat ethnic identity’. He goes on to add that, ‘[n]othing less than the future hope 
of Africa for stability, democracy, and development is at stake’.16  
 
It is evident from this that it is well worth interrogating the need for and potential of 
minority rights as a framework for addressing the claims of ethno-cultural groups for 
social justice and inclusive democracy, and generally for reconfiguring the structure of 
the post-colonial African state.  
 
In engaging with this task from a legal perspective, this dissertation seeks to address the 
following questions: What are the factual bases and the normative frameworks for 
articulating and responding to the claims of minorities (or ethno-cultural groups in 
general) in Africa? How might minority rights be best conceptualised and translated in 
multi-ethnic African states into a democratic constitutional design for recognising and 
accommodating such claims? What insights can be drawn from the individual and 
                                                 
15 OC Okafor ‘“Righting”, Restructuring, and Rejuvenating the Post-colonial African State: The Case for 
the Establishment of an AU Special Commission on National Minorities’ (2007) 13 African Yearbook of 
International Law 2005 43, 46.  
16 AG Selassie ‘Ethnic Identity and Constitutional Design for Africa’ (Fall 1992-1993) 29 (1) Stanford J 
of Int L. 1, 5.  
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group-based models of constitutional accommodation of diversity represented by South 
Africa and Ethiopia respectively?   
 
The main objective of this study is, accordingly, to articulate and defend a robust 
constitutional democratic framework for the protection of minority rights and the 
accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity in Africa. To this end, this study seeks: (a) to 
identify the nature of ethno-cultural diversity in the post-colonial African state; (b) to 
establish the historical, social and political conditions and the normative bases for the 
recognition and accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity in Africa; and (c) to define 
the form that such recognition should take as well as its institutional implications (ie the 
principles and structures of a democratic constitution committed to the accommodation 
of ethno-cultural diversity).   
 
1.2 The concept of minorities   
 
Although the term minorities has a long pedigree in international law and many efforts 
have been made to define it, so far, there is no universal agreement about its definition. 
As Capotorti puts it, ‘[t]he preparation of a definition capable of being universally 
accepted has always proved a task of such difficulty and complexity that neither the 
experts in this field nor the organs of the international agencies have been able to 
accomplish it today’.17  
  
The impact of the absence of a universally agreed upon definition on minority rights 
standard setting has not, however, been insurmountable. There are indeed many scholars 
who doubt that there is a need for having a universally agreed upon definition. This has 
also become the official position of the United Nations and other international 
organisations. In the drafting of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities (The Declaration on the Rights 
of Minorities) the Commission on Human Rights took the view that ‘the question of 
definition was not a necessary prerequisite for drafting the declaration and that this 
                                                 
17 F Capotorti Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging To Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities 
(1979) UN Docs. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, Sales No E78XIV1 p. 5.  
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question should not hinder the continuation of drafting work’.18 Similarly, the working 
group established to draft the declaration stated that ‘the declaration could function 
perfectly well without precisely defining the term as it was clear… to which groups the 
term referred to in concrete cases.’19 The view of the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der 
Stoel, is almost in the same vein. 20 In an often quoted statement, he once said: ‘Given 
the dynamism and diversity in the nature and manifestation of the minority 
phenomenon, the possibility and necessity of a universally agreed upon definition of the 
term minorities may indeed be doubted.’21  
 
This does not, however, dispense with the need for a definition altogether. Thornberry, 
while admitting the importance of a definition for reasons of clarity, reiterated the view 
that ‘the lack of a universal definition does not, however, prevent a description of what 
is and has been understood by the terms’.22 Similarly, Hannum expressed the view that 
the absence of a widely accepted definition of the term ‘minority’ does not bar scholars, 
judicial bodies and international organisations from using a common-sense conception 
of the term.23 There is therefore the implicit recognition that some understanding of 
what constitutes a minority is a prerequisite for determining the application and subject 
of minority rights as set out in international law.24 For the purposes of this study as well 
as an elaboration of the concept of a minority, particularly as it applies to Africa, it is 
necessary to elaborate the form that a constitutional recognition and accommodation of 
ethno-cultural diversity should take.   
 
                                                 
18 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/43  3.  
19 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1991/53 para. 9.  
20 See M van der Stoel ‘Key-note address to the Human Dimension Seminar, case studies on national 
minorities issues’ Warsaw 24-28 May 1993, reprinted in 1(1) CSCE ODHR Bulletin 22.  
21 Ramaga observed that ‘because of diverse experiences of different states, solutions can hardly be 
formulated in universal principles but depend on the particular circumstances of particular contexts’. PV 
Ramaga ‘Relativity of the Minority Concept’ (1992) 14 Human Rights Quarterly 104, 112. In defining 
minority this variation should be taken into account.   
22 P Thornberry International Law and the Rights of Minorities (1991) 164.   
23 H Hannum ‘Contemporary Developments in the International Protection of the Rights of Minorities’ 
(1991) 66 Notre Dame LR 1431.  
24 See M Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (1993) 487; MN Shaw 
‘The Definition of Minorities in International Law’ in Y Dinstien (ed) The Protection of Minorities and 
Human Rights (1992) 1, 1-2.   
 7 
In international legal discourse and official documents, the most widely acknowledged 
definition is the one formulated by Special Rapporteur Francesco Capotorti.25 This 
definition is also used in this study to develop a working definition of the term and for 
elaborating the nature and type of groups that this term covers, as used in this 
dissertation. In his highly regarded study for the UN on the rights of persons belonging 
to minorities based on Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), Capotorti defined a minority for purposes of Article 27 of the ICCPR 
as  
 
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, 
whose members – being nationals of the state – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic 
characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a 
sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.26     
 
For the purposes of this study, the most important elements of this definition are: the 
numerical inferiority of the group; the ‘non-dominant position’ that it has in the society; 
the ‘ethnic, religious and linguistic characteristics’ distinguishing the group from those 
of the ‘rest of the population’ of the state; and the collective will to preserve its ‘culture, 
traditions, religion or language’.  
 
In the context of this study, the numerical factor raises some important issues. The first 
relates to its importance in determining a group’s minority status in a country. The idea 
that a group constitutes a minority if it is less than 50 percent of the total population of 
the state is very difficult to sustain, particularly in the African context, for various 
reasons.27 Firstly, it is not always the case that the relative size of the group necessarily 
impinges on its dominant or subordinated position in a society. Even in those African 
states having majority groups (50 percent plus), a group that is numerically a minority 
                                                 
25 See Nowak (ibid) 487; J Pejic ‘Minority Rights In International Law’ (1997) 19 Human Rights 
Quarterly  666, 670.  
26 Capotorti (note 17 above) at 96.  
27 Malcolm N Shaw observed that ‘[i]t is commonly assumed that the group in question will constitute a 
numerical minority within the state.’ Malcolm N Shaw ‘The Definition of Minorities in International law’ 
in Yoram Dinistien (ed.) The Protection of Minorities and Human Rights (1992) 1, 24. Similarly Oldrich 
Andrysek states that ‘[a]lready looking at the term minority we feel an arithmetical connotation: a 
minority is a smaller part of a whole’. Report on the Definition of Minorities SIM Special No. 8 (1989) 
49.  
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can actually be politically and economically dominant. This was the case in South 
Africa during the apartheid era. Today, it is also the case in Rwanda and Burundi. In 
these countries as well as in Niger and Zimbabwe, numerical strength is not generally 
accompanied by political and socio-economic strength. The numerical majority can be 
and in most of these states is, in a politically vulnerable position. It is only in very few 
countries such as Botswana, Egypt, Algeria and possibly Djibouti, that the minority-
majority dichotomy in terms of size may have clear application. Secondly, in countries 
composed only of numerical minorities characterised by some as countries of minorities, 
28 as is the case in the majority of African countries, the relative population size of 
groups says little, if anything, about the issue of minorities. Some suggest that in such 
cases each group in a state is a minority vis-à-vis the aggregate of all other members 
taken together.29 The criticism raised against such a perspective is that ‘the comparison 
is between a culturally homogeneous group and an amorphous one (the aggregate of all 
the rest)’.30 Most importantly, it defines minority status mainly in terms of inter-group 
relations rather than in terms of power relations.  
 
There are other factors that cast further doubt on the relevance of the numerical factor 
for determining the status of groups as minority in the African context. Unlike in 
Europe, in most African countries there is no single group that constitutes a numerical 
majority. Similarly, unlike the experience in Europe where the majority not only 
commands numerical and socio-economic dominance, but has also been central in the 
process of the making of the state, in those African states where there is a group with a 
numerical majority, despite its numerical strength, the group often possesses none of 
these attributes. This mainly reflects the difference in the process or form of the making 
of European states and the post-colonial African state. Whereas in Europe the state 
emerged through a long historical and organic process of state building by historically 
dominant groups, the state in Africa is a product of colonial rule, an externally imposed 
and artificially constituted entity. Most African states are thus composed of numerous 
                                                 
28 See Li-Ann Thio Managing Bable: The International Legal Protection of Minorities in the Twentieth 
Century (2005) 11.  
29 See Capotorti (note 17 above) 96; G Alfredsson ‘Minority Rights: International Standards and 
Monitoring Procedures’ in N Taku (ed) From human wrongs to human rights – Part VII (2000) 37; J 
Crawford ‘The rights of peoples: “Peoples” or “Governments”?’ in J Crawford (ed) The rights of peoples 
(1988) 55, 60-61.      
30 Ramaga (note 21 above) 117.  
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and divergent ethno-cultural groups of which none constitutes a majority nor had any 
role in the process of the making of the African state.  
 
This difference means that in the context of Europe and similarly situated countries 
elsewhere in the world, the issue of minorities is about how to protect numerically 
smaller and ethno-culturally distinct groups from assimilation into and domination by 
the majority. Although it involves power relations, it has basically been seen as a 
statistical and cultural issue. The numerical factor has accordingly assumed particular 
importance in the definition of a minority in the European experience. In Africa, by 
contrast, the issue of minorities is not a statistical problem involving counter-balancing 
of the numerical strength of a majority. It is more about the accommodation of 
population diversity. The central thrust of minority issues in Africa is how to recognise 
and accommodate in the processes of the state the diverse identities and interests of 
members of the various ethno-cultural groups constituting the post-colonial African state 
in a way that provides sufficient structures and processes for the expression and 
accommodation of those identities and interests.  
 
It is clear from all the above that the numerical factor should not generally be seen as 
essential for the definition of the term minority, particularly as it applies in Africa and is 
used in this study. However, this does not mean that it is totally irrelevant in the 
discussion on minorities. It is, for example, one of the considerations in assessing the 
degree of vulnerability of groups, and in determining the appropriate form that the 
application of various rights takes and how it is tailored to the particular condition and 
scale of groups. The numerical factor can also play a role in other ways. It is important, 
for example, to examine the question of the minimum numerical threshold required to 
qualify for recognition as minority. Clearly, two persons do not form a minority for the 
purpose of minority rights.31 At the same time, setting a precise figure as a numerical 
minimum, as, for example, suggested by the Swedish government for a minimum of 
100 persons, would not be realistic, although such a standard could be desirable for 
reasons of legal certainty. According to Capotorti, ‘[i]n principle, even quite a small 
group has the right to claim the protection provided for in Article 27, to the extent to 
                                                 
31 Nowak (note 24 above) 488.  
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which it seems reasonable to expect the state to introduce special measures of 
protection’.32  
 
In the context of Africa, the size of ethnic groups varies from many millions, as in the 
case of the Hausa-Fulani of Nigeria, to some thousands, as in the case of the Harari of 
Ethiopia. The application of this rule of reasonable expectation must therefore also be 
seen in the light of other considerations, particularly marginalisation and the historical 
inequities suffered by the group, among others.   
 
The numerical factor also becomes particularly important in Africa with respect to the 
issue of whether the determination of minority status can be made in relation to the 
population of some internal political unit such as a province or a unit of a federation. 
Undoubtedly, the expression ‘the rest of the population’ in Capotorti’s definition, is 
primarily a reference to the total population of a state. At the level of the UN, the UN 
Human Rights Committee (HRC), the body responsible for supervising the 
implementation of the ICCPR, held in Ballantyne, Davidson and McIntyre v Canada 
that ‘the minorities referred to in Article 27 are minorities within such a state (party to 
the ICCPR), and not minorities within any province’.33  
 
The problem with this approach is that it fails to take account of situations in which a 
large portion of political power is constitutionally or otherwise vested in provincial or 
regional government, as is usually the case in federal or federal-like states. In such 
states, the issue of minorities arises even at the provincial or regional level, particularly 
where the boundaries of such internal political units coincide with the territorial 
concentration of particular groups leading to the domination of those units by such 
groups.34 In a separate opinion, the minority of the HRC in Ballantyne, Davidson and 
McIntyre v Canada expressed the need to take into account such considerations in the 
                                                 
32 Capotorti (note 17 above) 12.  
33John Ballantyne and Elizabeth Davidson, and Gordon Mcintyre v Canada (Communications Nos. 
359/1989 and 385/1989) UN Doc. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989 and 385/1989/Rev.1 (1993) para 
11(2).  
34 In his note 44, De Varennes makes the point: ‘[I]t could be validly maintained that the drafters of 
Article 27 simply overlooked that in a federal state, even a national majority may find itself subjected to 
serious mistreatment if it is a numerical minority in one of the federal units and outside the reach of 
federal (national) protection.’ F De Varennes Language, Minorities and Human Rights (1996) 143.     
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application of Article 27.35 Some scholars also rightly maintain that the numerical status 
of the group may be judged by reference to an internal political structure in addition to 
the whole country, in so far as such entities have certain powers, as federal units do, and 
this can affect the interest of the population group concerned.36 This seems to be a 
reasonable approach in the light of the overall purpose of minority rights and protection. 
In India, this approach has also been adopted. The Supreme Court of India established 
that minority status can be determined not only nationally but also within the units of the 
federation, depending on the matter in question.37  
 
At the European level, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has 
proposed a definition in Recommendation 1201.38 According to Recommendation 
1201’s definition of minority, the concept can also include minorities at the regional 
level in a given state. This recognises that a minority situation can arise not only at the 
national level but also at provincial or regional levels as long as such structures exercise 
autonomous governmental authority within their territory.39 One can rightly say that this 
is an appropriate approach as it affords protection to groups in a minority situation at 
various levels and reflects the context specific nature of minority status.   
 
Non-dominance is another defining element of a minority. This element recognises that 
a minority is most importantly a political reality. In the light of this, minority status is 
                                                 
35 The minority members of the HRC disagree with the reasoning that ‘because English-speaking 
Canadians are not a numerical minority in Canada they cannot be a minority for the purposes of Article 
27’ and with the conclusion that ‘persons are necessarily excluded from the protection of Article 27 where 
their group is an ethnic, linguistic or cultural minority in an autonomous province of a state, but is not 
clearly a numerical minority in the state itself’. Individual opinion by Mrs Elizabeth Evatt, co-signed by 
Nisuke Ando, Marco Tulio Bruni Celli and Vojin Dimitrijevic as quoted in De Varennes (note 32 above) 
142-143.    
36 See Ramaga (note 21 above) 105-110; K Henrad Devising an adequate system of minority protection: 
Individual Human Rights, Minority Rights and The right to Self-determination (2000) 35; Thio (note 28 
above) 10.   
37 D.A.V. College, Jullunder v Punjab, A.I.R. (1971) S. Ct. 1731.  
38 Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Recommendation 1201 (1993), ‘On an Additional 
Protocol on the Rights of National minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights’, 1993. 
39 In its Opinion on Finland the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities observes that ‘taking into account the level of autonomy enjoyed and/or the nature of 
the powers exercised by the province of Åland, the Advisory Committee is of the opinion that the Finish-
speaking population there could also be given the possibility to rely on the protection provided by the 
framework Convention as far as the issues concerned are within the competence of the Province of 
Åland.’ACFC/INF/OP/I (2001)002 para. 17 as quoted in note 18 of M Pentikäinen ‘Integration of 
Minorities into Society’ in M Scheinin & R Toivanen (eds) Rethinking Non-discrimination and Minority 
Rights (2004) 103.  
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conceptualised in terms of the relationship of the group in question, primarily, to 
political power,40 although the economic, cultural and social standings of the group may 
also be important indicators of the weak position of that group to qualify it as a 
minority.41 Thus, a minority is generally regarded as lacking political and economic 
clout to influence the decision-making processes of a state. It is this reality of 
powerlessness that makes minorities vulnerable and constitutes a chief defining element 
of a minority. And it is from this position of general vulnerability and weakness that the 
need for minority protection finds one of its justifications.42 Given the history of the 
making of the African state, it is, however, important that non-dominance should be 
seen not just in terms of existing political, cultural and socio-economic marginalisation 
but also in terms of vulnerability to such marginalisation as well. That is, non-
dominance should not necessarily be restricted to the status of being subordinate or 
oppressed. 43 The effect of this in the African context could be that all groups, large and 
small, may become minorities. This should not, however, be regrettable. This is because, 
first, as noted above and as will be further shown in the following chapters, the most 
important dimension of the issue of minorities in African countries, is the relationship of 
all constituent ethno-cultural groups to state power or is about the relative position of 
constituent groups to the political, economic and socio-cultural process of the state. 
Second, while recognising all constituent groups as minorities, it is also possible and 
necessary to make further differentiations in terms of the particular form that the 
application of the rights of minorities takes to different groups, depending on the degree 
of vulnerability and disadvantage of each group.44   
 
                                                 
40 ‘In modern times,’ writes Ramaga, ‘political power is the major instrument of dominance. It may negate 
the possible influence of the majority by precluding the effect of all other elements of dominance.’ 
Ramaga (note 21 above) 113.  
41 Nowak (note 24 above) 188.  
42 Capotorti (note 17 above) 12.  
43 Henrard (note 36 above)  36.  
44 Such an approach is inspired by the difference in reality among minority groups and is not a new one. 
On the question of whether all minorities should be treated alike see A Eide Working Paper on the 
Relationship and Distinction Between Minorities and Indigenous Peoples UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/10 para. 26. Also see SJ Anaya ‘On Justifying Special Ethnic Group Rights: 
Comments on Pogge’ in I Shapiro & W Kymlicka (eds) Ethnicity and Group Rights (1997) 222, 225 
(stating that ‘the degree and kind of protection provided diverse minority groups will not in all instances 
be the same.’)   
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Another component of Capotorti’s definition is the possession by the group of ethnic, 
religious or linguistic characteristics that are different from the rest of the population of 
the state. Accordingly, groups within a state may be considered minorities for the 
purposes of international law only when they differ from the rest of the population of the 
state in which they exist by reference to these distinct characteristics.45 Although a 
distinction is made in international law between language, ethnicity and religion, the 
discussion on ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities is essentially a discussion about 
groups with a distinct culture. Culture thus looms large as an important component in 
the identification of minorities.   
 
Although the meaning of culture is generally contested, in the discussion on minorities it 
is used to refer to those aspects of the character of the group that its members and others 
use to identify the group. In other words, ‘the concept of “culture” within the minority 
protection schemes is understood in a narrow, ethnic sense.’46 Culture can accordingly 
be described in terms of the variables characterising it: ‘…[C]ulture is distinguished by 
such characteristics as language, religion, and race’.47 It can also be described in terms 
of symbols and patterns of relations or behaviour ‘as a coherent self-contained system of 
values, and symbols as well as a set of practices that a specific cultural group reproduces 
over time and which provides individuals with the required signposts and meanings for 
behaviour and social relationships in every day life.’ 48  
 
One question that can be raised with respect to the identification of a minority by 
reference to such historically constructed characteristics from the perspective of the 
nature of diversity in Africa is whether inhabitants of a particular region can be taken to 
constitute a minority on account of their common experience of marginalisation, 
discrimination or possession of other shared features or historical experience as 
inhabitants of such a region, despite belonging to different ethnic groups. Examples that 
illustrate this include black Muslims of the Darfur region of Sudan, the people of South 
Sudan, peoples of Cabinda of Angola, the Casamans of Senegal or the people of 
                                                 
45 Nowak (note 24 above) 491.  
46 Thio (note 28 above) 9.  
47 V Dyke The Cultural Rights of Peoples (April-June 1980) 2 (2) Universal Human Rights 2.  
48 R Stavenhagen ‘Cultural Rights: A Social Science Perspective’ in A Eide, C Krause & Allan Rosas 
(eds) Economic, social and cultural rights: A Textbook (2001) 85, 89.  
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Northern Uganda or Eritrea before its independence from Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, 
historically, it is common that people identify themselves mainly by reference to their 
provincial origin. Accordingly, the Amharic-speaking people of highland Ethiopia have 
mainly identified themselves as Shewe, Wolloye, Gojame and Gondere. Similarly, 
Tigrigna speaking people in the north have identified themselves as Tigrayans of various 
localities, and Oromos as Quotu or Harar Oromo, Arsi Oromo, Shewa Oromo, Jumma 
Oromo and Wollega Oromo.49 As the consideration of the complaints from the people of 
Katanga by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights indicates,50 it is 
plausible in some cases to identify a population group on the basis of its regional origin 
where regional identity is politically more salient and is used by the inhabitants of the 
region as well as others as a principal identification marker.51  
 
The elements of the definition of a minority analysed above constitute the objective 
characteristics of a group. The last element of the definition, the collective will of the 
group to preserve its distinctive features, constitutes the subjective dimension of what 
distinguishes the group as a minority. This involves the awareness of the group that it 
differs from others on account of its distinctive features and its willingness to identify 
itself in terms of its distinct culture. The question that often arises in this regard is how 
to determine the existence of this subjective dimension. Is it necessary for the group to 
declare its willingness to preserve its distinctive characteristics or can this be determined 
in another way?  
 
The most plausible approach to this is expressed by Capotorti. He emphasises the close 
link between the objective dimension in the possession of distinct ethnic, religious or 
linguistic (even regional) features and the subjective dimension. Accordingly, he 
maintains that the subjective element does not need to be expressed; instead, ‘the will in 
question generally emerges from the fact that a given group has kept its distinctive 
                                                 
49 See A Habtu ‘Ethnic Pluralism as an Organizing Principle of the Ethiopian Federation’ (2004) 28 
Dialectical Anthropology 91, 109-111. 
50 Katangese People Congress v Zaire (2000) AHRLR 72 (ACHPR 1995) [Communication 75/92 8th 
Annual Activity Report, 1994-1995].  
51 See TR Gurr & JR Scarritt  ‘Minority Rights at Risk: A Global Survey’ (1989) 11 Human Rights 
Quarterly 375, 380-81. (Region of residence is identified as one of the many possible bases for separate 
group identity by reference to which the minority status of a group is determined.) 
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characteristics over a period of time’.52 Most importantly, this subjective element can be 
gathered from the fact that members of minorities continue to identify themselves as 
belonging to a group, to participate in and observe cultural activities, and make use of 
their language or practise the religion of the group.  
 
For the purposes of this study therefore, a minority is a population group that 
distinguishes itself and is distinguished by others by reference to ethnicity, language or 
religion or a combination of any of these, or by reference to regional origin, and suffers 
political, socio-economic or cultural oppression and/or marginalisation or is vulnerable 
to such oppression or marginalisation. The term minority can accordingly include 
groups that are not necessarily a numerical minority but are nevertheless politically, 
socio-economically or culturally vulnerable to oppression or marginalisation. Hutus in 
Rwanda are a good example here. This relatively broad definition would treat the groups 
constituting the majority of African states as minorities. However, since some groups 
are more marginalised than others, it is further suggested that a distinction be made 
between highly disadvantaged minorities and others. Such a distinction means that 
minority rights should be given different forms of application to cater for the interests of 
these highly disadvantaged minorities. Accordingly, those population groups identified 
as indigenous peoples also constitute minorities, albeit a special category of minorities. 
 
It is important to emphasise that minorities are not regarded in this study as self-
contained and monolithic or internally homogenous entities. As a group, a minority 
acquires its significance by how its members and others regard and relate to the culture 
that gives it its identity. This implies that it is not just the cultural features that 
distinguish minorities that matter by themselves, but the consequence that members and 
others attach to them.53 The possibility that members of minorities may abandon or 
revise their group membership or that they may not necessarily seek to identify 
themselves or be identified by others as such is accordingly recognised. For the 
                                                 
52 Capotorti (note 17 above) 28.  
53 N Lerner observes that ‘[g]roups are often the result of complex combinations, and the issues of self-
perception and perception by the surrounding community are of great importance.’ He goes on to say at 
note 13 that ‘judicial decisions in several countries have stressed that more important than the nature of 
the group is how they regard themselves and are regarded by others in the community.’ N Lerner ‘The 
Evolution of Minority Rights In International Law’ in C Brölman, R Lefeber & M Zieck (eds) Peoples 
and Minorities in International Law (1993)75, 80.  
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purposes of this study, the communitarian conception of groups as homogenous, static 
or self-contained entities with identifiable and stable boundaries is also rejected. Instead, 
it is recognised that different minorities exist in continuous interaction, often sharing 
and intermixing in the same territory.   
 
Before winding up the discussion on the concept ‘minorities’, it is appropriate to 
discuss, albeit only briefly and by way of introduction, both the convergence and 
divergence between the terms ‘minorities’, ‘indigenous peoples’ and ‘peoples’, and how 
these concepts and the rights attached to them are employed in this study. This is also 
particularly necessary for at least two additional reasons. First, it is the legal categories 
of ‘peoples’ and lately ‘indigenous peoples’ that have received express recognition 
within the African human rights regime. Second, in elaborating the minority rights 
framework it defends, the study will draw not only from norms specific to ‘minorities’ 
but also from the rights and legal guarantees that international law accords to ‘peoples’ 
and ‘indigenous peoples’.  
 
Under international law the term ‘peoples’ is generally associated with self-
determinaiton.54 The Charter of the United Nations Organization55 is the first modern 
international law instrument to enshrine the principle of self-determination, which had a 
status only of a political idea during the League of Nations. Within the framework of the 
UN Charter the term ‘peoples’ signifies the entire population of the member states of the 
UN. Rosalyn Higgins thus maintains that the principle of self-determination of peoples 
as referred to in the UN Charter ‘seems to be the rights of the peoples of one state to be 
protected from interference by other states or governments.’56 The opening words of the 
UN Charter, ‘We the peoples of the United Nations’ offer further support to this 
conclusion. It is evident from this that the term nations is a reference to states and hence 
                                                 
54 It is for this reason that ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples specifies under Article 1(3) 
that the use of the term peoples in the Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as 
regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law. ILO Convention No. 169 
concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries 72 ILO Official Bull. 59. Adopted by 
the General Conference of the International Labor Organization in 1989 and entered into force in 1991.    
55 Charter of the United Nations of June 26, 1945 UNTS No. 993, 3(Hereinafter the UN Charter).   
56 Rosalyn Higgins ‘Self-determination and secession’  in Julie Dahlitz (ed.) Secession and international 
law (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2003) 23.  
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the term peoples was a reference to those having their own states.57 It can be established 
from this that the term peoples first signifies the whole populaiton of a state as in the 
expression the peoples of South Africa.  
 
During the decolonization process, the legal status and meaning of self-determination 
tremendously evolved. This has begun with the adoption of the Declaration for the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960 by the UN General 
Assembly.58 This Declaration transformed self-determination from an international 
‘principle’ under the Charter of the UN to a right of peoples. In terms of its application, 
despite its universal formulation as a right of peoples, the term ‘peoples’, as the title of 
the Declaration suggests, was essentially a reference to colonial peoples.59 Accordingly, 
apart from its understanding as a reference to all the peoples within a state, the term 
applies to peoples under colonial rule or alien domination.60  
 
It is clear that in international legal practice the term ‘people’ is not used in its ethnic or 
sociological sense as a reference to groups possessing certain shared characterstics and 
an awarness of possessing distinct identity.61 It is also important to note that in both 
these contexts (entire populaiton of a state and people under colonial rule or alien 
subjugation) the term peoples mainly entails the capacity to assert a claim for sovereinty 
and independence and thus in this sense it is confined to external self-determinaiton. 
Clearly, peoples in these two senses does not therefore cover sub-national entities 
                                                 
57 ‘We cannot ignore,’ maintains Higgins, ‘the coupling of ‘self-determination’ with equal rights and it 
was equal rights of states that was being provided for (emphasis in the original).’ As above.  
58 UN GA Res. 1514 (XV) of 14 Dec. 1960 15 United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Supp. 
(No. 16) 66, UN Doc. A/4684 (1961).   
59 In its Advisory Opinion on Namibia International Court of Justice articulated self-determination in the 
light of the developments in international law as linked with non-self-governing territories. See Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, 6, 
31(Hereafter the Namibia case). Similarly in the Western Sahara case the ICJ affirmed the principle of 
self-determination as a right of peoples and its application for the purpose of bringing all colonial 
situations to a speedy end.’  Western Sahara Case, Advisory Opinion ICJ Reports (1975) 12, 31.  
60 In the Namibia case, the International Court of Justice said that ‘the subsequent development of 
international law in regard to non-self-governing territories (colonies), as enshrined in the Charter of the 
United Nations, made the principle of self-determination applicable to all of them.’ The Namibia case (as 
above) 31.   
61 See Shaw (note 27 above) 5. Yoram Dinstein offers an ethnic meaning to the term ‘people’. Yoram 
Dinstein ‘Self-determination and the middle east conflict’ in Ynah Alexander and Robert. A. Friedlander 
(eds.) Self-determination: National, regional and global dimensions (Colorado, Boulder: Westview 
Press,1980) 246-247.  
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particularly minorities as elaborated above. Accordingly, it is not relied upon in 
elaborating the minority rights framework defended in this study.  
 
As will further be elaborated in Chapter IV, within the framework of the two UN 
Covenants in which self-determinaiton is enunciated as the right of all peoples, there is 
an emerging conceptualizaiton of the term peoples as a reference also to sub-national 
groups. But in this context, it mainly carries an entitlement to various forms of 
guarantees and institutional accommodation internally within state boundaries. In other 
words, the focus here is mainly on internal-self-determinaiton.62 The term peoples in this 
context covers minorities both as one of the possible entities to which it applies and in 
terms of the rights or guarantees that it signifies. Accordingly, in subsequent chapters, 
this is relied upon in identifying the relevant institutional frameworks and legal 
guarantees that form part of the minorities rights framework defended in the study as 
necessary for adequately addressing the issue of minorities in Africa.    
 
The other legal category of particular importance is ‘indigenous peoples’. the 
understanding of the term that is commonly used is the one in the Special Rapporteur 
Martinez Cobo Study on the Problem of Discriminaiton Against Indigenous Peoples. 
This reads 
 
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with 
pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves 
distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those territories, or parts of them. 
They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop 
and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis 
of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social 
institutions and legal system.63 
 
 It can be gathered from this that first and foremost indigenous peoples is a reference to 
the descendants of the original non-European inhabitants of lands colonized and settled 
by European powers.64 This is not however a feature common to minorities. Other 
                                                 
62 See further Chapter IV below.  
63 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7, Add. 1 (vol. 2) para. 379.  
64 See Deas in U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm. on 
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defining elements of the term, which are commonly shared with minorities, are their 
non-dominant position and their determination to maintain their distinct identity. Apart 
from these however adherence to pre-modern way of life is another distinguishing mark 
of indigenous peoples that separates them from minorities. These features are aptly 
elaborated in kymlicka’s useful analysis:  
 
It is widely accepted, for example, that the subjugation and incorporation of indigenous peoples by 
European colonizers was a more brutal and disruptive process than the subjugation and 
incorporation of national minorities by neighboring societies, and that this has left indigenous 
peoples weaker and more vulnerable. It is also often assumed that there is a supposed “ 
civilizational ” difference between indigenous peoples and national minorities. Whereas national 
minorities typically share the same modern (urbanized, industrialized) economic and sociopolitical 
structures as their neighboring European peoples, indigenous peoples are often assumed to have 
retained premodern modes of economic production, engaged primarily in subsistence agriculture or 
a hunter-gatherer lifestyle.65 
 
International law also attaches distincit rights and guarantees to minorities and indigenus 
peoples. As Eide puts it, the specific rights of indigenous peoples contained in the ILO 
Convention and the draft Indigenous Declaration are significantly different from those 
in the Minority Declaration. He articulated this distinction between the two categories as 
follows:  
 
[W]hereas the Minority Declaration and other instruments concerning persons belonging to 
minorities aim at ensuring a space for pluralism in togetherness, the instruments concerning 
indigenous peoples are intended to allow for a high degree of autonomous development. Whereas 
the Minority Declaration places considerable emphasis on effective participation in the larger 
society of which the minority is a part (arts. 2.2 and 2.3), the provisions regarding indigenous 
peoples seek to allocate authority to these peoples so that they can make their own decisions (e.g. 
Convention No. 169, arts. 7 and 8; draft indigenous declaration, arts. 4, 23 and 31). The right to 
participation in the larger society is in the draft given a secondary significance and expressed as 
an optional right. Indigenous peoples have the right to participate fully, if they so choose, through 
                                                                                                                                               
Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Working Paper on the Relationship and Distinction between the 
Rights of Persons Belonging to Minorities and those of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/10 (July 19, 2000) para. 49.  
65 Will Kymlicka ‘The Internationalization of minority rights’ 6 (1) I.CON (2008) 1, 9.  
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procedures determined by them, in devising legislative or administrative measures that may 
affect them (draft indigenous declaration, arts. 19 and 20).66 
 
He further indicated that the two have different rights as regards rights over land and 
natural resources. In the words of Eide ‘[T]he Minority Declaration contains no such 
rights, whereas these are core elements in the ILO Convention (arts. 13-19) and in the 
draft indigenous declaration (arts. 25-30).’67 On the question of the relationship between 
minorities and the right to self-determination, he stated that ‘the relevant instruments 
provide no right to group (collective) self-determination.’ He goes on to say that ‘[T]he 
rights of persons belonging to minorities are individual rights, even if they in most cases 
can only be enjoyed in community with others.’68 According to him, although the 
question of whether indigenous peoples are ‘peoples’ in the sense of common Article 1 
of the two Covenants remains to be controversial, there are strong reasons to consider 
indigenous peoples as having the right to self-determination in the sense of being 
entitled to ‘some degree of territorial autonomy’.69  
 
The above analysis representative of the UN approach as captured in the two UN 
documents (1992 UN Declaration on the rights of National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities and the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Inigenous Peoples) 
distinguishes minorities from indigenous peoples in three ways. This is nicely summed 
up by Kymlicka to involve ( a ) minorities seek institutional integration while 
indigenous peoples seek to preserve a degree of institutional separateness; ( b) 
minorities seek to exercise individual rights while indigenous peoples seek to exercise 
collective rights; (c ) minorities seek nondiscrimination while indigenous peoples seek 
self-government.70 
  
                                                 
66 Abjorn Eide Working paper on the relationship and distinction between the rights of persons belonging 
to minorities and those of indigenous peoples paper submitted to the Sub-Commission on the promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights of the UN Commission on Human Rights UN doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/10 para. 8.  
67 As above, para. 9.  
68 Eide (n 66 above) para. 10.  
69 As above paras. 11-15.   
70 Kymlicka (note 65 above) 4.  
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In this study, although the special needs and situaiton of indigenous peoples is 
recognised, the sharp distincitons and the legal hierarchy that internaitonal law grafted 
into the corpus of internaitonal human rights law is rejected. It cahllenges the 
assumption that the claims of minorities is substantially or qualitatively different from 
indigenous peoples or peoples and does not involve cliams to self-determinaiton rights 
such as self-government. As Kymlicka rightly notes ‘[s]ome of the most well known and 
protracted struggles for autonomy around the world involve groups that are considered 
minorities rather than indigenous peoples by the UN — groups such as the Scots, 
Catalans, Chechens, Kosovar Albanians, Kurds, Kashmiris, and Tamils.71 Similarly, 
James Anaya, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, rejects 
the approach of international law, which excludes minorities from some of the 
guarantees to which indigenous peoples or peoples are entitled. As he puts it, this 
approach ‘renders self-determination inapplicable to the vast number of sub-state groups 
whose claims represent many of the world’s most pressing problems in the postcolonial 
age.’ Besides, he goes on to say, ‘by effectively denying a priori a right of self-
determination to groups that in many instances passionately assert it as the basis for their 
demands, this limited conception may serve to inflame tensions.’72      
 
The implication of the rejection of the approach of internaitonal law to the African 
context is that it questions the approach adopted by the African Commission’s Group of 
Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities that upholds the approach of 
international law vis-à-vis minorities.73 If one takes into account the particular history of 
the emergence of the state in Africa and the particular socio-historical premise on the 
basis of which international law makes the distinction between the two categories, 
controversial as it is, there is little doubt that that distinction has very little merit or room 
in Africa. This is specifically noted by Asbjorn Eide: 
 
One question is whether the distinction has global relevance. It has been argued that the approach 
to the drafting of minority rights has been influenced mainly by European experience and that it 
therefore is profoundly Eurocentric, whereas the drafting of indigenous rights has been 
                                                 
71 As above, 6.  
72 Anaya (n 48 above) 100.  
73 See ACHPR/IWGIA Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities (2005).  
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influenced mainly by developments in the Americas and in the Pacific region (the "blue water 
doctrine" The "blue water doctrine" hold that the indigenous are those people beyond Europe 
who lived in the territory before European colonization and settlement, and who now form a non-
dominant and culturally separate group in the territories settled primarily by Europeans and their 
descendants.), and therefore is America-centric. The Sami of northern Scandinavia and the Arctic 
peoples of the Russian Federation are widely held to be indigenous in spite of the fact that they 
are not covered by the "blue water doctrine". Norway has ratified ILO Convention No. 169 on 
the understanding that the Sami are indigenous as defined in article 1 of that Convention. The 
distinction is probably much less useful for standard-setting concerning group accommodation 
in Asia and Africa.74 
 
Accordingly, the attention given to indigenous peoples rights within the framework of 
the African Commission’s working Group, valuable and justifiable as it is, should not be 
taken to imply that accommodation and self-determination rights such as self-
government or autonomy apply only to those groups identified as indigenous peoples 
but not to minorities. The distinction between indigenous peoples (highly marginalized 
and vulnerable ethnic groups leading a pre-modern way of life) and minorities (groups 
having distinct culture and language who suffer discrimination and marginalization or 
are vulnerable to such discrimination and marginalization and seek to have their 
recognized and to achieve proportional representation and effective participation 
including through self-government or autonomy) in Africa should not lead to nothing 
more than prioritizing and paying special attention to the former on account of the 
degree of their marginalization and their distinct way of life and identity leading a pre-
modern way of life as hunters and gatherers or pastoralists and the threat that they are as 
a result facing. For the purposes of this study, indigenous peoples are thus regarded as a 
special category of minorities falling within one of the different groups of minorities 
identified in this study, namely peripheral minorities.75  
1.3 The framework of minority rights defended in this study 
  
An examination of international norms on minorities reveals that there are two related 
types of guarantees. The first guarantee is what may be referred to as institutional 
                                                 
74 Eide (n 66 above) (Except in the last sentence emphasis in the original).  
75 For this see below Chapter II.  
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tolerance, which can be expressed as a non-discrimination right.76 This ensures to 
minorities that state authorities refrain from engaging in activities that interfere with or 
unduly restrict minorities from pursuing their cultures, using their languages and 
practising their religions. It imposes on state authorities a negative obligation by 
prohibiting them from actions that prevent members of minorities from enjoying their 
culture. It entitles members of minorities not to be prevented from participating in the 
cultural life of their group.  
 
Accordingly, members of minorities are free, within certain limits, to use their minority 
languages, participate in the reproduction and development of the minority culture and 
practise their religion. The entitlment is formulated as a negative right and takes the 
form of non-discrimination. As a negative right, it entitles members of minorities to 
remedies when their freedom to participate in the cultural life of their group is curtailed 
by an action of state authorities.77 It does not aim at affording any substantive positive 
guarantees that ensure the survival of minority cultures. In international law, this 
perspective is represented by the literal and traditional understanding of Article 27 of the 
ICCPR.78 This perspective is generally in agreement with the dominant liberal 
individual rights and nation-state framework: not only that the right guaranteed is 
individual but also that it is a negative one.  
 
The other guarantee that international norms on minorities provide is what may be 
referred to as rights of protection (positive right to culture). These are rights whose 
objective is to make it possible for minorities to preserve their identity, characteristics 
and cultures, and which are often called special.79 These provide certain limited 
guarantees for minorities, whereby state authorities not only refrain from obstructing the 
                                                 
76 See United Nations Human Rights Fact Sheet No. 18 (Rev.1) Minority Rights (1998) 2-4.  
77 Like any other right, interference with the right of a person belonging to a minority to participate in the 
cultural life of the minority would not automatically entitle the person to a remedy. Often, it is generally 
where such interference is unreasonable and disproportionate that such a person would be granted a 
remedy. See Sandra Lovelace v Canada (Communication No. 24/1977) U.N. Doc . Supp. No. 40 
(A/36/40) 166 (1981) (HRC) para. 16; Ivan Kitok v Sweeden (Communication No. 197/1985) UN Doc. 
Supp. No. 40 (A/43/40) 221 (1988) (HRC) para. 9.8; Ilmari Länsman et al v Finland (Communication No. 
511/1992) UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/50/40) 66 (1992) (HRC) para 9.4; Jouni E. Länsman et al v Finland 
(Communication 671/1995) UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/52/40) 191 (1996) (HRC) para. 10.3.  
78 GA Res. 2200 A (XXI), 16 Dec. 1966. See note 26 above.   
79 See United Nations Human Rights Fact Sheet No. 18 (Rev.1) Minority Rights (1998) 4.  
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right of members of minorities to participate in the cultural life of their groups, but also 
provide certain positive or protective measures that are necessary for the enjoyment of 
that right in certain circumstances. The aim of these guarantees is to protect the culture 
of minorities in the interest of members of minorities.80 It is normally formulated as a 
positive right to culture. In its strong formulation, this right requires state authorities to 
make provisions that allow the preservation of minority cultures, such as through 
minority schools and other cultural institutions. Some of the positive guarantees under 
the 1992 UN Declaration on Minorities81 include the right of a minority to exist and the 
right to enjoy its own culture, to profess and practise its own religion, and to use its 
language. 
 
Although this constitues significant improvement towards accommodating the interests 
of minorities, the formulation is largely influenced by the dominant liberal individual 
rights and nation-state framework. Although positive in their formulation, the rights are 
often expressed in vague and highly qualified terms. The extent and nature of the state’s 
positive obligations are not sufficiently elaborated either. Most importantly, the reach of 
these positive minority guarantees, although generally in the right direction, is 
inadequate to give just satisfaction to minority needs, even with respect to their culture 
and language, let alone to secure guarantees for their political participation and self-
government. Accordingly, they do not offer sufficient guidance in relation to whether 
and under what circumstances states need to recognise minority languages for public 
purposes, including in communication between members of minorities and state 
agencies.   
   
As the subsequent chapters of this study show, in order to address adequately the issue 
of minorities in multiethnic societies in general and in Africa in particular, there is a 
need for further guarantees that go beyond the protection of minority cultures as 
articulated under the international minority rights regime. Such guarantees help 
elaborate the necessary institutional framework both for the institutional expression and 
                                                 
80 It is maintained that these rights are granted ‘to make it possible for minorities to preserve their identity, 
characteristics and traditions.’ Ibid.   
81 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities GA Res. 47/135, 18 Dec. 1992. (hereinafter the UN Declaration on Minorities). 
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affirmation of minority cultures alongside the dominant culture as defining elements of 
the character of the states to which they belong, and for the inclusion of minorities in the 
political and socio-economic processes of the state. Accordingly, this study defends a 
robust and effective system of minority rights as the basis for designing the relevant 
constitutional structures, norms and processes for accommodating the identities and 
interests of constituent minorities of the post-colonial African state, and hence for 
building a legitimate system of governance. As the analysis from normative political 
theory and the international law framework in Chapter IV shows, such a conception of 
minority rights consists of three normative pillars. The first is what Kymlicka calls ‘the 
good of cultural membership’,82 whose guaranteed access both ensures ‘for minority 
elements suitable means for the preservation of … their traditions and their national 
characteristics’83 and necessitates the institutional expression of minority cultures as 
important elements of the character of the state. The second is equality, which addresses 
the question of the relevant considerations to achieve socio-economic and political 
equality in the context of ethno-cultural diversity and disparities in the conditions of 
ethno-cultural groups or ethno-regions. Given the colonial process of the suppression of 
the freedom and independence of African societies, which led to the genesis of the issue 
of minorities in the first place, it is necessary in the African context that minority rights 
also operate as mechanisms for rectifying the political, socio-economic and cultural 
maladies that continue to affect minorities as a result of the colonial experience. 
Accordingly, the third pillar that frames the content of minority rights as defended in 
this study is self-determination. The importance of the minority rights framework 
elaborated and presented is that it is necessary in the redefinition of a legitimate system 
of governance in Africa.     
 
Against this background, in Chapter V this study elaborates how such a robust minority 
rights framework should be translated into an effective constitutional design for the 
accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity and achieving a legitimate system of 
governance. To illustrate how the relevant constitutional mechanisms, processes or 
                                                 
82 See generally W Kymlicka Liberalism, Community and Culture (1989).  
83 In its advisory opinion on the Minority Schools in Albania the PCIJ indicated that there are two 
considerations underlying the minority protection system and one of which is to ensure for the minorities 
suitable means for the preservation of their linguistic, ethnic, religious and racial characteristics. Minority 
Schools in Albania PCIJ (Ser. A/B) No. 64 (1935) 17. 
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principles and guarantees should be and are actually institutionalised, and how in 
practice they should and do operate, the study also uses as case studies the constitutional 
design of South Africa and Ethiopia, in chapters VI and VII respectively. Within the 
framework of such a conception of minority rights, it is submitted that the state is best 
conceived to be multiethnic, composed of diverse and overlapping ethno-culturally 
identifiable groups, rather than a nation-state. This acknowledges not only the existence 
of ethno-cultural diversity but also its importance in national life, not as a condition of 
division to be overcome, but as a basis of social identity to be accommodated and even 
celebrated. 
 
This is generally a controversial matter and even more so in the context of Africa. Many 
people question the need for and the validity of minority rights as a mechanism for 
addressing issues of ethno-cultural diversity and ethnic conflicts in Africa, as elsewhere. 
For some, particularly nationalist politicians, ethnicity is a divisive force that must be 
countered through state-controlled nation-building.84 For others, who see the main 
problem of the post-colonial African state as being a lack of both democracy and respect 
for human rights, problems of ethno-cultural diversity and conflicts are better addressed 
through the institutionalisation and effective implementation of democratic processes 
and individual human rights. In all these cases, problems surrounding ethno-cultural 
diversity and inequality, such as those referred to above, are treated as being capable of 
resolution without resorting to group-specific minority rights.85  
 
Some of these arguments are rooted in the view widely held during the post-colonial 
period that ethnic attachment in Africa was a product of colonial invention or a 
manifestation of tribal differences and that the only legitimate form of social 
organisation is the nation-state, with its singular national character, an ideal to which the 
                                                 
84 On the widely held view in post-colonial Africa that ethnicity was divisive and atavistic and hence 
should be eradicated see Peyi Soyinka-Airewele ‘Western Discourse and the Socio-Political Pathology of 
Ethnicity in Contemporary Africa’ in E Ike Udogu (ed.) The Issue of Political Ethnicity in Africa (2001) 
167, 176-177; on post-colonial nation-building as a response to the demands of ethnic diversity in post-
colonial Africa see Solomon A Dersso ‘Constitutional Accommodaiton of Ethno-Cultural Diversity in the 
Post-Colonial African State’ 24 (3) South African Journal on Human Rights (2008) 365.       
85 See Jack Donnelly Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (1989) 159-160; Chandran 
Kukathas ‘Are There Any Cultural Rights?’ in Will Kymlicka The Rights of Minority Cultures (1995) 
228, who advances the thesis that ‘there is no need to depart from the liberal language of individual rights 
to do justice to them (groups).’ 230.   
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post-colonial African state has actively sought to conform.86 Other arguments are 
expressions of a liberal view that has been dominant until recent times in western 
democracies and in the constitutional systems of Africa as well. While on the one hand 
this rejects the necessity of minority rights, on the other hand it expresses the fear that 
minority rights may lead to divisions and fragmentation. These concerns are not all 
without merit. As subsequent chapters will show neither the post-colonial nation-
building process nor the return to democratisation, as well as the constitutional 
recognition of human rights in Africa, would be sufficient to address the issue of 
minorities in Africa. Indeed, state-centred and homogenising nation-building, rather than 
resolving minority problems, has further entrenched the problem, leading to heightened 
ethnic rivalry and conflicts. Although fundamental, democratisation and individual 
human rights would only address the symptoms of the problem and obscure the root of 
the issue of minorities, ultimately only to postpone its resolution, if not exacerbate it 
further. While acknowledging the merits of some of the concerns, this study contends 
that in the post-colonial state, the effective resolution of the issue of minorities demands 
that democracy be reconceptualised beyond the majoritarian liberal model to 
accommodate minorities and individual human rights that are complemented by group-
specific rights.    
1.4  The implications of a minority rights framework for democratisation in 
Africa  
 
This study contends that minority rights understood as such can provide the necessary 
framework to address the claims of members of various groups for inclusion and 
accommodation in the political and socio-economic processes of the state, claims which 
in the African context are central to the issue of minorities. Clearly, these are questions 
regarding fundamental aspects of democracy, most importantly, the framework of 
representation of members of society, the process of participation in the political and 
socio-economic processes of the state, and the character of the structure and the mode of 
political decision making. These issues relate to the general question of the form that 
democracy takes in multicultural and multinational societies, not only in Africa but also 
                                                 
86 See B Davidson The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State (1992).  
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in established multiethnic democracies such as Canada.87 There are, however, more 
factors that make this question particularly critical for Africa. These include illegitimate 
state formation through the process of colonisation and its continuing effects, the high 
degree of centralisation of political power, domination of the state machinery by few, 
the emergence of patterns of exclusion and marginalisation from the processes of the 
state, and generally, the lack of a democratic culture.  
 
Generally speaking, the problem that multiculturalism in general, and in Africa in 
particular, presents as far as democracy is concerned, relates to the question of whether 
and in what ways ethno-cultural diversity and inequality should be considered in the 
political, socio-economic and cultural processes of the state.88 To put it differently, the 
question is what account should be given to ethno-cultural membership in a democracy. 
Majoritarian liberal democracy is premised on the centrality of the individual and 
majoritarian decision-making processes. Its concern is the proper relationship of the 
individual with the state. Individual rights, a majoritarian electoral system and 
organisation of political power, and political pluralism are its main features.89 It is 
further characterised by the representation of individual choices or alternating interest 
groups. In its republican form, it envisages a membership-blind political system and 
institutional organisation. Ethno-cultural groups are not recognised as having any 
political role and hence there is no political space envisaged for minorities with such 
characteristics. In relation to ethnicity, it is predicated on the unstated principle of 
separation of state and ethnic identity. Ethnic identity is a matter that is left to the 
private sphere, where the state plays neither a promotional nor inhibitive role.90 
                                                 
87 According to Plattner and Diamond ‘perhaps the most serious challenge both to the consolidation of 
new democracies and to the health of well-established ones is posed by the problem of ethnic conflict’. M 
Plattner & L Diamond ‘The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict’ (1993) 4 (4) J of Democracy 17. On the 
character of democracy and constitutionalism in multinational societies see J Tully ‘Introduction’ in AG 
Gagnon & J Tully (eds) Multicultural Democracies (2001) 1; S Tierney Constitutional Law and National 
Pluralism (2004).  
88 See generally Amy Gutman (ed) Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (1994); Will 
Kymlicka Multicultural Citiznship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (1995); Iris M Young Justice and 
the Politics of Difference (1990); M Deveaux Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice (2000); Donald 
L Horowitz Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985); Ted Robert Gurr Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk 
in the New Century (2000); with specific referene to Africa see Arthur Lewis Politics in West Africa 
(1965); Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh & Will Kymlicka (eds.) Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa (2004).  
89 See John Rawls Political Liberalism (1993).  
90 As Kymlicka put the position of such approach ‘[E]thnic identity, like religion, is something which 
people should be free to express in their private life, but which is not the concern of the state. The state 
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Majoritarian liberal democracy often leads to undemocratic results as it tends to 
perpetuate the marginalisation of minorities from decision-making.91  As will be shown 
in Chapter III, liberal democracy understood in these terms has not been adequate for 
addressing the claims of members of minorities for representation and effective 
participation, and more generally for real socio-economic, cultural and political equality 
in the multiethnic societies of the post-colonial African state. In the African context, as 
witnessed at the time of and subsequent to independence and during the post-1990 
period, democracy in its majoritarian form is prone to lead to a zero sum game of 
winner-takes-all, in which the members of many groups, particularly marginalised ones, 
would continue to be excluded and ethnic rivalry and conflicts are perpetuated.  
 
The framework of minority rights adopted in this study entails and envisages a type of 
democracy that can be broadly termed as multicultural democracy. In some ways, this is 
akin to ‘consociational democracy as proposed by scholars such as Arend Lijphart92, and 
with specific reference to Africa, W Arthur Lewis.93 It is, however, more in line with 
multicultural theorists such as Will Kymlicka,94 Iris Marion Young,95 James Tully96 and 
Monique Deveaux,97 among others, who maintain that democracy based on majority 
rule and individual rights would not offer proper mechanisms to determine just 
appropriation of societal (constitutional) goods among individuals belonging to different 
groups. Indeed, many political thinkers concluded that it has led to injustice to members 
of minority groups.98 Its reliance on individual rights does not leave space for groups 
that seek state recognition of their distinct culture and for them to take part and have a 
say in political decision-making, not just as citizens but as members of particular groups 
                                                                                                                                               
does not oppose the freedom of people to express their particular cultural attachments, but nor does it 
nurture such expression-rather, as Glazer elsewhere put it, the state responds with ‘salutary neglect.’ W 
Kymlicka ‘Introduction” in Will Kymlicka (eds.) The Rights of Minority Cultures (1995) 9.     
91 See Lewis  (note 88 above).  
92 See A Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies (1977); Democracies: Patterns Of Majoritarian And 
Consensus Government In The Twenty-One Century (1984)   
93 Lewis (note 88 above).   
94 Kymlicka (note 88 above).  
95 Young (note 88 above).  
96 J Tully Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (1995).  
97 Deveaux (note 88 above). 
98 Young (note 88 above); Deveaux Ibid, J Räikkä ‘Is a Membership-Blind Model of Justice False by 
Definition?’ in J Räikkä (ed) Do We Need Minority Rights? (1996) 3-19.  
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as well.99 This would mean that democracy based on majority rule would create a 
problem in multiethnic societies in so far as it fails to accommodate the ‘group-specific 
rights’ of minorities. In such societies, strict adherence to individual-centred democracy 
would in effect mean the perpetuation of the marginalisation of non-dominant groups 
and of prevailing ethno-cultural inequality.  
     
The multicultural model not only recognises diversity, but also requires the provision of 
mechanisms that facilitate the representation of members of the diverse groups in the 
political process and the creation of structures for the self-government of territorially 
concentrated minorities.100 Accordingly, not only does it seek to treat members of 
various groups with equal concern and respect regarding their cultural commitments, but 
it also institutionalises guarantees for their inclusion and effective participation in the 
political decision-making processes of the state. It operates on the basis of deliberation 
(in which all interested parties including members of minorities are guaranteed 
representation and fair hearing), negotiations and reciprocity, thus empowering 
minorities to have a wider role in the decision-making process.101 The specific structures 
and principles which would underpin this institutional application are outlined in 
chapters V, VI and VII.  
 
The implication of minority rights as defended in this study is therefore that any exercise 
in democratising the state in Africa must provide sufficient mechanisms for ensuring 
participation and representation of all minorities and where necessary, for recognising 
their self-government or autonomy. The nature of ethnic diversity in Africa, as 
examined in Chapter II, is such that democracy can enable all members of the 
constituent ethnic groups of the post-colonial African state to feel that they are justly 
included and accommodated in the political and socio-economic processes of the state, 
only if it provides specific institutional guarantees to ensure that members of all groups 
take part and have their say in political decision-making on an equitable basis. 
                                                 
99 Deveaux (note 88 above) 147.  
100 See generally Allan Gagnon and James Tully (eds) Multicultural Democracies (2001); Young (note 88 
above) 185; Tully (note 96 above) 3-4; Deveaux (note 88 above); Kymlicka (note 88 above).   
101 See Young (note 88 above); M . S Williams ‘The Uneasy Alliance of Group Representation and 
Deliberative Democracy’ in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (eds) Citizenship in Diverse Societies 
(2000) 124; S Wheatley ‘Deliberative Democracy and Minorities’ 14 (3) European Journal of 
Internaitonal Law (2003) 507.  
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Accordingly, the study proposes and employs the framework of robust minority rights as 
a foundation in redefining the system of political representation and the internal power 
structure of the post-colonial African state.  
 
The argument that supports this proposition is that it is only if members of all the 
various ethno-cultural groups constituting the post-colonial African state are given 
representation and inclusion, that they can have just opportunities in the political and 
socio-economic processes of the state to which they belong. This acknowledges that the 
recognition and inclusion of members of various groups in the democratic process is a 
necessary condition for addressing the threat of or marginalisation of some groups and 
the resultant conflicts, as well as the persistent illegitimacy of the structure of the 
African state.102  
 
This implies two things in relation to the existing basic structure of most post-colonial 
African states. First, as will be shown in chapters II and IV, the basic structure103 of the 
these states lacks legitimacy,104 and the issue of minorities is a manifestation and 
product of the crisis of legitimacy of the African state. Secondly, and more importantly, 
the framework of minority rights as elaborated and defended in this study offers a basis 
for conceptualising a democratic structure that is capable of accommodating the 
interests and identities of minorities and thereby reshaping the nature of the post-
colonial African state.    
 
Clearly, the issue is the form that democracy should take in Africa. There is no question 
here that democracy and the institutionalisation of human rights are the proper 
institutional system to best address the issue of minorities.105 Democracy cherishes 
                                                 
102 The form in which such a system is to be devised is a central issue that this study will pursue later on. 
103 This term is used in the sense defined by Rawls as ‘a society’s main political, social, and economic 
institutions, and how they fit together into one unified system of social cooperation from one generation to 
the next.’ Rawls (note 89 above) 11.  
104 See Mutua (note 13 above); OC Okafor Re-Defining Legitimate Statehood: International Law and 
State Fragmentation in Africa (2000); CR Ezetah ‘Legitimate Governance and Statehood in Africa: 
Beyond the Failed State and Colonial-Self-determination’ in EK Quashigah & OC Okafor (eds) 
Legitimate Governance in Africa: International and Domestic Legal Perspectives (1999) 15; Abdulahi 
(note 13 above).  
105 Writing on human rights and democracy in Africa, Sidgi Kaballo remarked that ‘only a democratic 
order which takes human rights seriously will be capable of avoiding or resolving ethnic conflict’ S 
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diversity and offers the necessary framework for pursuing issues of equity and social 
justice.106 Its provision for realising the enjoyment of human rights by all and the rule of 
law and constitutionalism is beyond reproach. The importance of democracy as the 
requisite political system for the protection of minorities is clearly spelt out by the 
OSCE member states as follows:         
 
The participating states recognize that the questions relating to national minorities can only be 
satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework based on the rule of law, with a 
functioning independent judiciary. This framework guarantees full respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, equal rights and status for all citizens, the free expression of all their 
legitimate interests and aspirations, political pluralism, social tolerance and the implementation 
of legal rules that place effective restraints on the abuse of governmental power.107 
 
This study fully shares these views. For democracy to work in addressing minority 
issues it is necessary that it provides institutional mechanisms and measures for the 
accommodation of minorities.108  
1.5 Methodology of the Study  
 
Although this is mainly a legal study, its approach is a multidisciplinary one. 
Accordingly, it relies on more than one method. For the legal component, a legal 
method is employed. This method relies on analysis and construction of primary sources 
such as relevant international instruments, cases and national laws. This is supported by 
secondary sources from published academic and research works. The main purpose of 
this is to examine how the issue of minorities is addressed in international law and the 
constitutional practice of states, as well as to identify and elaborate the relevant 
                                                                                                                                               
Kaballo ‘Human Rights and Democratization in Africa’ in D Beetham (ed) Politics and Human Rights 
(1995) 189,  192.  
106 What makes democracy instrumental for managing issues involving minorities are its qualities of 
‘inclusiveness, pluralism and its sensitivity to uniqueness or diversity, along with the bargaining, coalition 
building, and political learning it spawns.’ See PC Aka ‘Nigeria: The Need For An Effective Policy of 
Ethnic Reconciliation in the New Century’ 14 Temp. Int & Comparative LJ (2000) 351.   
107 Copenhagen Meeting as note 81 above para. 30. In his Study for Peaceful and Constructive Solutions 
to Problems involving Minorities, Special Rapporteur Asbjon Eide indicated that full democracy and the 
rule of law form the basis of any effort to solve minority problems. U.N Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/43 
(1991) 6.  
108 See Asbjorn Eide ‘In search of Constructive Alternatives to Secession’ in Christian Tomschout 
Modern Law of self-determination (1993) 139 arguing that ‘democracy cannot fully safeguard the 
concerns of minorities’ at 155.  
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constitutional guarantees and institutional arrangements necessary for achieving the 
accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity within the post-colonial African state.    
 
Materials from the social sciences including history, political science, sociology and 
philosophy are accessed from various secondary sources, including journal articles, 
books, internet sources and relevant reports. They are used in this study in different 
ways, both to understand and analyse the problem and to develop the relevant 
constitutional guarantees and institutional arrangements. Accordingly, the resources 
from these materials will help to examine the historical and socio-political processes that 
led to the issue of minorities and establish the nature of ethno-cultural diversity in 
Africa. Those resources from political science and philosophy are particularly valuable 
in discussing the normative bases by reference to which the various dimensions of the 
issue of minorities can be analysed and the necessary constitutional guarantees and 
institutional arrangements can be identified and defended. They are also important in 
helping to identify and understand the various political, social and cultural factors that 
affect the operation of the constitutional guarantees and arrangements defended in this 
study as the defining elements of an adequate constitutional design for the 
accommodation of diversity.  
 
Finally, to illustrate how the proposed constitutional design should be and is actually 
translated into specific norms, processes and institutions and to exemplify how it should 
and does operate, the study uses the constitutional models of South Africa and Ethiopia. 
These two case studies are chosen for different reasons. The first and main reason is that 
of all the countries that introduced constitutional reform during the so-called second 
liberation of Africa, these are arguably the only ones that deliberately provided 
comprehensive mechanisms for the accommodation of diversity. The second reason is 
that the constitutions of these two countries employ two different approaches, 
representing two different models of accommodation of diversity. The last reason is 
personal familiarity with these two countries: Ethiopia being my country of origin and 
South Africa the place where I have been pursing my postgraduate studies.        
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1.6 Outline of Chapters  
 
In the following chapter, (Chapter II) two issues are investigated. The first is the 
historical, socio-economic and political processes that led to the issue of minorities in 
Africa. In this regard, it will be argued that the issue of minorities is inseparably linked 
to the making of the African state and the way this has historically defined the 
relationship of members of various groups with the state. The other issue addressed in 
this chapter is the question of the nature and types of claims to which the issue of 
minorities has given rise. Here, the study identifies four types of minority claims. The 
first is the claim for the recognition and provision of public space for the expression of 
the culture and language of groups. The second is expressed by the struggle or conflict 
between various groups in relation to taking part and having a say in the processes of the 
state. The third is the claim for achieving self-government. Finally, there is also the 
claim of highly marginalised minorities for the recognition of their distinct identity, for 
their socio-economic and political inclusion and sometimes for special measures to 
rectify their historical oppression or marginalisation.  
 
Chapter III deals with the approach of the post-colonial African state to the issue of 
minorities. The purpose of this is to investigate the limits of first, the nation-state model 
of post-colonial nation building and second, the dominant liberal nation-state 
constitutional model to address the issue of minorities in Africa. It is argued that in the 
particular conditions of ethno-cultural diversity and inequality that is characteristic of 
the population makeup of the post-colonial African state, the issue of minorities cannot 
be addressed on the basis of a national project that suppresses the ethno-cultural 
attachments of people and a difference-blind constitutional system that is inhospitable to 
group membership claims.   
 
In Chapter IV, the study examines and elaborates a robust minority rights framework by 
reference to which the mechanisms and guarantees for constitutional accommodation of 
ethno-cultural diversity are to be identified. It is proposed here that a robust minority 
rights framework that defines the basis for constitutional recognition and 
accommodation of diversity in Africa should have three components. The first is culture. 
The discussion on culture seeks to establish the moral and legal basis for recognising the 
 35 
importance of culture and the particular claims that can be addressed within the 
framework of culture. The second component of the minority rights framework 
defended in this study is equality. This helps to identify the conditions that necessitate 
the recognition of ethnic membership in determining the organisation and distribution of 
political power and socio-economic goods and opportunities in the multiethnic African 
state. The third and final component is self-determination. Self-determination captures 
the historical and political processes that led to the issue of minorities and offers a 
framework for substantiating the institutionalisation of self-government structures and 
the recognition of the interests of peripheral minorities, such as indigenous peoples, over 
the land and resources to which they have cultural and socio-economic attachment. 
 
Chapter V seeks to outline the institutional mechanisms and constitutional guarantees 
through which the minority rights framework elaborated in Chapter V can be 
institutionalised. In other words, this chapter elaborates the structures, processes and 
principles that institutionalise multicultural democracy in Africa.   
 
Chapters VI and VII consist of the case studies of South Africa and Ethiopia 
respectively. These case studies are used to exemplify how the institutional 
arrangements and constitutional guarantees elaborated in Chapter V are and should be 
translated into constitutional design for the accommodation of diversity and how they 
should and actually do operate in practice. They also help to substantiate the argument 
of the thesis that addressing the issue of minorities in Africa requires the constitutional 
recognition and accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity.   
 
Chapter VIII outlines the findings of the study and provides some general conclusions, 
observations and recommendations.  
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CHAPTER II  
 
The issue of minorities in Africa: Describing its context and understanding its 
nature 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter has two objectives. As the introductory chapter of this study indicates, the 
issue of minorities in Africa is a reflection of the legitimacy of the post-colonial state, its 
stability, and its level of democratisation. To understand why this issue occupies such a 
central place in Africa’s quest for justice, peace and democracy, one needs to examine 
the nature of the phenomenon of minorities in Africa, and the political and historical 
processes and circumstances that led to its genesis. The first aim of this chapter is thus 
to outline the historical, ethno-cultural and political context of the issue of minorities in 
Africa.  
 
The determination of the design of the necessary constitutional processes and 
mechanisms best suited to address the issue of minorities in Africa largely depends upon 
an understanding of the nature and various types of claims that minorities make.1 The 
other task of this chapter is accordingly to identify and articulate the nature of those 
claims. In this regard, although it is acknowledged that the issue of minorities varies 
from country to country and from one group to another, minority claims in many ways 
share common themes, on the basis of which they are categorised and elaborated in this 
chapter.  
 
2.2 The nature and genesis of ethno-cultural diversity in Africa  
 
 
One of the features of the state in Africa is its deep ethnic diversity. This is not to say 
that ethnic diversity is unique to Africa. Indeed, it is a feature common to many 
                                                 
1 As Thio rightly observes, ‘The understanding of “minorities” and the nature of minority problems will 
color a determination of what solutions are appropriate. In this regard, it is important to consider the 
different situations encountered by minorities.’ Li-ann Thio ‘Battling Balkanization: Regional Approaches 
Towards Minority Protection Beyond Europe’ (2002) 43 Summer Harvard Int LJ  409, 411.  
 37 
countries worldwide.2 But the state in Africa is unique in both the degree and nature of 
its diversity. Although the number of ethnic groups in Africa is not exactly known, if the 
estimated number of languages spoken in Africa is anything to go by, the continent’s 54 
countries are home to about 2 000 distinct ethnic groups.3 Almost all African states thus 
exhibit rich linguistic, cultural and religious diversity. Comparatively speaking, African 
states are home to more ethnic groups than other states in most parts of the world.4  
Except for Somalia and, to a lesser extent, Lesotho, virtually every African country is 
composed of more than one ethnic group.5 Notably, one of the characteristics of the 
multi-ethnic composition of these states is the presence of a large number of different 
ethnic groups. Some African states are, however, more diverse than others. Nigeria is 
composed of more than 250 ethnic groups.6 Sudan,7 Chad8 and Cameroon9 each have 
more than 200 ethnic groups. Many other African states are home to many ethnic 
groups, ranging from little more than a dozen, as in the case of South Africa,10 to more 
than 100, as in the case of Tanzania.11 Countries with half a dozen or less ethnic groups 
are in the minority. These include almost all of northern African states, as well as 
Djibouti, Rwanda and Burundi. The observation that ‘the African states south of the 
Sahara are more ethnically diverse than those in other regions’12 reflects this reality.  
2.2.1 The pre-colonial background  
 
                                                 
2 There are about 8 000 distinct cultural groups inhabiting the more than 190 independent countries of the 
world. See A Addis ‘On Human Diversity and the Limits of Toleration’ in I Shapiro & W Kymlicka (eds) 
Ethnicity and Group Rights (1997) 112.  
3 See A Lodhi ‘The Language Situation in Africa Today’ (1993) 2(1) Nordic J of African Studies 79, 81. 
4 See C Legum ‘Africa’s Quest for Nationhood and Stability’ in Black Africa Twenty-Five Years After 
Independence: Lessons for the Future Africa Institute of South Africa, Conference (1985) 17.  
5 Ninety-nine per cent of the population of Lesotho is composed of the Sotho ethnic group. See C 
Dammers & D Sogge ‘Central and Southern Africa’ in World Directory of Minorities (1997) 494. 
Although Somalis constitute one ethnic group, they are divided along clan lines. Since 1991 these 
divisions have led to the collapse of the Somalian state, with inter-clan warfare involving various warlords 
who have been exercising control over different parts of its territory. For a succinct account of the conflict 
in Somalia see R Cornwell ‘Somalia: Fourteenth Time Lucky?’ (April 2004) ISS Occasional Paper 87.  
6 J Maxted & A Zegeye ‘North and Central Africa’ World Directory of Minorities (note 5 above) 405-408.  
7 See RK Hitchcock ‘Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples in Africa and Asia’ in DP Forsythe & PC 
McMahon (eds) Human Rights and Diversity (2003) 209.  
8 Maxted & Zegeye (note 6 above).  
9 Dammers & Sogge (note 5 above) 479.  
10 The 11 official languages and the San and Koi languages listed in Section 6 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 more or less reflect the ethnic makeup of South Africa.  
11 See RE Howard Human Rights in Common Wealth Africa (1986) 97.  
12 TR Gurr Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (1993) 225.  
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The diversity of the modern African state can be traced back to the pre-colonial period. 
Before the advent of European colonialism in Africa, there were many societies, mostly 
bound by kinship ties. There were almost as many traditional societies in Africa as the 
number of the ethno-cultural groups that inhabit the post-colonial African state today. 
These were historically evolved societies that possessed their own culture and language. 
They inhabited smaller territories than most distinguishable groups do today, and had 
mostly smaller population size. According to Mutua, ‘a feature common to all pre-
colonial African societies was their ethnic, cultural and linguistic homogeneity – a trait 
that gave them fundamental cohesion.’13  
 
Africa’s pre-colonial societies, regarded by many as national societies,14 had different 
historical experiences, political traditions and social structures.15 Following Busia Jr’s 
classification and Wilson’s typology of African pre-colonial societies in terms of their 
socio-political structures and historical experiences, one can identify four patterns of 
socio-political organisation.16  
First, there were communities with their own pre-colonial states in the form of empires 
or kingdoms.17 These had their own state-like political system centred on a culturally 
identifiable core group. They possessed centralised political structures involving 
administration, law-making and enforcement. In these societies, people had a common 
sense of belonging and of sharing one system of government, even if they were not 
                                                 
13 MW Mutua ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language 
of Duties’ (1995) 35 Virginia J Int L 339, 347. Some of those with highly centralised political structures 
were, however, constituted by more than one ethnic community, but possessed a strong core ethnic group 
or shared a common religion.  
14 See, for example, B Davidson The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State 
(1992) 75. 
15 As Wilson pointed out, ‘[p]recolonial African societies exhibited great diversity, comprising city states 
and self-governing villages alongside sizable nations with distinctive political structures.’ HS Wilson The 
Imperial Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa Since 1870 (1977) 24.  
16 For further analysis of the nature of these formations and their human rights implications in present-day 
Africa see NKA Busia, Jr ‘The Status of Human Rights in Pre-Colonial Africa: Implications for 
Contemporary Practices’ in E McCarthy-Arnolds et al (eds) Africa, Human Rights and the Global System: 
The Political Economy of Human Rights in a Changing World (1994) 225-250.  
17 Examples of groups in this category include, among others, the Buganda, Ashanti, AmaZulu, Bakongo, 
Mossi etc. See OC Okafor Re-Defining Legitimate Statehood: International Law and State Fragmentation 
in Africa (2002) 23.  
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ethno-culturally homogenous.18 At the advent of colonialism, some were in the process 
of developing important characteristics to become nation-states.19 In Wilson’s typology, 
these are referred to as communities with a history of imperial structures of varying 
durability.20  
The second category consists of communities of smaller size and territorial jurisdiction. 
These were more homogenous communities with centralised and hierarchical socio-
political structures and traditions. They constituted polities having chiefdoms and 
kingdoms of various kinds.21 The socio-political organisation of most groups in this 
category was centralised and hierarchical, which provided their individual members 
with a shared sense of belonging.  
The third category of groups consists of those with decentralised social and political 
structures.22 Their political units constituted no more than loose village alliances.23 They 
had egalitarian social formations, where political and social relationships were 
essentially horizontal, while allowing village elders a degree of leadership. In these 
societies, age grades were very central to the organisation of society and village elders 
therefore held the centre stage of political authority.24  
There are also groups that fall outside of Wilson’s typology. These are what Busia Jr 
called non-settled nomadic polities – hunters and gatherers or cattle herders leading a 
pre-modern way of life with no identifiable political structure.25 In these societies, the 
                                                 
18 Formations that exemplify this include the Lunda of Angola, the Fulani kingdoms and the Abyssinai 
kingdom in Ethiopia.  
19 The case of Ashanti of Ghana aptly illustrates this. According to Davidson, ‘it was manifestly a national 
state on its way towards becoming a nation-state with every attribute ascribed to a west European nation-
state’ Davidson (note 14 above) 76. The same is true of the Buganda of Uganda and the Bakongo of 
Angola.  
20 See Wilson (note 15 above) 97. 
21 Examples in this category include the Ankole and Toro of Uganda, the Hausa and Niger Delta states of 
what is now Nigeria, the Akan states of Ghana, and the Tswana, Ndebele, Sotho, Xhosa etc of southern 
Africa. See CA Diop Pre-colonial Black Africa (1987) 89-92; Wilson (note 15 above) 97. 
22 These are, according to Davidson, ‘segmentary societies’ where delegation of power to chiefly persons 
was limited, minimal or nonexistent. Davidson (note 14 above) 86.  
23 Examples include the Lou, Oromo, Igbo, Nuer, Ebrie, Tallensi, Kikuyu, Akamba, Igbo etc. See Busia, 
Jr (note 16 above) 232. In Wilson’s typology these were stateless societies which were divided into small 
village units. Wilson (note 15 above) 97.  
24 See Busia, Jr (note 16 above) 232-233.  
25 Ibid.  
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idea of organised political structure was the least developed, and their members were 
barely conscious of belonging to a distinct community.26  
Apart from differences in their political traditions, these constituent ethnic communities 
of African states additionally differed in their lifestyle and mode of livelihood, as they 
do today. Whereas some are pastoralists, many others practise sedentary agriculture. 
There are also scores of hunter-gatherer groups in many African states.  
2.2.2 Colonialism: The emergence of new patterns of relations  
 
Colonisation completely changed the map of Africa. One of the lasting legacies of the 
brutal conquest of Africa by European colonial powers was the partition of the continent 
into various colonial units. At the notorious Berlin Conference of 1884-85, the colonial 
African state was established within borders that were contrived on the basis of a 
combination of negotiation among colonial powers, reference to geographic features and 
resort to simple geometrical lines.27  
 
One of the most distinctive features of this process of the radical imposition of the 
colonial state was that many of the various pre-colonial societies were forcibly 
amalgamated under the same political unit and others were sliced and placed into 
different units. This totally interrupted the autonomous development of these societies 
and, depriving them of their independence, subjected them to the authority of an alien 
political structure: the colonial state. Regarding the nature and effect of the colonial 
boundaries, Lewis rightly notes that: 
[T]he colonial frontiers rarely followed tribal boundaries; and even when they did, grouped 
together different tribes and language groups with little regard for ethnographic niceties. Each 
European Colony was thus typically a mosaic of peoples, many of whom had previously little 
                                                 
26 As one report on the pygmies of central Africa states, ‘[t]he traditional power structure of representative 
institutions is entirely foreign to pygmy society, as hierarchy is not necessarily a dominant feature of 
pygmy clans’. IRIN News In-Depth Report Minorities under Siege: Pygmies Today in Africa (April 2006) 
12 (hereinafter IRIN In-Depth).  
27 See I Brownlie African Boundaries: Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopedia (1979) 6. 
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knowledge of, or contact with those other communities with whom they were now inseparably 
associated under a common destiny.28  
From the perspective of this study, one important consequence of the making of the 
African state by colonial fiat is the conglomeration within the same political unit of 
large numbers of culturally divergent, socio-politically and numerically unequal ethno-
cultural communities. This gave the African state what Nwabueze calls ‘staggering 
ethnic plurality’29 involving in some cases hundreds of communities, some of which had 
a history of animosity and conflict.30  
In political terms, the effect of the amalgamation of such numerically and socio-
politically unequal groups under the colonial state was unequal patterns of relations 
between the groups and the state, and among the groups themselves. While some of the 
groups adapted to the colonial state and were relatively well integrated into it, others 
were ignored by the colonial powers and excluded from the process. In the development 
process, this led to some groups being integrated into, and others marginalised from, the 
economy of the state. In East Africa, for example, those groups who were mainly 
cultivators and adopted sedentary agriculture after contact with the colonial powers 
came to constitute the mainstream population of the post-colonial states of the region. 31 
This pattern was directly inherited by the post-colonial states. As the economy of the 
post-colonial state has invariably been structured in a way that privileges crop 
production, including cash crops, state development policies have prioritised sedentary 
agriculture while neglecting other traditional modes of livelihood such as pastoralism, 
animal herding, hunting and gathering.  
 
The agglomeration of such distinct and unequal groups within the same political unit 
under the colonial-state system simultaneously forced increased interactions between 
members of those groups that were relatively well integrated into the new political 
order. Not only did this bring ethnic self-consciousness to the fore as a necessary 
                                                 
28 IM Lewis ‘The Tribal Factor in Contemporary Africa’ in C Legum & J Drysdale (eds) Africa: 
Contemporary Record 1969-1970 (1971) A 13.  
29 B Nwabueze Constitutional Democracy in Africa Vol. 5 (2004) 298.  
30 Howard (note 11 above) 93; Okafor (note 17 above) 25. 
31 See J Ngugi ‘The Decolonization-Modernization Interface and the Plight of Indigenous Peoples in Post-
Colonial Development Discourses in Africa’ (2002) 20 Wisconsin Int L J 279, 324.  
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element in the processes of the state, but it also set the stage for rivalry.32 The result was 
‘more pronounced cleavages between groups which have given rise to lasting patterns of 
tension in the postcolonial times.’33  
It was not merely the amalgamation of culturally distinct and politically and socio-
economically unequal groups, and the resultant inequality, that led to the genesis of the 
issue of minorities in Africa. The colonial state, as part of its system of control known as 
divide and rule, institutionalised unequal patterns of relations among members of 
various groups horizontally, and between particular groups and the state vertically. This 
system ranked members of various groups differently as ‘advantaged’ or 
‘disadvantaged’ based on their ethnic membership. As L Adel Jinadu puts it: 
This asymmetrical stratification system fractured or differentiated citizenship in many colonial 
territories, in such a way that it facilitated (for privileged ethnic groups) or constricted (for 
underprivileged ethnic groups) access to the state and its resources, in the public services, in 
commerce, trade and industry, in the judicial system and administration of justice …34  
 
The nature of the administration of the colonial state, more particularly its economic 
processes, also led to the creation of new patterns of inequality among members of the 
various ethno-cultural groups. This mainly related to the uneven distribution by the 
colonial state of the goods of modernisation, such as education, jobs in the colonial 
administration and infrastructure development. As a result, while some enjoyed access 
to education and employment opportunities, acquired skills in the running of European 
institutions and hence achieved higher levels of political and socio-economic 
integration, many others had only limited access, and some were totally excluded.  
 
                                                 
32As G Selassie argued, this is partly because the ‘juxtaposition of two or more ethnic groups in the same 
political environment often results in each group attempting to disaffirm the other politically’. AG 
Selassie ‘Ethnic Identity and Constitutional Design for Africa’ (1992-93) Fall 29 (1) Stanford J of Int Law 
1, 9. It is not, however, the mere existence of different groups within one political system that produces 
the rivalry. The problem arises where this is accompanied by the absence of an agreed-upon democratic 
framework for mutual benefit and coexistence among the constituent groups within a polity, hence 
opening the state up for grabs by any of the groups. See A Eide ‘Minority Situations: In Search of 
Peaceful and Constructive solutions’ 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. (1991) 1311, 1321.  
33 D Rothchild ‘Reconfiguring State-Ethnic Relations in Africa: Liberalization and the Search for New 
Routines of Interaction’ in P Lewis (ed) Africa: Dilemmas of Development and Change (1998) 215.  
34 LA Jinadu Explaining and Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Towards a Cultural Theory of 
Democracy Claude Ake Memorial Papers No 1 (2007) 15.  
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Moreover, as its main purpose was advancing the economic goals of the relevant 
colonial power, the state was run in a way that resulted in an uneven distribution of 
economic advantages. As a result, peoples living in areas that served as centres of 
economic activity and administration ‘were exposed to greater administrative intensity, 
more commercial activity, and more active missionary and education presence’35 than 
peoples in peripheral areas. Such is the case, for example, with respect to the coastal 
areas of West Africa and the mining lands of southern Africa and the DRC, as well as 
the coastal areas and farm lands of East Africa.36 This resulted in unequal access to 
economic resources and modern social goods among the various constituent groups and 
regions of African states, further accentuating the already existing cleavages occasioned 
by the amalgamation of groups without regard to their historical, cultural and socio-
political differences. The effect has been to intensify rivalry and ‘tension between ethno-
regions that were advantaged by close contact with western education, infrastructural 
improvement, and agricultural and industrial development and those in the hinterland 
that remained neglected.’37  
 
2.2.3 Patterns of ethno-cultural diversity bequeathed to the post-colonial 
state  
2.2.3.1 States with a majority group  
Although there is no up-to-date and reliable official population census on the ethnic 
composition of most African states, examination of secondary sources suggests that only 
about one fifth have a numerically dominant majority group.38 In some of these states, 
the largest group constitutes only a bare majority. This is, for example, the case in Niger 
                                                 
35 D Welsh ‘Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (1996) 72 Int Affairs 479.  
36 See details D Horowitz Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985) 151-156.  
37 Rothchild (note 33 above) 215. 
38 Of these many are northern African states, such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco – each 
of which, except Algeria and Morocco where Berbers constitute twenty one and thirty seven per cent 
respectively, has a majority group that accounts for more than ninety per cent of the population. In 
Swaziland and Seychelles, Swazis and Creole respectively account for more than ninety per cent, in 
Rwanda and Burundi Hutus constitute about eighty five per cent, and in Equatorial Guinea the Fang 
ethnic group makes up eighty to ninety per cent of the population. In the others the majority fall in a range 
from a little more than fifty per cent, as in the case of the Hausa of Niger or Issa of Djibouti, to about 
seventy seven per cent in the case of the Shona of Zimbabwe. Botswana is another country with dominant 
majority, the Tswana, who comprise more than sixty per cent of the total population. The data employed 
here is collected from CIA World Fact Book 2005 <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook> 
accessed on 25 July 2006 and the general information available at 
<http://www.library.uu.nl/wesp/populstat/Africa/algeriag.htm> accessed on 25 July 2006.  
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and Djibouti.39 In most cases, the numerically minority groups are numerous and 
diverse.40  
There are differences among these states in the nature of the relationship between the 
majority group and minorities. From this perspective, one can identify two classes of 
states: those with a single numerically and politically dominant group, and those with 
two numerically large and politically contending groups. Botswana,41 Egypt,42 Algeria 
and Morocco43 are among the single-group-dominated states, where the majority group 
enjoys an established dominant position and hence is generally in effective control of 
the state. In these states, minority groups are generally in a precarious situation, faced 
with the danger of discrimination, assimilation and domination.44  
Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Burundi exemplify states with two large and contending 
groups. In Zimbabwe, there has been a history of rivalry for political power between the 
majority Shona and the Ndebele, who constitute the largest minority. Other minorities, 
including the Shangaan, Venda and Tonga, are ‘at the political and geographical 
margins outside the Shona-Ndebele polarity’.45 Rwanda and Burundi manifest a history 
of genocidal strife and deep ethnic animosity between the majority Hutu and the 
dominant minority Tutsi. The Tua, the smallest minority group in these two countries, 
are generally outside of the Hutu-Tutsi rivalry and constitute the most marginalised and 
vulnerable section of society. In these states the majority has not established itself as 
                                                 
39 In Niger, the majority Housa people form only a little more than half of the total population. See Niger 
CIA World Fact Book 2006 <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook> accessed on 27 July 2006; A 
Neef ‘Ethnic Groups in Niger’ in GP Lawrence & M von Oppen (eds) Adapted Farming in West Africa: 
Issues, Potentials and Perspectives (2000). The Isa of Djibouti account for about sixty per cent of the total 
population. See PJ Schraeder ‘Ethnic Politics in Djibouti: From “Eye of the Hurricane” to “Boiling 
cauldron”’ (1993) 92 African Affairs 203.  
40 Such is, for example, the case with respect to Zimbabwe, Botswana and Niger.  
41 See JS Solway ‘Reaching the Limits of Universal Citizenship: “Minority” Struggles in Botswana’ in B 
Berman et al (eds) Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa (2004) 129-147. In Botswana such minorities as the 
Kalanga, BaKgalagadi and the Basarwa, comprising seven, five and three per cent respectively, have 
experienced various degrees of exclusion, the Basarwa being the most disadvantaged of all. See Dammers 
& Sogge (note 5 above) 474-475.  
42 See Maxted & Abebe Zegeye (note 6 above) 405-408.  
43 See section on ethno-cultural minorities below.  
44 These are groups who are in a similar situation to what Kymlicka calls national minorities. He describes 
the circumstances underlying their vulnerability: ‘[T]he viability of their societal cultures may be 
undermined by economic and political decisions made by the majority. They could be outbid or outvoted 
on resources and policies that are crucial to the survival of their societal cultures.’ W Kymlicka 
Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (1995) 109.  
45 See Dammers & Sogge (note 5 above) 530; see further M Sithole ‘Ethnicity and Democratization in 
Zimbabwe’ in H Glickman (ed) Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa (1995) 121-160.  
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being in effective control of the state system. As a result, its relationship with the 
minority is best characterised as having been one of rivalry for control of the state 
machinery. However, in Zimbabwe, although it has caused intermittent tensions and 
violence, this rivalry has not led to the kinds of catastrophic conflicts and civil wars that 
it induced in Rwanda and Burundi.  
2.2.3.2 States of minorities  
In most African states, there is no single majority group. These states are all inhabited 
by many different groups, each comprising less than half of the total population. There 
are, however, wide differences among the groups constituting these states in terms of 
population size and power relations.  
The groups constituting these states vary widely in terms of population size. Many of 
these states are composed of a few numerically dominant groups and numerous other 
smaller groups. The population sizes range from many millions, as in the cases of the 
Hausa, the Buganda, the Ashanti and the Oromo, to some thousands, as in the case of 
the Zemi.46 While the few large groups account for somewhere in the range of 20 to 45 
per cent of the total populations of the states to which they belong, the large number of 
smaller groups contribute about ten per cent or less each. In Nigeria, the Hausa-Fulani, 
Yoruba and Igbo account for 29, 20 and 17 per cent of the population respectively. 
Similarly, in Ethiopia, the Amharas, Oromos and Tigreans together form more than 66 
per cent of the total population. The Fang in Gabon; the Kongo, Sangha, Mboshi, and 
Teke in the Republic of Congo; and the Baya, Banda and Mandiji in the Central African 
Republic enjoy a numerically dominant position. Similar demographic trends exist in 
other countries, such as Kenya, Angola, Zambia and Malawi.47  
Most importantly, the various groups differ in terms of political influence and access to 
resources, and degree of inclusion in the socio-cultural framework of the state. 
Generally speaking, in these states no one particular group has achieved an established 
                                                 
46 JS Wunsch ‘Foundations of Centralization: The Colonial Experience and the African Context’ in JS 
Wunsch & D Olowu (eds) The Failure of the Centralized State: Institutions and Self-Governance in 
Africa (1990) 34. 
47 The data  employed  here  is  collected  from  CIA  World  Factbook  2005  available  at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>  accessed  on  25  July  2006and  the  general information available at <http://www.library.uu.nl/wesp/populstat/Africa/algeriag.htm> accessed 
on 25 July 2006 
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political or socio-economic dominance. With no agreed upon and inclusive political 
processes, the constituent groups in most of these states have been in constant rivalry for 
a share of political power and access to resources. In many of these states, such as 
Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Angola etc, the larger groups are generally at the centre of this 
struggle. Often the smaller groups are either drawn into this rivalry or, in most cases, 
remain at the periphery of the political and economic processes of the state, which are 
dominated by the struggle of the large contending groups. Where any one of the 
contending groups or a coalition of some of them takes power, it puts the machinery of 
the state to the service of their own interests. Members of other groups are often left out 
of the political and socio-economic structures. Those that (have been perceived to) pose 
a threat to the political elite in power, as in Liberia under Samuel Doe, have often been 
subject to repression through arbitrary arrest, torture and intimidation of their leaders, 
and, in the worst cases, mass killings and massacres.  
2.3  Various categories of minorities and the nature of their claims 
  
For clear understanding of the various problems that define the minority question in 
Africa, this section identifies the various kinds of minorities and the nature and types of 
claims that they make.48 This analysis provides the basis for identifying and elaborating 
on the characteristics of a constitutional design that best achieves the accommodation of 
diversity in Africa. This classification merely identifies the common patterns in the 
situation and the demands of various groups. It acknowledges that there are overlaps and 
recognises the historical and socio-cultural specificity of the various groups falling 
within the same classification.  
2.3.1 Ethno-cultural minorities  
 
The first category consists of ethno-cultural minorities. These are groups that have and 
seek to maintain and enjoy recognition for their own distinct culture/language which is 
different from the culture/language of the dominant population, and/or the mainstream 
                                                 
48 It is not uncommon to classify groups for the purpose of understanding minority demands. See 
Kymlicka (note 43 above) Chapter 2. This analysis is informed by the classification that Ted Robert Gurr 
makes in his work on minorities at risk, but since that work does not sufficiently capture the nature and 
situation of groups in Africa, on account of its global orientation, his classification is also not adopted in 
its entirety in this study. See Gurr (note 12 above).  
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ethnic groups in the population. Examples include the Berbers of Morocco and Algeria; 
the Copts of Egypt; non-Chewa-speaking groups in pre-1994 Malawi; the Wayeyi, 
Kgalagadi and other non-Tswana groups in Botswana and the various ethnic groups in 
Ethiopia. These minorities have been disadvantaged by the institutionalisation of the 
dominant language and other cultural attributes of the mainstream society in the 
processes of the state, leading to their non-recognition and the marginalisation of their 
distinct culture. As a result, they face multiple pressures to abandon their culture and 
assimilate into the mainstream society, or face exclusion and hence relegation to a status 
of secondary citizenship.  
 
This is as much a result of the making of the African state by colonial fiat that lumped 
together culturally divergent and unequal historical communities as it is of the failure of 
the post-colonial state to acknowledge the cultural attachments of its population and 
integrate them on an equal basis. The post-colonial nation-building process of some 
African states has been hegemonic. The dominant culture has been used to create a 
semblance of national integration by way of a common language, national identity and, 
in some cases, even religion. In these countries, the language and other cultural 
attributes of dominant groups have been institutionalised in the processes of the state to 
the exclusion of other languages and cultures. As a result, minority cultures, having been 
left unrecognised and subject to repression, have been exposed to erosion and ruin, and 
the dignity and sense of equality of members of these groups have consequently also 
been damaged.  
 
The state employs a variety of approaches to induce the assimilation of minority cultures 
or their peripheralisation. One can categorise these approaches as taking either of the 
following forms, or a combination of both: a coercive one, consisting of the restriction 
or outlawing of a group’s language, impositions upon its traditional practices and ways 
of life, the persecution of cultural leaders and clergy members, and attacks on academics 
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and intellectuals; and an assimilationist one, involving a systematic process of 
nationalising the dominant culture to the exclusion of others.49  
 
A good example of a country that has employed a coercive approach to institutionalise 
the dominant culture is Algeria. The question of the identity of Algeria has been one of 
the most contentious issues in the country’s post-independence politics. Although 
Algeria is multicultural, and 27 per cent of its population is composed of the indigenous 
Amazigh, throughout its post-independence existence Algeria has defined itself as a 
purely Arab state and pursued a policy of Arabisation. As a result, Arabic has been 
institutionalised as the only Algerian language. Linguistic and cultural expressions of 
the Amazigh were forbidden and the practice of Amazigh nationalism, labelled 
‘Berberism’, has been outlawed.50 As part of the policy of Arabisation, in 1998 the 
government passed a comprehensive law that required the use of Arabic in all spheres of 
public life.51 The nationalisation of Arab identity has thus involved, to use Anderson’s 
expression, ‘a systematic, even Machiavellian, instilling of nationalist ideology through 
the mass media, the educational system, administrative regulations and so forth’,52 
exclusively on the basis of the cultural attributes of the dominant Arab majority. The 
Amazigh in Morocco are in a similar situation to their counterparts in Algeria.53 
 
This has led to the emergence of an Amazigh ethno-cultural movement demanding equal 
recognition and protection for their languages and cultural practices.54 The expression 
and articulation of their distinct culture and the use of their language in public has 
frequently resulted in detentions and violent repression.55 Although the Arabic 
Language Decree of 1998 has been suspended following a recommendation by the 
                                                 
49 The essence of the assimilationist approach is aptly captured in Adeno Addis’s definition of 
assimilation. See A Addis ‘Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities’ (1992) 
67 Notre Dame LR 615, 619-620.  
50 ‘From 1980 to 1988, an estimated 300 activists for Amazigh were imprisoned for “Berberism”.’ 
ACHPR Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities (2005) 43 (hereinafter ACHPR Report).  
51 See UNHRC Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on the Second Periodic Report 
of Algeria UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/ADD. 95 (August 1998) para 15 (hereinafter UNHRC on Algeria). 
52 B Anderson Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1991) 113-
114. 
53 See ACHPR Report (note 50 above) 42-43.  
54 See J McDougal History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria (2006) 184-216.  
55 See Maxted & Zegeye (note 6 above) 394.  
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UNHRC,56 and the Algerian Constitution was amended in October 2002 to recognise 
Tamazight, the Amazigh language, as a national language, the situation of the Amazigh 
remains precarious.  
 
The identity of the state and control of state machinery have also been points of 
contention between dominant and smaller groups in many other African states. 
Examples include countries composed of Arab and African-origin population groups 
such as Sudan, Chad57 and Mauritania.58 Much of the post-independence political 
history of these countries reflects the struggle arising from the attempts of successive 
governments to impose the dominant Arab culture and Arabic language on African 
population groups, and the resistance of the latter.59 Indeed, this is one of the many 
factors which led to the civil war in the Sudan.60 The approach employed by 
governments in these states has often been generally repressive, and sometimes violent. 
Other African states have employed a variation on the coercive approach, in which 
institutional pressure has been put on certain groups to force them into abandoning their 
traditional practices and ways of life.61  
 
The assimilationist approach is reminiscent of Benedict Anderson’s idea of official 
nationalism.62 This is a process by which a state institutionalises the culture of the 
dominant group as a national culture by way of ‘stretching the short, tight, skin of the 
                                                 
56 Practices against the culture of the Amazigh include the prohibition of the registration of children who 
are given Amazigh names as well as the outlawing of the use of Tamazight in courts. Amazigh are not 
also allowed to give Amazigh names to their organisations and companies, nor to write in Tifingh. 
Tamazight is not as yet officially recognised nor is it taught at any level of the education system. UNHRC 
on Algeria (note 50 above) para 15.  
57 See generally S Decalo ‘Chad: The Roots of Centre Periphery Strife’ (1980) 79 African Affairs 491.  
58 The title of the news item ‘Mauritania – Neither Arab nor African’ from the Nordic Africa Institute 
succinctly captures the nature of the problem that characterises much of the post-independence politics of 
Mauritania. See Gariba Diallo ‘Mauritania – Neither Arab nor African’ 
http://www.nai.uu.se/newsfromnia/arkiv/2000/diallo.html. accessed on September 15 2007.  
59 According to Horowitz for these Afro-Arab states the persistent questions have been: is the state to be 
Arab or African, and its derivative: who would rule it, Arabs or Africans? Horowitz (note 35 above) 189.  
60 For a discussion on the cultural basis of the southern Sudan struggle, see FM Deng ‘Sudan’s Turbulent 
Road to Nationhood’ in RRené Larémont (ed) Borders, Nationalism and the African State (2005) 33, 42-
60.  
61 One illustration of this is the attempt of Tanzanian authorities to destroy the cultural identity of the 
Massai ethnic group, giving the group a choice between ‘abandoning the ancestral customs or exclusion 
from public life.’ See ACHPR Report (note 50 above). 
62 See Anderson (note 52 above) particularly 83-112.  
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nation over the gigantic body of the empire.’63 It involved the diffusion of the majority 
(or dominant) group’s language and culture all over the territory of the state through 
state institutions. The media, the educational system and all other public activities 
reproduce the dominant culture and are conducted in the language of the dominant 
group. No space is left for expression of other cultures, and those who are not members 
of the dominant culture have no choice but to assimilate into it or face repression.64 This 
has been the case, for example, in such countries as Ethiopia,65 Malawi66 and 
Botswana.67 
                                                 
63 Ibid 86.  
64 This happens to be the case even when effective and seemingly ‘neutral’ individual rights are accorded 
to all citizens. For further discussion of this see Chapter III.  
65 See C Clapham ‘Ethnicity and the National Question in Ethiopia’ in P Woodward & M Forsyth (eds) 
Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa: Federalism and Its Alternatives (1994) 27-40; A Fiseha 
Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia (2006). The origin of the modern Ethiopian 
state was what was known as historic Ethiopia. According to Adhana Haile Adhana, ‘[t]he historic 
Ethiopian state normally known as Abyssinia had the Tigray (speaking Tigrigna), the Christian Agew 
(speaking Agewigna) and the Amhara (speaking Amharic) as its core and as components of its 
nationhood, although the Tigray and the Amhara were preponderant … The uniting or core culture 
consisted of common history and Christianity, not Amharic or the Amhara core culture’ (my emphasis). A 
Haile Adhana ‘Mutation of Statehood and Contemporary Politics’ in A Zegeye & S Pausewang (eds) 
Ethiopia in Change: Peasantry, Nationalism and Democracy (1994) 12, 19. Ethiopia’s sovereignty was 
legally established – after the Battle of Adwa, where Ethiopia defeated the colonial forces of Italy – when 
Ethiopia signed boundary agreements with France, Great Britain, and Italy between 1898 and 1907. See 
Brownlie (note 27 above) 775. The process of boundary consolidation that took place during the course of late  19th  and  early  20th centuries and gave Ethiopia its current demographic and territorial shape 
involved, to use the words of Anderson, the ‘welding of two opposing political orders, one ancient 
[historic Ethiopia], one quite new [modern Ethiopia]’. Anderson (note 51 above) 86. The imposition of the 
identity of historic Ethiopia over the gigantic body of the new empire led to the emergence of numerous 
ethno-national and ethno-cultural movements.  
66 See generally D Kaspin ‘Tribes, Regions and Nationalism in Democratic Malawi’ in I Shapiro & W 
Kymlicka (eds) Ethnicity and Group Rights (1997) 464-503. Although Malawi consisted of more than a 
dozen ethnic groups, its post-independence nation-building process under the one-party rule of Hastings 
Banda was directed to ‘the promotion of one ethnicity – the Chewa – as the national mainstream, and one 
region – the centre – as Malawi’s heartland’. Ibid 470. This was accompanied by the promotion of Chewa 
language as the national language and Chewa culture as the cornerstone of nationhood and the source of 
its political iconography. See ibid; Pascal Kishindo ‘The Impact of a National Language on Minority 
Languages: The Case of Malawi’ (1994) 12(2) J of Contemporary African Studies 138. 
67 The post-independence constitutional and political order of Botswana was established on the premise of 
what Richard Werbner called the One-nation Consensus. Richard Werbner ‘Introduction: Challenging 
Minorities, Difference and Tribal Citizenship in Botswana’ (2002) 28(4) J of Southern African Studies 
676. This was an assimilationist and culturally exclusive policy that was directed at the official 
nationalisation of the Tswana nation with no regard to the cultures and languages of the various other 
groups. See Solway (note 40 above); Kamanakao & Others v. Attorney-General and Another (2002) 
African Human Rights Law Reports (AHRLR) (BwHc 2001) 35-58; ‘Violations of Linguistic and 
Cultural Rights of Minority Groups in Botswana’: statement of Lydia Ramahobo to the UN Working 
Group on Minorities (1 March 2004) available at 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/minorities/statements10/MCB3a.doc> last accessed on 27 September 2006.  
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It is clear from the foregoing that one of the various forms that the issue of minorities in 
Africa takes involves situations in which the existence and identity of non-dominant 
ethnic groups have been denied public expression, either through forced imposition of 
the dominant culture and the concomitant repression of minority cultures, or through 
official nationalisation of the cultural attributes of the dominant society and the 
promotion of the assimilation of members of other cultures. For minorities in this 
category, their non-recognition has not only undermined their members’ identity and 
self-respect, it has also caused their marginalisation from the political and socio-
economic framework of the state in which they live. As an expression of their equal 
inclusion into society and an affirmation of their equal rights and status as citizens, 
members of these groups therefore demand not only the recognition of their languages 
and culture, but also the expression of their linguistic and cultural attributes in the 
structures and processes of the state.  
2.3.2 Ethno-political minorities 
 
The second category of minorities involves those communities whose main concern is to 
achieve strong representation and participation in the political process of the state. Their 
interest is more in gaining a fair share of political power than in the recognition and 
protection of their cultural identity per se. Being at the centre of competition for political 
power, the main focus of the demand of groups in this category is the distribution of 
political power. In other words, their demand involves effective political representation 
and participation, among other issues. Seen in this light, the term ethno-political 
minorities best describes the nature of such minorities.68 Arguably, most ethnic groups 
in African states are ethno-political.69  
 
It is the historical process of the making of the African state, and the inability of the 
post-colonial state to build legitimate political and constitutional frameworks, that have 
adversely affected a just distribution of constitutional goods, most particularly political 
rights (the equitable representation and participation of members of the constituent 
                                                 
68 Such groups are also known in Gurr’s typology as communal contenders. Gurr (note 12 above) 18.  
69 This is consistent with the finding in Gurr’s study that most groups in sub-Saharan Africa are 
communal contenders, and account for about eighty per cent of the world’s communal contenders. Ibid 22 
& 255.  
 52 
ethno-cultural groups), in conditions of deep ethno-cultural diversity and inequality. The 
colonial origin of the African state affected power relations among various groups and 
between the groups and the state in two ways. First, it brought together groups with 
different historical traditions, and unequal political and socio-economic standing under 
one political authority with no guarantee of their equitable integration into the state. This 
inevitably led to formidable challenges for mutual co-existence as part of one political 
community and in the organisation and distribution of political power.70 Secondly, it set 
the stage for increased interactions between, particularly, those groups that mobilised in 
the struggle for independence. As previously noted, intensified ethnic self-consciousness 
and rivalry were the result.71  
The structure of government introduced by the colonial state was not organised to 
harness integration and a common political vision in the various African territories on 
which it was imposed.72 In the first place, it had no historical or social foundations in 
those territories. Moreover, the colonial state organised political authority and operated 
in these territories in a way that entrenched the system of divide and rule,73 and hence 
political as well as socio-economic inequality among the various groups. Furthermore, 
by its nature, it was highly centralised and its authoritarian administrative machinery 
brought almost all political and military power, as well as economic resources and 
modern social goods, under centralised control.74 One of the dominant features of the 
African political scene during and after formal independence has therefore been the 
rivalry of the constituent units of society for control of the state.75 
                                                 
70 See NKA Busia, Jr ‘The Right to Self-Determination, the State and the Quest for Democracy in Africa: 
An Explanatory Analysis’ (1992) Proceedings of the 4th Annual Conference of African Society of Int and 
Comparative Law 24.  
71 See Seilassie (note 32 above) 9; Eide (note 32 above) 1321.   
72 See A Rivkin Nation-Building in Africa: Problems and Prospects (1969) 1; see also Davidson (note 14 
above) 184-185.  
73 See JO Ihonvbere ‘The State and Ethnicity in Africa’ in E Ike Udogu (ed) The Issue of Political 
Ethnicity in Africa (2001) 59, 70; see also MW Mutua ‘Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together: The 
Dilemmas of the Post-colonial African State’ (1995) 21 Brooklyn J of Int Law 505, 520-522.  
74 J Wilson ‘Ethnic Groups and the Right to Self-Determination’ (Spring 1996) 11 Connecticut J of Int L 
433, 441 (stating that during the colonial period, colonial powers had exclusive control over the political 
and economic resources of their colonies).  
75 Exceptions to this include, most importantly, Botswana and Tanzania. On Botswana, see J Reader 
Africa: A Biography of the Continent (1998) 665. For Tanzania, the use of Swahili as a common language 
and the particularly small size of all of the 125 ethnic groups, together with their mostly non-hierarchical 
traditional political structure, has made ethnic mobilisation for control of state power unworkable. Since 
the institutionalisation of multiparty democracy, however, the country has witnessed Christian-Muslim 
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In most post-colonial African states, during the process of independence and also 
thereafter, the parties involved did not properly negotiate or establish a workable 
political and constitutional framework that would have provided sufficient guarantees of 
equitable representation and effective participation for the members of various groups. 
As a result, in the run-up to independence and subsequently, political power has been 
contested among political movements that mainly mobilised their support from members 
of particular ethnic groups.76 Such has been the case, for example, in Nigeria,77 
Angola,78 the DRC (former Zaire),79 Mauritius,80 Kenya,81 Uganda,82 Zambia,83 
Zimbabwe,84 Ghana,85 Sierra Leone,86 Sudan,87 Chad,88 Rwanda,89 and Burundi.90 The 
                                                                                                                                               
tensions and rising secessionist sentiments in offshore Zanzibar. See H Glickman ‘The Management of 
Ethnic Politics and Democratization in Tanzania’ in Glickman (note 44 above) 289, 291-297.  
76 See S Adejumobi ‘Citizenship, Rights, the Problem of Conflicts and Civil Wars in Africa’ (2001) 23 
Human Rights Quarterly 148, 159.  
77 See Reader (note 75 above) 660-665. 
78 AV Malaquias ‘The Political Economy of Angola’s Ethnic Conflict’ in S MacLean et al (eds) The 
Crises of Governance in Asia And Africa (2001) 207-226; See A Pitsch ‘Ovimbundu of Angola: A Case 
from University of Maryland’s Minorities at Risk Project’ (1995) 
<http://www.bsos.umd.edu./cidcm/mar/angovim.htm.> accessed on 7 October 2007.   
79 See A Heraclides Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics (1991) 58.  
80 See D Kadima & R Kasenally ‘The Formation, Collapse and Revival of Political Party Coalitions in 
Mauritius: Ethnic Logic and Calculation at Play’ in D Kadima (ed) The Politics of Party Coalitions in 
Africa (2006) 73-110, 74-76.  
81 See the case study on Kenya, J Scarrit ‘Communal Conflict and Contention for Power in Africa South 
of the Sahara’ in Gurr (note 12 above) 270-277; see also G Muigai ‘Jomo Kenyatta and the Rise of the 
Ethno-Nationalist State in Kenya’ in Berman et al (note 41 above) 200-217. For a discussion on current 
communal rivalry in Kenya see A Pitsch ‘Political Rivalries and Communal Vengeance in Kenya’ in TR 
Gurr Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (2000) 261-265.  
82 See N Kasfir ‘Cultural Sub-nationalism in Uganda’ in VA Olorunsola (ed) The Politics of Cultural Sub-
nationalism in Africa (1972) 51-148; P Mbabazi ‘Ethnicities in Crises of Governance in Africa: The Case 
of Uganda in the Great Lakes Region’ in S MacLean et al (note 78 above) 227-244. 
83 See generally DN Posner Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa (2005); Also on Zambia see J Scarrit 
in Gurr (note 12 above) 264-279.  
84 See Sithole (note 45 above) 132-145.  
85 According to Howard, before independence, the Ashanti-based National Liberation Movement was the 
chief opponent of Kwame Nkrumah’s Convention Peoples Party. Howard (note 11 above), 92-93.  
86 The conflict that ended in 1999 started as rebellion by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) which 
drew its main support from the Tamne ethnic group. According to Gurr, the rebellion that led to the 
conflict was an outgrowth of long-standing communal rivalries over access to official positions and 
largesse. He further added that one of the justifications offered by the RUF leader was to eliminate the 
‘hegemony of the Mende’ in Sierra Leone’s government. See Guru (note 80 above) 54. See S Rein ‘Sierra 
Leone: Between the Prison Houses of Nationalism and Transnationalism’ in MS Smith (ed) Globalizing 
Africa (2003) 127, 131.  
87 See Rivkin (note 72) 35-37. 
88 Decalo (note 57 above) 497-506.  
89 See Reader (note 75 above) 665-672.  
90 Although it did not have a political-party framework as in the case of Rwanda, the rivalry for political 
power took an ethnic dimension, pitting Hutus against Tutsis. See R Lemarchand ‘Burundi in 
Comparative Perspective: Dimensions of Ethnic Strife’ in J McGarry & Brendan O’Leary (eds) The 
Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts (1993) 151-171.  
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nature of the competition has been a zero-sum game, with each group seeking to 
dominate the political environment. Thus, in the cases of Rwanda and Burundi, one 
group rose to political dominance to the exclusion of the contending group, leaving the 
countries in cyclic genocidal conflict.91 The disagreement between the highly federalist 
group in Katanga, Confédération des Associations Tribales de Katanga (CONAKAT), 
and Patrice Lumumba’s radical and pro-unionist movement pitched independent Congo 
into a crisis that led to international intervention.92 In other cases, such as Kenya, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, unstable coalitions emerged in which one or some groups 
dominated.93 In Ghana and Uganda, the struggle took the form of a rivalry between 
traditional centripetal forces and modern nationalist centrifugal forces.94 In the case of 
Angola, the struggle of the various political forces led to almost three decades of civil 
war.95 Nigeria suffered civil war for the same reason.96  
 
The rivalry over political power in many of these countries led, during late 1960s and 
the 1970s, to the emergence of one-party regimes, military dictatorships or the 
despotism of ‘charismatic’ or ‘revolutionary’ leaders. Constitutions were written, 
rewritten and reconfigured to entrench the control of those in power and restrict all 
avenues of political and ethno-cultural pluralism.97 Although some of these constitutions 
guaranteed certain human rights to varying degrees, political pluralism and dissent were 
nevertheless barred. As Chapter III further shows, ethnic claims were brutally 
suppressed or silenced through the co-option of ethnic elites. Minority guarantees and 
federal arrangements incorporated in some of the independence constitutions were 
removed. At the same time, while some groups and regions dominated the state 
machinery and disproportionately controlled and exploited resources, others were 
                                                 
91 See Reader (note 75 above) 665-672; M Dravis ‘Burundi in the 1990s – From Democratization to 
Communal War’ in Gurr (note 80 above) 188-194,189.  
92 See HF Weiss & T Carayannis ‘The Enduring Idea of the Congo’ in Ricardo René Larémont (ed) 
Borders, Nationalism and the African State (2005) 135, 138-142; Heraclides (note 79 above) 60-62.  
93 See Gurr (note 12 above) 264-277; also Sithole (note 44 above) 142-148.  
94 See Davidson (note 14) 32-36; C Boon Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial 
Authority and Institutional Choice (2003) 144-146; Kasfir (note 82 above) 89-94, 109-119.  
95 Malaquias (note 77 above); A Rozès ‘Angolan Deadlock, Chronicle of a War with No Solution’ (2001) 
10 African Security Review available at <http//www.issafrica.org/Pubs/ASR/10No3/Rozes.html>. 
96 See, for example, Reader (note 74 above) 660-665; Howard (note 11 above) 94-95; Okafor (note 17 
above) 24, 99.  
97 See VT Le Vine ‘The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism in West Africa’ (1997) 35(2) The J of Modern 
African Studies 181-206.  
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systematically marginalised and even subject to repression.98 This situation was 
sustained until the end of the Cold War, largely with the support of the superpowers, 
whose rivalry played itself out on the continent.  
  
With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent process of democratisation witnessed 
in many African states, the previously overlooked ethnic problems that had been 
sidelined by the rivalry of the superpowers and the rise of authoritarian regimes across 
the continent came into the open.99 Groups that have hitherto been ruthlessly suppressed 
have started to assert their claims against their states and even challenge its authority. 
Many African countries have, as a result, experienced political upheavals of various 
proportions. In many African states violent conflicts have erupted, and in others, such as 
Sudan, Burundi and Angola, existing ones have acquired further impetus. In some cases, 
this has led to the explosion of the state – Liberia, Somalia, former Zaire and Rwanda 
being examples.100 Other states, such as Kenya, Mali, Nigeira, Senegal, have also 
witnessed identity-based tensions which have triggered intermittent or short-lived 
violence.101 Still others, such as Malawi, Zambia and even Botswana, have witnessed 
either the emergence of political parties that draw their support from particular groups or 
regions, or the rise of organisations claiming equal rights for minority groups and the 
recognition and protection of their identity.102  
 
The political scene in these countries has therefore been dominated by rivalry among 
ethno-political or ethno-regional forces for either control of the state or regional 
autonomy and a share of political power and resources. Since hegemonic control by the 
                                                 
98 See AM Abdullahi ‘The Refugee Crisis in Africa as a Crisis of the Institution of the State’ (1994) 6(4) 
Int J of Refugee L 562, 567.  
99 Writing in 1995 in a preface to a book, Harvey Glickman stated ‘in Africa today, ethnic and sectional 
conflict, hidden and often forcibly suppressed by authoritarian regimes, wells up as politics become freer’ 
in Harvey Glickman (ed.) Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa (1995) i. Elsewhere in the book 
Glickman reinforced this point ‘[a]n examination of the early period of democratization yields evidece 
that competitive processes created opportunities for increasing stridency of ethnic cliams’. Glickman 
‘Issues in the Analysis of Ethnic Conflict and Democratization Processes in Africa Today’ in Glickman 
(as above) 1, 23.  
100 See Darren Kew ‘Building Democracy in 21st Century Africa: Two Africans, One Solution’ The 
Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relaitons (Winter/Spring, 2005) 149, 153.  
101 See the reviews of reporting of incidences of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts in articles on African 
politics in Glickman (note 99 above) 1-3.  
102 D. N. Posner Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa (2005); Crawford Young ‘Competing Images of 
Africa: Democratization and its Challenges’ in Okon Akiba (ed.) Constitutionalism and Society in Africa 
(2004) 141, 146-149.   
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state as a mechanism of management of the ensuing conflicts has failed and is in any 
case no longer legitimate in the post-Cold War international order, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that the legally and politically sustainable way to overcome the 
dangers that minority claims entail is to negotiate mechanisms of just and democratic 
accommodation.  
 
From a legal point of view, the problem of ethno-political minorities raises a number of 
crucial questions, including: In what ways can minority-specific norms and other norms 
of international law, such as the right to self-determination, be articulated to meet group 
demands for a share of political power and socio-economic resources? What kind of 
policy approaches and legal methods or institutions are appropriate to realise the 
potential of these norms for addressing such tensions? What guidance do 
constitutional/political theory and the constitutional practice of states offer in this 
regard?  
 
These are the questions that subsequent chapters will address as part of the central 
problem that this study investigates.  
 
2.3.3 Ethno-national minorities  
 
The third type of minority encompasses those that are referred to, in Gurr’s global 
classification of ethnic political movements as ethno-nationalist groups.103 These are 
large minority groups associated with a particular territory whose main claim revolves 
around self-determination. Minorities in this category can further be divided into two. 
The first subdivision can be labelled ethno-regional groups and includes ethnic groups 
that are known for their predisposition to maintain their distinct culture, and seek to 
have their identity and interests recognised through self-government or territorial 
autonomy.  
The second subdivision is composed of what can be referred to as ethno-national 
groups. What distinguishes them from ethno-regional groups is the intensity of their 
                                                 
103 Gurr (note 12 above) 18.  
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sense of separateness from the dominant population and/or other ethnic groups in the 
mainstream population, and, most importantly, on account of their quest, in the past or 
currently, to achieve independent statehood of their own. The distinction between ethno-
regional groups and ethno-national groups is therefore that between those who claim 
autonomy or internal self-government, and secessionists.  
 
Although the demand for a share in the control and exercise of state power is therefore 
an overriding feature of the issue of minorities in Africa, this is by no means the only 
form that the phenomenon takes. No less important is the demand of some minorities in 
many African states for regional autonomy, self-government and even secession from 
the existing state. That significant numbers of African conflicts have been ethno-
regional or ethno-national in nature clearly demonstrates this.104  
 
Since the independence period in the 1960s, ethno-regional or ethno-national conflicts 
or movements have arisen in various African states at various times. The most famous 
historical attempts at secession in Africa include those of Katanga (1960-63) 105 and 
Biafra (1967-70).106 Ever since Angola gained its independence in 1975, Cabinda has 
been attempting to secede from it (having fought earlier, from 1965, for independence 
from Portugal).107 The various regions of Ethiopia have, since the 1970s, fought against 
the successive governments of that country – in this case, with the exception of 
Eritrea,108 more for regional autonomy than secession.109 The same is true of the 
Southern Sudan conflict that began in 1956. The Movement of the Democratic Forces of 
the Casamance has been fighting for the independence of Casamance from Senegal 
                                                 
104According to some studies, out of more than 40 internal armed conflicts that took place in Africa during 
1946-2001, ethno-regional or ethno-national conflicts account for thirty five per cent. See details in Armed 
Conflict 1946-2001 at <http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/ucdp_pub/conflict_list_1946‐2005.pdf > 
accessed on 8 February 2008.  
105 See R Lemarchand ‘The Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of the Katanga Secession’ (1962) 
56(2) American Political Science Review 404-416.  
106 Of the various secessionist conflicts in Africa, this was unmatched for the level of its human casualties. 
In this war, regarded by some as genocide, between 600 000 and 1 000 000 persons are said to have died 
from the fighting, starvation or disease. See L Kuper ‘Genocide and Mass Killings: Illusion and Reality’ 
in BJ Ramacharan (ed) The Right to Life in International Law (1985) 117, 118. 
107 See further JG Porto Cabinda, Notes on a Soon-to-be-Forgotten War (2003) ISS Occasional Paper 77 
(2003).  
108 See J Klabbers & R Lefeber ‘Africa: Lost Between Self-Determination and Uti Possidetis’ in C 
Brölmann, R Leteber & M Zieck (eds) Peoples and Minorities in International Law (1993) 37, 70-74. 
109 See Fiseha (note 65 above) 60-79.  
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since 1983.110 In 1999, a bloody attempt to sever the Caprivi Strip from Namibia took 
place.111 Since 1997, the secessionist Anjouan People’s Movement which controls the 
Island of Anjouan has defied the rule of the government of Comoros.112 In Mali, the 
period 1990-94 saw the Azawad Peoples’ Movement and the Islamic Arab Front of 
Azawad begin fighting for Tuareg separatism.113 Similarly, Tuareg secessionism 
emerged as a violent ethno-national movement in Niger in the 1990s.114 In Eritrea, the 
Afar Revolutionary Democratic Union, representing the indigenous Afar people, has 
called for the autonomy of the Danakil region from the Asmara government.115  
 
Demands for regional autonomy and/or issues of self-determination have been at the 
centre of contemporary political/constitutional debates and conflicts in many African 
states. They feature prominently in the peace negotiations on Darfur, in the 
constitutional review process in Kenya and the political crisis that unfolded in that 
country, and in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the government of Sudan. One of the thorny 
issues in the constitution-making process in South Africa was the degree to which the 
post-apartheid state would accommodate regional autonomy or self-government.116 It is 
also the main question to which the Ethiopian Constitution of 1994 addresses itself.  
 
At least three factors underlie the claims of ethno-regional and ethno-national minorities 
in Africa. These are the legacy of colonial rule, the possession of distinct cultures and 
political histories, and inherited and continuing patterns of socio-economic inequality 
and discrimination among groups and regions. 117 
 
                                                 
110 See B Sonko ‘The Casamance Conflict: A Forgotten Civil War?’ (2004) 3&4 CODESRIA Bulletin 30-
33.  
111 See further IRIN News Namibia: Caprivi Political Party Declared Illegal 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=55509&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=N
AMIBIA accessed on 28 April 2008.  
112 See C Ayangafac Situation Critical: The Anjouan Political Crisis (5 March 2008) ISS Situation Report  
available on <http://www.iss.org.za>. 
113 Gurr (note 81 above) 53-54.  
114 Ibid.  
115 See the Minorities at Risk project website of the University of Maryland at 
<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=53101>  accessed on17 October 2007 
116 See B de Villiers ‘A Constitutional Scenario for Regional Government in South Africa: The Debate 
Continues’ (1993) 18 SA Public L 86-101. Also see Chapter VI. 
117 See Gurr (note 12 above) 261.  
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The colonial origin of the state plays a pivotal role in African ethno-regional/national 
movements. One of the developments in the decolonisation process of Africa has been 
the convergence of, on the one hand, the colonial practice that imposed the colonial 
state, and, on the other, rules of international law, as international law was subsequently 
called upon to validate colonially defined entities. It was on the basis of colonial 
administration, rather than the self-determination of pre-colonial states and peoples, that 
the decolonisation process under the UN was designed and implemented.118 This can be 
contrasted with Wilsonian self-determination, which assigned the right to self-
determination to peoples and nations of eastern and southern Europe on the basis of a 
common cultural tradition, language, territory and shared history as a people.119 What 
determined the ‘self’ of decolonising self-determination was not peoplehood in the 
Wilsonian sense. It was rather the administrative territories of the various colonial 
powers, which were almost invariably inhabited by a multitude of such groups, that 
constituted the unit for self-determination.120 Political self-determination was therefore 
guaranteed, and sovereign statehood achieved, in Africa on the basis of territorial units 
that were defined by colonial powers. The result was the emergence of independent 
African states which incorporated within their territories many ‘selves’ which ‘have 
never had the time nor the opportunity to integrate into one “self” which would become 
the nation.’121  
 
The absence of agreed-upon mechanisms for mutual accommodation has also 
engendered fertile ground for the birth of ethno-regional and ethno-national 
movements.122 As Jackson puts it, ‘[s]ince most of the new states … do not provide 
minority rights and internal autonomies to compensate ethno-nationalists and indeed 
                                                 
118 See RB Neuberger National Self-Determination in Post Colonial Africa (1986) 21.  
119 On the distinction between Wilsonian self-determination and decolonising self-determination, see J 
Castellino ‘Order and Justice: National Minorities and the Right to Secession’ (1999) 6 Int J on Minority 
and Group Rights 389-415. Davidson makes a very interesting comparison between the redefinition of the 
map of Europe that took place after World War I on the basis of Wilsonian self-determination and the map 
of Africa that resulted from decolonisation. See Davidson (note 14 above) 187-188.  
120 According to Mutua, ‘[i]nternational law only seemed to contemplate the right of the territorial unit as 
a whole to choose to become free as one entity or to associate with another state; the birth of many new 
states from one territorial unit, based on pre-colonial political identities, seems to be out of the question’. 
MW Mutua ‘Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry’ (1995) 16 Michigan J of Int L 
1113, 1141.  
121 CC Mojekwu ‘Self-Determination: The African Perspective’ in Y Alexander & RA Friedlander (eds) 
Self-Determination: National, Regional, and Global Dimensions (1980) 221, 234.  
122 Ibid 235.  
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often deliberately withhold them, they tend to provoke civil discord along ethnic lines as 
did the old multinational empires of Europe.’123 The case of the Igbo of Nigeria in the 
Biafra war is a good example of this.124 Other examples include Ewe of Ghana, the 
Tuareg in Niger and Mali, and Casamance of Senegal. This is also true of Kenya, which 
has in recent years witnessed the resurgence of demands for regional autonomy or 
‘Majimboism’. 125 
 
In some states, the demand for self-determination or territorial autonomy is aggravated 
by the political importance that ethnic-based territories acquired during the colonial 
period. This is particularly the case in those states in which political and administrative 
units, which sometimes enjoyed varying forms of autonomy, as in Nigeria, Sudan and 
Uganda, were established on the basis of ethnic units.126 Other notable examples are 
Kenya, Malawi, Zambia and the DRC. 
 
A strong sense of a distinct culture and political tradition also explains some of the 
movements for self-determination. This is an important, although not the only, factor for 
movements such as the Inkatha Freedom Party127 in South Africa and that of the 
Buganda of Uganda.128 The secessionist movement in the Cabinda region of Angola also 
has its origin in the pre-colonial history of Cabinda, which is linked to the historically 
powerful kingdom of the Bakongo, and the sense of ethno-cultural separateness of the 
people.129 Accordingly, their claim for self-determination is a manifestation of a tension 
between the Angolan identity of Cabinda and the sense of ethno-cultural distinctness felt 
by the region’s people.130 The coupling of ethno-cultural differences with perceived or 
                                                 
123 RH Jackson Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (1990) 78.  
124 For a discussion on the attempted secession of Biafra, see generally RC Njoku ‘An Endless Cycle of 
Secessionism – Intellectuals and Separatist Movements in Nigeria’ in B Coppieters & M Huysseune (eds) 
Secession, History and the Social Sciences (2002) 249-274.  
125 See B Wainaina ‘Majimbo Mania in Kenyan poll’ (5 November 2007) Mail and Guardian; L Juma 
‘Ethnic Politics and the Constitutional Review Process in Kenya’ (2002) 9 Tulsa J of Comparative and Int 
L 471.  
126 EE Osaghae Ethnicity and the State in Africa (2006) Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development 
Studies Working Paper Series No 7 7.  
127 See Wilson (note 74 above) 442-456. 
128 See generally J Oloka-Onyango ‘The Question of Buganda in Ugandan Contemporary Politics’ (1997) 
15(2) J of Contemporary African Studies 173-179; C Johannesen Kingship in Uganda: The Role of the 
Buganda Kingdom in Ugandan Politics (2006) CMI Working Papers 8.  
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real socio-economic and political marginalisation accounts for the demands of Afars in 
Eritrea and black Muslims in Darfur for autonomy and of the Somalis in the Ogaden 
region of Ethiopia and the people of South Sudan for self-determination.  
 
Apart from historical factors, colonial or otherwise, and cultural factors, prevailing and 
continuing regional economic disparities explain many of the ethno-regional and ethno-
national claims. According to Horowitz, it is the ‘relative group’ position combined with 
the ‘relative regional’ position that determines the conditions for secessionist 
movements.131 In other words, one of the factors leading to such claims is economic 
discrimination, which involves the systematic exclusion of members of a group from 
access to desirable economic goods, conditions, or positions, which are to a large extent 
monopolised by other groups in society.132 This view suggests that secessionist 
movements are triggered or exacerbated by the regional dynamics of different groups in 
relation to the state, and that, among other things, poor groups in underdeveloped 
regions are the most prone to secessionist movements. The southern Sudan case133 and 
the political movements of various communities in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, 
particularly the Ogoni, sufficiently illustrate this point.134  
 
 
2.3.4 Peripheral minorities  
 
Finally, there are minorities who are at the periphery of the dominant or mainstream 
society. They are referred to in this study as peripheral groups and largely live outside 
the socio-economic and political processes of the state to which they nominally belong. 
The conditions of these minorities raise the issue of redressing past and continuing 
                                                 
131 Horowitz (note 36 above) 235.  
132 Gurr (note 12 above) 43. One manifestation of this, particularly in Africa, is the existence of 
substantial material deprivation (inequality) affecting the group or groups in question. This is a result of 
the uneven distribution of economic goods by colonial powers and the indifference of the post-colonial 
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133 Heraclides (note 78 above) 110; see also Horowitz (note 36 above) 239; See H Hannum Autonomy, 
Sovereignty and Self-Determination – The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (1990) 309-311.  
134 CR Ezetah ‘International Law of Self-Determination and the Ogoni Question: Mirroring Africa’s Post-
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exclusions, and creating conditions for their empowerment and substantive inclusion in 
the various processes of the state. Examples include the black Muslims in Darfur; the 
communities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria; the communities in northern and 
north-eastern Kenya, particularly the Somalis; the various groups in the western and 
eastern lowlands of Ethiopia, such as the Agnuak, Nuer, Berta, Afar and Somali; and the 
Nubians in Egypt.  
 
Peripheral groups often live in remote and socio-economically marginalised areas.135 
These are territories in which the institutions and operations of the state have often had 
very little presence.136 They were mostly left out from the colonial processes of 
integration into the economy and the political processes of the colonial state, a situation 
that has continued in the post-colonial period. Thus, most of the areas they occupy are 
impoverished and have poor infrastructure. There is little or no access to health services 
and appropriate education systems. They also have limited or no meaningful political 
participation. Peripheral groups have, as a result, been at the fringes of the political, 
economic, social and cultural processes of the states into which they were 
incorporated.137  
Within the category of peripheral minorities, certain groups constitute a special 
category. These are those who, in recent works of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), are referred to as indigenous peoples.138 These groups 
have largely remained outside of the political and socio-economic systems of the states 
in which they now live. One distinguishing feature of indigenous groups is also the 
distinctness of their culture from other groups in society.139 Most of them live in 
peripheral and forest lands, leading a pre-modern way of life based on hunting, 
gathering and herding or pastoralism. Their claims raise the seemingly paradoxical issue 
                                                 
135 Ngugi (note 31 above) 322.  
136 Since the colonial period, indigenous communities have come into contact with the state only where 
the state required the land they inhabited for development projects because of its location, fertility or rich 
resources. Whenever that happened, indigenous peoples ended up being removed from their land. During 
British colonial rule in Kenya, the Massai were dispossessed of their grazing grounds in the Central Rift 
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state to include them in the state system. See Busia, Jr (note 16) 239.  
138 See generally ACHPR Report (note 49 above). 
139 Gurr (note 12) 20.  
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of how to ensure their political, economic and social well-being on an equal basis with 
other members of society while at the same time recognising and respecting their 
cultural distinctness and their traditional way of life and mode of livelihood.  
 
They possess their own cultures, significantly distinct from other ethic groups that form 
part of the mainstream society, which are in some cases in a state of ruin and near-
extinction. This is one but not the exclusive defining element of indigenous peoples in 
Africa.  
 
Indigenous peoples exhibit additional characteristics to those that they share with other 
peripheral groups. One of these distinguishing features is a strong sense of attachment to 
their ancestral land.140 Not only their livelihood, but their culture, beliefs and medicine 
depend on the land they inherited since time immemorial. For them, their ancestral land 
is worth far more than the economic value that may be attributed to it by other members 
of society. For example, the pygmies of central Africa sustain themselves through a 
symbiotic relationship with the forest which is the source of all their basic needs and 
their socio-cultural well-being. The forest is the basis for their distinct livelihood. It is 
also their home and their spiritual centre, where they communicate with their ancestors 
and carry out their religious rituals and practices. Moreover, it is a source of 
medicine.141  
 
What seems to distinguish the attachment of indigenous peoples in Africa142  to their 
land from that of other African ethnic groups is not their spiritual and cultural 
association to their land. It is the combination of this association with the livelihood 
purpose for which the land is used, namely hunting and gathering, cattle herding, 
pastoralism or traditional agro-pastoralism and the inseparable relationship of these 
modes of livelihoods to the culture of the people. Once again, the pygmies of central 
                                                 
140 See ACHPR Report (note 50 above) 89.  
141 See IRIN In-Depth (note 26).  
142 In its original understanding, ‘the term indigenous peoples,’ according to José Bengoa, ‘had been 
attributed to the first nations existing there prior to transatlantic colonization.’ And hence the term 
recognises that these peoples had, prior to colonisation and domination by European settlement, a history 
of independent political systems. In the African context, the communities regarded as indigenous peoples 
did not have any history of having autonomous political organizsation, nor can they be regarded, unless 
except in very exceptional cases, as the original inhabitants of a particular country. See Report on the 
Second Workshop on Multiculturalism in Africa UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2001/3 para. 48.   
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Africa serve as good examples. They live in dense tropical rainforest across central 
Africa, and obtain their livelihood by hunting and gathering forest resources. Essential 
aspects of their culture and traditional religious practices are also closely linked with the 
practices of hunting and gathering. It is clear from this that not only the forest, but also 
the practice of hunting and gathering which depends on the land and the forest, have 
fundamental importance for their collective existence and cultural survival as distinct 
peoples.  
 
There are two types of communities in Africa that possess most of these characteristics. 
Hunters and gatherers, such as the pygmies of the central African region,143 comprise 
the one type, and pastoralists, animal herders or nomads and agro-pastoralists the other. 
Apart from the pygmies, other examples of hunters and gatherers include the San of 
southern Africa, the Hadzabe of Tanzania, and the Ogiek of Kenya.144 The Maasai, 
Pokot, Barbaig, Borena and Afar of the Horn of Africa and other eastern African 
territories; the Tuareg in west and north Africa; and the Mbororo of west and central 
Africa are examples of pastoralist or agro-pastoralist indigenous peoples.145 Berbers in 
North Africa are also regarded as indigenous peoples, mainly on the bases of self-
identification and their historically distinct culture and languages.146 
  
Like other peripheral groups, since they live outside of the socio-economic processes of 
their state, indigenous peoples ‘operate within their own cultural enclaves, ignoring [I 
prefer having been ignored by] modern state institutions and lacking the necessary 
human or other resources to enable their people to participate in the political or 
economic life of a modern complex society’.147 With minimal economic influence,148 
they often remain effectively outside of the economic life of the society.149 Following 
                                                 
143 See IRIN In-Depth (note 26 above) 7; ACHPR Report (note 50 above) 15-16.  
144 The San of Southern Africa are spread in most countries of southern Africa, such as Botswana, 
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the internationally legalised colonial differentiation between the ‘primitive’ and the 
‘modern’, the general perception so far held among members of mainstream social 
groups is that indigenous peoples (not necessarily other peripheral groups) are 
‘backward’ or ‘primitive’.150 All these factors have made these communities vulnerable 
to being neglected and even victimised by the dominant development paradigms and 
socio-economic perspectives pursued by mainstream social groups at the behest of state 
institutions.  
 
In most cases, being the least represented and politically mobilised sections of society, 
like other peripheral groups, indigenous peoples have virtually no voice. As one report 
revealed with regard to the pygmies, for example, they ‘do not benefit from any form of 
political representation and also lack institutions able to directly defend their rights.’151 
As a result, they have no participation, nor do they have any one to speak on their 
behalf, in the decision-making processes of the state, even on matters directly affecting 
them. As Ngugi rightly states: 
 
Untutored in the ways employed by a new intrusive and ubiquitous State manned by an elite with 
everything to gain from their unheralded assimilation, the indigenous peoples could only lose the 
battle that pitted them against the post-colonial State. National interests meant uniform 
‘development’ policies that further disempowered the indigenous peoples in their attempts to 
protect their lands and natural resources in a system unknown to them. 152  
 
This generally marginal status of indigenous communities in Africa has meant their 
virtual absence from the imagination of mainstream society in the formulation and 
implementation of national policies. Apart from non-recognition of their way of life as 
legitimate, certain policies have brought about consequences that endanger their very 
survival as peoples. The most important of these concern the use of land and resources 
and development policies, which are in many ways interrelated. Since the way of life of 
indigenous peoples is not recognised as legitimate, the use to which they put their land is 
also not recognised as worthy of legal recognition. As a result, their interest in the land 
they inhabited has not been protected. The development policies of post-colonial 
                                                 
150 See Ngugi (note 31 above) 326-328.  
151 IRIN In-Depth (note 26 above) 12.  
152 Ngugi (note 31 above) 326.  
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African states have been not only assimilationist in their orientation but have also 
involved, for their implementation, the dispossession of indigenous peoples’ land and 
exploitation of its resources, with no regard to the interests of the indigenous peoples 
themselves. 153  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has addressed two important issues. The first is the nature and genesis of 
ethnic diversity in the post-colonial African state, which forms the context for the issue 
of minorities in Africa. It has been shown that ethnic diversity is characterised by the 
presence of large numbers of groups with unequal population size and socio-political 
conditions, and divergent cultures and histories, and having attachment to a specific 
territory and a strong sense of identity. The genesis of these features of ethnic diversity 
in Africa is located in the pre-colonial socio-economic conditions and political traditions 
of many of the groups, and colonial and post-colonial socio-economic and political 
developments. The second issue dealt with in this chapter is the nature and types of 
minority groups and the various claims that are characteristic of the issue of minorities 
in Africa. In this regard, four types of minority groups have been identified and the 
genesis and nature of the claims of these minorities have been analysed in detail.  
 
The chapter argued that the issue of minorities is a product and manifestation of the 
historical and socio-political processes of the construction and reconstruction of the 
post-colonial African state. It logically follows from this, and from the nature of ethno-
cultural diversity in the post-colonial African state, that the resolution of the issue of 
minorities in Africa requires the existence of a constitutional structure that is commonly 
accepted by members of the constituent minorities to be just, thus rendering it capable of 
nurturing stability and social co-operation. The following chapter accordingly examines 
the nature of the basic structure of the post-colonial African state, as inherited from the 
colonial state and further redefined by post-colonial constitutions and nation-building 
processes, and whether and why it has failed to receive the acceptance of members of all 
                                                 
153 See ACHPR Report (note 50 above) 21-34. The colonial dispossession of the Massai was legitimised 
and the further alienation of their land justified based on arguments that their use of land was wasteful and 
the land should be used for mainstream development purposes. See Ngugi (note 31 above) 339-341. 
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the constituent ethno-cultural groups, and therefore has engendered conflicts instead of 
serving as a basis for social co-operation and national integration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68 
CHAPTER III 
 
The issue of minorities in the political and constitutional discourse and practice of 
post-colonial Africa 
 
In three or four years, no one will remember the tribal, ethnic or religious rivalries which, in the 
recent past, caused so much damage to our country and its population.1  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As the previous chapter showed, the proper resolution of the issue of minorities is 
fundamental to building cohesive and just societies in Africa, founded on a sustainable 
democratic system. To borrow from G Selassie, nothing is more perplexing or critical to 
African states than how to address this issue.2 The object of this chapter is accordingly 
to investigate the nature of the constitutional and politico-legal approaches of African 
states to the issue of minorities, with the aim of demonstrating their limits and ultimate 
failure. It further discusses the relationship of this question to the wider debate on the 
inadequacy of the nation-state model of nation-building and universal individual rights 
(common citizenship) to achieve equality and justice for minorities in multi-ethnic 
societies in general, and especially in Africa. The chapter also defends the need to 
embrace a multi-ethnic process of national integration and democratisation and go 
beyond majoritarian democratic structures and processes, as well as individual rights, in 
order to address adequately the issue of minorities in Africa.  
 
 3.2 The imperative of nation-building  
 
One of the most fundamental constitutional problems African states were faced with at 
independence was how to address the demands of their diverse constituent communities, 
forcibly brought under the arbitrarily contrived colonial boundaries and structures of the 
state. What made this problem particularly formidable is that almost all African states, 
as the product of the colonial process and its system of divide and rule, lack national 
                                                 
1 S Touré Toward Full Reafricanisation (1959) 28.  
2 AG Selassie ‘Ethnic Identity and Constitutional Design For Africa’ (Fall 1992-1993) 29(1) Stanford J of 
Int L 1, 5.  
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cohesion. Not only did their populations lack any shared consciousness of belonging to 
one country, but they were also ethno-culturally divided and socio-economically and 
politically unequal. The fragility of the post-colonial states was further compounded by 
the weak institutional foundation and capacity of the independent governments,3 a 
situation exacerbated by extremely underdeveloped and fragmented economies.4 Nation-
building thus rightly topped the agenda of the post-colonial African states.5 As David 
Welsh has noted, ‘in the heydays of independence, [beginning] in Ghana in 1957 and 
accelerating in the 1960s and beyond, “nation building” was assumed to be the priority 
of all the newly emerging [African] states.’6  
 
Given the colonial origin of the African state as a political unit constituted by an 
amalgamation of various ethno-political communities of different histories, political 
traditions and cultures, the independent governments had two options in their endeavour 
to achieve nation-building. The first was based on the hitherto dominant model of the 
nation-state. The other was what may be referred to as a multicultural model of nation-
building, exemplified by Switzerland and, probably of more relevance to Africa, India. 
The nation-state approach tends to ignore and even combat expressions of ethno-cultural 
diversity, with its strong assimilationist features emphasising national unity. Central to it 
is the idea that somehow there has to be coincidence between the nation, as a culturally 
and linguistically homogenous entity, and the state. Accordingly, the dominant view of 
                                                 
3 Despite the deceivingly authoritarian structure and centralised power of the state inherited from colonial 
powers, the state was also described as the ‘soft state’. Rothchild and Olorunsola explain: ‘In Africa, the 
soft state is marked by fragile institutions; not only are these institutions constrained by the 
ineffectiveness of linkages and the unavailability of human, material and fiscal resources, but the presence 
of domestic and international demands.’ D Rothchild & VA Olorunsola ‘Managing competing state and 
ethnic claims’ in D Rothchild & VA Olorunsola (eds) State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy 
Dilemmas (1983) 1, 7.  
4 Nwabueze puts it in vivid terms: in these countries ‘even those basic necessities for human existence are 
either non-existent or minimal for the vast majority of the population, for whom poverty, illiteracy, 
disease and apathy are inescapable conditions, hovering over the community like plague’. BO Nwabueze 
Constitutionalism in the Emergent States (1973) 164.  
5 ‘The fundamental political problem,’ as W Arthur Lewis aptly noted in 1965, ‘is neither economic 
policy nor foreign policy, but the creation of nations out of heterogeneous peoples.’ WA Lewis Politics in 
West Africa (1965) 49-50. See B Davidson The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-
State (1992) Chapters VI & VII.  
6 D Welsh ‘Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (1996) 72 Int Affairs 477, 477.  
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the 20th century was that a state should have a homogenous national identity, and this 
feature forms an important defining element of the modern constitutional state.7  
 
The multicultural model, and largely minority approach throughout the 20th century, by 
contrast recognises the reality of ethno-cultural diversity. It institutionalises mechanisms 
to accommodate the interests of diverse groups, and thereby actively nurtures a sense of 
allegiance to the state among its individual members. Under this system of nation-
building, as in Switzerland and India, ethnic identity is given recognition through 
institutions and policies that provide public space for its expression, while national 
identity is simultaneously fostered through common institutions, shared values and a 
shared historical past as well. Although not widely accepted in post-colonial states at 
independence, this has increasingly become a common mode of nation-building in 
multi-ethnic states in recent times. 8  
 
Almost all African states chose the first option on the basis of various constitutional 
models inherited at independence.9 Various arguments rooted in the liberal tradition 
presented, at that time and for most of the 20th century, the nation-state model as the 
dominant and only legitimate form of political organisation. Firstly, the possession of a 
single homogenous national identity was seen as a condition necessary to the generation 
of the sense of common purpose required for democratic government.10 For influential 19th‐century liberals such as John Stuart Mill, a democratic system of government is 
possible only where the people of a country share a common sense of nationhood. Mill 
put it thus:  
 
Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a 
people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united 
public opinion necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist.  
 
                                                 
7 James Tully notes that one of the characteristic features of the constitutional state following the French 
and American revolutions has been that it ‘possesses an individual identity as a “nation”’.  J Tully Strange 
Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (1995) 68.  
8 See AG Gagnon & J Tully (eds) Multicultural Democracies (2001).  
9 See B Neuberger ‘State and Nation in African Thought’ in J Huchinson & AD Smith (eds) Nationalism 
(1994) 231-235.  
10 For a discussion on this, see W Kymlicka Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority 
Rights (1995) 50-57.  
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According to him, therefore, it is ‘a necessary condition of free institutions that the 
boundaries of government should coincide in the main with those of nationalities.’11  
 
Secondly, the possession of a commonly shared identity by a state and its nationals was 
also seen as necessary to the unity and political stability of a modern constitutional state. 
Thus, it was suggested that the nation must generally be the basis of the state. This is 
because, as Ernest Barker argued: 
 
There must be a general social cohesion which serves, as it were, as a matrix, before the seal of 
legal association can be effectively imposed on a population. If the seal of the State is stamped 
on a population which is not held together in the matrix of a common tradition and sentiment, 
there is likely to be a cracking and splitting, as there was in Austria-Hungary.12  
 
The third argument is based on a functional requirement of the modern society. The 
modern state requires, it is argued, a culturally homogenous society for its effective 
running.13 Members of society must conduct transactions with each other, run the 
bureaucracy, operate the same court system and the like. This is possible, the argument 
goes, only where there is a standardised language and where people share common 
cultural attributes and historical symbols. Thus, the constitutional state has enforced ‘a 
kind of homogeneity of language and culture, both designedly, as through the education 
system’, and by the very way it operates, as through the media.14  
 
This perspective, dominant particularly at the time of the independence of the post-
colonial African states, was fully appropriated by the post-colonial African elite. There 
were also particularly African conditions and arguments that led to the wholesale 
adoption of the nation-state model of nation-building. The first of these was the deep 
ethno-cultural division of the post-colonial state’s population and their lack of a shared 
political history. The other was the widely held view at the time that African ethnicity, 
dubbed tribalism, was an impediment to modernisation and the achievement of national 
                                                 
11 JS Mill ‘Considerations on Representative Government’ in H Acton (ed) Utilitarianism, liberty, 
representative government (1972) 230, 233.  
12 E Barker Principles of Social and Political Theory (1951) 3, 42.  
13 E Gellner Nations and Nationalism (1983) 39.  
14 C Taylor ‘Nationalism and Modernity’ in JA Hall (ed.) The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the 
Theory of Nationalism (1998) 191, 193.  
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unity. Accordingly, these states adopted assimilationist and integrationist nation-
building processes, within the framework of the constitutions inherited at independence 
and further revised subsequent to independence to suit the objectives of state-centred 
nation-building.  
 
More specifically, post-colonial nation-building has taken two forms. The first is what 
Kymlicka calls a ‘pan-ethnic’ nation-building, which was aimed at developing pan-
ethnic bases of identification with the state through common supra-ethnic institutions 
and symbols.15 This was the declared aim in many African states.16 The second is what 
may be called majority nation-building, which involves, as we observed in Chapter II, 
building the state around the language, culture and history of the dominant ethno-
national group.17  
 
Notwithstanding these differences, the post-independence constitutional systems and 
nation-building policies of the majority of African countries have conceived of national 
unity in terms of homogeneity and oneness.18 The prevailing ethno-cultural diversity has 
generally been seen as reflecting some weakness in the character of the African state, or 
as being antithetical to the process of nationalisation of the dominant culture or the 
creation of a common national identity. Accordingly, the constitutions, laws and 
development policies of these states have all been used as instruments in a highly 
centralised, unitarist and homogenising nation-building process. In the constitutional 
                                                 
15 W Kymlicka ‘Nation-Building and Minority Rights: Comparing Africa and the West’ in B Berman, D 
Eyoh & W Kymlicka (eds) Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa (2004) 54, 65. As E Gellner observed, such 
types of nation-building projects ‘neither perpetuate nor invent a local high culture … nor do they often 
elevate an erstwhile native culture into new, politically sanctioned literate culture, as European 
nationalisms had often done’. They rather allowed the perpetuation and even active promotion of 
European languages and political culture inherited from the colonial state to be the basis of their rule. E 
Gellner Nations and Nationalisms: New Perspectives on the Past (1983) 9.  
16 Mauritius is probably the only country that genuinely deployed this approach without attacking the 
particular attachments of its people to their groups, but rather by cultivating the development of 
overlapping identification with one’s cultural group and with the state.  
17 Kymlicka (note 15 above) 64.  
18 See IJ Wani ‘Cultural Preservation and the Challenges of Diversity and Nationhood: The Dilemmas of 
Indigenous Cultures in Africa’ (1991) 59 UMKC LR 611, 630-636; NJ Udombana ‘The Unfinished 
Business: Conflicts, the African Union and the New Partnership For Africa’s Development’ (2003) 35 
Geo. Wash Int LR 55, 93-94.  
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and political discourse of the post-colonial state, as Francis Deng observed, ‘[u]nity was 
postulated in a way that assumed a mythical homogeneity amidst diversity.’19  
  
This has been expressed in the principles their constitutions proclaimed. For example, 
the 1975 Constitution of Angola provides that ‘[t]he People’s Republic of Angola shall 
be a unitary and indivisible state … and any attempt at separatism or dismemberment of 
its territory shall be vigorously combated.’20 Similarly, the independent constitutions of 
almost all of the ex-French colonial countries declared, in typical Jacobin style, and 
frequently in the very first article, the national unity, indivisibility and sovereignty of the 
state. A representative formulation of this can be found in the 1960 Constitution of Ivory 
Coast. 21 According to Article 2, ‘[t]he Republic of the Ivory Cost is one and indivisible, 
secular, democratic and social.’22 Many of the countries ‘have tried to pursue a top-
down Jacobin nation-building strategy’.23 Although the independent constitutions of 
some  anglophone countries incorporated some institutional guarantees, such as 
federalism or regionalism, in an attempt to accommodate diversity and as a mechanism 
for the protection of minorities, most were subsequently amended to give way to a 
highly centralised unitary political system.24 A typical example here is the declaration in 
the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana that ‘Ghana is a sovereign unitary 
state.’25  
 
‘Too often,’ observed former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, ‘... the necessity of 
building national unity was pursued through the heavy centralization of political and 
economic power and the suppression of political pluralism.’26 The homogenisation 
impulse of the mottos of national unity in the rhetoric and practice of post-colonial 
                                                 
19 FM Deng ‘Ethnicity: An African Predicament’ (Summer 1997) 15 (3) The Bookings Review 28-31, 28.  
20 Constitution of Angola of 1975, Article 4.  
21 Constitution of Ivory Coast of 3 November 1960 as amended 11 January 1963 reprinted in A Peaslee 
(ed) Constitutions of Nations Vol 1 Africa (1965) 242-253. A common theme in the mottos of many of the 
constitutions of the ex-French colonies is ‘unity’. The Constitution of the Republic of Mali of 1960 as 
amended in 1961 thus provides in its Article 1 that ‘[t]he motto is “one people, one purpose, one faith”’. 
Reprinted in ibid 535-545, 535.  
22 Constitution of Ivory Coast Ibid 242 (my emphasis).  
23 On the nature of this approach see B Berman et al ‘Introduction: Ethnicity and the Politics of 
Democratic Nation-Building in Africa’ in Berman et al (note 15 above) 17-18.  
24 See below, notes 34-47 and accompanying text.  
25 Article 4(1) reprinted in Peaslee (note 21 above) 213-228, 214.  
26 The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa 
Report of Secretary General Kofi Annan to the Security Council April 16, 1998 para 8.  
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nation-building has thus also been seen as requiring the restriction of political and 
ethno-cultural pluralism. The predication of the nation-building project on the emphatic 
premise of creating a singular national identity and oneness, as a precondition for 
development and national unity, was translated into a requirement that the various 
ethno-political communities be molded into an artificially constructed state identity or 
assimilated into the nationalised identity of the dominant ethnic group.27  
 
The constituent ethnic groups, branded as atavistic ‘tribal’ remains of a primitive past, 
thus soon became the main targets of the nation-building project.28 Accordingly, 
consistent with the nation-state model, one common theme running through almost all 
the constitutions of these countries has been the refusal to give any legal or political 
recognition and institutional expression to the various distinct groups constituting the 
state. The belief that ethnicity is divisive and undermines national unity informs the 
constitutional and political discourse of many African states throughout the post-
colonial period.29 In almost all the multinational countries of Africa, the expression of 
ethnic solidarity and the mobilisation of people on the basis of group identity have 
therefore been proscribed in various ways or else discouraged. For instance, following 
the Jacobin tradition of the French, almost all of the constitutions of francophone 
countries prohibit the expression of any particularist propaganda of a racial or ethnic 
character.30 In other countries, such as Ghana, laws were enacted to proscribe the 
establishment of organisations on the basis of group membership along ethnic, regional 
                                                 
27 See Wani (note 18 above) 630-636. ‘The assimilationist tendency,’ notes Shivji, ‘which in practice 
usually translates itself into oppression of other nations/nationalities by dominant nations/nationalities, 
has been so strong in Africa that even in situations of “voluntary” union like that of Zanzibar and 
Tanganyika, it has found some ugly expressions.’ IG Shivji ‘State and Constitutionalism: A New 
Democratic Perspective’ in IG Shivji (ed) State and Constitutionalism: An African Debate on Democracy 
(1991) 27, 34.  
28 FRELIMO, the Mozambican ruling party, solemnly pledged in the 1970s ‘to kill the tribe to build the 
nation’. M Cheg ‘Remembering Africa’ (1992) 71 Foreign Affairs 146. The reasoning for such a 
conception of national unity is that ‘since the nation-state must be seen as an integral part of modernity, 
and sub-state groups must be seen as existing in competition with the nation-state, the fragmentation of 
states must, invariably, be undesirable, a disintegrating factor, an obstacle to be overcome’. OC Okafor 
Re-Defining Legitimate Statehood: International Law and State Fragmentation in Africa (2000) 93.  
29 See G Selassie (note 2 above) 11-21; Deng (note 19 above); Wani (note 18 above) 633-636.  
30 For example, see Article 4 of the 1963 Constitution of Togo which provides that ‘any regionalist 
propaganda which might threaten the internal security of the state, national unity or the integrity of the 
territory, shall be punished by law’. As reprinted in Peaslee (note 21 above) 890-905, 891.  
 75 
or religious lines.31 Colonial languages were adopted as national languages and their use 
has been aggressively promoted.32 Children were to be taught in English or French, and 
the teaching of local languages was abolished.33  
 
Another logical consequence of building a singular national identity that supplants local 
ethnic affiliations was a process centralising political power, involving the elimination 
of institutional guarantees for minorities, such as territorial autonomy, from the 
independent constitutions. 34 Thus, although various kinds of federal arrangements were 
incorporated into the constitutions of many countries, including Kenya, Uganda, the 
DRC, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan and Cameroon, these federal experiments were 
abandoned as divisive and obstructive of national unity in all but Nigeria.35  
 
The 1963 ‘Majimbo Constitution’ of Kenya established a quasi-federal arrangement that 
divided legislative and executive powers among the central government and the seven 
regions.36 Not only did it seek to create a framework for a just distribution of political 
power, but it aimed in particular to safeguard the interest of smaller ethnic groups from 
marginalisation and domination by larger ethnic groups. It did not last very long. 
Neuberger summarises this short-lived federal experiment succinctly:  
 
In Kenya the quasi-federal ‘Majimbo Constitution’, which divided the country into regions with 
their regional Assemblies, Regional Civil Service and regional powers, was designed to protect 
the small backward ethnic groups from the Kikuyu-Luo alliance. It had strong support in Kadu, 
which represented the Coastal, Baluhya and Kalenjin tribes. One of its leaders, Masinde Muliro, 
                                                 
31 SKB Asante ‘Nation Building and Human Rights in Emergent African Nations’ (1969) 2 Cornell Int LJ 
83, 93-96. As Asante puts it, the ‘Ghanaian Act did more than merely ban political organisations using or 
engaging in tribal, racial or religious propaganda to the detriment of any other community; it also forbade 
the election of persons on account of their tribal or religious affiliation – in my view an unwarrantable 
fetter on the principle of free elections’. Ibid 95. 
32 See D Smock & K Bentsi-Enchill (eds) The Search for National Integration in Africa (1976) 161-167.  
33 Wani (note 18 above) 633.  
34 Welsh (note 6 above) 483. This led, as we have noted in Chapter II, to struggles for regional power, 
local autonomy and decentralisation, which in some cases escalated into violent conflicts. Okafor (note 28 
above) 103.  
35 Many of the leading African nationalist leaders of the post-independence era, including Kwame 
Nkrumah, Milton Obote, Jomo Kenyatta, and Patrice Lumumba, saw federalism as an external plot by 
western countries to weaken the newly independent African states by further balkanisation. According to 
them, federalism was inefficient, an invitation to ‘tribalism, and a waste of resources’. MW Mutua ‘Why 
Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry’ (1995) 16 Michigan J Int L 1113, 1169. 
36 The names of the seven regions, their organisations and powers are provided for in Chapter VI of the 
Constitution, reprinted in Peaslee (note 21 above) 257-418, 313-322.  
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saw in federalism the ideal solution for Africa … because it provides for ‘free association’ and 
prevents ‘imposed unity’. The dominant Kenyan African National Union opposed federalism, 
which it regarded as a colonial device to strengthen those tribes which did not participate in the 
anticolonial national movement, and to weaken the position of the ‘radical’ Kikuyu. KANU 
accepted the ‘Majimbo Constitution’ because that was the British condition for independence. It 
very soon eroded and then abolished the federal system, and imposed a unitary regime strongly 
dominated by the Kikuyu bureaucracy.37  
 
The emergence of a unitary system of governance led to the domination of the 
machinery of the state by particular groups and the consequent political and socio-
economic disparities among regions and members of various groups. This has led to a 
call for Majimbo in recent years, and lies at the root of the crisis that unfolded in Kenya 
following the December 2007 elections.  
  
The independent constitution of Uganda had similarly introduced a form of 
asymmetrical federal system, recognising self-government for some of the pre-colonial 
ethnic-based states, particularly the Buganda. Accordingly, its Article 2(1) stipulated 
that ‘Uganda consists of Federal States, Districts and the territory of Mbale.’38 Although 
the influential Ugandan People’s Congress, under the leadership of Milton Obote, 
initially accepted this arrangement for fear of the secession of Buganda and to take 
control of state power, four years after independence it abrogated the federal structure, 
violently destroyed the Buganda Kingdom, and centralised power under a unitary 
system.39 Although the asymmetrical features of the independent constitution’s 
regionalism were problematic, its total repudiation by Milton Obote and the concomitant 
centralisation of power without due regard to the history and culture of some of the 
country’s groups created resentment on the part of Buganda and various groups from 
western Uganda. This ultimately led to the various conflicts fought in that country.  
 
                                                 
37 B Neuberger ‘Federalism in Africa: Experience and Prospects’ in DJ Elazar (ed) Federalism and 
Political Integration (1985) as quoted in Mutua (note 35 above) 1154.  
38 See the Constitution of Uganda of 2 October 1962, as amended 30 September 1963, reprinted in Peaslee 
(note 21 above) 921-987, 921.  
39 The constitution was suspended in February 1966 and in April that year a new one was promulgated 
abolishing the federal status of Buganda. Under the 1967 constitution, Uganda became a unitary republic 
and all the traditional kingdoms were abolished. See DP Xydis (ed) Constitutions of the World (1974) 
999-1000, 1000.  
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The 1960 Constitution of the DRC similarly provided that ‘[t]he Democratic Republic of 
the Congo is composed of the city of Leopoldville and the autonomous provinces.’40 
Interestingly enough, its Article 5 stipulated that the provinces should be autonomous 
and each should have separate judicial personality.41 This system did not get the 
opportunity to be tested as the DRC sank into a crisis following the conflict between the 
unionist party, Mouvement National Congolais of Lumumba, and the leaders of the 
Kongo people and Katanga, Joseph Kasavubu and Moise Tshombe. After Mobutu took 
power in a military coup in 1965, the provincial federal arrangement was set aside. 
Under the 1967 Constitution, the DRC was named Zaire and became a unitary state.42 
This has not, however, totally diminished the independence movements of Katanga or 
Kasai, although the last, failed, attempt to control Katanga was in the late 1970s.43 
 
The federal constitutions of Cameroon44 and Ethiopia45 were replaced by unitary ones in 
1972 and 1962 respectively. Other attempted federal arrangements include Sudan,46 the 
union of Tanganika and Zanzibar that created the United Republic of Tanzania,47 the 
Mali Federation, the Federation of French West Africa and the Federation of French 
Equatorial Africa.  
 
Another development in the undemocratic nation-building processes of the post-colonial 
African state has been the rejection of multiparty politics, leading to either de jure or de 
                                                 
40 Article 4 Constitution of the Congo (Leopoldville) of 30 May 1960 reprinted in Peaslee (note 21 above) 
102-147, 103.  
41 Ibid. The organisation and powers of the provinces are stipulated under Title V of the Constitution, 125-
130.  
42 See Constitution of the Republic of Zaire of 1967 in Xydis (note 39 above) 1028-1146, 1029.  
43 See Minorities at Risk data of the University of Maryland on the Lunda and Yeke of the DRC, available 
at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=49005>. 
44 See AN Fru ‘The Reunification Question in Cameroon History: Was the Bride an Enthusiastic or a 
Reluctant One’ (Spring 2000) 47(2) Africa Today 91-119; MW DeLancey ‘The Construction of the 
Cameroon Political System: The Ahidjo Years 1958-1982’ (April 1987) 6 J of Contemporary African 
Studies 3-24.  
45 E Gayim ‘The Autonomy of Eritrea (1952-62): Learning from the Failed Experience’ in ZA Skurbaty 
(ed) Beyond a One Dimensional State: An Emerging Rights to Autonomy (2005) 401-419.  
46 Under the Addis Ababa Peace Accord of 1972, South Sudan achieved regional autonomy, leading to the 
emergence of a federal form of state structure in the Sudan by virtue of the Self-Government Act of 1972. 
See DM Wai ‘Geoethnicity and the Margin of Autonomy in the Sudan’ in Rothchild and Olorunsola (note 
3 above) 304ff.  
47 See Article 2 Interim Constitution of Tanzania of 11 July 1965 in Xidys (note 39 above) 926-982, 926. 
Regarding the union between Tanganika and Zanzibar, Shivji states that due to the assimilationist 
tendency of mainland authorities, the question of the union has become one of the most explosive political 
issues in the country. See Shivji (note 27 above) 34.  
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facto single-party authoritarianism or military dictatorship in one country after the 
other.48 What informed this development initially was the same reasoning that motivated 
post-colonial governments to proscribe ethnic-based movements and defy any 
institutional guarantees aimed at recognising the constituent ethnic communities.49 
President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon expressed the prevailing view in an interview 
as follows: 
 
For me, the one party structure is the only way to escape this demagogy [‘appeals to tribal, ethnic 
and religious differences in politics’], the only means to forge national unity.50 
 
Many post-colonial African leaders, as well as several scholars, were convinced that 
one-party rule would provide the best framework for successful nation-building, the 
rationale being that it would put politics beyond the reach of the prevailing ethnic 
cleavages and thus enhance unity.  
 
One of the advocates of a one-party state was Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Under his 
leadership, the Ghanian Avoidance of Discrimination Act was passed ‘to prohibit 
organizations using or engaging in tribal, regional, racial or religious propaganda to the 
detriment of any other community, or securing the elections of persons on account of 
their tribal, regional or religious affiliation and for other purposes connected 
therewith.’51 With its 1960 Constitution, Ghana became a one-party state, under the 
presidency of Kwame Nkrumah. This soon became a general trend. By the end of the 
1970s most African countries had either adopted a one-party system or descended into 
military dictatorship or autocracy.  
 
                                                 
48 ML Kilson ‘Authoritarian and Single-Party Tendencies in African Politics’ (January 1963) 15 World 
Politics 262-294. 
49 ‘Political plurality and ethnic diversity,’ maintains Hameso, ‘were decried as bottlenecks for the project 
of “nation-building” and national unity.’ S Hameso ‘Issues and Dilemmas of Multi-Party Democracy in 
Africa’ (2002) West Africa Review ISSN:1525-4488. Similarly, Crawford Young pointed out that ‘[t]he 
urgency of containing cultural pluralism was not the only argument marshaled, but it was nonetheless a 
leading plank in the single party platform’. C Young ‘Competing Images of Africa: Democratization and 
its Challenges’ in O Akiba (ed) Constitutionalism and Society in Africa (2004) 141, 145.  
50 As quoted in A Rivkin Nation-Building in Africa: Problems and Prospects (1969) 48-49.  
51 Asante (note 31 above) 93.  
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The natural fate of opposition and dissent under such circumstances was punishment and 
repression. As Hameso notes, ‘[i]n some cases, opposition met out with physical 
elimination and liquidation as in Ethiopia of the 1970s and 1980s, the period also known 
by White and Red Terror.’52 The only countries that have continued to practise 
multipartism throughout all or most of their post-colonial history have been the Gambia 
in West Africa, Botswana in Southern Africa and Mauritius in East Africa.53  
3.2.1 The flaws and ultimate failure of post-colonial nation-building in 
Africa  
 
Although some of the post-colonial elites followed the homogenizing nation-building 
process with good intentions, not only did this policy ultimately fail, with disastrous 
consequences, but it was also fatally flawed from inception. First, underlying the post-
colonial nation-building process in Africa was the wrong assumption that ethnic identity 
and one’s identity as a national of a state are mutually exclusive. Indeed, in most cases, 
not only can these two identities go together, but they can also reinforce each other, 
particularly where ethnic diversity is valued as an integral part of national identity. 
Moreover, this misconception overlooks the fact that people can and do live with 
multiple identities simultaneously without those identities necessarily conflicting with or 
undermining each other. 
 
Generally, it is also only where their ethnic identity is recognised and protected that 
people with deep commitment to their ethnic identity can develop strong attachment to a 
state.54 As Kymlicka puts it, although the existence of shared values and inspiring 
history are important to sustain solidarity in multinational states, ‘[p]eople from 
different national groups will only share an allegiance to the larger polity if they see it as 
                                                 
52 Hameso (note 49 above).  
53 M Owusu ‘Domesticating Democracy: Culture, Civil Society and Constitutionalism in Africa’ (January 
1997) 39(1) Comparative Studies in Society and History 120, 123.  
54 With respect to minorities, Timo Makkonen rightly observes that ‘the extent to which members of 
minorities feel accepted, through the accommodation of their specific needs, affects positively their ability 
to see the society as a common project. On the other hand, if people feel that society does not respect their 
particular identities and needs, they will feel harmed, and indeed are harmed, and will be less keen to 
participate in common affairs’. T Makkonen ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad for the Fight against 
Discrimination?’ in M Scheinin & R Toivanen (eds) Rethinking Non-Discrimination and Minority Rights 
(2004) 155, 173.  
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the context within which their national identity is nurtured, rather than subordinated.’.55 
Similarly, Lewis rightly argues with respect to Africa that  
 
[a]ny idea that one can make different peoples into a nation by suppressing the religious, tribal 
or regional or other affiliations to which they themselves attach the highest political significance 
is simply a non-starter. National loyalty cannot immediately supplant tribal loyalty; it has to be 
built on top of tribal loyalty by creating a system in which all the tribes feel that there is room for 
self-expression.’56  
 
Secondly, the existence of different ethno-cultural groups in the same country does not 
in itself lead to political instability and conflicts.57 As elsewhere, many of the conflicts 
that occurred in Africa are not the product of ethno-cultural differences per se. They are 
rather, as argued and shown in Chapter II, a result of the political and socio-economic 
processes of the state which have continuously created uneven material, cultural and 
political conditions among ethno-culturally different groups and their members. As 
many have argued and the case studies in this work will show, the provision of 
mechanisms to accommodate minority claims helps to address these conflicts through 
the democratic process and creates the conditions for advancing national integration.  
 
Thirdly, and most importantly, since the state cannot be, and has not been, neutral with 
respect to members of different and unequal ethno-cultural groups, the homogenizing 
nation-building process often exacerbated the crisis of the legitimacy of the state and 
frustrated the possibility of national integration. This is attributable to two factors. The 
first is that, given the prevailing deep ethno-cultural diversity and inequality, not only 
has such neutrality become unattainable, but the lack of it has invariably also 
engendered political and socio-economic inequality between the members of the various 
groups. Secondly, in many of the countries concerned, little attempt was made in 
                                                 
55 Kymlicka (note 10 above) 189.  
56 Lewis (note 5 above) 68. This view is shared by others. KA Busia, for example, posited that ‘[t]he 
African situation … calls for the concept of a nation of different tribes, possessing a diversity of traditions 
and even cultures, inhabiting a common territory, bounded together by the common desire to preserve 
their newly won independence and unity, and by the goals of economic, social, cultural and political 
progress which they share in common, and which they can see can be realized only if they stay together as 
a nation’. KA Busia Africa in Search of Democracy (1976) 116-117.  
57 See ibid 120; Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World UNDP Human Development Report 2004 
Chapter II.  
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practice to observe state neutrality. In many African countries, ‘[p]ost-colonial attempts 
at nation-building were overlaid on top of ethnically defined patronage politics, which 
rapidly reproduced itself within national institutions of states and parties.’58  
 
Indeed, among the many consequences of the homogenising nation-building process, in 
the context of the specific features of diversity in African states the most catastrophic 
was its inherent tendency to foster the co-option of the institutional apparatus of the state 
by one or more dominant groups to the relative exclusion of others.59 Post-colonial 
political developments in many African countries have abundantly attested that state 
power has often been employed to the benefit of relatively strong communities, to the 
disadvantage of others.60 Paradoxically enough, ‘[m]any African one party and military 
regimes, in spite of their supposed aversion to ethnicity … rested on distinctly ethnic 
political foundations and reproduced themselves on the basis of definable, in most cases, 
narrow ethnic alliances.’61 And when some groups are found in control of the state 
apparatus, as shown in Chapter II, the repression of other groups takes, among other 
things, the ‘form of state sanctioned imposition of cultural or political motifs of one or 
more groups on the rest of the population’.62 The excluded groups have often been either 
co-opted or silenced, and when they have protested against discrimination and 
marginalisation they have been subjected to repression.63  
                                                 
58 Berman et al (note 23 above) 8.  
59 See Okafor (note 28 above) 102; Donald R Horowitz Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985) 193-194; 
Alemante (note 2 above) 17; AM Abdullahi ‘The Refugee Crisis in Africa as the Crisis of the Institution 
of the State’ (1994) 6(4) Int J Refuge L 562, 567 & 570-578. In Kenya, it led to the domination of the 
state by the Kikuyu, and, when Arap Moi became president, mostly by Kelengi. In Liberia, the state was 
dominated by Samuel Doe’s Kore ethnic group, in Malawi by the Chewa, in Zaire by Mobutu’s Ngbandi 
ethnic group, in Sudan by northerners and Arabs, in Rwanda by Hutus until 1994, in Burundi by Tutsis, in 
Djibouti by Isa, in Ivory Coast by southern ethnic groups and in Mozambique by southerners. Similar 
patterns prevailed in many other African countries.  
60 On how non-dominant groups felt excluded from the homogenising conception of national unity and 
resisted their resultant marginalisation, see the contributions of Cheryl Hendricks (on South Africa) 
Jacqueline S Solway (on Botswana), Githu Mugai (on Kenya), Mamadou Diouf (on Senegal), Dickson 
Eyoh (on Cameroon) and Falola (on Nigeria) in Berman et al (note 15 above) (arguing that the state in 
Africa has lacked the appropriate power configuration and institutional structure to deter the 
predisposition of particular groups to control it to their benefit to the exclusion of others).  
61 L Laakso & A Olukoshi ‘The Crisis of the Post-colonial Nation-State Project in Africa’ in A Olukoshi 
& L Laakso (eds) Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa (1996) 15.  
62 See EE Osaghae ‘Ethnicity, the State and Constitutionalism in Africa: Preliminary Observations’ in O 
Akiba (ed) Constitutionalism and Society in Africa (2004) 95, 96-97. 
63 See Abdullahi (note 59 above) 567. Okafor observes that ‘[s]ocio-cultural groups have, in some cases 
such as the case of the Ogoni, Katafa and Bajju of Nigeria, been brutally suppressed in the drive to impose 
the power of the central authority on them’. Okafor (note 28 above) 72.  
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Political power has been organised and distributed within the state in such a way that the 
African state has not been a neutral arbiter of the competing interests of its diverse 
constituent groups. In the post-colonial African state, political power took a unitary and 
highly centralised form. Since control or domination of this power by members of one 
group leaves others on the political and socio-economic margins, this has often led to a 
Hobbesian-like rivalry between the constituent groups, which usually degenerates into 
violent conflict.64 Yet, the domination of the state by relatively stronger communities 
often means that the state itself becomes involved in the struggle. This has predisposed 
the state to advance the interests of some ethnic groups while neglecting those of 
others.65  
 
The attempted institutionalisation of a unitary political order and centralisation of power 
amid the prevailing ethno-cultural inequality have also furthered ethno-culturally 
unequal patterns of relations between members of various groups and the state. Not only 
have the constituent groups been unequally represented in the decision-making 
framework of the state, as well as in the bureaucracy and other state organs, but societal 
resources have often also been disproportionately controlled by and distributed in favour 
of dominant groups, further entrenching the inequality and the marginalisation of others. 
With the resultant marginalisation of certain sections of society from the state machinery 
and the spoils of economic development, the ethnic fragmentation inherited from 
colonial rule was further accentuated or otherwise given a new dimension.  
 
It is clear today that the homogenising, state-centric and authoritarian nation-building 
policies of African states have utterly failed.66 As Berman et al noted, ‘the level of 
identification with the state remains very low, the strategy has simply not worked, and in 
many cases has backfired, by fuelling fear and resentment amongst groups who feel 
                                                 
64 See Chapter II.  
65 Okafor (note 28 above) 95.  
66 To be exact, what it resulted in was the further alienation of the state from society, the deterioration of 
the capacity of the state, and ultimately the very disintegration of the state itself. It is in this context that it 
became common in the literature to speak of collapsed states, failed states etc. See IW Zartman (ed) 
Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (1995); MW Mutua 
‘Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together Again: The Dilemmas of the Post-Colonial African State’ 
(1995) 21 Brooklyn J of Int L 505; K Mengisteab ‘New Approaches to State Building in Africa: the Case 
of Ethiopia’s Ethnic-Based Federalism’ (1997) 40(3) African Studies Review 111-132, 116-119.  
 83 
excluded.’67 After more than four decades of nation-building efforts, almost all of these 
states are still faced with two challenges inherited from their colonial past: the urgent 
need to integrate their nations and to accommodate the claims of their constituent sub-
national groups democratically.  
3.3 The influence of the dominant constitutional paradigm of the nation-state  
 
As indicated above, a characteristic of post-colonial African constitutions is that they 
were much influenced by the dominant liberal constitutional paradigm (mainly based on 
the Westminister or the French republican model). Despite the fact that along the way 
some constitutions have incorporated influences from socialist traditions or African 
socialism, and many others have also been scrupulously violated, these constitutions 
contained some of the important elements of the dominant nation-state constitutional 
paradigm which are inhospitable to ethno-cultural accommodation. The most important 
aspects of this paradigm discussed here are the idea of national or popular sovereignty, 
and the definition of state-society relations in terms of individual rights and the related 
idea of common citizenship.  
3.3.1 National (popular) sovereignty  
 
One of the achievements of the modern constitutional state is the shift in the locus of 
sovereignty from the divine right of kings to that of the people. Popular sovereignty 
came to be the very basis on which the edifice of the modern constitutional state was 
erected. In modern constitutionalism, following the American and French Revolutions, 
popular sovereignty has been articulated as a politico-legal expression of the self-image 
of the state as a nation-state. According to this perspective, the state is imagined and 
portrayed as being made up of one people, or a single ‘demos’.68 Indeed, this is formally 
                                                 
67 Berman et al. (note 15 above) 18.  
68 James Tully identifies as the first feature of modern constitutionalism three concepts of popular 
sovereignty that preclude cultural diversity as a constitutive aspect of politics. (Tully note 7 above) 63-64. 
‘The people are sovereign and culturally homogenous in the sense that culture is irrelevant, capable of 
transcended, or uniform.’ Ibid 63. In the first conception of popular sovereignty ‘the people are taken to 
be a society of equal individuals’. The second aspect is that ‘the people are taken to be a society of equal 
individuals who exist at a “modern” level of historical development and recognise as authoritative a set of 
threshold, European institutions, manners and traditions of interpretation’. Ibid. Finally, ‘the people are 
seen as a community bound together by an implicit and substantive common good and a shared set of 
European institutions, manners and traditions of interpretation’. Ibid 64.  
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expressed in the very first words with which modern constitutions following the United 
States Constitution open: ‘We the People …’.  
 
One of the most important features of the modern constitutional paradigm is this 
narration of the unity and singularity of the sovereign people. This is meant to imagine 
the homogeneity of the people, and seeks to attribute to the population of the state a 
common identity. As Nergis Canefe has observed, ‘[i]n the European nation-state 
model, homogeneity rather than heterogeneity of the social texture was the foundation 
for the legitimating of self-determination and sovereignty.’69 Such projection or 
characterisation of the population of the modern state as one people or one nation 
provided the basis on which the state is attributed with an individual identity as a 
‘nation’, which is one of the features of the modern constitutional state.70 This 
individual identity of the state as a ‘nation’ also encapsulates the unity of the sovereign 
people and their constitutional characterisation as a homogenous unit. This is the 
common identity that is constitutionally given to the citizens of the state by virtue of 
which the bond between the populace and the institutions of the state is engraved in law.  
 
It is this feature of modern constitutionalism that European states employed to achieve 
the processes of nationalising themselves. Similarly, this dominant paradigm, 
bequeathed to Africa as part of the legacy of European colonial rule, has been 
religiously pursued in the discourse and formal structures of the post-colonial African 
state, to facilitate and legitimise a homogenizing nation-building process. Rather than 
building nationhood on the basis of the indigenous ethno-political communities forming 
the African state, as argued by Arthur Lewis, it was the European experience of 
constructing relatively homogenous nation-states, culminating in the modern 
constitutional state, that controlled the imagination of post-colonial African 
constitutionalists and policy-makers.71 As this dominant paradigm admits of only one 
people and a constitutionally sanctioned common identity, it tends not only to overlook 
                                                 
69 N Canefe ‘Sovereignty Without Nationalism? A Critical Assessment of Minority Rights Beyond the 
Sovereign Nation-State Model’ in M Sellers (ed) The New World Order Sovereignty, Human Rights, and 
the Self-Determination of Peoples (1996) 91, 107.  
70 See Tully (note 7 above); Taylor (note 14 above); SA Dersso ‘The Socio-Historical and Political 
Processes Leading to the Emergence of the Discourse on Minorities’ in Solomon Dersso et al (eds) 
Minority and Indigenous Rights in Africa (forthcoming 2008).  
71 See G. Selassie (note 2 above) 13-21; also Deng (note 19 above).   
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societal plurality, but also to encourage its assimilation into the common national 
identity, even if such identity is based on the language and cultural attributes of a 
dominant culture.72 As Julius O. Ihonvbere notes, ‘most first generation constitutions in 
the continent pretended that ethnicity, cultural and religious diversity did not exist and 
that what was important was the so-called quest for nationhood.’73 
 
It has been within this constitutional framework that post-colonial African states have 
pursued their mission of nation-building, aiming at the removal of what they called 
‘tribal divisions’ and identities and the sanctioning of the state-chosen identity. And this 
state-chosen identity has either been artificially constructed or created by nationalising 
the cultural attributes of the dominant group, to the exclusion of all others.74 Indeed, 
almost all the constitutions of post-colonial Africa speak of ‘We the people …’. The 
implication is that there is only one demos, constituted by individual members (as 
opposed to the various constituent groups by which the African state is constituted), and 
the individual members share a collective character (to use Frank Michelman’s term)75 
as a people. Accordingly, in constitutional terms, the post-colonial state imagines itself 
and is therefore portrayed, at least in legal and political discourse, as the political and 
institutional expression of a single community of individuals as ‘people’, without regard 
to the histories, political traditions and cultures of the constituent communities.76  
 
The unitary conception of sovereignty of the people is also given constitutional 
expression in the nature of the organisation of the internal sovereignty (political power) 
                                                 
72 Tully states that ‘[t]he requirements of one sovereign people …one nation and one uniform order of 
modern legal and political institutions make the recognition and accommodation of diversity impossible.’ 
Tully (note 7 above) 140.  
73 JO Ihonvbere ‘Politics of Constitutional Reforms and Democratization in Africa’ (2000) XLI IJCS 1, 
22.  
74 As Wani notes, ‘[t]he conception of nationhood embraced by Africans at independence was of an 
homogenous society, speaking the same language and bearing the same basic attitudes and habits. 
Tribalism, or pluralism for that matter, was perceived to be inconsistent with this conception of 
nationhood.’ (Wani note 18 above) 634.  
75 FI Michelman ‘Constitutional Authorship’ in Larry Alexander (ed) Constitutionalism: Philosophical 
Foundations (1998) 64, 80.  
76 This has acquired particular attention in countries that were under French colonial rule. In all but one of 
the constitutions of these countries, the state has been portrayed as being constituted by one people. The 
exception is the 1979 Constitution of Benin which amended the independence constitution, although the 
guarantees stipulated have in the end been empty. See Selassie (note 2 above) at his note 69.  
 86 
of the state.77 ‘In terms of classical illustrations of constitutional theory of the nation-
state,’ writes Tierney, ‘sovereignty as a legal concept is conceived of in unitary terms.’78 
What James Tully refers to as ‘political and legal monism’ captures the way in which 
this is expressed in modern constitutions. Accordingly, internal sovereignty is expressed 
through, among other things, ‘one national system of institutionalised legal and political 
authority rather than many’.79 This implies that within the dominant constitutional 
paradigm there can only be a single locus of authority within a state and sovereign 
power is undivided, and in the post-colonial African state neither was it sought to be 
limited. In terms of the internal power arrangement of the state, sovereign power is thus 
centrally controlled and organised in a unitary form. This is the only aspect of the 
constitutional framework that African states have further strengthened and jealously 
guarded, as John Stone observes.80  
 
The constitutional revisions made in many African states subsequent to the departure of 
the colonial powers were meant further to accentuate the unitaristic power structure 
already established under the independent constitutions, and led to a high degree of 
centralisation of power.81 Subsequent constitutional changes involving the removal of 
forms of decentralisation and constitutional limitations aggravated this by creating 
unlimited governments.82 This has made it possible for many African governments not 
only to repress demands for dispersion of sovereign power among the constituent 
communities – as, among others, in the Sudan, Ghana, Ethiopia, Senegal, Algeria, Chad, 
                                                 
77 As Macklem has it, ‘constitutional law comprehends sovereignty as referring to political and legal 
authority within states’. P Macklem Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (2001) 109. 
Also see IDetter de Lupis International Law and the Independent State 2 ed (1987) 3; S Assefa ‘Two 
Concepts of Sovereignty’ paper prepared for a symposium held in Mekelle on the occasion of the twenty-
fifth anniversary of the TPLF (24 February 2000) in Addis Tribune 
<http://www.addistribune.com/Archives/2000/03/24‐03‐00/Two.htm> accessed on 20 August 
2005.   
78 S Tierney Constitutional Law and National Pluralism (2004) 102-103.  
79 Tully (note 7 above) 66.  
80 J Stone ‘Ethnicity versus the State: The Dual Claims of State Coherence and Ethnic Self-
Determination’ in Rothchild and Olorunsola (note 3 above) 85, 89.  
81 See VT Le Vine ‘The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism in West Africa’ 35(2) The J of Modern African 
Studies (1997) 181-206, 188-198.  
82 Ibid 188-189. See also F Reyntjens ‘Authoritarianism for Francophone Africa from the Colonial to the 
Post-Colonial State’ (1988) Third World Legal Studies 59; ‘Recent Developments in Public Law of 
Francophone African States’ (1986) 30 (2) The J of Modern African Studies 75-90. AS Alexander Jr., 
‘The Ivory Coast Constitution: An Accelerator, not a Brake’ (1963) 3(1) The J of Modern African Studies’ 
293-311.  
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Nigeria, and Mozambique – but also to abrogate constitutionally entrenched autonomy 
regimes as well as any form of group rights – as in Kenya,83 Uganda,84 the DRC,85 
Cameroon86 and Tanzania.87  
3.3.2 The limits of the unitarist conception of national sovereignty  
 
The unitary conception of popular (national) sovereignty and the nature of the political 
organisation it engendered are problematic in multi-ethnic societies in general, and in 
Africa in particular, on several counts. In the first place, it does not cohere with the 
prevailing ethno-cultural diversity that is characteristic of the African state. Writing on 
Nigeria, Kelechi A Kalu states that ‘[a]s a product of [this] European intellectual 
tradition [of the constitutional state with a homogenous and singular popular 
sovereignty], the Nigerian state is assumed to possess one identity’.88 He argues with 
insight that ‘[s]uch fallacy of a single alternative is not only ignorant of the history of 
Nigeria’s state formation, but when superimposed on existing conflictual identities 
makes Nigeria prone to self-implosion.’89 Moreover, it has not only justified the process 
of homogenisation and coercive national unity, but also contributed to the neglect of the 
existing inequalities among members of various groups. This has had the effect of 
integrating members of these groups into the state on an unequal basis, leading to the 
inevitable relegation of members of disadvantaged groups to the status of second- or 
third-class citizenship. In the particular circumstances of African states, it also invites 
the explosive question of who should control political power, often leading to the kind 
                                                 
83 See notes 22-23 above and accompanying text.  
84 See notes 24-25 above and accompanying text.  
85 See notes 26-29 above accompanying text.  
86 See note 37 above.  
87 The 1965 Constitution of Tanzania provided for some form of federal union between Zanzibar and 
Tanganyika, leading to the establishment of Tanzania. Shivji observes: ‘[t]he articles of the union between 
Zanzibar and Tanganyika provided for some form of federation. The attitudes and expressions of the 
Zanzibari people since have clearly demonstrated their preference for a loose federation with substantial 
autonomy for Zanzibar. Yet, mainland authorities have been pushing for greater integration – or as it has 
been put “consolidation of the union”. Every opportunity has been taken to further integration, at least 
constitutionally, even though in practice it has been found difficult to effect such integration due to the 
resistance of Zanzibaris. The result is that the question of the union has become one of the most explosive 
political issues in the country.’ IG Shivji ‘State and Constitutionalism: A New Democratic Perspective’ in 
IG Shivji State and Constitutionalism an African Debate (1991) 27-54, 34.  
88 KA Kalu ‘Constitutionalism in Nigeria: A Conceptual Analysis of Ethnicity and Politics’ (2004) 6 West 
Africa Review.  
89 Ibid.  
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of ethnic antagonism and violent conflicts witnessed in many African states, including 
relatively stable ones, as the 2007 post-election election crisis in Kenya attests.  
 
Probably the most serious flaw of the unitary conception of popular sovereignty in the 
context of the colonial origin of the state and its deep ethno-cultural diversity and 
inequality is the nature of the internal organisation of political power it entrenched. This 
structural flaw defines the essence of the institutional or legitimacy crisis of the post-
colonial state, and constitutes the root basis of the issue of minorities in Africa. From the 
perspective of this study, there are two particularly important aspects to this crisis. The 
first is that the state is ‘a generally unalloyed external imposition rather than … a largely 
organic entity created through an internal process of consensus-building.’90 Moreover, 
its unitarist and highly centralised organisation of political power generally tend to 
induce ethnic rivalry and conflict rather than accommodation and peaceful coexistence. 
Most importantly, it failed, as discussed in Chapter II and is further shown in the next 
chapter, to create just and democratic political and socio-economic processes that 
guarantee and enhance genuine equality for members of different groups in all aspects 
of public life.  
 
The second and related issue that forms an important aspect of the institutional crisis of 
the post-colonial African state has been the absence of ‘fit’ between the institutions of 
the state and the indigenous social structures and values of the constituent ethno-cultural 
communities. This has caused what Mutua called ‘a crisis of cultural and philosophical 
identity’91 and has also led to the alienation of the citizenry from the processes of the 
state. The devaluation and suppression of indigenous languages, cultures and traditions 
within the framework of the unitary and homogenous conception and application of 
sovereignty has further accentuated this disconnection.92 
                                                 
90 OC Okafor ‘“Righting”, Restructuring, and Rejuvenating the Postcolonial African State: The Case for 
the Establishment of an AU Special Commission on National Minorities’ (2007) 13 African Yearbook of 
Int L 2005 43, 49-50.  
91 This crisis is expressed in terms of the non-recognition, marginalisation and ‘delegitimation of values, 
notions, philosophies about the individual, society, politics, and nature developed over centuries’. MW 
Mutua ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of 
Duties’ (1995) 35 Virginia J Int L 339, 343.  
92 As Abdullahi observes, ‘[t]he absence of ethnically based values in both the formation and management 
of African States and the exclusion of ethnicity as a component in political management accentuate the … 
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Another problem of the unitarist conception of sovereignty, at least in the context of 
Africa, has been its tendency to encourage concentration of power at the centre. As 
already noted, one of the developments witnessed during the post-colonial period in 
tandem with the homogenising nation-building process has been a centralisation of 
power. This has had the effect of narrowing the political space and making the central 
government a seat of fierce rivalry among various groups for its control or domination, 
which, as discussed earlier, in many countries degenerated into violent conflicts.  
3.3.3 The individual-rights-based conception of the state-society 
relationship  
 
The development of the modern constitutional state additionally involved the 
transformation of the basic unit of society from hierarchically organised social groups to 
the individual.93 Against the background of this transformation and under the influence 
of the political thought of the Enlightenment, starting with Hobbes, who began the 
analysis of political society from an individualist perspective, the individual and the 
state became the only relevant actors in terms of which modern constitutionalism 
defines the state-society relationship.94 In Hobbes and Locke it is individuals in the state 
of nature that come together to form the political community. Hobbes speaks of the 
agreement of ‘a multitude of men’;95 Locke talks of ‘any number of men’.96 In 
contemporary contractarian theories, such as that of  John Rawls, those who negotiate 
the principles of justice behind the veil of ignorance are also individuals.97 This 
theoretical understanding is reproduced in the way by which the state-society 
relationship is imagined and formulated in modern constitutional law. Accordingly, the 
                                                                                                                                               
crisis of the State’. Abdullahi (note 59 above) 567. See also DW Nabudere ‘Traditional and Modern 
Political Systems in Contemporary Governance in Africa’ (2004) 3 (1) J of African Elections 13.  
93 As Charles Taylor’s analysis aptly demonstrates, this transformation corresponds with the rejection of 
honour as determining the status of individuals in the ancien régime, and its replacement by the notion of 
dignity, which has become the basis of the modern democratic state. Charles Taylor ‘The Politics of 
Recognition’ in Amy Gutman (ed) Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (1994) 25-73, 
26-27. 
94 For a detailed analysis of this and its implications for the recognition of ethnic groups as relevant 
entities see V van Dyke ‘The Individual, the State and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory’ in W 
Kymlicka (ed) The Rights of Minority Cultures (1995) 31-56; see also RN Clinton ‘The Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples as Collective Group Rights’ (1990) 32 Arizona LR 739, 740; Tully (note 7 above) 63.  
95 See T Hobbes Leviathan (1651)  (CB Macpherson ed., 1968).  
96 See J Locke Two Treatises of Government (1690) (ed Peter Laslett 1960, 1992) 330-331.  
97 See Johan Rawls A Theory of Justice (1971).   
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people or the nation that constitutes the modern constitutional state ‘are taken to be a 
society of equal individuals’.98 This tendency of modern constitutionalism to define the 
nature of the state-society relationship on the basis of the duality of the individual, on 
the one hand, and the state, on the other, fails to have ‘any regard for any other actors on 
the social and political stage.’99  
 
Two devices are used in the modern constitutional state to define the boundaries of the 
state-society relationship on such terms. The first is the distinction often made between 
the public or the political and the social or the private. John Rawls, for example, 
distinguishes the political from the associational, which is voluntary in ways that the 
political is not; and from the personal and the familial, which are affectional domains, in 
ways that the political is not.100 This distinction identifies certain matters as falling 
within the public domain, and hence as matters which the state can legitimately regulate. 
On the other hand, it relegates other matters to the private sphere, which the state cannot 
regulate by its laws and institutions. One such matter is ethnic membership. This is a 
matter with respect to which the constitutional state should be neutral, according to 
mainstream liberal thinking.101 Properly understood, this entails not only that the state 
should not be biased against any particular group, but also that it is ‘supposed to be free 
of all identifying characteristics or associations with particular groups or individuals.’102 
‘This separation of state and ethnicity’, as Kymlicka terms it, ‘precludes any legal or 
governmental recognition of ethnic groups, or any use of ethnic criteria in the 
distribution of rights, resources, and duties.’103  
 
‘This vision of constitutionalism,’ maintains Selassie, ‘animated African states at the 
time of independence and has since remained the dominant vision.’104 As the state 
                                                 
98 Tully (note 7 above) 63.  
99 G Selassie (note 2 above) 16; see also RR Garet ‘Community and Existence: The Rights of Groups’ 
(1983) 56 South Carolina LR 1001, 1013-1014; N Glazer ‘Individual Rights against Group Rights’ in 
Kymlicka (note 94 above) 125-126.  
100 J Rawls Political Liberalism (2005) 137.  
101 According to Nathan Glazer, for example, in a liberal society the constitutional state ‘set before itself 
the model that group membership is purely private, a shifting matter of personal choice and degree, 
something that may be weakened and dismissed as other identities takeover’. As above,134. 
102 Y Tamir Liberal Nationalism (1993) 141.  
103 Kymlicka (note 10 above) 4.  
104 G Selassie (note 2 above) 16. Similarly Shivji argues that the ‘liberal perspective was part of the 
heritage left by the colonial power in the form of independence constitutions’. Shivji (note 27 above) 28.  
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should be identified as embodying no cultural attribute particular to any group, but 
rather as a supra-ethnic construction possessing some abstract identity, what many post-
colonial governments sought to achieve through nation-building was the creation of 
states based upon a nationalism transcending the existing ethnic cleavages characterising 
their states. This has often denied the various groups lumped together under the unitary 
state any legal and political space. It has rather served to the advantage of those post-
colonial governments which rejected ethno-cultural diversity as divisive and 
backward.105 Preoccupied with unitary nation-building, the framers of the post-colonial 
constitutions did not concern themselves with the dangers of unchecked political power, 
nor with the threat that failing to address these dangers posed to the hopes and ambitions 
of peoples for a peaceful and prosperous statehood. As the quotation at the beginning of 
this chapter illustrates, many African governments believed that they would achieve 
nationhood as a society of individual citizens with equal individual rights, without 
regard to, and by transcending, existing ethno-cultural identifications. This vision was 
eloquently summed up by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana:  
 
We must insist that in Ghana, in the higher reaches of our national life, there should be no 
reference to Fantes, Ashantis, Ewes, fas, dagombas, “starangers”, and so further, but we should 
call ourselves Ghanians – all brothers and sisters, members of the same community – the state of 
Ghana.106  
 
In many post-colonial African countries the private-public distinction was taken to the 
extreme. As noted above, in some cases the establishment of any form of association or 
movement on the basis of ethnic membership was banned.107 After Nkrumah was ousted 
from power by a coup in 1966, a law was enacted allowing the establishment of political 
parties,108 but it prohibited the establishment of political parties on an ethnic or religious 
basis, and even the use by any political party of names, words or symbols intended by 
                                                 
105 ‘[A]s soon as the conception of an independent nationhood subsuming tribal divisions was born,’ IM 
Lewis noted, ‘tribalism was relegated to the status of a dangerous, subversive factionalism’. IM Lewis in 
C Legum and J Drysdale (eds) Africa: Contemporary Record 1969-1970 (1971) A13.  
106 K Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom (1961) 212.  
107 See JW Clay ‘Nation, Tribe and Ethnic Group in Africa’ (1985) 9 Cultural Survival Quarterly 2 
(discussing the various efforts of African states to ‘eliminate’ ethnic identity).  
108 Political Parties Decree issued by the Government of Ghana on 28 April 1969.  
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such party to arouse tribal or religious feelings.109 This has been the dominant feature of 
African statecraft throughout the post-colonial period and beyond. In Kenya, President 
Daniel Arap Moi ‘startled his country in July 1986 by securing the party’s elite’s 
support for a resolution calling for the “wind up” of all tribal associations.’110 In 
Burundi, the government of Albin Nyamoya ‘went as far as declaring that ethnic names 
should not be used any longer’.111  
 
In this way, the private-public distinction that modern constitutionalism has envisaged 
has been stretched to its limits as a means to forge national unity, usually against and at 
the expense of ethnic identity – all that, however, to end up achieving anything but 
national integration. In the first place, it is not possible to maintain that distinction. This 
is because ‘[g]overnment decisions on languages, internal boundaries, public holidays, 
and state symbols unavoidably involve recognizing, accommodating, and supporting the 
needs and identities of particular ethnic and national groups.’112 Moeover, as we have 
seen above, in the practice of the post-colonial African state this distinction has not in 
any case been followed.  
 
The other device employed in the definition of the state-society relationship in modern 
constitutional law is the protection of the rights and liberties of the individual. Since in 
modern constitutional thought the individual is often imagined as standing in opposition 
to the state, modern constitutionalism defines the free domain of the individual, which 
the state is required to respect and protect, through the idea of individual rights and 
liberties. Premised on the Lockean and Jeffersonian view that the principal purpose of 
the state is to ensure the preservation of individual rights, modern constitutionalism 
demands that the state guarantee those rights and liberties to the individuals forming part 
of it. 113  
 
                                                 
109 Asante (note 31 above) 96.  
110 Rothchild and Olorunsola (note 3 above) 7.  
111 JB Ejobowah ‘The Limits and Possibilities of Conflict-Reduction Strategies in Africa’s Polyethnic 
States’ in EI Udogu (eds) The Issue of Political Ethnicity in Africa (2001) 149, 177.  
112 Kymlicka (note 10 above) 108. See also see Berman et al (note 23 above) 16.  
113 Ronald Dworkin thus held that constitutionalism is ‘a system that establishes individual legal rights 
that the dominant legislature does not have the power to override or compromise’. R Dworkin 
‘Constitutionalism and Democracy’ (1995) 3 European J of Philosophy 2.  
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The language of individual rights is also meant to define state-society relations in other 
ways. Members of society are seen to relate to the state as individual citizens, not as 
members of particular groups.114 And through these rights and liberties, the state defines 
the status of members of its population as equal citizens. A characteristic of the modern 
constitutional state is accordingly the attribution of common (universal) citizenship to its 
people(s) on an individual basis. This entails that there has to be one package of 
individual rights and liberties that apply commonly and equally to all individuals, and 
that all citizens, as equals qua citizen, should be treated in the same way before the law.  
 
Despite the ambivalence that many African governments have shown to the protection 
of individual rights, the constitutions they received and designed enshrined these rights, 
albeit with varying degrees of emphasis and form. Accordingly, the constitutional 
systems of most, if not all, African countries have been framed and operated in such a 
way that individual rights can be guaranteed and enforced, notwithstanding rampant 
rights violations and the authoritarian nature of the post-colonial state. Many of the 
constitutions of anglophone countries accordingly retain an elaborate bill of rights. They 
also expressly empower courts to enforce such rights. Francophone countries likewise 
give recognition to individual rights in their constitutions. Unlike anglophone countries, 
however, they recognised individual rights in the preambles to their constitutions. For 
example, the Preamble of the Constitution of Chad of 1962 declares its commitment to 
the principles set forth in the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789, and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948. It elaborates this further by 
listing the individual rights recognised. According to Asante, unlike the constitutions of 
anglophone countries, these constitutions have provided for ‘these rights in categorical 
terms, but in the form of general directive principles rather than precise legal rights.’115 
All the same, the constitutional systems of these countries have also been hospitable to 
claims of individual rights and operated on the basis of common citizenship. 
 
Consistent with the liberal constitutional tradition, a common feature of many of the 
African constitutions was that they did not provide for group-specific rights. Shivji notes 
                                                 
114 See Glazer (note 99 above) 125.  
115 Asante (note 31 above) 75.  
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that ‘[t]he approach in African Constitutions … to the nationality question … is total 
silence on nationality rights even where the constitution has elaborate provisions on 
individual rights and freedoms.’ He further says that ‘[w]here the constitution does avert 
to the issue of nationalities … as in Nigeria, it subtly reflects assimilationist 
tendency.’116 So, following the dominant modern constitutional paradigm, in the 
constitutions of African countries only individual rights have been recognised.  
 
Of course, most have provided for rights of non-discrimination on the basis of various 
group characteristics, including race and ethnic origin. This indirect acknowledgement 
is, however, as close as they have come to guaranteeing rights on the basis of group 
membership. Even then, the aims were, at least on paper, to ensure that the state remains 
neutral on matters such as ethnicity, or to promote unity. The logical consequence of this 
is the exclusion of constitutional or legislative designs involving the granting of rights or 
distribution of benefits on the basis of ethnic membership. This sought to dictate that all 
the citizens of the state relate and interact with the state as individuals only, rather than 
as members of particular groups.  
 
The problem is not merely that the constitutions of African countries have failed to 
incorporate any guarantees that accommodate diversity and justly resolve group-based 
claims. These constitutions, and the legal systems they instituted, have been inhospitable 
to claims other than those formulated in individual terms. The net effect of this hostility 
has been to preclude – not just the articulation of group claims, which has often been 
prohibited – but even the formulation of ethnic-based claims as individual-rights claims, 
such as on the basis of freedom of expression and freedom of association, individual 
liberties that could advance group interests. In many of these countries any expression of 
ethnic nationalism has been prohibited, and it has been ‘an invective to be referred to as 
a tribalist’.117  
 
The difficulty with the definition of state-society relations in terms of individual rights is 
not limited to the African state, but applies to all multi-ethnic societies generally. 
                                                 
116 Shivji (note 27 above) 35.  
117 Wani (note 18 above) 633.  
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Vernon van Dyke, for example, argues: ‘It is not enough to think in terms of a two level 
relationship, with the individual at one level and the state at another …. Considering the 
heterogeneity of … the population of virtually every existing state, it is also necessary to 
think of ethnic communities … and to include them among the kinds of right-and-duty 
bearing units’.118 In the African context, it is generally believed that the exclusive focus 
of the discourse on individual human rights is limited, as it ignores and leaves no space 
for group identity and the group-based rights embedded in African cultures and 
traditions. It runs in the face of the particular importance attached to group membership 
by many communities in the continent.119 The recognition and elaboration of peoples’ 
rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in part sought to rectify 
this omission and complement individual rights by recognising communities in the 
domain of the state-society relationship and in rights discourse.  
 
The validity of universal citizenship has also been challenged in recent years, 
particularly from the vantage point of minorities and other similar historically non-
recognised groups. Some have argued that it has the tendency to enforce homogeneity of 
citizens.120 It denies recognition to and public space for the expression of the cultural 
distinctness of minorities, and hence is assimilationist in its operation and 
discriminatory in its effect.121 It is further argued that in the context of ethno-cultural 
diversity and socio-economic and political inequality among members of different 
groups, the principle of common citizenship tends to perpetuate oppression or 
disadvantage.122 This is partly because universal citizenship assumes that cultural 
membership has no effect on the enjoyment of equal rights, or else its operation assumes 
the cultural equality, if not homogeneity, of citizens belonging to different ethno-
cultural groups.  
 
                                                 
118 Van Dyke (note 94) 31-56, 31.  
119 See Chapters II & IV.  
120 IM Young ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship’ in RE 
Goodin & P Pettit (eds) Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology (1997) 256-272, 257; C Taylor 
‘The Politics of Recognition’ in A Gutmann (ed) Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition 
(1994) 25. 
121 See Taylor (ibid); Tully (note 7 above) Chapter 1; Canefe (note 69 above) 103-109.  
122 See Young (note 118 above); Tully (note 7 above); Kymlicka (note 10 above); M Freeman Human 
Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach (2002) 117.  
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In the African context, the possibility and validity of maintaining universal citizenship 
without regard to factual differences, including those based on ethnic membership, has 
been and continues to be highly questionable, to say the least. Speaking in particular on 
the right to participation, Ben Nwabueze argues that in states composed of diverse and 
unequal ethnic groups who compete for control or a share of political power, as is the 
case in most African countries, ‘a right to … participate in government based solely on 
individual merit (common citizenship) is no less unacceptable than based on birth or 
wealth.’ He continues: ‘[T]he problem of social justice and democracy in a multi-racial 
or multi-ethnic society is about how to give all the component groups the opportunity to 
participate in both the elective and non-elective organs, arms and agencies of 
government, since only thus can each feel that it is a full member of the nation.’123 
Because it is generally indifferent to the situation of disadvantaged groups, universal 
citizenship can also lead to instability and conflicts as it has no effective framework to 
address group-based demands for inclusion and recognition.  
 
L Adele Jinadu writes:  
 
The inclusivist notion of common citizenship, based on individual rights, that has tended to 
underline this (Africa’s) state formation process, has been problematic in Africa not only because 
virtually all the countries on the continent are ‘ethnically split’ … but also because the political 
economy of colonial rule, and the state formation process that went pari passu with it encouraged 
and deepened intense ethnic conflict on the continent, differentiating citizens into stratified 
aggregations of first-class, second-class and third-class citizens.124  
 
Under such circumstances, the claim of the state that it guarantees equal rights for all on 
the basis of universal citizenship can only obscure the problem of group inequality and 
claims for recognition.125 It cannot meet the interests of minorities to have their 
languages, cultures, histories and traditions are given due recognition and guarantee.126 
Worse still, as the experience of many African countries shows, the attempt to enforce 
universal citizenship and nation-building has led to and often precipitates ‘ethnic 
                                                 
123 B Nwabueze Constitutional Democracy in Africa Vol 1 (2003) 55-56.  
124 LA Jinadu Explaining and Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Towards a Cultural Theory of 
Democracy Claude Ake Memorial Papers No 1 (2007) 10.  
125 Ibid.  
126 G Selassie (note 2 above) 27.  
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resentment, disaffection, resistance, and political disorder’127 and, in extreme cases, 
violent conflicts. This is essentially because, being difference-blind in its conception and 
operation, it ignores and even gives a semblance of legitimacy to the continuing socio-
economic, cultural and political inequalities, and hence to the second- or third-class 
status of disadvantaged groups, albeit the skewed relationship of the state with different 
groups is also in part to blame. It is clear from this that universal citizenship is not only 
inadequate to resolve ethno-cultural conflicts, but it even tends to exacerbate them. The 
unavoidable conclusion is that although universal citizenship, defined in terms of 
individual rights, is a crucial component of any democratic society, it must be 
complemented by group-specific rights or arrangements.  
3.4 The ‘second African independence’ and the neglect of the issue of minorities  
 
As a result of the above developments in the three decades since independence, almost 
all African states witnessed ethnic rivalries which led to not only social divisions and 
conflicts, but also a weakening of democratic institutions and an attendant rise of 
authoritarianism. Under the domination of one-party, military or no-party regimes, and 
with support from either of the two blocs in the Cold War, most African states came to 
have all-powerful presidents with unchecked executive powers and domination over 
legislatures, reminiscent of the absolute monarchs of 17th-century Europe.128 
Democratic rights such as the right to political participation (including through voting 
and the formation and running of political parties) and freedoms of the press, 
expression, association and assembly, among others, were all curtailed or systematically 
made inoperative. Rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and constitutionalism 
were all abused or else rendered useless. Human rights were either suspended or 
routinely violated. Corruption, nepotism, incompetence and gross misgovernance 
prevailed. Economic growth has also generally been declining, with governments failing 
                                                 
127 Ibid 28, 29. 
128 According to Samuel Huntington, the majority of African countries were either ‘personal dictatorship, 
military regimes, one party authoritarian systems or a combination of these three’. S Huntington The 
Third Wave of Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (1991) 295. The list of tyrants include Idi 
Amin of Uganda, Mengistu Hailemariam of Ethiopia, Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, Kamuzu Banda of 
Malawi, Mobutu Seseseko of former Zaire, etc.  
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to meet the basic needs of their people such as food, shelter, drinking water, schooling 
etc, leading some scholars to refer to the post-colonial state as the ‘irrelevant state’.129  
 
As alluded to above, apart from the internal conditions of these states, most importantly, 
the superpower ideological struggle and imperial rivalry that played itself out in the 
politics of many African countries during the first three decades of the post-colonial 
period cultivated many of these ailments. Some analysts agree that almost all of the 
post-independence regimes actively solicited support from either the former USSR or 
the United States to sustain their grip on power.130 This is one of the most significant 
factors that explains the long duration of authoritarian rule by the likes of Arap Moi of 
Kenya, Mobutu of former Zaire, and Banda of Malawi.131  
 
With the unceremonious end of the Cold War in 1989, the authoritarian rulers and the 
highly weakened (but highly centralised and authoritarian) post-colonial states were left 
exposed. The door was wide open for the expression of hitherto suppressed political 
dissent and societal grievances.132 Almost everywhere on the continent, people rose up – 
in most cases spontaneously and without clearly organised and historically established 
political leadership – to demand long-overdue political and socio-economic changes. 
The post-1990 period has therefore been characterised by a wave of political turbulence 
sweeping through Africa. Described by some as the ‘second African independence or 
liberation’,133 this has brought about a process of constitutional change and political 
reform in many countries.  
 3.4.1 The nature of post-1990 constitutional reform 
 
                                                 
129 See J Ihonbvere ‘The “irrelevant” State, Ethnicity and the Quest for Nationhood in Africa’ (1994) 17 
Ethnic and Racial Studies 42-60.  
130 As Edward Jaycox puts it, during the Cold War, ‘there was practically no African state that was not 
propped up by the East or West for its legitimacy’. Quoted in M Owusu ‘Domesticating Democracy: 
Culture, Civil Society and Constitutionalism in Africa’ (January 1997) 39(1) Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 120-152, 130.  
131 According to a 1990 survey of African heads of state since independence, of the 22 longest-serving 
African heads of state then in power, one was a president for life, three had been in office for 30 to 31 
years, seven for 22 to 29 years, eight for 11 to 20 years, and four for 10 years. As quoted in Owusu (ibid) 
142.  
132 See See R Joseph ‘Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives’ 
(April 1997) 29(3) Comparative Politics 363- 382, 363.  
133 As above 363-382.  
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Although very broad in aspiration, this new wave of democratic change was largely 
limited to addressing certain aspects of the problems of the post-colonial African state. 
The issues that this democratic and constitutional reform process focussed on were 
authoritarianism, unlimited government, human-rights violations and the lack of a 
human-rights culture, and the restriction of political rights, including the formation and 
running of political parties, and multiparty elections.  
 
As can be gathered from the previous sections in this chapter, the post-colonial African 
state inherited and further perfected the use of violence and repression as a mode of 
governance.134 Dissent was not tolerated, and almost any form of political opposition 
was severely punished. African governments have in many ways been tyrannical, with 
no respect for the interests and wishes of their people. The rise of authoritarianism in 
post-colonial Africa involved a centralisation of power and the progressive removal of 
various institutional limits established under the early independence constitutions. This 
led to the emergence of unlimited governments, leaving no place, in practice, for the 
rule of law and constitutionalism.135 Moreover, unlimited government, with all its 
failures to deliver on the promises of economic progress and political liberties, soon 
became a source of ethnic clientelism and repression.136  
 
Related to the problem of authoritarian rule and centralisation of power have been the 
prohibition of political pluralism and the curtailment of citizens’ political liberties. It has 
been noted above that the one-party system became an African political orthodoxy, such 
that ‘in almost all the independent countries of sub-Saharan Africa free political 
competition was eliminated either by the establishment of the one-party state or the 
complete replacement of civilian politicians by military rulers.’137 Political liberties such 
                                                 
134 See, for more, M Meredith The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence (2005, 2006) 
Chapter 13 ‘The Coming of Tyrants’ & Chapter 23 ‘The Struggle for Democracy’; J Reader Africa: A 
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as the freedoms listed above were, for all practical purposes, disallowed.138 Those who 
dared to practise them did so on pain of imprisonment, torture and even death. People 
were effectively denied, as in colonial times, any possibility of exercising their right to 
self-determination through participation in the management of public affairs. As 
multiparty politics gave way to one-party rule, political liberties were lost to allow 
despotism and repression to reign.  
 
The liberation struggle for which Africans laid down their lives was expected to bring 
freedom from not only colonial rule but also from the attendant violations of the rights 
and dignity of colonial peoples. The struggle was undoubtedly as much for self-rule as 
for the achievement of economic development and for the rights and liberties of 
individuals as well as communities. However, within a few years these promises of 
independence were betrayed in almost all African countries. Human-rights guarantees 
were honoured more in their breach and violation than in their respect and protection. 
‘[T]he idea that government must be in accordance with the rule of law in ways that 
uphold the fundamental individual and collective rights of all citizens has not been 
observed by the post-colonial states.’139 As Osaghe has observed, it is only logical that 
‘[o]ne of the areas of national life where (post-1990) democracy is expected to make a 
major difference and facilitate development is the enjoyment and protection of human 
rights.’140  
 
These were also regimes that squandered the meagre resources of their countries and 
allowed the embezzlement of state money and rampant corruption, leaving the state 
without the means to provide for basic services such as health, sanitation, justice, water 
and education.  
 
There is no doubt that all these are among the most serious democratic deficiencies of 
Africa’s post-colonial political order. Post-1990 democratic and constitutional reforms 
in Africa have legitimately sought to address them. The problem with this diagnosis is, 
however, that it does not identify all the problems of democratic governance and 
                                                 
138 Nwabueze (note 135 above) 150-153.  
139 An-Na‘im (note 135 above) 14.  
140 EE Osaghae ‘Making Democracy Work in Africa’ (2004) 3(1) J of African Elections 1, 6.  
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legitimate statehood in Africa, but deals largely with the symptoms alone. The various 
ailments of the post-colonial order identified for resolution by post-1990 
democratisation processes are in reality attributable to the institutional crisis of the state. 
This is an area that has not been sufficiently problematised and articulated in the post-
1990 constitutional changes and political reforms adopted by the majority of African 
countries. The issue of minorities, which is the product and an important manifestation 
of the crisis, has not also figured as a critical issue that has to be addressed by the new 
democratic and constitutional reforms.  
3.4.2 The nature of post-1990 constitutional changes and democracy in 
Africa and their limitations  
 
Clearly, the problem with the post-Cold War constitutional reforms and processes of 
democratisation in Africa relates as much to the gap in the nature of the proposed 
reforms as to the diagnosis of the problems sought to be addressed. The constitutional 
changes and the nature of democratic change embraced by African states during this 
period are largely confined to addressing authoritarianism, unlimited government and 
the absence of political pluralism.  
 
The first change introduced by this wave of reforms has been the institutionalisation of 
limited government. The new constitutions express commitment to constitutionalism 
and the rule of law. Some, such as the Benin Constitution, go as far as expressly 
rejecting government ‘founded on arbitrariness, dictatorship, injustice, corruption, 
misappropriation of public funds, regionalism, nepotism, confiscation of power, and 
personal power.’141 As part of this commitment, many of these constitutions declared the 
supremacy of the constitution and instituted a constitutional court to oversee its 
implementation and enforcement. Most of the newly made or amended constitutions 
also adopted presidential term limits, although some of these were later tampered 
with.142  
 
                                                 
141 See Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Benin of 2 December 1990.  
142 According to Njunga M Mulikita, of the 37 African constitutions in force by 1994, all but four 
contained provisions for term limits. NM Mulikita ‘A False Dawn? Africa’s Post-1990 Democratization 
Waves’ (2003) 12(4) African Security Review 105, 107.  
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Similarly, to address the problem of concentration of power in the executive, the 
reformers sought to establish the constitutional separation of powers as well as checks 
and balances. Accordingly, not only were the executive, legislative and judicial organs 
assigned their respective powers, but an attempt was also made to define their 
relationship in such a way that the legislature and the judiciary exercise some effective 
control over government. In the new constitutions, therefore, parliament is vested with 
the power to oversee the activities of the government and have it account for its actions. 
Nevertheless, the dominance of the presidency and the struggle for its control continues 
to be a feature of the political order of many African countries.  
 
Another important part of the new constitutional reform process has been the 
reintroduction of multiparty politics and the establishment and changing of governments 
by elections. Most African states have held multiparty elections for the first time in their 
post-colonial history. By the early 1990s, Africa had 20 elected governments. In 1996 
alone, there were 18 multiparty elections, the most  ever held in post-colonial Africa in a 
single year.143 Not only has this enabled most African countries to institutionalise 
multiparty politics and elect their governments, but it has also led to the removal of 
long-serving dictators. Notably, in many of these countries, constitutional reform has 
also led to the emergence of vibrant independent media, the widening of the democratic 
space with mushrooming civil society organisations, increasing enjoyment of civil and 
political rights by citizens, and a relative expansion of political participation.144  
 
Finally, all the constitutions incorporated a catalogue of human rights and freedoms.145 
The human rights defined by these constitutions are individual rights, largely those 
traditionally known as civil and political rights.146 The lists of rights are generally 
accompanied by guarantees for their respect and protection. Accordingly, many of the 
constitutions, in addition to the ordinary mechanism of judicial enforcement, introduced 
                                                 
143 See New York Times (11 January 1997) 3.  
144 In terms of the regulation of political rights, particularly freedom of association, in many of the 
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national human-rights institutions charged with the responsibility of promoting the 
implementation and protection of the rights guaranteed.147 Like the post-independence 
constitutions, most of the new constitutions do not recognise, or only marginally 
recognise, minority rights.148  
 
These are undoubtedly all very crucial changes and constitute important manifestations 
of democratisation on the continent. They have not, however, addressed the structural 
dilemma of the post-colonial African state. Notwithstanding these changes, the problems 
of political rivalry along ethnic lines and the disconnection between the state and the 
majority of the population have continued to plague many of these states. Some 
countries, including Uganda, Angola, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Senegal, and Niger, have experienced varying levels of conflict.149  
 
As this brief exploration of the nature of the reforms instituted shows, the model of 
democracy embraced in Africa is generally the conventional model of majoritarian 
liberal democracy. Indeed, the most widely held conception of democracy in theory and 
in the practice of many states on the continent is associated with one important aspect of 
this type of democracy: elections. In political theory, this conception of democracy is 
intimately associated with Schumpeter, for whom democracy merely meant ‘that 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire 
the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.’150 From 
this perspective, democracy is understood as a basis for control of political power by 
shifting political parties formed by self-interested individuals or socio-economic classes. 
The focus of this model is accordingly on multiparty political and electoral processes. It 
                                                 
147 According to the above study, 12 African constitutions provide for national human-rights institutions, 
and 19 provide for an ombudsman or public protector. Ibid 678.  
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is a thin conception that reduces democracy to competition between parties for control 
of power.  
 
From the perspective of this study, the problem with this model is more fundamental 
than its thinness. The model is, in fact, fraught with multiple problems. Firstly, as Nergis 
Canefe has pointed out, ‘as long as the central state is perceived and functionalised as 
the basis for shifting coalitions between self-interested individuals and/or socio-
economic classes, there is no room left for the instrumental inclusion of minority 
communities as actors in state-building processes or state and civil society relations.’151 
Secondly, even if minority communities get some representation, they generally run the 
risk of being outvoted on important issues.152  
 
In the context of Africa’s ethno-cultural diversity and patterns of rivalry among ethnic 
or ethno-regional groups, such a thin conception of democracy tends to produce 
governments that draw electoral support from particular ethnic groups or, in ideal 
situations, coalitions of such groups. In this winner-takes-all style of politics, while 
members of some groups win, others ‘face a grim prospect of permanent exclusion from 
political power and the resources that emanate from therein.’153 In conditions of 
inequality of access to political power and resources, and historical rivalry for power, 
this inevitably leads, as the experience of many African countries has shown, to ethnic 
or ethno-regional conflicts as those in power seek to retain power and others try to 
displace them.154 For the highly disadvantaged minorities, referred to in this study as 
peripheral minorities such as indigenous peoples, the situation tends to entrench their 
marginalisation.155 This leads to what Horowitz calls ‘the injustice of procedural 
democracy.’156 Generally, majoritarian liberal democracy not only lacks the required 
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framework to address political inequalities among members of various groups and 
minorities’ fears of exclusion, but may also be ‘destructive of any prospect of building a 
nation in which different peoples might live together in harmony.’157 This model of 
democracy also entails the continuation of the winner-takes-all pattern of politics that 
ultimately leads to rivalry and conflicts.  
 
Democracy can be just and legitimate in the particular context of Africa only if it 
provides mechanisms to manage the issue of minorities, what Arthur Lewis called the 
democratic problem in a plural society – that is, if it establishes ‘political institutions 
which give all the various groups the opportunity to participate in decision-making, 
since only thus can they feel that they are full members of a nation, respected by their 
numerous brethren, and owing equal respect to the national bond which holds them 
together.’158 There is, in other words, a need for ethno-culturally inclusive and 
deliberative democracy.159 Seen in this light, of the countries that have adopted new 
constitutions or constitutional reforms, the most exemplary and probably the only states 
whose constitutions are deliberately designed to provide for comprehensive institutional 
mechanisms for accommodating ethno-cultural diversity are South Africa and Ethiopia. 
They are accordingly given particular attention in Chapters VI and VII.  
3.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the nature and limits of the approach of the post-colonial 
African state to the issue of minorities. Within the framework of the homogenizing 
nation-building process in post-colonial Africa, ethno-cultural diversity has been treated 
as obstacle to the quest for national integration. As a result, far from developing 
mechanisms for its accommodation, African states did not even think it appropriate to 
tolerate this diversity. Instead they actively sought to forge a single national identity that 
would ultimately eliminate peoples’ ethnic attachments. Following the framework of the 
dominant liberal nation-state constitutional model, the tendency has also been to 
maintain difference-blind legal and institutional structures, common universal 
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citizenship and individual rights. Both politically and constitutionally, the post-colonial 
African state has therefore been inhospitable to ethno-cultural diversity and the claims to 
which it gives rise. The chapter has demonstrated the limits of these approaches and 
their eventual failure to achieve stability, justice and national integration. It is therefore 
suggested that addressing the issue of minorities requires changes to the existing 
structure and composition of representative political institutions, so as to allow all 
ethno-national groups, particularly the historically disadvantaged, a greater voice in the 
political and economic processes of the country. This analysis also suggests the need for 
constitutional reform in the form of a state structure that allows devolution of power 
through federalism, regionalism or autonomy. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
The normative bases for constitutional accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity 
in Africa: The three components of the minority rights framework  
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter opens the discussion on the examination and elaboration of a robust 
minority rights framework on the basis of which the relevant constitutional guarantees 
and institutional arrangements for the accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity within 
the post-colonial African states are to be identified and elaborated. Taking into account 
the historical and socio-political contexts that define the particular characters of ethno-
cultural diversity in Africa, and drawing from relevant norms of international law and 
constitutional theory on multiculturalism, the chapter contends that there are three 
elements that constitute such a robust minority rights framework. These are cultural 
identity, equality and self-determination. 
 
4.2 Cultural identity  
 
 4.2.1 The theoretical framework  
 
In Africa, as in other parts of the world, the issue of minorities relates to cultural identity 
and its recognition.1 To the extent that the claims of minorities in Africa are about the 
recognition and protection of their cultural integrity, they are intertwined with the 
importance of membership in one’s ethnic group. The importance of cultural 
membership in Africa is expressed, for example, by its relation to the understanding of 
the essence of a person and human dignity in African thought.2 Individuals are 
conceived as being part, rather than independent of or prior to, and in harmony rather 
                                                 
1 See AG Selassie ‘Ethnic Identity and Constitutional Design for Africa’ (Fall 1992-93) 29 Stanford J of 
Int L 1; IJ Wani ‘Cultural Preservation and the Challenges of Diversity and Nationhood: The Dilemmas of 
Indigenous Cultures in Africa’ (1990-91) 59 UMKC LR 612.  
2 See JAM Cobbah ‘African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African Perspective’ (1987) 9 
Human Rights Quarterly 309-331, 320-325; MW Mutua ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural 
Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties’ (1995) 35 Virginia J Int L 339, 346-359;  
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than in conflict with, their community.3 It is within a communal context and through 
culture that persons become persons. The philosophical expression ‘I am because we 
are, and because we are therefore I am’ aptly captures this.4 As Chief Justice Pius Langa 
of the South African Constitutional Court has put it, in the tradition of many African 
cultures this ‘is often expressed in the phrase umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu5 which 
emphasises “communality and the inter-dependence of the members of a community”6 
and that every individual is an extension of others’.7 The community is the locus by 
reference to which the identity and place of a person in the world is defined and given 
meaning. Membership in a community (culture) for peoples in Africa is a fundamental 
framework that defines ‘the most important parts of a person’s identity’.8 In 
multicultural liberal theory, there is increasing support for and acknowledgement of the 
importance of culture as a basis for the personal identity of individuals. Kymlicka, who 
has offered one of the most influential theories of minority rights,9 maintains that 
‘cultural membership affects our sense of personal identity and capacity’.10 This view is 
shared by many others.11 
 
Culture is also more than an identity marker. G Sellasie observes that ‘[i]n much of 
Africa, ethnicity is the hub around which life revolves’.12 It is a source of peoples’ sense 
of belongingness, self-worth and security, and of feeling at home in the world. Francis 
Deng writes: ‘Ethnicity is more than skin colour or physical characteristics, more than 
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Peoples’ Rights’ (1988) 82 American J Int L 80, 82.  
4 JS Mbiti African Religions and Philosophy (1970) 141.  
5 This translates literally as ‘a person is a person through other people’. 
6 Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and Others (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus 
Curiae); Shibi v Sithole and Others; South African Human Rights Commission and Another v President of 
the Republic of South Africa and Another 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC); 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at para 163. 
7 MEC for Education, KwaZuu-Natal & Others v. Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) para. 53. [Pillay Case] 
8 Pillay case (ibid).  
9 See W Kymlicka Liberalism, Community and Culture (1989); Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal 
Theory of Minority Rights (1995).  
10Ibid 175.  
11 See A Margalit & J Raz ‘National Self-Determination’ in W Kymlicka (ed) The Rights of Minority 
Cultures (1995) 79, 85-88; C Taylor ‘The Politics of Recognition’ in A Guitmann (ed) Multiculturalism: 
Examining the Politics of Recognition (1994); A Addis ‘Individualism, Communitarianism, and the 
Rights of Ethnic Minorities’ (1992) 67 Notre Dame LR 615; Y Tamir Liberal Nationalism (1993).  
12 G Selassie (note 1 above) 12.  
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language, song, and dance. It is the embodiment of values, institutions, and patterns of 
behaviour, a composite whole representing a people’s historical experience, aspirations, 
and world view.’13 Accordingly, not only people’s sense of identity but also their self-
respect and dignity are in deep ways tied with and structured by cultural membership. In 
Africa, culture additionally has significant spiritual value, akin to religion. It offers a 
framework through which persons not only identify themselves and associate with 
others and the world, but also communicate with the dead, the living, those yet to be 
born and, ultimately, God.14 In short, for many in Africa, culture expresses a way of life 
as well as a world-view.15 Clearly, depriving a people of their ethnicity, their culture, is 
to deprive them of their sense of identity and direction or purpose.16 According to 
Hannah Arendt, ‘[s]omething much more than freedom and justice … is at stake when 
belonging to the community into which one is born is no longer a matter of course and 
not belonging a matter of choice’.17  
 
Related to all this is the role of cultural membership as a context of choice, the 
framework that renders the choices we make meaningful. This is one of the foundations 
of Kymlicka’s influential liberal theory of minority rights. According to him, individual 
freedom in the sense of the ability of individuals to define and choose among different 
conceptions of the good is tied to cultural membership. He emphasises that, ‘[p]ut 
simply, freedom involves making choices amongst various options, and our societal 
culture not only provides these options, but also makes them meaningful to us’.18 
Although he does not articulate the consequence that must follow from people’s deep 
attachment to their culture, Dworkin maintains in no less emphatic terms:  
 
They [people] need a common culture and particularly a common language even to have 
personalities, and culture and language are social phenomena. We can have only the thought, and 
ambitions, and convictions that are possible within the vocabulary that language and culture 
provide, so we are all, in a patent and deep way, the creatures of the community as a whole.19  
                                                 
13 FM Deng ‘Ethnicity: An African Predicament’ (Summer 1997) 15 (3) The Brookings Review 28.  
14 See GBN Ayittey Indigenous African Institutions (1991) 14-20; Mbiti (note 4 above).  
15 Cobbah (note 2 above) 320-323.  
16 Deng (note 13 above) 28.  
17 H Arendt The Origins of Totalitarianism (1972) 296.  
18 Kymlicka (1995) (note 9 above) 83.  
19 R Dworkin ‘Liberal Community’ (1989) 77 California LR 479-504.  
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In the African context, as in other parts of the world that suffered the brutalities of 
colonial rule, the claim for the recognition of minority cultures additionally manifests a 
resistance to the colonial and post-colonial denigration, devaluation, marginalisation and 
suppression of indigenous African cultures.20 Seen in this light, the claim for recognition 
of cultural identity partly represents an attempt on the part of members of the various 
cultures to have the dignity of their culture and identity restored as a means to regain 
their self-respect and dignity as members of those particular cultures. As many people in 
Africa continue to draw meaning from and define their life goals by reference to their 
cultural dispositions, the quest for recognition of cultural pluralism in Africa is also 
meant to prevent the further erosion of indigenous cultures and languages, and the 
resultant loss of identity that members of these cultures would face. Moreover, for many 
people in Africa one of the barriers to active participation in the processes of the state is 
that the state and its institutions operate on the basis of languages and other cultural 
forms which are alien to them. Cultural rights, particularly the recognition of indigenous 
languages, thus additionally serve to end this alienation of people from the state and 
facilitate their integration into its processes by enhancing linguistically unrestricted 
participation in the management of public affairs. So, the argument for cultural 
recognition goes further than the idea that cultural membership is the main marker of the 
identity of most Africans, as for others, and provides the context for defining their life 
goals and relations to the world. It also draws from the need to redress the pain suffered 
by members of indigenous cultures due to the denigration, non-recognition and 
marginalisation of their cultures and languages under the colonial state and its successor. 
The question that arises is how to protect minority cultures and eliminate the 
disadvantages that often result from membership in a minority culture .  
  
Although individual rights such as freedom of expression, religion and association offer 
a valuable framework for the protection of minority cultures, many have rightly argued 
and demonstrated that they are nevertheless inadequate.21 The main reason for this is 
                                                 
20 See Wani (note 1 above); Mutua (note 2 above) 343; Ayittey (note 14 above); B Nwabueze 
Constitutional Democracy in Africa Vol 5 (2004) 271-277.  
21 After examining the jurisprudence on the European Convention on Human Rights regarding the 
potential and actual capacity of non-discrimination and individual rights to address minority issues, 
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that these rights do not regulate important aspects of public life that directly impact upon 
the cultural identity of minorities. As Kymlicka indicates, these traditional human rights 
standards 
 
are simply unable to resolve some of the most important and controversial questions relating to 
cultural minorities: which languages should be recognised in the parliaments, bureaucracy, and 
courts? Should each ethnic or national group have publicly funded education in its mother 
tongue? Should internal boundaries (legislative districts, provinces, states) be drawn so that 
cultural minorities form a majority within a local region? .... Should political offices be 
distributed in accordance with a principle of national or ethnic proportionality?22  
 
And, needless to say, supplementing them with affirmative action measures would not 
be enough to ensure the equality of members of minorities in having secure access to 
their culture.23 As we have seen in Chapter II, in the multi-ethnic African state, arguably 
more than in other multi-ethnic societies, different groups are situated in unequal 
political, socio-economic and cultural circumstances and therefore are placed unequally 
within the processes of the state, in a way disadvantageous to the equal enjoyment of 
political rights and socio-economic opportunities and the cultural identity of many 
groups. There is therefore a need for affirmative support to members of disadvantaged 
cultures. However, ‘[s]ince this inequality would remain even if individual members of 
(minority or disadvantaged) communities no longer suffered from any deprivation of 
material resources, temporary affirmative action programmes are not sufficient to ensure 
genuine equality’.24 Accordingly, in multicultural societies, real equality and the need to 
                                                                                                                                               
Kristin Henrard concluded that ‘approaching the minority issue merely through the prohibition of non-
discrimination and individual human rights is rather unsatisfactory’. K Henrard Devising an Adequate 
System of Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights, Minority Rights and the Right to Self-
Determination (2000) 141-142. See also G Gilbert ‘The Legal Protection Accorded to Minority Groups in 
Europe’ Netherlands Yearbook of Int L (1992) 67-104, 90.  
22 Kymlicka (1995) (note 9 above) 4-5.  
23 Addis (note 11 above) 659. 
24 Kymlicka (1989) (note 9 above) 191. In Africa a very good example of the inadequacy of the 
equalization of the material conditions of members of minorities for securing the equal enjoyment of their 
culture is Botswana. As Jacquelin S Solway’s study of the struggle of minorities in Botswana shows, the 
fact that non-Tswana-speaking groups other than the San are in a position of relative material equality 
with members of the dominant Tswana people did not help them to achieve cultural equality in public life. 
Accordingly, their main claim is the political and institutional recognition of their cultures and languages, 
which is necessary for achieving cultural equality in the public sphere. See JS Solway ‘Reaching the 
Limits of Universal Citizenship: “Minority” Struggles in Botswana’ in B Berman, D Eyoh & W Kymlicka 
(eds) Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa (2004) 129.  
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treat members of different groups with equal respect and concern25 may entail that 
individual human rights are supplemented with not only affirmative action measures, but 
also permanent special rights for minorities.26 These rights relate to language, including 
in communication with public authorities; religion; education in minority languages; 
recognition of customary or religious law; communal land; access to media and other 
means of reproducing and transmitting culture; and exemptions from general rules.27 
The foregoing strongly establishes that the African state – as part of the process of 
building national integration and reinstating the dignity of African cultures and 
traditions, and treating them with equal seriousness – must recognise and give public 
expression to the culture and identity of members of the various groups that constitute it 
through culturally inclusive and just language, cultural and educational policies. These 
should include, among others, guarantees for the use of indigenous African languages in 
the public sphere, including in communication with public authorities; education in 
these languages; and recognition of customary laws.  
4.2.2 The international law framework  
 
In international human rights, cultural rights are addressed in a wide range of ways.28 Of 
particular interest for purposes of this study are the cultural rights of groups. With 
respect to minorities, international human rights law provides certain guarantees of 
culture, language and religion, albeit in modest terms that do not define in sufficient 
detail the content of those rights and the obligations of states. During the time of the 
League of Nations, the European minority protection system was essentially designed to 
afford protection to the cultural identity of minority groups. In its advisory opinion on 
                                                 
25 Adeno Addis rightly points out that ‘[t]o treat individuals with “equal respect” entails, at least partly, 
respecting their traditions and cultures, the forms of life which give depth and coherence to their 
identities’. A Addis ‘On Human Diversity and the Limits of Toleration’ in I Shapiro & W Kymlicka (eds) 
Ethnicity and Group Rights (1997) 112, 121. See also D Miller ‘Liberalism, Equal Opportunities and 
Cultural Commitments’ in P Kelly (ed) Multiculturalism Reconsidered: Culture and Equality and its 
Critiques (2002) 45, 48.  
26 Kymlicka (1989) (note 9 above) 162. See J Anaya ‘On Justifying Special Ethnic Group Rights: 
Comments on Pogge’ in Shapiro & Kymlicka (note 25 above) 222, 223; Addis (note 11 above) 659-660.  
27 For a useful identification and analysis of these various forms of rights see JT Levy ‘Classifying 
Cultural Rights’ in Shapiro and Kymlicka (note 25 above) 22-67.  
28 See A Eide ‘Cultural Rights and Minorities: Essay in Honour of Erica-Irene Daes’ in G Alfredson & M 
Stavropoulou (eds) Justice Pending: Indigenous Peoples and Other Good Causes: Essays in Honour of 
Erica-Irene A. Daes (2002) 83, 84-88; E Stamatopoulou Cultural Rights in International Law: Article 27 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Beyond (2007); YM Donders Towards a Right to 
Cultural Identity? (2002).  
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Minority Schools in Albania, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
elaborated the rationale for minority protection in a frequently quoted passage: 
  
The idea underlying the treaties for the protection of minorities is to secure for certain elements 
incorporated in a state, the population of which differs from them in race, language or religion, 
the possibility of living peacefully alongside that population and co-operating amicably with it, 
while at the same time preserving the characteristics which distinguish them from the majority, 
and satisfying the ensuing special needs.  
 
According to the Court, this objective requires states to ensure that minorities (a) are 
placed on a footing of perfect equality with others in the society, and (b) have ‘suitable 
means for the preservation of racial peculiarities, their traditions and their national 
characteristics’.29 It is on this foundation that the edifice of contemporary international 
norms on minority rights is constructed. The second of the two aspects that underlie this 
legal regime establishes the cultural rights of minorities and forms part of what is known 
in international legal parlance as the ‘special rights of minorities’.30  
 
These rights are generally defended and articulated using more or less the same line of 
reasoning that is used in normative political theory, discussed above. Eide, for example, 
maintains: ‘The basic source of identity for human beings is often found in the cultural 
traditions into which he or she is born and brought up. The preservation of that identity 
can be of crucial importance to well-being and self-respect.’31 He accordingly concludes 
that ‘“cultural rights” should give priority to access to, and education of, one’s own 
culture as well as the right to participate in the reproduction and further development of 
that culture’.32 This essentially entails that minorities are provided with special rights or 
protection mechanisms, since without such mechanisms ‘cultural rights will not be fully 
enjoyed and guaranteed for everybody, notwithstanding the principles of equality and 
non-discrimination’.33 The reason why such rights or guarantees are called special is 
what the PCIJ calls the ‘special needs’ of these groups, arising from their minority 
                                                 
29 Minority Schools in Albania PCIJ (Ser. A/B) No 64 (1935) 17 (my emphasis). 
30 See UN Minority Rights Human Rights Fact Sheet No 18 Rev 1 (1998) 4-7.  
31 Eide (note 28 above) 85.  
32 Ibid 85-86. (my emphasis) 
33 R Stavenhagen ‘Cultural Rights: A Social Science Perspective’ in A Eide, C Krause, & A Rosas (eds) 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (2001) 92. 
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status.34 They are special in the sense ‘that certain kinds of rights are of direct interest to 
or addressed to, ethnic, religious or linguistic groups in order to defend their cultures, 
the practice of their religion and the use of minority languages’.35  
 
Although international law has not fully elaborated the content and reach of such 
cultural rights of minorities qua minorities, as noted in Chapter I it nevertheless provides 
certain guarantees to members of minorities for the protection of their culture. Built on 
the minority rights regime of the League of Nations, these rights, apart from equality 
and non-discrimination, include the right to existence and identity, language rights and 
some rights relating to education.  
4.2.2.1 Identity and existence 
 
Article 27 of the ICCPR is by far the most important provision on minority rights, as the 
only legally binding provision at the international level. Notwithstanding its negative 
formulation, it is regarded as positively guaranteeing the right of minorities to identity.36 
The HRC, the body responsible for supervising and enforcing the ICCPR, has 
accordingly asserted that Article 27 ‘is directed towards ensuring the survival and 
continued development of the cultural, religious, and social identity of the minorities 
concerned’.37 According to the HRC, the effective protection of this right may require 
the provision of positive measures ‘necessary to protect the identity of a minority and 
the rights of its members to enjoy and develop their culture and language and to 
practice their religion, in community with other members of the group’.38 It is, however, 
clear that this extended elaboration of Article 27 does not give sufficient guidance for 
resolving some of the most important issues, such as how to determine the use of 
languages for government purposes, in education and in the media, as well as the form 
of the electoral system.  
 
                                                 
34 Minority Schools in Albania (note 29 above).  
35 P Thornberry ‘Is There a Phoenix in the Ashes? International Law and Minority Rights’ (1980) 15 
Texas Int L J 421, 440.  
36 See F Capotorti Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities 
(1979) Sales No. E.78XIV. 1 37.   
37 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 23, Article 27 (fifth Session, 1994) UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 38 (1994) para. 9.  
38 Ibid para 6(2) (my emphasis).  
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The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
prohibits the physical or biological destruction of national, ethnic, religious or racial 
groups.39 According to Buergenthal, by outlawing the destruction of national, ethnic, 
racial or religious groups, the Genocide Convention formally recognises the right of 
these groups to exist as groups, which surely must be considered as the most 
fundamental of all cultural rights.40  
 
These rights are guaranteed more extensively in Article 1 of the 1992 UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities.41 Thornberry asserts that this transcends the tentative phrasing of Article 27 
(of the ICCPR) and proposes identity and existence as fundamental attributes of groups. 
He goes on to say that ‘[t]he “group protection” nature of the Declaration is very evident 
from this provision and the obligation to protect existence and identity is mandatory as 
evidenced by the use of “shall”’.42  
 
As Thornberry points out, under the 1992 Declaration on Minorities the existence and 
identity of minorities is to be protected not only by outlawing the physical destruction of 
the group, as done by the 1958 Convention against Genocide, but also through other 
positive provisions, including basic subsistence rights and cultural and spiritual 
protection, including protection against forced assimilation, ethnocide, and forced 
population transfer.43 Under Article 4(2) of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Minorities, this is given further elaboration by the requirement that states ‘take measures 
to create favourable conditions to enable persons belonging to minorities to express their 
characteristics and to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs’. 
Most importantly, this declaration calls upon states to promote cultural diversity 
through, among other measures, encouraging knowledge of the history, traditions, 
                                                 
39 Genocide Convention Article 2 provides: ‘In the present Convention, genocide means any of the 
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group…’ (my emphasis). 
40 T Buergenthal International Human Rights in a Nutshell (1988) 49. Also see Y Dinstein ‘Collective 
Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities’ (1976) 25 Int and Comparative L Quarterly 102, 105-106, 118.  
41 GA Res. 47/135 adopted 18 December 1992, UN Doc. A/RES/47/137. (Declaration on Minorities).  
42 P Thornberry ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities: Background, Analysis, Observation, and an Update’ in A Philips & Allan 
Rosas (eds) Universal Minority Rights (1995) 13, 39.  
43 Ibid 40.  
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language and culture of the minorities within their territory.44 Other international 
instruments that recognise the right to cultural identity include the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child,45 the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,46 
the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination47 and the 
UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Declaration on Race 
and Racial Prejudice.48 Taken together, these instruments require states not only to 
tolerate minority cultures and their observance or expression by their members, even in 
the public sphere, but also to ‘encourage conditions for their promotion’. Clearly, this is 
best achieved if states accord legal recognition to the existence of minority cultures and 
institutionalise mechanisms for their accommodation in the processes of the state. 
4.2.2.2 Rights relating to language and education  
 
With respect to language rights, Article 1(1) of the 1992 Declaration affirms the right of 
minorities to their linguistic identity, which was not explicitly recognised under Article 
27 of the ICCPR.49 Most importantly, notwithstanding its vague formulation, Article 
4(2) provides that states shall take measures to create favourable conditions to enable 
members of minorities to develop their language. Depending on the particular context of 
each society and the needs of minorities, this may include the provision of various forms 
of assistance that facilitate the use of their languages. Apparently, this is merely related 
to the right of members of minorities to speak their languages, and does not involve a 
right to use such languages in communication with public authorities. The two most 
important European instruments provide better guarantees in this area.50 Article 10 of 
the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities recognises the right 
to use a minority language. This includes a qualified right to use the language in 
communications with public authorities where the group speaking the language is of a 
                                                 
44 Article 4 (4) Declaration on Minorities (note 41 above).  
45 Art. 30 GA Res. 44/25 adopted 20 Nov. 1989, entered into force 2 Sept. 1990 
46 See GA Res. 61/295 adopted on 13 September 2007. 
47 See GA Res. 2106 A (XX) adopted 21 December 1965. 
48 See Article 9 (2).  
49 This article stipulates: ‘In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their 
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.’  
50 See K Henrard Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights, 
Minority Rights and the Right to Self-determination (2000) 210-217.  
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sufficiently large size and territorially concentrated.51 More specifically, the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages enjoins states to protect and promote the 
use of regional or minority languages in the field of education,52 among judicial53 and 
administrative authorities and public services,54 in access to media55 and in the spheres 
of cultural, economic and social activities.56 These are the kind of guarantees whose 
national implementation can give optimal satisfaction to the interests of minorities in 
this area.  
 
With respect to education, Article 4(3) of the 1992 Declaration on Minorities enjoins 
states to provide minorities ‘adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue or have 
instruction in their mother tongue’. This provision, although formulated in such open 
terms, clearly recognises that it is just for minorities to receive education in their own 
language and, where circumstances do not warrant that, to learn their language as a 
subject. Moreover, it calls upon states to promote multicultural education through taking 
measures that encourage knowledge of the history, traditions, language and culture of 
minorities.57 Minorities also have the right, subject to national regulations, to establish 
and maintain their own educational institutions. Other instruments guaranteeing such 
rights at the international level include the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination 
in Education.58  
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3 The African human rights system   
 
                                                 
51 Article 10.  
52 Article 8. 
53 Article 9. 
54 Article 10. 
55 Article 11. 
56 Article 12 & 13.  
57 Article 4 (4).  
58 See Articles 2 & 5.  
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In Africa there are several regional instruments that articulate the right to culture in 
various ways. The first and most important of such instruments is the African Charter 
itself.59 Article 17 of the African Charter provides for the right to cultural identity. This 
right is given further protection under Article 22(1), which specifically guarantees the 
right to cultural development and identity. The right of peoples to existence is also one 
of the cultural rights guaranteed by the Charter, under Article 20.60 With respect to 
language, the African Commission held that the right to culture under Article 17 extends 
to language as necessary for the identity and personality of individuals. The 
Commission states:  
 
Language is an integral part of the structure of culture; it in fact constitutes its pillar and means 
of expression par excellence. Its usage enriches the individual and enables him to take active part 
in the community and its activities. To deprive a man of such participation amounts to depriving 
him of his identity.61  
 
Broader language guarantees are envisaged elsewhere. Under the African Cultural 
Charter,62 the importance of the various cultures of African peoples and the need for 
their protection are also extensively articulated, although the process for the application 
of measures to this end and mechanisms for their enforcement are not clearly spelt out.63 
The Declaration of Principles of Freedom of Expression in Africa, a non-binding 
instrument developed by the African Commission, calls upon states to take positive 
measures to promote diversity, including through ‘the promotion of the use of local 
languages in public affairs, including in the courts’.64 Notwithstanding its non-binding 
status, this clearly goes beyond what is provided in most international instruments in 
addressing the most controversial component of minority language claims. It expresses 
                                                 
59 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 
October 1986 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5. [the African Charter]  
60 See F Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for 
Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa (2003) 217-227.  
61 See Malawi African Association, Amnesty International, Ms. Sarr Diop, Union Interafricaine des droit 
de l’Homme and RADDHO, Collectif des Veuves et Ayants-droit & Association Mauritanienne des Droits 
de l’Homme v. Mauritania (2000) AHRLR 149 (ACHPR 2000) Communications 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 
164/97, 196/97 & 210/98 (13th Annual Activity Report ACHPR,1999-2000) para. 137.  
62 Adopted 5 July 1976 and entered into force on 19 September 1990.  
63 See Part V. 
64 See Principle III Resolution on the Adoption of the Declaration on Principles of Freedom of Expression 
in Africa, adopted by the ACHPR at its 32nd ordinary session held in Banjul, the Gambia on 17-23rd 
October 2002 available at 
<http://www.achpr.org/english/declarations/declaration_freedom_exp_en.html>. 
 119 
an acknowledgement that without the promotion of the use of these languages in public 
affairs, most people cannot adequately participate in public life as they are not generally 
well versed in the official European languages.  
 
Generally, although the formulation of some of the guarantees recognising the cultural 
rights of minorities are terse, weak and qualified, and enunciated in legally non-binding 
instruments, they nevertheless establish a growing normative recognition that the 
adoption of linguistic, cultural and educational policies that give public space to, and 
embrace the full diversity of, the cultural and linguistic components of societies, with 
particular attention to the cultures of non-dominant and marginalised sections of society, 
is a necessary aspect of effective minority protection.65 In this age of multiculturalism, 
this is becoming part of the standard of measurement of the commitment of states to 
ensure that members of all groups are taken equally seriously and treated fairly and with 
equal concern.  
 
In this context, the importance of the theory of multiculturalism (or minority rights) lies 
both in providing the theoretical underpinnings of these international legal norms, and in 
giving meaningful interpretation and content to them in a way that spells out the form 
that their institutionalisation within states has to take to address the issue of minorities 
adequately, and ultimately contributes to a just democratic order in multi-ethnic 
societies. This, according to the 1992 UN Declaration on Minorities, is the ultimate aim 
of minority rights.66  
4.3 Equality 
 
 4.3.1 Theoretical framework  
 
Although the international legal framework on the rights of minorities to cultural 
membership addresses important aspects of concern to minorities, particularly vis-à-vis 
the good of cultural membership, it does not tell us why minorities should also have 
                                                 
65 See M Koenig & P de Guchteneir ‘Political Governance of Cultural Diversity’ in M Koenig & P de 
Guchteneir (eds) Democracy and Human Rights in Multicultural Societies (2007) 3, 7 (indicating the 
effect of these developments in delegitimising the nation-state model and requiring new public policies of 
governing diversity).  
66 See Preamble 1992 Declaration on Minorities (note 41 above).  
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further guarantees pertaining to the political and socio-economic spheres of public life. 
Even when it addresses this question, it defends such other guarantees only 
instrumentally. For example, it is argued, of course rightly, that the cultural rights of 
minorities cannot be fully secure unless they are accorded effective participation in the 
formulation of the rules, or the making of public decisions, that affect their enjoyment of 
cultural rights, and have access to the resources necessary for participation in their 
culture. Although this is a powerful and very important argument, as far as minority 
guarantees in the political and socio-economic spheres of public life is concerned, it is 
nevertheless only a secondary argument.  
 
It is true that these guarantees enable members of minorities to defend their cultural 
rights by making them direct participants in the political and socio-economic processes 
of the state, not just as citizens, but most importantly as members of their respective 
cultures. But primarily they are expressions of recognition that the limitations or 
disadvantages that minorities suffer due to their minority status are not limited to the 
security of cultural membership. As the discussions in previous chapters show, 
minorities also suffer disadvantages in terms of the exercise and enjoyment of other 
goods, including political and socio-economic equality.67 Indeed, in the context of 
Africa, minority claims are more strongly expressed with respect to these disadvantages 
than those in the cultural sphere. The main issue here is thus the achievement of equality 
in the political and socio-economic spheres rather than secure access to one’s cultural 
membership alone.  
 
Indeed, in addition to, or even more than, cultural identity, what gives the claims of 
ethnic groups in Africa, as elsewhere, a powerful moral, legal and political force is their 
grounding in problems of socio-economic and political inequality. In order to 
                                                 
67 Political equality refers to that which affects the access to or control of and exercising of public powers 
in society. By economic equality, we mean that which makes reference to the equitable distribution of 
burdens and benefit that members of a community support or obtain from public powers. These equalities 
are not separate, but mostly converge and influence each other. See A Phillips Which Equalities Matter? 
(1999) 74-79.  
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understand and identify these issues of equality that underlie most ethnic claims in 
Africa, it is necessary in the first place to identify their context.68  
 
As can be gathered from the previous two chapters, the historical, political and socio-
economic processes of the African state have fundamentally shaped the relative position 
of groups and patterns of power relations. Historically, this relates in the first instance to 
the incorporation of unequal and culturally distinct groups within the unitary political 
structures of the colonial state, the precursor to the modern African state. The uneven 
distribution of political and economic goods (such as education, jobs, administrative 
posts, access to land etc) as well as infrastructures of political and economic 
opportunities (roads, schools, hospitals, industrial and commercial centres etc) among 
groups and/or ethno-regions have created further disparities and inequalities in terms of 
participation in the political and economic processes of the state during and after 
colonialism. Discriminatory political and socio-economic structures, as well as 
colonially and historically induced relationships of animosity and conflict, have further 
reinforced deeply unequal patterns of political and socio-economic development and 
relationships among constituent groups. The post-colonial state inherited distinct ethno-
cultural groups with disproportionately unequal political, economic and numerical 
circumstances as well as distinct cultural and socio-political traditions.69  
 
Post-colonial political and economic developments (the enhancement of centralised 
organisation of political power; the process of concentration of political power and 
socio-economic resources away from the local to the centre; the rise of ethnic 
clientelism, leading to disproportionate control of political and economic resources by 
one or more dominant groups; inefficient and corrupt systems of governance; and other 
                                                 
68 C Albertyn & B Goldblatt ‘Equality’ in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd 
edition OS (2007) Chapter 35, 35-3 (stating that the meaning of equality is context specific in that it is 
influenced by the historical, socio-political and legal conditions of the society concerned). This is 
particularly true if one is looking at substantive equality. Patrick Macklem thus holds that ‘[a] 
commitment to substantive equality mandates an examination of the concrete material conditions of 
individuals and groups in society and the ways in which state structuring can ameliorate adverse social 
and economic circumstances’. P Macklem Indigenous Difference and the Constitution in Canada (2001) 
126.  
69 Mutau (note 2 above) 342-343, 365; Nwabueze (note 20 above); B Berman, D Eyoh & W Kymlicka 
‘Introduction: Ethnicity and the Politics of Democratic Nation-Building in Africa’ in Berman et al (note 
24 above) 1-21.  
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similar patterns of discriminatory and authoritarian tendencies), rather than rectifying 
these disparities, have in many ways further entrenched them, and in some cases created 
additional dimensions of imbalance.70 The post-colonial period has also witnessed in 
many African countries not only unequal patterns of representation in and control of the 
political process, but also unbalanced development among different ethno-regions. 
Moreover, as noted in the previous chapter, the nation-building process of the post-
colonial state, based on the nation-state paradigm, denied the various constituent groups 
due recognition in the political processes of the state and failed terribly in almost all 
African states, unleashing violent civil wars and ethnic conflicts.  
 
These historical, political and socio-economic developments have led to group and 
ethno-regional disparities and inequalities in almost all African countries, with the 
consequence of creating patterns of domination and subordination, inclusion and 
marginalisation, and non/misrecognition.71 Although most minorities have suffered 
these discriminatory patterns, some, such as peripheral minorities, and more particularly 
indigenous peoples, are more seriously affected than others. The inequalities and 
patterns of disadvantages (discrimination) that affect such minorities are expressed not 
only in socio-economic terms, involving high levels of illiteracy or lack of access to 
education and basic services, including water, health and sanitation,72 but also in 
political terms, such as weak or no representation of minorities in policy-making bodies, 
as well as in the public services.73 The specific conditions of groups, such as their 
numerical size, the size and resource endowment of their territories, and the nature of 
their political and socio-economic traditions, are additional factors that often put some 
groups at a disadvantage.74 Additionally, members of some groups suffer certain 
                                                 
70 See Chapter III above.  
71 Clearly, within the various disadvantaged communities some are worse off than others. The case of 
women is a good example of this. Minority women generally suffer double disadvantage: on account of 
both their ethnic membership and their gender. See, for more, F Banda & C Chinkin Gender, Minorities & 
Indigenous Peoples (2004).  
72 P Justino & J Litchfield Economic Exclusion and Discrimination: The Experience of Minorities and 
Indigenous Peoples (2003); Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on 
Indigenous Populations/Communities (2005) (ACHPR Report) Chapter II.  
73 Ibid 45-49. As we have noted in Chapter II, however, the main site of minority contention in Africa 
relates to the issue of political equality and affects all constituent minorities of the post-colonial African 
state.  
74 This and the account given in Chapter II regarding the process of the making of the African state and 
the unequal conditions of members of the various groups brought under the colonially contrived state 
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disadvantages due to societal prejudices, stereotypes and negative attitudes towards their 
distinct way of life and culture.75 It is this context that informs the nature of equality 
issues that lie beneath many of the claims of the minorities constituting African states. If 
a just and democratic solution is to be found to minority issues, it is therefore important 
that equality is achieved among the members of various groups in terms of political 
representation and participation, distribution of and access to socio-economic goods, and 
recognition of their identities.  
 
In the light of this, it is clear that minority claims for equality in Africa are claims for 
achieving substantive inclusion and participation in the political and socio-economic life 
of the society to which they belong. This can be achieved only if the state provides for 
institutions or guarantees that ensure that members of minorities have the capacity to 
enjoy their rights and are treated with equal concern and respect, not only as citizens, 
but also as members of particular groups. It is also important that there exists a socio-
economic regime that rectifies past patterns of socio-economic marginalisation or 
deprivations, and institutionalises a fair system of distribution of the burdens and 
benefits of living under a common government. This implies that the idea of equality 
among members of various groups referrs not only to the provision of the same rights, in 
those respects that people are the same or equal, but also to the provision of differential 
rights or guarantees in those relevant respects that people are different or unequal.76  
 
One should accordingly distinguish between universal (formal) equality, on the one 
hand, and substantive equality and/with equality in difference, on the other. Universal 
equality involves the provision of the same rights, privileges and powers to all 
individuals and their identical treatment by institutions of the state, without regard to 
their particular differences. Substantive equality, on the other hand, involves the 
provision of different rights, privileges and powers with regard to the relevant matters in 
                                                                                                                                               
clearly show that the disadvantages suffered by such groups are not a product of the free choice their 
members. They are rather products of circumstances over which they have had no control. On the 
distinctions between chosen disadvantages and disadvantages that are product of unequal circumstances 
see Kymlicka (1989) (note 9 above) 185-190.  
75 See ACHPR Report (note 72 above) 34-38.  
76 For an apt elaboration of the difference between the two see B Parekh Rethinking Multiculturalism: 
Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (2000) 239-242. See also I Brownlie ‘The Rights of Peoples in 
Modern International Law’ in J Crawford (ed.) The Rights of Peoples (1992) 1, 7-11.  
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respect of which people are different or, more accurately, unequal.77 Equality in 
difference, which is a narrow form of substantive equality, is specific to the recognition 
of and provision for the security of the cultural identity of individuals and groups.78  
 
In his widely acknowledged work, The Politics of Recognition, Charles Taylor locates 
the origin of universal equality in the emergence of the politics of the equal dignity of all 
citizens, which he associates with Rousseau and Kant.79 ‘[T]he content of this politics,’ 
Taylor states, ‘has been the equalisation of rights and entitlements. What is to be 
avoided at all costs is the existence of “first-class” and “second-class” citizens.’80 The 
basis for this is ‘the idea that all humans are equally worthy of respect’.81 This 
‘fundamental intuition’, he explains, ‘focuses on what is the same in all’.82 Laurie WH 
Ackermann, Emeritus Justice of the Constitutional Court South Africa, similarly locates 
the basis of universal equality in what makes all human beings common.83 He says: 
‘[T]he attribute in respect of which all humans are equal, must be treated equally and 
may not be discriminated against, is their common and immeasurable human worth 
(dignity).’84  
 
It is important to note that universal equality, in some circumstances, most specifically 
in cases of past discrimination, allows what Charles Taylor calls reverse discrimination, 
which is also what Justice Ackermann calls remedial or restitutionary equality.85 As 
Charles Taylor points out, the aim of this is, however, to level the playing field and 
allow the old blind ‘rules’ to come back into force in a way that does not disadvantage 
any one.86 As Adeno Addis aptly puts it, in this instance the reality of groups is being 
acknowledged so as ultimately to remove the conditions for their existence and thereby 
                                                 
77 See Kymlicka (1989) (note 9 above), 190-191; Parekh ibid 240.  
78 The idea of equality in difference as it pertains to culture was fully articulated as part of the politics of 
difference for the first time by Charles Taylor in ‘The Politics of Recognition’ (note 11 above).  
79 Ibid 44-57. 
80 Ibid 37  
81 Ibid 41.  
82 Ibid 43.  
83 LWH Ackermann ‘Equality and Non-Discrimination: Some Analytical Thoughts’ (2006) 22 (4) SAJHR 
597-612. 
84 Ibid 611 (emphasis in the original).  
85 Ibid 605. 
86 Taylor (note 11) 40.  
 125 
transcend them.87 In effect, reverse discrimination is an application of the principle of 
universal equality to extraordinary situations.  
 
As the basis of universal equality is what Justice Ackermann called the ‘common and 
immeasurable human worth (dignity)’ of individuals, it ultimately aims at ‘treating 
people in a difference-blind fashion’.88 It is ordinarily made operational by anti-
discrimination norms ‘that seek to ensure that decision-making is, as a default position, 
colour and culture blind: people are to be treated as if there was no such thing as ethnic 
origin’.89  
 
Although universal equality is absolutely fundamental, it is not enough to achieve 
equality among members of various ethno-cultural groups in the political, socio-
economic and cultural life of multi-ethnic societies in general, and the post-colonial 
African state in particular. Its inadequacy mainly pertains to its being difference-blind 
and its inattention to circumstantial inequality. In other words, as Iris Marion Young and 
Melissa S Williams, among others, have shown, it does not recognise systematic 
inequality rooted in the existence of group-based marginalisation and subordination, and 
in the non/misrecognition of the identity of members of some groups in society as 
constituting discrimination or second-class citizenship.90  
 
In multicultural societies, particularly of the kind in Africa, as argued in chapter III, this 
has at least two adverse effects. The first is that the application of such a conception of 
equality has discriminatory results. It preserves the unequal power relations in society 
among members of different groups, as well as the non-recognition of minorities. The 
effect is to condemn minorities, particularly the most vulnerable ones, to perpetual 
                                                 
87 Addis (note 11 above) 639. According to Addis, ‘this was the guiding principle of the United States 
Supreme Court in the 60s and 70s when dealing with race conscious remedies. Perhaps Justice Blackmun 
expressed that view most eloquently in Bakke when he observed, “In order to get beyond racism, we must 
first take account of race. There is no other way.”’ Ibid 632.  
88 Ackermann (note 78 above) 90.  
89 T Makkonen ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad for the Fight against Multiculturalism?’ in M Scheinin & R 
Toivanen (eds) Rethinking Non-discrimination and Minority Rights (2004) 155, 158.  
90 See IM Young Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990) 164-165; MS Williams ‘Memory, History 
and Membership: The Moral Claims of Marginalized Groups in Political Representation’ in J Raikka (ed) 
Do We Need Minority Rights? (1996) 85-119, 105, 110; Phillips (note 67 above) 90-98.  
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political and socio-economic marginalisation. 91 Secondly, it is also assimilationist in its 
effect. It recognises only what is the same in all (dignity) and hence is inhospitable, or 
gives no public space, to identity differences and the issues of equality to which these 
differences give rise.92 Given the unequal position of various groups, such 
assimilationism means an inequitable treatment of minority cultures that may eventually 
result in the demise of their cultural integrity.93  
 
It is in response to these drawbacks of universal equality that substantive equality and 
equality in difference have been elaborated.94 These dimensions of equality extend the 
understanding of discrimination and second-class citizenship to issues of power relations 
in society and to assimilation, uniformity and the neglect of the distinctness of peoples’ 
identity. Substantive equality and equality in difference broaden the principle of equality 
to involve not only the provision of the same rights and guarantees to all without 
distinction, but also the provision of group-specific minority rights both to offset their 
political and socio-economic vulnerabilities and prevent their future exclusion, and to 
recognise and affirm their particularity or cultural distinctness (which is covered by 
what Albertyn and Goldblatt call ‘social equality’)95 as additional, but equally 
important, dimensions of equality.96  
 
Substantive equality in the context of ethno-cultural diversity and inequality thus calls 
for measures and institutional arrangements necessary to improve the material 
conditions of minorities and to guarantee them increased voice in politics.97 As Monique 
Deveaux accurately pointed out, this entails, even in established democratic states, 
‘either the reform of certain political institutions so as to secure permanent 
                                                 
91 See IM Young ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship’ in RE 
Goodin & P Pettit Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology (1997) 256-272; Williams (note 90 
above) (rejecting the idea of universal equality in situations of ‘group-structured inequality’ saying that 
ignoring social difference by strict adherence to difference-blind equality will only serve to perpetuate 
such inequality). Also see Phillips (note 67 above) 25. 
92 Taylor (note 11); Phillips (note 67); C Albertyn ‘Equality’ in E Bonthuys & C Albertyn (eds) Gender, 
Law & Justice (2007) 87 (arguing that formal equality cannot tolerate differences on grounds such as race 
or gender, even if they promote equality).  
93 Taylor (note 11); Phillips (note 67 above) 25.  
94 Taylor (note 11 above); Phillips (note 67 above) Chapter 4.  
95 Note 68 above. 
96 Kymlicka (1989) note 9 above, 190-194; Young (note 90 above).  
97 Macklem (note 68 above) 126.  
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representation for national minorities (for example, through the introduction of group-
based cultural rights) or a realignment of the state’s internal power relationships (for 
example, by devolution of power or greater self-government for certain groups)’98. Such 
measures that are meant to institutionalise substantive equality should be seen as 
forming part of the general scheme of rights necessary for the enjoyment of freedom and 
equality by minorities.99 The objective is not necessarily to bring about equality of 
result, although that may be a preferred outcome. These measures rather serve to ensure 
that members of minorities have the necessary guarantees for full and equal participation 
in the political and economic processes of the state.100  
4.3.2 The international law framework  
 
The arguments made on the basis of various dimensions of equality find modest 
articulation in international law as well. Universal equality is enunciated in general 
terms in Articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter; Article 2 of the UDHR; Articles 2 and 26 
of the ICCPR; and Article 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). These guarantees, although general in their formulations, 
deal with situations in which minorities and their individual members may be denied 
equality of treatment and non-discrimination as they insist on equal enjoyment of rights 
without distinction on grounds of group membership of various kinds.  
 
The principle of non-discrimination, an essential element of equality of dignity, is also 
guaranteed in various specialised instruments, including: the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965;101 UNESCO 
Convention Against Discrimination in Education of 1960;102 UNESCO Declaration on 
                                                 
98 M Deveaux Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice (2000) 3 & Chapters 5 & 6.  
99 This is because, as Kymlicka argues, ‘it must be recognized that the members of minority cultures can 
face inequalities which are the product of their circumstances or endowment, not their choices or 
ambitions’. Kymlicka (1989) note 9 above 190. See also Addis (note 11 above) 659.  
100 Kymlicka (note 9 above, 1995) 109; S James Anaya Indigenous Peoples in International Law (1996) 
110-111.  
101 Under Article 2 racial discrimination is defined as ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference 
based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life’.  
102 Article 1 defines the term ‘discrimination’ to include ‘any distinction, exclusion, limitation or 
preference which, being based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
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Race and Racial Prejudice of 1978;103 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief of 1981104 and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.105 The guarantees that these instruments provide 
are of direct importance to minorities.106  
 
Affirmative action (reverse discrimination) is increasingly being articulated as an 
important aspect of non-discrimination. In consequence, there is a trend in contemporary 
international law and legal analysis ‘to emphasise that non-discrimination not only 
allows, but also in some situations requires’ treating individuals differently on the basis 
of having regard to their ethnic origin or religious conviction.107 Accordingly, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) mandates affirmative 
measures directed towards achieving substantive equality among racial and ethnic 
groups.108 Similarly, the HRC, in its General Comment 18(37), stated that ‘the principle 
of equality sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative action in order to 
diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination 
prohibited by the covenant’.109 As already alluded to above, such measures are, in the 
words of McKean, ‘strictly compensatory’.110 Affirmative action can be given 
application in various forms, including quota or other similar mechanisms that accord 
preferential treatment to minorities in various spheres of public life, most particularly 
access to education and other basic amenities, and public as well as private employment.  
                                                                                                                                               
or social origin, economic condition or birth, has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing equality 
of treatment in education’.  
103 Article 3 in its relevant part provides: ‘Any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on 
race, colour, ethnic or national origin or religious intolerance motivated by racist considerations … is 
incompatible with the requirements of an international order which is just and guarantees respect for 
human rights.’ 
104 The expression ‘intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief’ is understood in Article 2 of 
the Convention to mean ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief 
and having as its purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis’.  
105 In Article 2 States Parties undertake to ‘take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is 
protected against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed 
opinions, or beliefs of the child’s parents, legal guardians, or family members’.  
106 See Henrard (note 50 above) 193-205.  
107 Makkonen, (note 89 above) 158-159.  
108Accordingly, under Article 2(2) States Parties are required, when circumstance warrant, to take in the 
social, economic, cultural and other fields ‘special and concrete measures to ensure the adequate 
development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to them’.  
109 Para 10.  
110 W McKean Equality and Discrimination under International Law (1983) 288.  
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Beyond such temporary measures, other measures that may be taken to ensure equal 
access to opportunities in the political and socio-economic spheres of public life need 
not necessarily be temporary.111 When measures that states need to adopt take such 
form, they constitute aspects of substantive equality, which has found some articulation 
in various instruments, albeit in a weak or indirect and not sufficiently detailed form. 
Rights that are of particular importance in this regard include those relating to 
participation and representation. 112 
 
The 1992 Declaration on Minorities, in addition to elaborating the rights under Article 
27,113 enunciates additional rights that aim to ensure substantive equality for minorities. 
The most important is the right ‘to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, 
economic and public life’.114 Effective participation is further elaborated in Article 2(3) 
which provides for  
 
the right to participate effectively in decisions on the national and, where appropriate, regional 
level concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions in which they live, in a manner 
not compatible with national legislation.  
 
Although the right to effective participation as provided in this declaration does not 
specify the form that the right takes and its specific institutional implications, it is only 
logical to regard its reach as extending beyond Article 25 of the ICCPR, which 
guarantees the right of individuals to participation. The implication of this is that, 
beyond and above individual participation, effective participation of minorities requires 
states to adopt various arrangements, such as power-sharing political processes or 
electoral schemes, which facilitate the representation and participation of minorities.115  
                                                 
111 See General Comment No 25, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, para 
19. 
112 See, on such rights, V van Dyke Human Rights, Ethnicity and Discrimination (1985) 36-37.  
113 See the Declaration on the Rights of Minorities Articles 2(1) and 4(2).  
114 See the Declaration on the Rights of Minorities Article 2.  
115 See Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life 
principle 1.1; F De Varennes Towards Effective Political Participation and Representation of Minorities 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/1998/WP.5; A Eide Commentary to the Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities Working Paper, Working Group on 
Minorities (6th Session) E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2000/WP.1. (Commentary to the Declaration)  
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In the socio-economic sphere, Article 5(1) provides for the obligation of states to plan 
and implement national policies and programmes with ‘due regard for the legitimate 
interests of persons belonging to minorities’. States are also required to ‘consider 
appropriate measures so that persons belonging to minorities may participate fully’.116 
Elaborating on this, Asbjorn Eide states:  
 
Members of the different ethnic, religious, linguistic groups should on the basis of equality 
participate in, contribute to and benefit from the right to development. Consequently, 
development policies should be conducted in ways which decrease the disparities that might exist 
between different groups. Groups living compactly together should always be fully consulted 
with regard to development projects affecting the regions in which they live.117  
 
In more concrete terms, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural (CESC) 
Rights has highlighted the obligation to ensure equal opportunities for minorities in 
several fields, but especially in relation to employment, housing, health and 
education.118 Rights to land and natural resources are guaranteed, particularly with 
respect to peripheral minorities.119 
4.3.3 The African human rights system  
 
The right to equality in its universal form is provided for under Article 3 of the African 
Charter. Under Article 2 of the Charter, the non-discrimination clause also provides that 
[e]very individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and 
guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, 
color, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, 
birth or other status. 
                                                 
116 The Declaration on the Rights of Minorities Article 4(5). See also UN Manual on Human Rights 
Reporting (1997) (HR/PUB/91/1 (Rev.1)), 277 (where specific indication was made to the effect that 
attention be paid to the socio-economic and political situation of minorities to ensure that their 
development in the social, economic, and cultural spheres takes place on an equal footing with that of the 
general population). 
117 Possible Ways and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution of Problems 
Involving Minorities Report submitted by Special Rapporteur Asbjørn Eide Addendum 4, 
Recommendations UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34/Add.4, 11 August 1993 11 August 1993 para 16.  
118 W VandenHole Non –Discrimination and Equality in the View of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies 
(2005) 234. 
119 See Declaration on Indigenous Peoples Article 8 (2) (b).  
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This provision is mainly an expression of universal equality and as such is understood to 
require states to ensure that all individuals, including members of minorities, enjoy 
rights guaranteed in the charter without discrimination. Additionally, however, given the 
pervasive inequality among members of different groups in many African states, this 
provision can also be understood as requiring states to take affirmative measures in 
favour of disadvantaged minorities.120 Accordingly, it also has aspects of substantive 
equality.  
 
The enunciation of socio-economic rights under Articles 14-17 of the African Charter, 
although formulated as individual rights, must, in the particular circumstances of many 
African states, enjoin the state to develop policies that are not only capable of being 
directed towards improving the socio-economic conditions of citizens generally, but also 
both remedial (of the socio-economic marginalisation of disadvantaged groups and 
regions) and distributive in their effect.121 As the decision of the African Commission in 
the Ogoni case also shows,122 these rights, despite their formulation as individual rights, 
may be used to safeguard the socio-economic needs of minorities who are subject to 
particular socio-economic disadvantages and, at a minimum, to guarantee, together with 
the right of peoples to dispose of their natural wealth under Article 21, that such groups 
are not deprived of their means of subsistence.  
 
One of the unique features of the African Charter is that it guarantees the rights of 
peoples. Although the position of minorities as beneficiaries of peoples’ rights under the 
Charter has been a subject of controversy, it is now established that minorities are 
indeed among the beneficiaries of peoples’ rights.123 One of these is the right of peoples 
to equality. Article 19 stipulates:  
                                                 
120 See KA Acheampong ‘The African Charter and the Equalization of Human Rights’ (1994) 12 
Scandinavian Human Rights J 168.  
121 See SA Dersso Promotion of Human Security in Africa: The Role of African Human Rights Institutions 
ISS Monograph Series No 145 (June 2008) 12, 24-30; see also the Guidelines for National Periodic 
Reports in Second Activity Report of the African Commission as adopted in June 1989 annex XII, 
reprinted in C Heyns (ed) Human Rights Law in Africa Vol I (2004) 507, Guidelines II, 47, 515 & 55, 
516-517, which make direct reference to minorities.  
122 See SERAC & CESR v. Nigeria Communication No. 155/96 decided at ACHPR’s 30th Ordinary 
Session held in Banjul, The Gambia from 13-27 October 2001.  
123 See SA Dersso ‘The Jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights With 
Respect to Peoples’ Rights’ (2006) 6 (2) African Human Rights J 358.  
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All peoples shall be equal. They shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the same rights. 
Nothing shall justify the domination of a people by another.  
 
This provision strengthens the protection envisaged under Article 2 for members of 
minorities by specifically recognising the importance of inter-group equality, 
particularly in the context of Africa, for achieving substantive equality. The inter-group 
equality that it guarantees covers all aspects of public life: political, social and 
economic. Other guarantees that are of particular importance for minorities generally, 
and for indigenous peoples in particular, are the rights of peoples to their natural 
resources and to development, guaranteed under Articles 21 and 22 respectively.124 
 
It is clear from the foregoing that there is sufficient evidence in international law of the 
recognition of group-specific rights as a necessary component for ensuring the genuine 
equality of minorities. This implies the emergence of an evolving international legal 
expectation that states, having regard to their historical and socio-political conditions 
and the needs and interests of minorities, should adopt relevant institutional 
arrangements and socio-economic regimes that give optimal effect to these rights.125  
4.4 Self-determination  
 
Equality is undoubtedly a powerful normative framework for elaborating and defending 
minority rights, not only as they relate to the good of cultural membership but also in 
terms of political participation and representation, as well as socio-economic needs. 
However, some of these rights can find stronger and more direct support on another 
basis, namely, the right to self-determination. Given that the issue of minorities in Africa 
is also a product of the suppression of the autonomous political development of diverse 
pre-colonial ethno-cultural communities, and their forcible amalgamation under the 
                                                 
124 See, for example, Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities (2005) 75-76. On the importance of Article 21, see J Oloka-Onyango 
‘Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalization: International Mechanisms, Non-State 
Actors, and the Struggle for Peoples’ Rights in Africa’ (2003) 18 American University Int LR 851, 889-
893.  
125 These are generally regarded as offering an institutional framework for conflict management in various 
parts of the world and as producing positive results. See TR Gurr Peoples Versus States: Minorities at 
Risk in the New Century (2000) Chapter 8.  
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colonially contrived state structure,126 it is necessary that the defence and articulation of 
minority rights within the post-colonial African state also rest on and draw from self-
determination. In other words, it is only if minority rights are robustly defended as forms 
of the application of self-determination required to rectify these violations, which 
continue to affect many communities, that they can capture the historical dimension. 
The following section accordingly investigates and defends this possibility.  
4.4.1  The dominant perspective and its limits  
 
The Charter of the United Nations Organisation127 is the first modern international legal 
instrument to enunciate self-determination as a principle of international law.128  
Previously, during the League of Nations, this only had the status of a political idea. 
Under the 1960 UN Declaration for the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples,129 self-determination was elevated to the status of a right of peoples, albeit 
that the reference to people was confined to those in ‘territories which have not attained 
independence’.130 Although this has been a very important development, as Umozurike 
maintains, ‘the resolution does not offer false hope to minorities within states, for it 
expressly refers to “alien subjugation” as an essential qualification to “peoples” in “all 
peoples have the right to self-determination”’.131 
 
Under the UN, as under the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), decolonisation in 
Africa and Asia has been the most important development with respect to the 
articulation of self-determination as the right of peoples. The effect, however, has been 
the tendency under international law to equate the right to self-determination with 
independence. As Thornberry puts it, the logic of the 1960 Declaration is that ‘peoples 
hold the right to self-determination; a people is the whole people of a territory; a people 
                                                 
126 See Chapter II.  
127 See Charter of the United Nations of June 26, 1945 UNTS No. 993, 3 (hereinafter the UN Charter) 
Article 1 (2) & Article 55. Its enunciation in this text is generally associated with independence or the 
freedom of a people from external domination or interference.  
128 See A Cassese Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (1995) 19-33.  
129 UN GA Res. 1514 (XV) of 14 Dec. 1960 15 United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Supp. 
(No. 16) 66, UN Doc. A/4684 (1961). 
130 See para 5 & principle I.  
131 UO Umozurike Self-Determination in International L (1972) 72. 
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exercises its right through the achievement of independence’.132 As a result, the right to 
self-determination has been limited to, firstly, peoples of a particular territory under 
colonial rule or alien subjugation and, secondly, independence.  
 
This inevitably linked self-determination with territory and sovereignty, leading to the 
rise of a tension between self-determination and the principles of the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of states, principles on which the international system is founded. 
According to Hannum, in order to reconcile this tension self-determination is 
formulated, in the practice of the UN, as the right to freedom for a colonial people, or 
external self-determination, and the independence of a state’s population from foreign 
intervention, or internal self-determination.133  
 
There is the additional problem of the definition of the term ‘peoples’. In international 
law, consistent with the dominant perspective, the term ‘peoples’ as subject of the right 
to self-determination has generally been considered to signify either people under 
colonial rule or alien subjugation, or the whole people of a state.134 Other groups, such 
as minorities, including indigenous peoples, have not been regarded, at least until 
recently, as having the attributes of ‘peoples’ as a subject of self-determination.  
 
In Africa, the effect of this is the restriction of the application of self-determination to 
the removal of the colonial authority (independence) and the corresponding legal 
sanctification of everything else, including the highly contrived borders and state 
structures.135 As noted in Chapter II, the post-colonial African state is, in terms both of 
                                                 
132 P Thornberry International Law and the Rights of Minorities (1991) 18.  
133 H Hannum Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination 49. Here, the internal and external aspects 
of self-determination are actually expressions of self-determination as independence. The second aspect, 
although labelled external, in actual fact constitutes the principle of sovereignty of states. As will be 
shown below, the internal aspect of the right to self-determination, rather than being an expression of the 
international-law principle of sovereignty, refers to the institutions and norms that define the internal 
political structures and processes of the state.  
134 See R Higgins ‘Post-Modern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, Comments’ in C Brölmann et al 
(eds) Peoples and Minorities in International Law (1993) 29, 32; J Dugard ‘A Legal Basis for Secession – 
Relevant Principles and Rules’ in Julie Dahlitz (ed) Secession and International Law (2003) 92.  
135 CC Mojekwu ‘Self-determination: The African Perspective’ in Y Alexander & RA Friedlander (eds) 
Self-Determination: National, Regional & Global Dimensions (1980); A Xnathaki ‘The Right to Self-
determination: Meaning and Scope’ in N Ghanea & A Xanthaki (eds) Minorities, Peoples & Self-
Determination: Essays in Honour of Patrick Thornberry (2005) 15, 22-24; B Neuberger National Self-
Determination in Postcolonial Africa (1986).  
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its conception and making, a product of colonial rule. It ‘was so created by forcibly 
merging together various groups of different cultures’.136 The members of these hitherto 
independent groups forming the colonial state had no say at all in the process of its 
making.137 During decolonisation, while the colonial territory achieved independence, 
the diverse ethno-cultural groups forcibly included in it did not regain their freedom.138 
The process did not allow for negotiations and deliberations among the members of the 
constituent groups to determine, by themselves, the unit within which they should attain 
their independence.139 Ben Nwabueze comments: ‘Africa’s independence has operated, 
not to liberate the ethnic nationalities by restoring to them their pre-colonial autonomy, 
but rather to continue the denial of that autonomy and to heighten their continued 
alienation from the state.’140 It is only logical to conclude with Mutua that ‘the right to 
self-determination was exercised not by the victims of colonisation but by their 
victimisers’.141  
 
The constitutional configuration of the states was devoid of any popular consensus and 
cultural and historical foundation. On top of that, however, it also lacked the kind of 
institutional and normative framework (basic structure) that is necessary to effect a just 
organisation, distribution and sharing of political power, relevant to the deep ethno-
cultural diversity and political and socio-economic asymmetry that characterises the 
situation of so many groups and ethno-regions.142 Moreover, the institutions and 
processes of the state had no affinity with the social structures and values with which the 
                                                 
136 Nwabueze (note 20 above) 296. 
137 See B Davidson The Black Man’s Burden: The Curse of the Nation-state (1992); OC Okafor 
Redefining Legitimate Statehood: International Law and State Fragmentation in Africa (2000), 
particularly Chapter 2; MW Mutua ‘Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry’ (1995) 
16 Michigan J Int L 1113, 1122-1141.  
138 As Mojekwu aptly puts it: ‘It is a simpler matter for a given colonial territory to be independent. It is a 
much more involved affair for the same territory to be self-determined.’ Mojekwu (note 135 above) 234.  
139 As Davidson pointed out, ‘the leading nationalists found themselves obliged by imperialist policies, 
fashioned in London and Paris, “to seek independence within the existing power unit” of their colony, 
rather than in any more rational or historically logical territorial unit’. Davidson (note 137 above) 183; 
AA An-N‘im ‘Introduction: Expanding Legal Protection of Human Rights in African Context’ in AA An-
N‘im (ed) Human Rights Under African Constitutions (2003) 1, 12.  
140 Nwabueze (note 20 above) 309.  
141 Mutua (note 137 above) 1117.  
142 AM Abdullahi ‘The Refugee Crisis in Africa as a Crisis of the Institution of the State’ (1994) 6 (4) 
International J of Refugee L 562-580, 566 (arguing that the African state failed to construct an institution 
of the state that not only looks viable, but also functions and accommodates the diverging and often 
conflicting interests of the diverse ethnic nationalities within its borders). 
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life of members of the various communities is intimately connected.143 The continuation 
of the respective colonial language as the officially sanctioned medium of public 
communication ‘deprives the majority of Africans of access to knowledge, and hinders 
them from participating in national politics and the decision making processes’ and 
‘creates insecurity and feelings of inferiority among those who have to operate in the 
foreign language of the ruling elite’.144 As a result, many members of the population of 
the newly independent African states have been alienated from the process of the state, 
and hence continued to be excluded from exercising their basic freedom of self-rule. 
 
So peoples in Africa were deprived not only, by colonial conquest, of their inherent right 
to determine their own political, economic and social organisation,  but also, during and 
subsequent to ‘decolonisation’, of any meaningful say in respect of that process and the 
running of the formally independent African state. Moreover, the state continued to 
operate as an alien imposition, detached from the social structures and historical and 
cultural values, as well as the lived experiences, of the diverse people constituting it. 
This has often led, Shivji observed, to ‘internal oppression and discrimination of nations 
and nationalities within state borders’.145 The issue of minorities as examined in chapter 
II is a direct manifestation of this crisis of the legitimacy of the African state.146 
 
The correction of this structural crisis requires the application of the right to self-
determination in a form that both reinstates the freedom that the diverse peoples 
constituting the African state lost due to colonialism and ends its continuing violation 
under the post-colonial state. Similarly, it is necessary that not only peripheral 
minorities, but also minorities generally, are regarded as groups to which the term 
‘peoples’ – as a subject of the right to self-determination – applies. Nevertheless, given 
that there have been relevant intervening factors since the colonial period, such a 
formulation and application should necessarily be flexible enough not only to achieve 
the above ends, but also to address conflicting claims and reflect the interdependencies 
                                                 
143 See B Nwabueze Constitutionalism in the Emergent States (1973) 24; Davidson (note 137).  
144 A Lodhi ‘The Language Situation in Africa Today’ (1993) 2 (1) Nordic J of African Studies 81.  
145 IG Shivji ‘State and Constitutionalism: A New Democratic Perspective’ in IG Shivji State and 
Constitutionalism: An African Debate (1991) 27-54, 33.  
146 On the crisis of the legitimacy of the African state, along the same lines, see Okafor (note 137); JP 
Pham ‘African Constitutionalism: Forging New Models for Multiethnic Governance and Self-
determination’ in JI Levitt (ed) Africa: New Boundaries in International Law (2008) 183, 184-188.  
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developed among peoples within the modern African state, and allay the fear of 
disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. This leads us to examine 
James Anaya’s analysis of the content and application of self-determination and the 
emerging recognition in international law of internal self-determination, which seeks to 
address all these intricacies.  
4.4.2 Anaya on self-determination  
 
As Anaya’s very insightful study shows, the dominant perspective of self-determination 
associated with UN practice is very restrictive and fails to capture the essence of self-
determination. Based on the textual conceptualisation of the right or principle of self-
determination and the relevant practice, Anaya establishes that self-determination is 
constituted by a set of universal values that ‘are grounded in the idea that all segments of 
humanity, individually and as groups, have the right to pursue their own destinies in 
freedom and under conditions of equality’.147 The essential mark of these common sets 
of values underlying self-determination is that they define the minimum conditions of 
human freedom and equality for the constitution and functioning of legitimate 
government. Anaya thus concludes that self-determination ‘comprises a standard of 
governmental legitimacy within the modern human rights frame’.148 According to 
Anaya, the substance of self-determination, which applies to all segments of humanity, 
lies in what he calls a more or less identifiable ‘nexus of opinion about the minimum 
conditions for legitimate government’ shared by relevant international actors at any 
given time within the modern era of human rights.149  
 
The substance of self-determination does not mean that for the institution of government 
to be legitimate it has to uphold any conception of the good. Substantive self-
determination is rather about the procedural aspects of the constitution of the institutions 
of government and the manner of their operation, particularly in terms of the fairness of 
the distribution of constitutional goods as well as the burdens and benefits of social co-
operation. Accordingly, substantive self-determination is formulated as consisting of 
                                                 
147 See J Anaya ‘Self-determination as a Collective Human Right under International Law’ in P Aiko & M 
Scheinin (eds) Operationalizing the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination (2000) 3-18, 8.  
148 See J Anaya Indigenous Peoples in International Law (1996) 81. 
149 Ibid.  
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two normative aspects: a constitutive aspect and an ongoing aspect. In its constitutive 
aspect, substantive self-determination entails that ‘the governing institutional order be 
substantially the creation of processes guided by the will of the people, or peoples, 
governed’.150 This applies to the process of the formation of or change in the governing 
structures or institutional order of a society, such as the making or changing of 
constitutions. Substantive self-determination dictates that there be meaningful 
participation and consent by the people or peoples concerned to such occasional or 
episodic procedures. Ongoing self-determination, on the other hand, applies to any 
governing institutional order and ‘continuously enjoins the form and functioning of the 
governing institutional order’. This equires the existance of ‘a governing order under 
which individuals and groups are able to make meaningful choices in matters touching 
upon all spheres of life on a continuous basis’.151 These two aspects of substantive self-
determination require that the governing institutional order of a society be one that is, in 
the first place, a product of the equal and free participation and consent of individuals 
and groups constituting the society, and secondly managed on an ongoing basis through 
the participation and freely and equally expressed will of the people/peoples.  
 
The violation of self-determination in both its constitutive and ongoing aspects gives 
rise to contextually applicable remedies. This remedial aspect of self-determination must 
be distinguished from its substantive aspect. This distinction entails that ‘“all peoples”, 
not just the aggregate populations of states and colonial territories, but other spheres of 
community that define human existence and place in the world, including indigenous 
peoples as well as other groups’,152 such as minorities, have the right to self-
determination. But when the right to self-determination is invoked by any one of these 
groups, its application to them operates as remedy for the particular violations (of 
substantive self-determination) they suffered under the governing institutional order to 
which they belong. Given that not all violations of substantive self-determination need 
to be remedied by the grant of independence, the application of self-determination can 
and often does take other forms, including representation and participation, self-
                                                 
150 Anaya (note 147 above) 9.  
151 Anaya (note 148 above) 82.  
152 J Anaya Indigenous Peoples In International Law (2004) 193.  
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government or territorial autonomy, language rights, rights to land and resources, and 
cultural rights, including recognition of customary law.153  
 
The treatment of minorities in Africa, as discussed above in this section and in the 
previous two chapters, clearly violates their right to substantive self-determination, in 
both its constitutive and ongoing aspects. This necessarily entitles them to remedial self-
determination. Generally, this can be achieved through institutionalising relevant 
structures that guarantee minority representation and participation and self-government; 
language and cultural rights, including the recognition and enforcement of customary 
laws; and rights to land and resources. The redefinition of the structures and processes 
of the state that this necessitates essentially affects the legitimisation of the African 
state, or, in the words of Okafor, the ‘righting’, restructuring and rejuvenating of the 
post-colonial African state.154  
4.4.3 Emerging trends in international law and the African human rights 
system  
 
Significant developments in international law are slowly leading to the acceptance of a 
flexible formulation of self-determination which can be understood as allowing self-
determination in its application to take the above forms. These developments also 
recognise minorities, and particularly indigenous peoples, as having some of the 
attributes of ‘peoples’, and hence as being among the beneficiaries of the right to self-
determination in a form relevant to their specific conditions, which are defined by the 
violations they sufferred. In this context, the inclusion of the right to self-determination 
under two UN Covenants is of particular importance.155 These Covenants – the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR – both accorded the right to self-determination a prime place as Article 
1. In the language of the two Covenants, self-determination is a right of all peoples. 
Although the subject ‘peoples’ is left undefined, in this context it is understood to mean 
                                                 
153 See Anaya (note 148 above) Chapter 4.  
154 See OC Okafor ‘“Righting,” Restructuring, and Rejuvenating the Post-Colonial African State: The 
Case for the Establishment of an AU Special Commission on National Minorities’ (2007) 13 African 
Yearbook of Int L 2005 43, 50-56.  
155 See A Rosas ‘Internal Self-Determination’ in C Tomuschat (ed) Modern Law of Self-Determination 
(1993) 225-252.  
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not only those in colonial territories but also identifiable groups within independent 
states.156  
 
Within this human rights framework, probably the most important development is the 
trend towards recognising and articulating internal self-determination, which embraces a 
variety of institutional arrangements and entitlements that regulate the relationship 
between states and sub-national groups.157 According to Cassese, this was enunciated 
for the first time at the international level with the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act of 
1975.158 Here, Principle VIII of the Decalogue provides that 
 
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always 
have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external 
political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic 
and cultural development. (my ephasis) 
 
Unlike other international pronouncements on the right to self-determination, the 
express reference to internal political status introduced into international legal discourse 
the notion of internal self-determination as an exercise of political decision-making 
through which peoples establish a new constitutional order and ‘adapt existing social or 
political structures to meet new demands’.159 Although less direct, another instrument 
that makes reference to internal self-determination is the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action of 1993, which requires governments to be representative of the 
                                                 
156 In its General Comment on the right to self-determination, the UNHRC stated that Article 1 ‘imposes 
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‘whole people’, not just the majority. 160 Recently, internal self-determination for groups 
within states has been given clearer enunciation as part of international law under the 
2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.161  
 
Although self-government or territorial autonomy, which forms part of the right to self-
determination, is not expressly recognised in the leading international minority rights 
standard setting document, the 1992 Declaration on Minority Rights, it is nevertheless 
taken as one mechanism for giving substantive application to certain minority 
guarantees, particularly the right to effective participation.162 As Thornberry puts it, 
‘[t]here is no specific right to autonomy in the Declaration (1992), but “effective” 
participation through local and national organisations may necessitate the creation of 
autonomies to achieve the Declaration’s standard’.163 At the European level, there is 
specific recognition that self-government gives effective protection to minorities. 
Section IV (35) of the OSCE’s Copenhagen Document (1990), for example, 
recommends ‘appropriate local or autonomous administrations corresponding to the 
specific historical and territorial circumstances of … minorities’.  
  
In Africa as well, the right to self-determination as enshrined under the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights embodies the idea of internal self-determination.164 In 
the Katangese Peoples Congress v Zaire case,165 the African Commission, the body 
charged with monitoring compliance with the African Charter, expressly recognised 
internal self-determination, and held that 
 
Self-determination may be exercised in any of the following ways independence, self-
government, local government, federalism, confederalism, unitarism or any other form of 
                                                 
160 See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993 UN Doc A/CONF.157/23 Part 1.2.    
161 See UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Articles 3 & 4.  
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A Comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa (2003) 249-269.  
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relations that accords the wishes of the people but fully cognizant of other recognized principles 
such as sovereignty and territorial integrity.166 
 
Self-determination formulated in this way relates, particularly in societies with ethno-
cultural diversity, to ‘the internal state structure as well as to certain legal regulations to 
accommodate the population diversity of a state in a (more) optimal way’.167 These 
structures and legal regulations may include self-government arrangements in the form 
of federalism or autonomy, and rights of representation and effective participation, as 
well as various cultural rights. 168 They also include rights to land, the peoples’ rights to 
dispose freely of their natural wealth and resources, and not to be deprived of their own 
means of subsistence.169 Taken together, the effect of the above developments is an 
emerging recognition, rather than denial, of the entitlement of minorities to self-
determination, understood as a right to various forms of arrangements that guarantee 
self-government and participation.  
 
In the particular history of the post-colonial state and the situation of minorities in 
Africa, the application of internal self-determination in such forms essentially operates 
much like Anaya’s remedial self-determination. It remedies the violations that various 
minorities suffered by fully embracing and institutionally accommodating their 
identities and hitherto suppressed group interests. It also empowers members of the 
constituent minorities and guarantees them fair participation in shaping the political, 
economic and socio-cultural process of the state, thereby ending what Shivji calls 
‘national oppression’ or what Nwabueze terms ‘alienation’ from the state.170 Moreover, 
as indicated above, such constitutional application of the right to self-determination 
‘rights’, to use Okafor’s powerful term,171 the post-colonial African state, and thereby 
rectify its inherited and continuing illegitimacy. This approach generally builds upon the 
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jurisprudence of the African Commission and constitutes an elaboration of the direction 
it should take.172  
4.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has identified and elaborated the legal and normative bases for the 
recognition and accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity in Africa. The foregoing 
discussion has shown that arguments supporting such accommodation can be drawn 
from cultural identity, equality and self-determination. Although each of these three 
elements provides its own basis for addressing the issue of minorities, as shown in this 
chapter, no one or two of them alone would be enough to constitute a minority rights 
framework sufficiently robust for designing an adequate constitutional mechanism for 
accommodation of diversity in Africa. They are also elaborated as complementing each 
other to offer a comprehensive legal and normative framework, not only to justify the 
recognition and accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity, but also to identify the 
mechanisms (the institutions and constitutional principles) for institutionalising such 
recognition and accommodation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
172 See Dersso (note  123 above).  
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CHAPTER V 
Towards a multicultural constitutional framework: The institutional dimensions of 
the minority rights framework 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The approach to minority rights defended in this study is built on three pillars – access 
to cultural membership, equality and self-determination – which in turn depend on two 
frameworks: a theoretical framework and the international law framework. Combining 
these two, this chapter outlines the specific institutional arrangements and minority 
guarantees that optimally translate the three pillars of minority rights into an adequate 
constitutional design for accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity in Africa. Due to 
space limitations, the following pages offer only a general outline.  
5.2 Self-government and/or territorial autonomy  
 
Structures of self-government and/or territorial autonomy constitute by far the most 
important institutional arrangements and minority guarantees that together translate the 
three pillars of minority rights into an adequate multicultural constitutional design. They 
not only satisfy the rights of minorities to internal and/or remedial self-determination, 
but also provide the strongest institutional framework for the protection of the culture of 
minorities. 
 
Self-government can be institutionalised within states in various ways.1 One such 
important mechanism, increasingly being used in many parts of the world, is 
federalism.2 This term signifies a normative position about how a polity should organise 
its power structures.3 As an ideology about organisation of power, federalism ‘holds that 
                                                 
1 Devolution of power is one means of institutionalising self-government. But such devolution does not 
have to be and generally is not a constitutionally entrenched mechanism. It is rather a result of political 
bargaining whose legal basis is generally an act of parliament, which has less durability and a lower level 
of protection. Preference is therefore given to arrangements, like federalism, that are constitutionally 
entrenched.   
2 RL Watts ‘Federalism, Federal Political Systems, and Federations’ (1998)  1 Annual Review of Political 
Science 117-137, 117-120.  
3 For details on this and further references see ibid 120.  
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the ideal organization of human affairs is best reflected in the celebration of diversity 
through unity’.4 As Andreas Eshete points out, however, federalism is not ‘a necessary 
part of an ideal conception or theory of a democratic society’.5 This means that 
federalism, unlike public ideals of universal reach such as human rights, would not be 
applicable to all societies.6 Accordingly, ‘it is difficult to defend federalism as a free-
standing ideology comparable to or separate from liberalism or socialism’.7 Rather, 
federalism is a situation-dependent theory, if it is to be taken as such, which draws its 
support from existing ideals of universal reach and the particular circumstances of 
specific societies. It expresses the idea that political organisation should seek to achieve 
political union and autonomy by combining shared rule on common matters and self-
rule on other aspects of public life. 8  
 
From the perspective of this study, what makes federalism attractive is its capacity to 
provide a flexible framework for balancing the demands of unity and diversity by 
allowing members of various groups to participate at the centre in relation to common 
concerns through shared rule, while leaving autonomous space for minorities through 
self-rule. The principle of federalism, according to the Supreme Court of Canada, 
‘recognises the diversity of the component parts of confederation or a federation and the 
autonomy of the provincial governments to develop their societies within their 
respective sphere of jurisdiction’.9 It is, however, important to note that whether 
federalism serves to accommodate the interests of minorities depends on the resolution 
of two questions.10 The first is whether, and the extent to which, the boundaries of 
federal units are defined to allow minorities to exercise some degree of self-government 
within those units. The other is the degree of autonomy that the division of sovereign 
                                                 
4 G Smith ‘Mapping the Federal Condition: Ideology, Political Practice and Social Justice’ in G Smith 
(ed) Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge (1995) 4.  
5 A Eshete ‘Ethnic Federalism: New Frontiers in Ethiopian Politics’ in First National Conference on 
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7 Smith (note 4 above) 4.  
8 See R Watts Comparing Federal Systems (1999) 9.  
9 Reference re the Secession of Quebec (1998) 2 SCR 217 para 58 [Re Secession of Quebec].  
10 See W Kymlicka ‘Federalism, Nationalism and Multiculturalism’ in D Karmis & W Norman (eds) 
Theories of Federalism: A Reader (2005) 269.  
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powers leaves to the federal units to accommodate self-rule for the minorities 
concerned.  
 
Federation expresses a particular form of institutional and structural arrangement by 
which federalism is given institutional application. It refers to a political community in 
which power is constitutionally divided and shared between a central government, 
having nationwide responsibility, and constituent governments, having local 
responsibility.11 A federation can be created on the basis of either 
administrative/territorial boundaries or ethnic, religious and linguistic considerations. A 
distinction can therefore be made between territorial or administrative federalism and 
multinational federalism.12 The first of these is institutionalised merely on the basis of 
historic internal boundaries and administrative considerations. American federalism is 
the first example of territorial federalism. Others include Germany and Australia. But as 
Kymlicka observes, ‘[f]or a federal system to qualify as genuinely multinational, 
decisions about boundaries and powers must consciously reflect the needs and 
aspirations of minority groups’.13 Examples of such federal systems include Canada, 
Belgium and Spain.  
 
From the perspective of this study, the problem with territorial federation is that it would 
not address the claims of minorities for self-government, or for participation through 
self-government, as internal boundaries are not generally drawn along ethno-cultural 
lines to allow each group to form a majority within the federal units.14 On the other 
hand, multicultural federation aims exactly at that. In this case, the boundaries of federal 
units are drawn in a way that allows territorial minorities to be self-governing.15  
 
The trouble with multicultural federalism is the problem of how to meet the interests of 
minorities with regard to self-government without compromising democratic ideals of 
                                                 
11 Watts (note 2 above) 121; Re Secession of Quebec (note 9 above) para 56.  
12 Kymlicka (note 10 above) 273-277.  
13 Ibid 276.  
14 Kymlicka (note 10 above) 276; W Kymlicka Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority 
Rights (1995) 29.  
15 Ibid. According to the Supreme Court of Canada federalism accordingly ‘facilitates the pursuit of 
collective goals by cultural and linguistic minorities which form the majority within a particular 
province’. Re Secession of Quebec (note 9 above) para 59.  
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universal reach. There is a danger of fragmenting state institutions and further 
accentuating the ethnic divisions that federalism is meant to regulate, particularly if the 
system leads to the emergence of ‘exclusive’ or ‘mono-national’ home republics.16 In 
the context of this study, it is imperative to underline that the deployment of federalism 
is only meant to recognise and promote the interest of minorities in self-government and 
effective participation in the processes of the state of which they form a part.17 
Accordingly, its legitimacy should also ultimately be judged in terms of its ability, not 
only to accommodate diversity, but also to subject it to universal ideals of constitutional 
democracy, including non-discrimination, rule of law and the principles of democracy.18  
 
There is no hard and fast rule about the degree of authority to be constitutionally vested 
in federal units; it is a matter to be determined according to the specific circumstances of 
each society and the nature of the issues affecting the minorities concerned. In the case 
of multicultural federations, it is important that federal units are assigned the powers 
necessary for the community or communities constituting the self-governing units to 
exercise effective self-government over local matters. According to the Lund 
Recommendations, ‘the functions over which such administrations [federal units] have 
successfully assumed primary or significant authority include education, culture, use of 
minority language, environment, local planning, natural resources, economic 
development, local policing functions, and housing, health, and other social services’.19 
They further state that taxation, administration of justice, tourism, and transport are 
functions shared by central and regional authorities.  
 
This does not, however, mean that there has to be a watertight division of power 
between the centre and the federal units. This is neither necessary nor practically 
possible. Accordingly, while the respective spheres of competence of the two domains 
                                                 
16 See Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World Human Development Report (2004) 52; A G Selassie 
‘Ethnic Federalism: Its Promise and Pitfalls for Africa’ (Winter 2003) 28 Yale J of Int L 51.  
17 As Elazar puts it, federal principles are said to work if they can ‘combine kinship (the basis of 
ethnicity), and consent (the basis of democratic government) into politically viable, constitutionally 
protected, arrangements involving territorial and non-territorial polities’. D Elazar Federalism and the 
Way to Peace (1994) 23-24.  
18 See The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life 
(1999) prepared by international experts for OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, principles 
16 and 21. See further below on principles that regulate the application of minority rights.  
19 Ibid principle 20.  
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have to be constitutionally defined as clearly as possible, and guarantees provided 
against either level of government encroaching upon the powers of the other, there has 
to be flexibility and co-ordination between the two levels for the effective and efficient 
exercise of their respective powers. It is also more important in the context of 
developing multi-ethnic societies, such as those in Africa, that such autonomy is not of 
such a nature that it frustrates national cohesion or undermines the emergence of 
effective national government necessary to advance the countries’ socio-economic 
development. 
 
Federalism also enhances the participation of minorities in public life by creating 
different levels of policy making.20 In a federal system, minorities can effectively take 
part in and influence the decision-making processes through representation and 
participation in national as well as regional policy making.21 The system creates this 
possibility by providing for institutions of both self-rule and shared rule. In federal 
systems, parliament is thus organised in such a way that the interests of both unity and 
diversity have representation and voice in the national law-making process.22 ‘In 
federations,’ writes Preston King, ‘the people are taken as a single entity, in one sense, 
but as a plurality in another. The people are represented as whole and as parts.’23 The 
lower house of parliament in a federation is constituted on the basis of universal 
elections and represents the interest of the whole, while the upper house is constituted 
on the basis of federal units, and represents the interests of those units or the relevant 
differences in society.24 Minorities can have representation in the national law-making 
process directly through the lower house, but mainly on the basis of citizenship and 
through the upper house, by being part of the federal units represented in it mainly on 
                                                 
20 C Young ‘Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy: An Overview’ in C Young (ed) Ethnic Diversity and 
Public Policy: A Comparative Inquiry (1998) 1, 11.  
21 This is the essence of the definition of a federation by James Tully. According to him a federation is a 
society in which democratic self-government is distributed in such a way that citizens participate 
concurrently in different collectivities – in the democratic institutions of the society as a whole and of the 
federated members, such as provinces, states, nations or first nations. J Tully ‘Introduction’ in AG 
Gagnon & J Tully (eds) Multicultural Democracies (2001) 1, 10. Also see Re Secession of Quebec (note 9 
above) para 59.  
22 See ibid (where the Supreme Court of Canada held that federalism allows minorities to form majorities 
within particular provinces and made provision for their representation in the federal parliament).  
23 P King ‘Federation and Representation’ in M Burgess & A Gagnon (eds) Comparative Federalism and 
Federation (1993) 95, 95-96.  
24 On the organisation of upper house of parliaments see A Fiseha Federalism and the Accommodation of 
Diversity in Ethiopia (2005/2006) Chapter 3.  
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the basis of their group membership. They can thus ventilate their group interests in the 
national policymaking processes.  
 
In Africa, as noted in chapter III, federalism has not had a good history. Consequently, 
many query its workability.25 But, as Ladipo Adamolekun and John Kincaid observe, 
‘the failures of federalism in Africa are not peculiar to federalism; they are part of the 
general failure of democratic governance on the continent’.26 Even in the case of 
Nigeria, federalism has had only limited success not because it is not workable, but 
because of the particular characteristics of the design of the federation, such as 
concentration of power at the centre, and the particular political, demographic and socio-
economic context.27 What this says is not that federalism cannot accommodate diversity 
in Africa, but that its workability depends on the way it is institutionalised and the 
particular political context of the country within which it operates.28 In this study, as 
well, federalism is seen only as a necessary mechanism whose efficacy depends on the 
political, social and legal context of particular societies.29  
5.3 Institutionalising effective representation and participation of minorities  
 
The institutionalisation of self-government or territorial autonomy through federalism to 
address minority claims is not without its limits. It can be a more effective instrument in 
countries where minorities are territorially concentrated. Where minorities are dispersed 
it may be of very limited use, although not necessarily irrelevant. Besides, the 
circumstances of some societies and their minorities may not require the 
institutionalisation of self-government structures. In that case, federalism may not 
provide the answer. In the context of this study, for example, such is the case with 
respect to groups identified as ethno-cultural minorities, as well as many ethno-political 
                                                 
25 See, for example, MW Mutua ‘Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry’ (1995) 16 
Michigan J Int L 1113, 1152-1160.  
26 L Adamolekun & J Kincaid ‘The Federal Solution: Assessment and Prognosis for Nigeria and Africa’ 
21 (1991) Publius: The J of Federalism 173, 174.  
27 See O Nnoli Ethnicity and Development in Nigeria (1995) 95. 
28 As Young pointed out, and as the case studies particularly on Ethiopia (Chapter VII below) would 
show, probably the strongest argument for federalism is that in large and culturally complex societies no 
other formula may work. Note 20 above, 11.  
29 See DJ Elazar ‘International and Comparative Federalism’ (June 1993) 26 (2) Political Science and 
Politics 190-195; RL Watts ‘Federalism and Diversity in Canada’ in Y Ghai (ed) Autonomy and Ethnicity: 
Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic Societies (2000) 29, 49.  
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minorities in Africa. Under such circumstances, participation rights and the manner of 
their institutionalisation become avenues for increased minority representation and 
participation. Finally, even when federalism is an option, states must still make 
provision for minority representation.  
 
Probably the most effective, though not uncontroversial, way for achieving the effective 
participation of minorities is group representation.30 As Iris Marion Young argues, this 
is because ‘[g]roup representation provides the opportunity for some to express their 
needs or interests who would not likely be heard without that representation’.31 It thus 
enables marginalised groups to voice their interests directly and articulate the ways by 
which those interests can be accommodated in the process of national policy making.32 
Yash Ghai comments: ‘Representation is an emphatic recognition of a positive right of 
the minority – to take part in the state political processes and to influence state 
policies.’33 Without such participation, members of such groups cannot fully enjoy free 
and equal status, nor can their marginalisation and subordination be dismantled.34 Group 
representation is also the best way to ensure the recognition and institutional expression 
of the ethno-cultural diversity of society in the decision-making structures of the state. It 
is therefore necessary to provide for arrangements that secure the representation of 
minorities in the process of national policy making on the basis of their group 
characters, although the arrangements must be flexible enough not to force people into 
identifying themselves with particular groups and tightly institutionalised divisions.  
 
The most important level for minority representation is the legislative process.35 As we 
have seen above, in federations parliaments can be designed with two houses, with the 
upper house facilitating the representation of groups exercising self-government as units 
                                                 
30 On group representation see MS Williams ‘Memory, History and Membership: The Moral Claims of 
Marginalized Groups in Political Representation’ in J Raikka (ed) Do we need minority rights? 85-119, 
104-109; Kymlicka (note 10 above) Chapter 7; IM Young ‘Differing Group Representation’ in I Shapiro 
& W Kymlicka (eds) NOMOS XXXIX Ethnicity and group rights (1997) 349-376.  
31 IM Young ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship’ in RE 
Goodin & P Pettit Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology (1997) 256, 264.  
32 See, for more, IM Young Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990) 184-186.  
33 Y Ghai ‘Public Participation, Autonomy and Minorities’ in ZA Skurbaty (eds) Beyond a One 
Dimensional State: An Emerging Right to Autonomy? (2005) 3, 19.  
34 Williams (note 30 above) 107.  
35 See S Wheatley ‘Deliberative Democracy and Minorities’ (2003) 14 (3) European J of Int L 507, 514-
518. 
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of federation. Another, and probably the most important, mechanism for achieving 
minority representation in the legislative process is the electoral system. As Steiner 
points out, ‘the electoral structure selected for choosing a legislature ... will significantly 
influence the degree of representation and power of many minority groups in society’.36 
From the perspective of the normative framework discussed above for the constitutional 
accommodation of diversity in multi-ethnic societies, preference should be given to an 
electoral system that can, in the particular circumstances of the particular country, 
secure both a high level of representation of members of minorities and their effective 
participation, without institutionalising group differences. The forms that an electoral 
system may take can be broadly divided into plurality or majority systems, and 
proportional representation (PR) and/or mixed systems.37  
 
Many argue, appropriately in my view, that PR is the preferred electoral system for the 
just representation of minorities and their effective participation.38 The essence of this 
electoral system is that votes cast are translated into a proportional number of seats for 
each party, and it is thus credited with fairness and inclusivity. According to Lewis, ‘in a 
plural society, proportional representation with a few large several-member 
constituencies is better than electoral systems with many single-member constituencies 
not only because it gives more satisfaction to the minorities, but also because it reduces 
the geographical conflict, and the racial or other differences which go with 
                                                 
36 HJ Steiner ‘Political Participation as a Human Right’ in Harvard Human Rights Yearbook (1998) 77, 
107.  
37 See generally A Reynolds, B Reilly & A Ellis with JA Chebub et al Electoral System Design: The New 
International IDEA Handbook (2005) (hereinafter Handbook); A Lijphart Electoral Systems and Party 
Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990 (1994).  
38 There are, however, scholars who reject PR on the ground that instead of dampening divisions it leads 
to their institutional entrenchment. Thus, Donald L Horowitz, for example, proposes as an alternative to 
PR the ‘Alternative Vote’ electoral system. DL Horowitz A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional 
Engineering in a Divided Society (1991) 188-203; DL Horowitz ‘Electoral Systems: A Primer for 
Decision Makers’ (October 2003) 14 J of Democracy 122-123. In such a system voters cast their votes by 
ranking their preferred candidates. If a candidate receives an absolute majority of first preferences, he or 
she is elected; if not, the weakest candidate is eliminated, and the ballots are redistributed according to 
second preferences until one of the candidates receives a majority of the votes. The aim is to ensure the 
election of moderate representatives. The problem with this system is that it leads to a difference-blind 
system of representation, and as a result would not satisfy the needs of minorities that seek fair 
representation and participation for their members. For further criticisms of this system, see Arend Liphart 
‘The Alternative Vote: A Realistic Alternative for South Africa?’  (June 1991) 18 Politikon 9.  
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geography’.39 Many agree that PR better ensures fair representation of minorities in 
multi-ethnic societies.40 It also does not force people to identify with particular groups.  
 
As W Arthur Lewis argued in 1965, and others have argued since then, in African plural 
societies electoral systems that yield governments based on a simple aggregation of 
votes and majority rule are not to be preferred over those that deliver an inclusive or 
power-sharing government. PR systems are better suited to deliver such inclusive 
government. It makes the opportunity to participate in the political processes of the state 
available to all minorities who seek representation and participation, and thereby 
minimises the pattern of ethnic rivalry for control or a share of state power that the 
winner-takes-all system tends to produce.41  
 
The PR system, however, is defended here only as a basic institutional design feature for 
facilitating minority representation. Effective minority representation may in particular 
situations call for additional arrangements.42 Accordingly, to accommodate the situation 
of highly marginalised sections of society, such as the San in Botswana or South Africa, 
and other peripheral minorities whose representation may not be secured through the 
mere application of a PR system, states may have to complement it with other methods, 
such as reserved seats or quotas.43 Once such highly marginalised minorities achieve a 
degree of socio-economic, cultural and political inclusion sufficient to mitigate their 
marginalisation, these special arrangements may be removed. ‘[I]n so far as these rights 
are seen as a response to oppression or systematic disadvantage,’ writes Kymlicka, ‘they 
are most probably seen as a temporary measure on the way to a society where the need 
                                                 
39 WA Lewis Politics in West Africa (1965) 72.   
40 A Reynolds ‘Constitutional Engineering in Southern Africa’ (April 1995) 6(2) J of Democracy 86; A 
Reynolds ‘The Case for Proportionality’ (October 1995) 6 (4) J of Democracy 117; A Reynolds  Report: 
Electoral System and the Protection and Participation of Minorities (2006) 11; AL ‘Self-Determination 
Versus Pre-determination of Ethnic Minorities in Power-sharing Systems’ in W Kymlicka (ed) The Rights 
of Minority Cultures (1995) 275, 281; N Topperwien ‘Participation in the Decision-Making Process as a 
Means of Group Accommodation’ in GA Tar, RF Williams & J  Marko (eds) Federalism, Subnational 
Constitutions and Minority Rights (2004) 41-52, 47; Ghai (note 33 above) 23; A Reynolds ‘The Case for 
Proportionality’ (October 1995) 6(4) J of Democracy 117.  
41 See UNDP Human Development Report 2004 (note 16 above) 54.  
42 Young (note 32 above) 187-188.  
43 Ghai (note 33 above). This is done in many countries, such as Venezuela, Romania, India, Jordan, 
Niger, Slovenia, Colombia, Croatia and Burundi. See, for example, Human Development Report 2004 
(note 16 above) 54.  
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for special representation no longer exists.’ He adds that ‘society should seek to remove 
the oppression and disadvantage, thereby eliminating the need for these rights’.44  
 
The representation of minorities does not necessarily guarantee their effective 
participation. Once represented in the law-making structures of a state, they need to be 
given opportunities to contribute to the legislative process. It is important in this regard 
that minorities are also allowed representation in the various committees, hearings and 
processes of legislative bodies. Additionally, the promotion and affirmation of diversity 
in the legislative process can ensure that minority representatives get the opportunity to 
represent, sufficiently articulate, and defend the interests of minorities.  
 
Most importantly, minority representation can be translated into effective participation 
in countries with a deliberative and participatory democratic process.45 As many 
scholars of deliberative democracy argue,46 and the South African case study in chapter 
VI shows, such a system guarantees that minorities are given the opportunity, 
notwithstanding their representation in the legislature, to have their say and to have their 
views accommodated, particularly on matters that are of direct concern to them. This 
approach is capable of transforming post-colonial African politics from a zero-sum 
game of ‘winner takes all’ into an all-inclusive process of participatory decision-making. 
It would also lead, it is hoped, to greater unity and solidarity in society: 
 
For one thing, political decision making would be seen as more legitimate since every one would 
have a fair chance to have their views heard and considered. Moreover, the very fact that people 
share the experience of deliberating in common provides a tangible bond that connects citizens 
and encourages greater mutual understanding and empathy.47 
 
                                                 
44 Kymlicka (note 10 above) 32.  
45 See MS Williams ‘The Uneasy Alliance of Group Representation and Deliberative Democracy’ in W 
Kymlicka & W Norman (eds) Citizenship in Diverse Societies (2000) 124-152; Wheatley (note 35 above) 
509-514.  
46 See Williams (note 45 above); Monique Deveaux Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice (2000); 
Anne Phillips Which Equalities Matter? (1999) Chapters 4 & 5.  
47 A Patten & W Kymlicka ‘Introduction: Language Rights and Political Theory: Context, Issues, and 
Approaches’ in A Patten & W Kymlicka (eds) Language Rights and Political Theory (2003) 1, 1. See also 
M Deveaux Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice (2000) 5 & Chapter 5-6; Democratic Alliance & 
Another v. Masondo NO & Another 2003 (2) SA 413 (CC) 2006, (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) para. 115.   
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This view emphasises the existence of adequate mechanisms and opportunities to 
facilitate direct public participation of minorities in decision-making processes, as 
envisaged in Articles 2(2) and (3) of the 1992 Declaration on Minority Rights. These 
may include special procedures and arrangements through which minorities can bring 
relevant facts to decision-makers, articulate and defend their views, propose alternative 
courses of action, and generally get the opportunity to be heard or become co-decision 
makers. It is accordingly maintained here that combining PR with such robust forms of 
participatory/deliberative democratic processes would give minorities adequate voice or 
influence in the processes of the state.  
  
Minority representation and participation should not be limited to the law-making 
process alone.48 They should cover the whole range of the conduct of public affairs. 
According to General Comment 25 of the UN HRC:  
 
Conduct of public affairs … is a broad concept which relates to the exercise of political power, in 
particular the exercise of legislative, executive and administrative powers … covering all aspects 
of public administration, and the formulation and implementation of policy at international, 
national, regional and local levels.49  
 
It is therefore important that minorities are represented in executive, administrative and 
judicial institutions as well. Yash Ghai rightly points out that there are many good 
reasons for this. ‘A great deal of state policy and regulation are made by public servants, 
and it is appropriate that officials of minorities should be able to participate in those 
processes.’50 Moreover, ‘[d]ecisions on policy and implementation are better informed 
and improved through the input of minorities’. This broader representation also 
enhances the identification of minorities with the state and its institutions, and hence 
nurtures national integration. ‘The access of minorities to the public service and their 
relations with state services are greatly facilitated and improved if they can deal with 
officials from their community.’51 The quota system is one possible mechanism for 
                                                 
48 See Wheatley (note 35 above) 515.  
49 UN Human Rights Committee General Comment 25 (57) UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (1996) 
para. 5. 
50 Y Ghai Public Participation and Minorities MRG Report (2003) 12.  
51 Ibid.  
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effecting such representation, but such a rigid mechanism may be necessary only in 
sharply divided societies such as Burundi, and, as the Indian experience shows, for fast-
tracking the inclusion of highly marginalised groups. It may therefore be more relevant 
in the African context in countries with peripheral minorities. Otherwise, greater 
minority participation can also be effected through a constitutional provision that 
requires institutions of government to be representative of the diversity of the society.  
5.4 Language and cultural policies, and guarantees for cultural, religious and 
linguistic rights  
 
With respect to language, the most important issues to be addressed include the use of 
minority languages in communication with public authorities, including courts, and the 
use of minority languages in public media and in education. To the extent that the 
language situation of different countries and groups are different, the determination of 
the appropriate language policy and minority-language guarantees should be decided 
contextually. The most important thing is that – in order to give optimal constitutional 
application to the value of cultural identity, the need to revitalise African languages 
hitherto neglected and suppressed, and to give equality of opportunity in access to public 
sphere, as discussed above – consideration has to be given to guarantee the use of 
minority languages in various spheres of public life, including in communication with 
state authorities.  
 
Given the multiplicity of languages spoken in most African states, as in other 
multilingual countries, states cannot be said to have the obligation to provide all public 
services in every language that members of the public might speak. Accordingly, the 
determination of whether public authorities should use minority languages in their 
dealings with members of such language groups depends on a number of factors. The 
‘sliding-scale’ approach offers an important standard in this regard.52 According to this 
approach, the right of minorities to use their language in communication with public 
                                                 
52 F de Varennes Language, Minorities & Human Rights (1996) 177.  
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authorities depends upon the size of their population, their territorial concentration, the 
capacity of the state, and the nature of the service in question.53  
 
This clearly acknowledges that in multilingual societies, such as those in most African 
states, neither justice nor equality demands that all languages be given equal legal status 
in terms of their use for public purposes. The implication of this is that in such societies 
states are expected to provide public services and communication in minority languages 
in places where speakers of those languages are found in significant numbers, the public 
services in question are of a very important nature, and the resources required to provide 
the public services can be made available without unduly compromising the distribution 
of resources in other areas of public demand as well.54 In the African context, since most 
groups are territorially concentrated and most social and economic affairs are conducted 
at local levels in the regional or local vernacular, the recognition and use of minority 
languages in the conduct of public affairs can best be institutionalised at the regional or 
local levels. Within the limits of the above considerations, African states should 
accordingly recognise, for government purposes, the use of local vernaculars at the 
regional or local levels. At the national level, however, the most widely spoken 
language/s can be designated as (the) official language/s, as the common medium of 
communication necessary for the proper functioning of a modern society. Since states 
should facilitate the learning of such official language/s by members of minorities 
without depriving them of the freedom to choose the language they wish to use, the 
national official language/s should be made to operate alongside the regional languages 
where the latter are official at regional or local levels. This balances the interest of 
having a common national language with the need to recognise local languages to 
empower their hitherto neglected speakers.  
 
The use of minority languages in the conduct of public affairs covers, and is also 
particularly important in, education and the media.55 These are important tools for the 
                                                 
53 See F de Varennes ‘A Guide to the Rights of Minorities and Language’ COLPI Paper No 4 (2001) 30. 
These various considerations are spelt out in the Oslo Recommendations of the OSCE HCNM Regarding 
the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities particularly principles 13-15  
54 De Varennes (note 52 above) 177-178. Also see J Packer’s formula of expressed desires + genuine 
needs against real possibilities. J Packer ‘On the Content of Minority Rights’ in J Räikkaä (ed) Do We 
Need Minority Rights? (1996) 121-178, 143-144.  
55 See Oslo Recommendations (note 53 above).  
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reproduction and maintenance of not only the cultures of groups, but also their 
languages. As Adeno Addis has argued, they are also instrumental in nurturing genuine 
dialogue across difference and developing a strong sense of pluralistic solidarity in 
multi-ethnic societies.56 Issues of particular importance with respect to the use of 
minority languages in education include the provision of public education in minority 
languages, the establishment of private educational institutions, and the content of 
curricula.  
 
The concern with cultural identity and equality in access to education, as per the 
discussion on the normative framework, entails that minorities are guaranteed the right 
to receive education in their languages, but, once again, subject to the considerations of 
the sliding-scale approach. Accordingly, ‘a state would only be expected to provide 
education in a certain language if the linguistic group concerned is of a certain size and 
only in areas where the group reaches a certain concentration’.57 Nevertheless, as De 
Varennes argues, ‘[m]embers of a minority have, at minimum, the right to be taught 
their language in public schools (as a subject) where practical and justified, even if their 
numbers are not sufficient for the use of their language as the medium of instruction in 
public schools’.58 The qualification ‘where practical and justified’ mainly relates to, 
among other things, factors such as the number of minority students seeking education 
in their language and the extent of the burden this puts on public resources. Where 
resource limitations mean that minority children are not taught in their languages, it may 
be necessary to make adequate provision to assist them in learning in the official 
language.  
 
As already observed, education in minority languages is also given effect through the 
right of linguistic minorities to establish their own educational institutions subject to 
national standards of quality education. Although generally it is for the group members 
                                                 
56 See A Addis ‘On Human Diversity and the Limits of Toleration’ in Shapiro and Kymlicka (note 30 
above) 112.  
57 K Henrard Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights, Minority 
Rights and the Right to Self-Determination (2000) 260-261.  
58 De Varennes (note 53 above) 33. Henrard similarly argues that partial satisfaction can be given to the 
right to education in minority languages in the context of developing multi-ethnic societies through 
multilingual education, whereby the various languages spoken by students are used as medium of 
instruction for certain courses or during certain time blocks. Note 57 above, 261.  
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to bear the costs of such institutions, in certain circumstances the state may bear the 
costs or provide subsidies. In the light of Article 5(1)(c) of the UNESCO Convention on 
the Elimination of Discrimination in Education and the requirements of substantive 
equality as discussed above, the state bears such costs where the minority lacks 
sufficient financial resources and where public schools are not sufficiently pluralistic to 
give satisfaction to minority-language education.59  
 
As far as the content of education curricula is concerned, the normative framework 
discussed above enjoins states to adopt a multicultural approach.60 The education 
curricula should reflect, to the extent possible, in an objective and non-pejorative way, 
the culture, history, language and traditions of all ethno-cultural groups within states, 
particularly those of historically disadvantaged or marginalised groups.61 Ideally, the 
text materials to be used should also be representative of the perspectives of members of 
different sections of society.  
 
The most important aspects of the use of minority languages in the media relate to the 
establishment of print or electronic media in minority languages, and support for 
printing in minority languages and provision of access to public broadcasting. The first 
aspect is guaranteed in international instruments as part of the right of minorities to 
establish their own institutions, which includes media.62 With respect to state support for 
printing and broadcasting, it is reasonable to argue that the full realisation of the rights 
of minorities, particularly those concerning participation and recognition as well as 
equality, can be understood as entailing that states provide meaningful support for 
printing in minority languages and, most importantly, access to minority-language 
broadcasting, particularly the allocation of frequencies for the purpose.63 It is only where 
minorities are supplied with the information they need that they can meaningfully 
participate in and engage with the political process, and achieve the substantive equality 
                                                 
59 Henrard (note 57 above) 267.  
60 See Article 4 of the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Minorities and Article 12 of the Framework 
Convention.  
61 Henrard (note 57 above) 262-265.  
62 See De Varennes (note 52 above) 217-225.  
63 Ibid 223. Also see principle III Resolution on the Adoption of the Declaration on Principles of Freedom 
of Expression in Africa; principles 9 & 10 of the Oslo Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights 
of National Minorities.  
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that affirms the equal worth of individuals, not just as citizens, but as members of 
particular cultures. Language is the vehicle through which these aims are achieved. 
Once again the sliding-scale approach applies in determining the extent of state 
obligation in this area. Accordingly, the size and geographical concentration of the 
minority population, the capacity of the state concerned, and the needs and interests of 
minorities should be taken into account.  
 
In the area of cultural rights, an important area in the African context relates to the 
recognition of customary law. In many African countries, most people continue to 
regulate their lives and their relationships on the basis of customary law. It accordingly 
also serves for many minorities as an important institution for the development and 
preservation of their cultures and traditions. The recognition of the right to cultural 
identity can therefore be given application through legal recognition of customary law.64 
This allows members of particular cultures or religions to regulate some aspects of their 
life and relationships on the basis of their traditional or religious norms, and thereby 
participate in the enjoyment or practice of their culture or religion.65  
 
As indicated in the discussion on culture, another dimension of the cultural rights of 
minorities is exemption rights. These rights relieve members of minorities from 
complying with otherwise legitimate rules in order to enable them observe their cultural 
or religious commitments.66 This forms part of what Kymlicka calls ‘polyethnic rights’, 
which ‘are intended to help ethnic groups and religious minorities express their cultural 
particularity and pride without it hampering their success in the economic and political 
institutions of the dominant society’.67 Underlying exemption rights is the recognition 
that ostensibly neutral laws that require citizens to comply with standard norms of 
behaviour as a condition for public opportunities impose an undue or disproportionate 
burden on those whose culture requires them to behave in ways that do not conform to 
                                                 
64 It is what Levy calls the ‘recognition’ or ‘enforcement’ right. See JT Levy ‘Classifying Group Rights’ 
in Shapiro & Kymlicka (note 30 above) 36-40.  
65 On the most preferred form that such regulatory power by religious or traditional authorities can take, 
with due regard to the individual rights of members, particularly women, see A Shachar ‘Should Church 
and State be Joined at the Altar? Women’s Rights and the Multicultural Dilemma’ in Kymlicka & 
Norman (note 45 above) 199-223. On various models of customary law see JT Levy ‘Three Methods of 
Incorporating Indigenosu Law’ in Kymlicka & Norman (ibid) 297-325.  
66 See Levy (note 64) 25-29.  
67 Kymlicka (note 14 above) 31.  
 160 
such norms. The equal treatment of these minorities therefore entails, within the bounds 
of limitations that are reasonable and rational in democratic societies, that they be 
exempted from the requirements of such general norms. There are some who consider 
exemptions as giving minorities advantages that are not available to others and hence 
contrary to the requirements of equality itself.68 This is attributable partly to the view 
that cultural or religious commitments are like expensive tests and partly to the view that 
somehow those who are not exempted are as a result disadvantaged. The first view fails 
to recognise properly the extent to which our culture or religion defines the way we 
relate to the world in general and hence is not something that can be abandoned by 
choice. The second is also flawed, in the sense that giving exemption to those with 
certain cultural or religious commitments would not in any way affect others, since the 
law does not share the burden that it imposes on those who ask for exemptions on 
account of their religion or culture.  
5.5 Socio-economic guarantees, including special measures  
 
A characteristic of ethnic diversity in Africa, as in many multi-ethnic societies, is 
unequal patterns of distribution of socio-economic benefits and opportunities among 
ethnic groups and regions. These manifest not only in educational, economic, and social 
inequalities among groups but also in political and bureaucratic inequalities. The 
institutional and normative arrangements for accommodating diversity accordingly 
require, for their success, socio-economic policies that redress past discrimination and 
current patterns of inequalities, and guarantee future equality.69  
 
To this end it is imperative that socio-economic rights, including the right of peoples to 
development and to dispose of their natural resources as enunciated under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, Cultural Rights and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, are constitutionally guaranteed. Although many of these 
                                                 
68 See B Barry Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (2001) 40-50. For a 
response to Barry’s critique of multicultural accommodation see P Kelly (ed) Multiculturalism 
Reconsidered: Culture and Equality and its Critiques (2002).  
69 See Ghai (note 50 above) 11. Young in this regard says that ‘no one disputes the importance of overall 
economic growth as one key policy objective; there is some truth in the adage that a rising tide lifts all 
boats. But metaphorical reasoning has its limits; some ethnic vessels may be stranded as the tide of 
prosperity rises, and compensatory measures are indispensable to sustain ethnic accommodation.’ Young 
(note 20 above) 23.  
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rights are generally expressed as individual rights to the benefit of ‘everyone’, in their 
application they can be used to benefit minorities in two ways. First, they can operate to 
allow the provision of special measures to remedy the socio-economic disadvantages of 
minorities, expressed in part by their material deprivation and their extremely low level 
of access to education, health and public employment.70 As noted above, international 
human rights norms both support and require that states adopt measures necessary to 
minimise or eliminate socio-economic disparities among groups. The Special 
Rapporteur on Minorities, Asbjorn Eide, states in his report ‘Possible Ways and Means 
of Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution of Problems Involving 
Minorities’:  
 
In those situations where members of particular minorities are economically in a weaker position 
than members of majorities, measures of affirmative action should be adopted on a transitional 
basis to redress the inequality. In that respect specific policies should be formulated in 
cooperation with the members of vulnerable groups to achieve equality of opportunity and 
access.71 
 
The aim of these measures is not just to redress past inequities suffered by ethnic 
minorities. Such measures are also necessary ‘in order to avoid relegation (of minorities) 
to an economic and social backwater, excluded from mainstream improvements’.72 This 
invariably means that a wide range of specially tailored measures will also be required 
in various areas of the socio-economic life of society, including education and public-
service recruitment. Generally, however, states have to adopt socio-economic regimes 
that fairly distribute the benefits and burdens of living under a common government 
among members of society, and group membership may accordingly be a factor in such 
a regime. 
 
                                                 
70 See P Justino & J Litchfield Economic Exclusion and Discrimination: The Experiences of Minorities 
and Indigenous Peoples MRG Issue Paper ( 2003).  
71 A Eide Possible Ways and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution of Problems 
Involving Minorities Addendum 4, Recommendations, E/C.4/Sub.2/1993/34/Add.4, para 14 (my 
emphasis).  
72 P Thornberry ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities: Background, Analysis, Observation, and an Update’ in A Philips & A Rosas 
(eds) Universal Minority Rights (1995) 13, 49.  
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The design of special measures must ensure that they offer various opportunities and 
benefits not only to members of minorities that are well off but also, and most 
importantly, to poor members of such minorities. Moreover, special measures will fail to 
attract wide societal support and will be less effective if they simply focus on shifting 
opportunities and benefits from one section of society to another without expanding 
them and creating new ones. It is therefore important that special measures are designed 
and implemented within the framework of economic policies that invest in job creation 
and new development initiatives and socio-economic opportunities.73  
  
With respect to groups regarded in this study as peripheral minorities, such as 
indigenous peoples who depend for their socio-economic and cultural survival on land 
and natural resources, socio-economic guarantees are best formulated to include rights 
to land and resources. These include, in particular, access to and control over land, 
including security of occupation of the land the minority has historically inhabited and 
the utilisation of its resources, as well as the right to a share of the proceeds of the 
exploitation of resources from the land that they inhabit. Given the special attachment 
that such groups have to their land and the use of its resources, and the importance 
thereof to their survival, when state authorities venture into using these territories and 
resources for public purposes special attention should be given not to dislocate them 
entirely and deny their means of survival.74  
5.6  The nature and limits of minority rights and the principles regulating them  
 
In any discussion on minority rights one of the most contentious issues is their nature. 
The controversy often centres on whether the subjects of the rights are individuals or 
groups. I argue, following Kymlicka, that the determinant of the character of the right as 
                                                 
73 A special-measure regime that is widely acknowledged for its success is the one adopted by Malaysia. 
This Malaysian experience shows the importance of such approaches for the success and society-wide 
legitimacy of special measures. See DR Snodgrass Successful Economic Development in a Multiethnic 
Society: The Malaysian Experience  
<http://www.earth.columbia.edu/sitefiles/File/about/director/pubs/503.pdf> accessed on 7 
February 2008.  
74 See Ilmari Länsman et al v Finland  (Communication No. 511/1992) UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/50/40) 
66 (1992) (HRC); Jouni E. Länsman et al v Finland (Communication 671/1995) UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 
(A/52/40) 191 (1996) (HRC).   
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a group right is not necessarily tied to the question of who holds the right.75 Indeed, it 
can be said that that question is irrelevant. The most important determinant is the 
interest that is protected by those rights. The discussions in this chapter and in chapter I 
reveal that minority rights are essentially group rights. Their essence as such is that they 
protect, firstly, the interests of individuals as members of minorities and, secondly, the 
linguistic or cultural attributes of the group whose protection is necessary for the 
identity, self-respect and personal development of its members. It is clear that what 
minority rights protect is an interest that is shared by, or common to, the members of the 
minority on account of their membership, and hence is, by its character, a group interest.  
 
Another related characteristic of minority rights that signifies their nature as group rights 
is that, unlike individual human rights, they depend upon group membership. As Charles 
Taylor shows, universal human rights are based on what all human beings have in 
common: their equal worth or dignity. Being human is the basis for entitlement to 
universal human rights, and therefore whether one is black or white, Amhara or Oromo 
is irrelevant. But group membership is the basis for the recognition of minority rights, 
hence the reference to them as group rights.  
 
Notwithstanding that they are essentially group rights, minority rights can be exercised 
by individual members of the group or by the group as a whole, or in a federation by the 
federal state or province within which the minority forms a majority.76 One objection 
that is often raised to minority rights is their frequently assumed problematic 
relationship to individual human rights. Some critics of minority rights tend to conceive 
of them as a threat to individual human rights.77 This conception wrongly depicts 
minority rights and universal human rights as essentially irreconcilable. This is partly 
attributable to the possible tension that may arise between minority rights as group 
rights and the individual rights of members of minorities. Partly, it is based on the fear 
that accepting minority rights suggests prioritising the group over the individual. All 
these are pertinent issues that should not be dismissed out of hand. But to a large extent 
they are a result of a misconception of the nature of minority rights.  
                                                 
75 See Kymlicka (note 14 above) Chapter 3.  
76 Ibid 45.  
77 N Glazer ‘Individual Rights against Group Rights’ in Kymlicka (note 40 above) 123;  
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It is true that conflicts can arise between minority and individual human rights. This 
nevertheless does not necessarily suggest that the former are invalid. As Akermark 
argues, the rejection of such rights  
 
on the basis of risks to individual rights ignores the fact that conflicts of rights are common also 
as regards individual rights, thus leading to a debate about priorities. In other words, the 
existence of conflicts calls for a balancing of the underlying interests. If one accepts the 
recognition of collective rights this does not imply automatically that those rights should always 
be given priority.78  
 
Therefore, the recognition of minority rights does not imply the communitarian logic 
that group rights take precedence over individual rights.79 It is also clear that conflicts 
that may arise in particular circumstances between minority and individual rights are 
not, and should not necessarily be seen, as being significantly any different from 
conflicts between different individual rights.80 Accordingly, the resolution of a conflict 
that may arise should be determined on a case by case basis rather than by applying 
prior principles.81  
 
                                                 
78 AS Akermark Justification of Minority Protection in International Law (1996) 44-45.  
79 The fear that minority rights may lead to the precedence of the community over the individual is a result 
of the association of minority rights with communitarianism and individual rights with liberalism. As 
Casalas observes, it is this association that often leads to the unfortunate depiction of group rights as being 
incompatible with individual rights. See NT Casalas Group Rights as Human Rights: A Liberal Approach 
to Multiculturalism (2006) Chapter I. Casalas effectively demonstrates in Chapter II of this work that 
group rights need not be seen as conflicting with individual rights in that way.  
80 Charles Taylor maintains that the difficulties faced as a result of the tension or conflict that may arise 
between the two categories of rights ‘are not in principle greater than those encountered by any liberal 
society that has to combine, for example, liberty and equality, or prosperity and justice’. C Taylor ‘The 
Politics of Recognition’ in A Gutmann (ed) Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition 
(1994) 59-60. Similarly, Gillian Triggs maintains that ‘individual rights are frequently balanced both with 
other individual rights and with the interests of a democratic society (the latter a collective interest)’. G 
Triggs ‘The Rights of “Peoples” and Individual Rights: Conflict or Harmony?’ in J Crawford (ed) The 
Rights of Peoples (1992) 141, 144.  
81 This can also be gathered from the jurisprudence of the UNHRC with respect to Article 27 of the 
ICCPR. Whereas in the Lovelace case it found that the way the group sought to secure its right was 
contrary to the individual right of Lovelace, who as a result was excluded from membership; in Kitok it 
did not hold such exclusion to be a violation of the right of the individual. See Sandra Lovelace v Canada 
(Communication No. 24/1977) U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) 166 (1981) (HRC) [Hereinafter 
Lovelace]; Ivan Kitok v Sweeden (Communication No. 197/1985) UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/43/40) 221 
(1988) (HRC).  
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There is, however, a need for a certain caveat here. It is important to note that there are 
certain rights that should not be limited on account of minority rights. As many scholars 
have argued, this leads to making a distinction between rights that should be observed at 
all times and others whose limitation on account of minority rights can be defended. 
Thus, for example, Charles Taylor speaks of the distinction between  
 
fundamental liberties, those that should never be infringed and therefore ought to be unassailably 
entrenched, on the one hand, from privileges and immunities that are important, but that can be 
revoked or restricted for reasons of public policy – although one needs a strong reason to do this 
– on the other.82  
 
Within the international human rights framework, such a distinction can be gathered 
from the differentiation between derogable and non-derogable rights. Triggs observes: 
‘Most human rights instruments permit derogation from at least some of the rights they 
define, giving a temporary priority to the state in public emergencies “threatening the 
life of the nation”.’83 At the same time, these instruments exclude any derogation from 
certain fundamental rights even in situations of emergency. 
 
Following almost the same line of analysis, Martin Scheinin identifies what he calls ‘a 
tentative list of human rights that must enjoy absolute protection in relation to the 
regulatory authority of a minority community’.84 These include the right to life (in all its 
dimensions); the prohibition against torture and inhuman, degrading or cruel treatment; 
the prohibition against all slavery-like practices; the prohibition against deprivation of 
liberty, save for cases where legislation explicitly prescribes powers of detention and 
they are subject to appropriate safeguards, including court review; and the prohibition 
against grave forms of discrimination.85  
 
                                                 
82 Taylor (note 80 above) 59.  
83 Triggs (note 80 above) 144.  
84 M Scheinin ‘How to Resolve Conflicts Between Individual and Collective Rights’ in M Scheinin & R 
Toivanen (eds.) Rethinking Non-Discrimination and Minority Rights (2004) 233-234. 
85 As Scheinin points out, inasmuch as they relate to the very core of the group’s identity and hence are 
based on objective and reasonable grounds in specific situations, distinctions based on group membership 
or other grounds cannot be presumed to constitute discrimination and hence can be justified as the 
necessary consequence of the rights of the group to practice its culture or religion. Ibid 234.  
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Minority rights, like individual rights, are also subject to various other limitations and 
regulated by principles of constitutional democracy. As the jurisprudence of the HRC 
shows, the exercise of some of these rights is subject to considerations of the interests of 
other members of society or public policy, where the latter has a reasonable and 
objective justification.86 Moreover, the exercise of minority rights is also subject to the 
regulation of certain important principles of democracy and constitutionalism. In the 
context of multi-ethnic democracies, one such principle is that of mutual recognition or 
reciprocity.87 According to this principle, the recognition of the rights of minorities 
entails that minorities (a) respect the rights and interests of internal minorities, including 
those individuals residing in a federal unit controlled by a minority, and (b) accept the 
authority of the state to enforce the rights of such internal minorities or common 
citizenship rights in general.88 From the perspective of international law, this latter 
aspect of the principle can be taken as an expression of the obligation of the state to 
maintain and enforce internationally recognised human rights, which is an aspect of 
common citizenship.89 It is also an embodiment of the principles of equality and non-
discrimination.90 As Asbjørn Eide puts it, ‘[w]here pluralist arrangements are 
contemplated, they should ideally be limited in such a way as not to prevent the state 
from being able to ensure, without discrimination, the enjoyment of human rights to 
everyone under their jurisdiction’.91  
 
The implication of this is that minority rights should operate alongside universal human 
rights. As Charles Taylor puts it, a society committed to collective goals can be liberal 
not only where ‘it is capable of respecting diversity’ but also where ‘it can offer 
adequate safeguards for fundamental rights’.92 The relationship between the two can 
generally be one of complementarity and interdependence. The guarantee of human 
                                                 
86 See, for example, Lovelace (note 84 above) para. 16.  
87 See J Tully Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (1995) 165-176, particularly 
at 167. Also see Also see Case U 5/98, Request for Evaluation of Constitutionality of Certain Provisions 
of the Constitution of Republika Srpska and the Constitution of the Federation of BiH, Partial Decision 
(Constitutional Ct. Bosn. & Herze. July 1, 2000), available at http://ccbh.ba/ decisions (last accessed June 
4, 2008). 
88 See L Green ‘Internal Minorities and their Rights’ in Kymlicka (note 40 above) 256. 
89 See A Eide ‘Minority Protection and World Order: Towards a Framework for Law and Policy’ in 
Phillips and Rosas (note 72 above) 99. 
90 See, for example, Article 20 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.  
91 Eide (note 88 above) 102.  
92 Taylor (note 80 above) 59.  
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rights to all individuals ensures that a common civic bond pervades the whole political 
community, a bond that coexists, without mutual conflict, alongside each individual’s 
particularist attachments and loyalties specific to group membership and a particular 
territory or jurisdiction.93 To the extent that these are rights that define the status of all 
individuals, including members of minorities, as citizens, respect for these rights by 
minorities is also respect for their own rights of citizenship. On the other hand, minority 
rights give substantive recognition and protection to the interests of individuals as 
members of minority groups.  
 
In the context of multi-ethnic federations, this principle entails that federal units, which 
serve as the structure of self-government for minorities that form majorities within such 
units, should not be institutionalised and operate as the exclusive possession of such 
minorities.94 If such units are meant to give institutional expression to the distinct 
characters of such minorities within the national population, the same logic dictates that 
they should reflect in their structures the diversity of their territory.95 Rainer Baubock 
argues that ‘even with regard to national cultural matters the (regional) majority cannot 
legitimately govern in a way that exclusively promotes its own interests … claiming for 
itself a federal privilege to establish its own regional cultural hegemony obliges it to 
honour similar claims by cultural minorities living in its own territory… it must provide 
opportunities for a public representation of minority cultures’.96 This dictates that there 
shall be avenues for effective participation of regional minorities at the regional level as 
well through various mechanisms. In developing multi-ethnic societies, where 
democratic institutions and practices are weak, particularly at sub-national/regional 
levels, federal arrangements should institutionalise some form of power-sharing 
                                                 
93 S Assefa ‘Of Federalism and Secession’ in Constitutionalism: Reflections and Recommendations, 
Symposium on the Making of the New Ethiopian Constitution (1993) 113, 118.  
94 A G Selassie ‘Ethnic Identity and Constitutional Design for Africa’  (Fall 1992-1993) 29 (1) Stanford J 
of Int L 1, 50; See para 33 of the Copenhagen Document, according to which measures that states adopt 
should be ‘in conformity with the principles of equality and non-discrimination with respect to other 
citizens’. The Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (29 June 1990) reprinted in (1990) 29 ILM 
1305. The explanatory note to the Lund Recommendations provides in its para 21 that ‘[w]here powers 
may be devolved on a territorial basis to improve the effective participation of minorities, these powers 
must be exercised with due account for the minorities within these jurisdictions. Administrative and 
executive authorities must be accountable to the whole population of the territory.’ Note 18 above, 31. 
95 See Tully (note 86 above) 167.  
96 R Baubock ‘Why Stay Together? A Pluralist Approach to Secession and Federation’ in Kymlicka and 
Norman (note 45 above) 366, 386.  
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arrangements for minorities within federal units.97 At a minimum, there should be 
guarantees of non-discrimination and cultural rights specific to regional minorities.98  
 
The other related principle is that of stability.99 This principle recognises that the 
institutionalisation of mechanisms for the accommodation of diversity can have adverse 
effects on stability or national cohesion. For this reason, it is generally regarded that, in 
giving expression to minority rights, a balance should be struck between stability and 
unity, on the one hand, and diversity, on the other.100 This may not be achieved by 
constitutional design alone. The point is that in institutionalising mechanisms for 
accommodation of diversity, sufficient attention must be paid to the requirements of 
stability and unity. Related to this is the principle of common national identity. The 
recognition and institutionalisation of membership-based rights and institutions should 
not obstruct the achievement of a common national identity.101 In other words, 
mechanisms should be provided to meet both the interests of particularity and the need 
for nurturing and maintaining a common national identity. The common national 
identity envisaged is not the nation-state model of a homogenous national identity. It is 
rather what Patten calls multinational identity, which is expressed in terms of a 
‘commitment to the ideal of making a social order in which different national groups 
have different objects of identification and different modes of belonging but share 
willingness to live together under arrangements which reflect and endorse the pluralistic 
character of their society’.102  
 
                                                 
97 See Y Ghai ‘Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework for Analysis’ in Ghai (note 29 above) 1, 22.  
98 Ibid; Watts (note 29 above) 41. See also, on language rights of regional minorities, A Patten ‘The 
Rights of Internal Linguistic Minorities’ in A Eisenberg & J Spinner-Halv (eds) Minorities within 
Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity (2005) 135-154.  
99 See W Norman ‘Justice and Stability in Multinational Societies’ in Gagnon & Tully (note 21 above) 90. 
100 Justice Albie Sachs of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in this regard held that any open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom in which conscientious and religious 
freedom has to be regarded with appropriate seriousness can cohere only if all its participants accept that 
certain basic norms and standards are binding. See Christian Education South Africa v Minister of 
Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC), 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC) para 35.  
101 See Kymlicka (note 14 above) Chapter 9 ; A Patten ‘Liberal Citizenship in Multicultural Societies’ in 
Gagnon & Tully (note 21 above) 279.  
102 Patten (ibid) 295. Also see Kymlicka (note 14 above) 190 (speaking of the need to have ‘deep 
diversity’ as a basis for social unity in multi-ethnic societies, in the sense of not only respect for diversity 
but also respect for a diversity of approaches to diversity); D Miller On Nationality (1995).  
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Another important principle is that of democracy.103 This principle insists that the 
exercise of minority rights, like the exercise of individual rights, should be on the basis 
of, and abide by, democratic processes. In part, this is very much related to the point 
made above with respect to the rights of individual members of minorities, as it 
underscores individual freedom. Accordingly, while operating within the framework of 
their culture or religion, minorities are expected to respect the freedom of their 
individual members.104 On the other hand, minorities should also respect the democratic 
processes and values of the national community of which they form a part. This in 
particular means that in the exercise of their rights, members of minorities have to abide 
by the requirements of respect for the interests and identity of others, and of dialogue.105  
 
Finally, minority rights are also informed by the principle of constitutionalism and rule 
of law. This entails that the enforcement or exercise of minority rights has to comply 
with the processes laid down under the constitution and such other relevant laws that are 
made following due procedure, including the participation of minorities.106 Important 
aspects of this are the requirements of equality and non-discrimination. These are 
expressed, among other things, by the principle of proportionality. As Brownlie puts it, 
‘the modalities of the different treatment (group-specific minority rights) must not be 
disproportionate in effect or involve unfairness to other racial groups’.107 As noted 
above, this is one of the various considerations that should inform the institutionalisation 
of minority guarantees in such areas as language use in communication with public 
authorities, education in minority languages and the media.  
5.7 Conclusion  
 
Against the background of the minority rights framework examined in the previous 
chapter, this chapter has identified and elaborated the constitutional guarantees and 
                                                 
103 See principle 16 of the Lund Recommendations (note 18 above); Re Secession of Quebec (note 9 
above) para 80, indicating that three constitutional principles (federalism, democracy and 
constitutionalism) and rule of law inform the scope and operation of specific provisions that protect the 
right of minorities. Also see Ghai (note 50 above) 16.  
104 Christian Education (note 99 above) para 26.  
105 See Re Secession of Quebec (note 9 above) para. 61-68, particularly 68.  
106 Ibid.  
107 I Brownlie ‘The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law’ in J Crawford (ed) The Rights of 
Peoples (1998) 1, 10.  
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institutional mechanisms through which the minority rights framework defended in this 
study can be translated into a democratic constitutional design for accommodating 
ethno-cultural diversity in Africa. It has also examined the nature and the form that these 
guarantees and institutional arrangements take. The nature, limitations and principles 
that regulate the operation of these mechanisms and constitutional guarantees were also 
identified and examined. 
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CHAPTER VI  
South Africa’s constitutional design for the accommodation of diversity 
 
6.1  Introduction  
 
Thus far we have examined and elaborated the form and content of the constitutional 
minority rights regime defended in this study. Against the background of the arguments 
made in the last chapter about an ideal constitutional design for the accommodation of 
diversity, this chapter and the next examine the form and nature of South Africa’s and 
Ethiopia’s constitutional designs for the accommodation of their diverse populations. 
Although these countries have had a relatively short experience with their new 
constitutions and hence it is not possible to assess their successes or failures 
conclusively, their experience can help to exemplify how the minority rights regime 
defended in this study is and should be translated into a constitutional design for the 
accommodation of diversity, and to draw some conclusions regarding its actual 
operation once institutionalised.  
 
These chapters contend that the constitutional application of the minority rights 
framework in African countries, as defended in this study, is necessary to address the 
issue of minorities and establish a just and democratic framework. It is further argued 
that the success or efficacy of such a constitutional framework depends both on the form 
and nature of its institutionalisation and on the particular political, socio-economic and 
ethno-cultural context within which it operates. Accordingly, the chapters examine not 
only the nature of the constitutional accommodation of diversity in these two countries, 
but also the extent to which the respective constitutional designs offer the necessary 
framework to address the issue of minorities as discussed in Chapter II, and thereby 
contribute to national integration, stability and social equality.  
 
6.2 The context: The nature of minority issues in South Africa  
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South Africa is by any standard a multicultural country. It is inhabited by people of 
different racial, ethno-linguistic and religious groups. Racially the population is divided 
into four groups: Africans (79,7 per cent), whites (9,1 per cent), coloured (8,8 per cent) 
and people of Indian and Asian origin (2,4 per cent).1 Due to the history of apartheid, 
there is high degree of division and socio-economic inequality between members of the 
different race groups. As a result, race is most salient in political and social terms. From 
the perspective of this study, however, the most important dimension of South Africa’s 
diversity is ethno-cultural. This is mainly expressed in terms of linguistic differences. 
There are 11 significant languages in South Africa that are spoken by more than 99 
percent of the population.2 In addition to these, there are also many religious 
communities.  
 
During the negotiations for the making of South Africa’s democratic constitution, the 
most debated and time-consuming issue was the question of how to accommodate these 
various dimensions of South Africa’s population diversity. This was very controversial 
for at least two reasons. The first was the history of divisions and manipulation of group 
membership during the apartheid years. All aspects of public life were organised in a 
way that accorded different treatment to members of the different race groups. Further to 
that, Africans were divided into different homelands on the basis of their ethno-
linguistic membership. This presented the challenge of overcoming the divisions and 
inequalities that this had entrenched in society. As a result, claims for accommodation of 
diversity were viewed with a lot of suspicion and anxiety.  
 
The second reason for controversy was that there was no agreement about the nature of 
South Africa’s ethno-cultural diversity among either the contending parties or the 
constitutional experts. For the African National Congress (ANC), ‘[e]thnic divisions 
were real, but they were essentially the creations of apartheid and once that was 
abolished then a democracy based on neither race nor ethnicity would be able to 
                                                 
1 See Statistics South Africa, Mid-year estimates for South Africa by population group and sex, 2007 
<http://www.statssa.gov.za/PublicationsHTML/P03022007/html/P03022007.html> accessed on 
22 November 2007.  
2 See Statistics South Africa, Census 2001 (2001) 
<http://www.statssa.gov.za/census01/html/Key%20results_files/Key%20results.pdf> accessed on 
22 November 2007.  
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emerge’.3 The party therefore advocated for a unitary state structure and a Westminster-
style majoritarian democracy that could ensure social transformation, economic 
empowerment and nation-building.4 Others, including the National Party (NP), 
emphasised the country’s ethno-cultural diversity and the need for institutional 
accommodation of the identities and interests of the various constituent groups.5 
Accordingly, they advocated for power-sharing structures and a federal form of state 
structure.  
 
The final constitutional settlement, as set out in the 1996 Constitution, reflects a 
compromise between these positions but is skewed more in favour of the first.6 
Although the final Constitution (FC) rejects executive consociationalism and group 
membership as a basis of political participation and representation,7 the political system 
that it instituted is founded on the principle of PR. Similarly, even if a fully-fledged 
multicultural federalism was not adopted, the FC establishes a federal-like state structure 
with a system of provincial government. Once again, while rejecting race as an identity 
marker to be accommodated, the FC at the same time provides guarantees and 
institutional arrangements that not only tolerate, but also ensure respect for, and 
accommodate and even promote, the various languages, cultures and religions which 
give meaning and purpose to the life of many South Africans. It is fair to say from this 
that the 1996 Constitution provides a reasonably sophisticated design for the 
accommodation of diversity specific to the South African historical and socio-political 
                                                 
3 C Murray & R Simeon ‘Recognition Without Empowerment: Minorities in a Democratic South Africa’ 
(2007) 5 (4) I.CON  699-729, 711.  
4 See H Klug ‘How the Centre Holds: Managing Claims for Regional and Ethnic Autonomy in a 
Democratic South Africa’ in Y Ghai Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-
ethnic Societies (2000). 
5 See H Ebrahim The Soul of a Nation: Constitution-Making in South Africa (1998); Murray & Simeon 
(note 3 above) 708-713; Klug (ibid) 104-107.  
6 The ANC conceded to the demand for regional autonomy by proposing a constitutional principle for a 
multi-level government structure. As Ebrahim pointed out this had two significant dimensions. ‘First, the 
ANC agreed to accord regions significant legislative and executive powers which would be entrenched in 
the interim constitution. Secondly, the proposal effectively cast regional powers in stone, denying the 
constitutional assembly the power to change them.’ Ebrahim (ibid) 155.  
7 The CC has affirmed the rejection under the FC of consociational democracy involving executive 
power-sharing through minority representation in the executive. According to the court, this is because the 
primary purpose of the executive body ‘is to ensure effective and efficient government and service 
delivery’. Democratic Alliance & Another v Masondo NO & Another 2003 (2) SA 413 (CC), para. 18. 
[Masondo] 
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context, and that this design largely reflects the framework developed and defended in 
this study.  
 
6.3 Indirect accommodation in the political processes and the structures of the 
state  
 
 
The FC provides three devices that facilitate, albeit indirectly, the accommodation of 
members of different groups in South Africa. These are (a) the principle of PR, (b) 
participatory and deliberative policy-making processes and (c) the system of multilevel 
government. An outline of how this is institutionalised in the Constitution, how it fares 
in accommodating diversity and has been applied in practice, follows below. 
 
6.3.1 Representation and participation  
 
The process of South African constitution-making had two stages.8 The first phase 
involved the making of the Interim Constitution (IC) that established the Government of 
National Unity. The second phase involved the drafting and adoption of the final 
Constitution of 1996.9 One of the most important outcomes of the first phase of the 
constitution-making process was the adoption of the 34 Constitutional Principles 
(CPs).10 These principles set out in general terms the fundamental items that should be 
included when the final constitution was drafted by the Constitutional Assembly (CA).11 
One of these CPs that was written into the final constitution was the principle of PR.12  
 
                                                 
8 See Klug (note 4 above); K Henrard Minority Protection in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Human Rights, 
Minority Rights and Self-determination (2002) Chapters 3 & 4; Ebrahim (note 8 above); S Gloppen South 
Africa: The Battle over the Constitution (1997) Chapter 9; P Andrews & S Ellmann (eds) The Post-
Apartheid Constitutions: Perspectives on South Africa’s Basic Law (2001); J Robinson ‘Federalism and 
the Transformation of the South African State’ in Graham Smith Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge 
(1995) 255.  
9 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. [FC] 
10 See Schedule 4 to the Interim Constitution of 1993. [IC]  
11 S 71 of the IC stipulated that a new constitution or any part of a new constitution shall become 
operational only once the CC has ratified that it complies with the constitutional principles. See for more 
B de Villiers ‘The Constitutional Principles: Content and Significance’ in B de Villiers Birth of a 
Constitution (1994) 41-42.  
12 CP VIII stipulated that ‘[t]here shall be representative government embracing multi-party democracy, 
regular elections, universal adult suffrage, a common voters’ roll, and in general, proportional 
representation.’ (my emphasis)  
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This led, among other developments, to the adoption of a PR electoral system. 
Accordingly, FC s 46(1)(d) and s 105(1)(d) stipulate elections ‘in terms of an electoral 
system that … results, in general terms, in proportional representation’. This is further 
elaborated under the Electoral Law Act 73 of 1998 as amended by the Electoral Laws 
Amendment Act 34 of 2004 in which Schedule 1 stipulates the design of the electoral 
system of South Africa to be a closed-list PR system.13 Under this system, the nine 
provinces serve as multi-member constituencies from which half (200) of the 
representatives for the National Assembly (NA) are elected and the remaining half are 
elected from a national closed list. According to the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa (CC), this closed PR electoral system is ‘designed to promote optimal 
proportionality’ between votes cast and seats won.14  
 
From the perspective of this study, the importance of this system lies, firstly, in the fact 
that it has made it possible for even minority parties with small electoral support to 
secure representation that otherwise would not have been possible.15 Secondly, it 
encourages parties to list ethnically diverse candidates and hence enhance minority 
representation through party structures.16 Thirdly, this high degree of representation and 
participation of minorities serves to enhance the legitimacy of South Africa’s democracy 
and national cohesion, and to promote inclusion, mutual respect and tolerance.17  
 
This national representation and participation is channelled in two ways, thus 
multiplying the dimensions of the inclusion and participation of minorities. Firstly, 
                                                 
13 For details on this see G Fick ‘Elections’ in S Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (2007) 
2nd ed.Chapter 29.  
14 Ex Parte Speaker of the Western Cape Provincial Legislature: In Re First Certification of the 
Constitution of the Province of the Western Cape (1997) (1997) (4) SA 795 (CC), 1997 (9) BCLR 1167 
(CC)  para. 45. 
15 W James & A Hadland ‘Shared Aspirations: The Imperative of Accountability in South Africa’s 
Electoral System’ in Electoral Models for South Africa: Reflections and Options Electoral Task Team 
Review Roundtable Konrad-Adenaur-Stiftung Seminar Report No 18 (2007) (2nd ed.) 15, 20. As 
Reynolds observed ‘even with their geographical pockets of electoral support, the Freedom Front, the 
Democratic Party, the PAC and the African Christian Democratic Party would have failed to win a single 
parliamentary seat if the elections had been held under a single-member district FPTP [first past the post] 
electoral system.’ A Reynolds ‘South Africa: Electoral System, Conflict Management and Inclusion’ 
<http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/esy/esy_za> accessed on 22 October 2007.   
16 Reynolds (ibid).  
17 ‘The fundamental constitutional purpose is,’ wrote O’Regan J, ‘to undo the separation, exclusion and 
inequality of the past by ensuring that there is shared involvement in deliberation subject, of course, to the 
right of the majority to make decisions.’ Masondo (note 7 above) para. 72.  
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members of various groups get representation through the parties who win seats in the 
NA in proportion to the votes cast for them nationally. According to FC s 46 (1) (d), the 
NA shall consist of no less than 350 and no more than 400 members elected by an 
electoral system based on a national common voters’ roll and producing, in general, PR. 
Although this system has not resulted in a coalition government due to ANC’s 
predominant electoral support, it has nevertheless facilitated the representation of 
significant groups through the various parties that have won seats in the NA.18  
 
Secondly, minorities also get indirect representation in the national legislative process 
through the second house of parliament, the National Council of Provinces (NCOP).19 
FC s 42 (4) provides that the NCOP represents provinces to ensure that provincial 
interests are taken into account in the national sphere of government.20 What makes the 
potential of the NCOP particularly suited for mirroring the diverse ethnic composition of 
the South African population in the national legislative process, and hence for the 
accommodation of minorities at the political level, is its composition. The NCOP 
consists of nine provincial delegations of ten members each.21 The delegation of each 
province has to be composed in a manner that enables parties to be represented in the 
delegation proportionately to their support in the provincial legislature.22 As one of the 
characteristics of the provinces is relative concentrations of particular population 
groups, the national representation of provinces through the NCOP might mean the 
channelling of the representation of diverse sections of society into national policy 
making.23 The role of the NCOP in accommodating minorities is also of particular 
importance as it is a critical institution responsible for facilitating public participation in 
                                                 
18 Murray & Simeon (note 3 above) 714-715; Reynolds (note 15 above).  
19 In pointing out this role of the NCOP, former President Nelson Mandela stated that it is uniquely placed 
to reflect the diversity of South African society and to contribute to the project of nation building. 
President Nelson Mandela, Address to the National Council of Provinces 7 August 1998, Cape Town. See 
also Henrard (note 8 above)113.  
20 See also Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) 325-30. [First 
Certification Judgement]  
21 FC s 60.  
22 See FC s 61 (1) & First Certification Judgement (note 20 above) para. 325. Since it enjoys wide powers 
with respect to Schedule 4 matters, the NCOP offers minorities an important additional avenue to have a 
meaningful say in the national legislative process. Siri Gloppen argues that ‘[t]his is a potentially 
important source of minority influence’. This is because, Gloppen explains, ‘Schedule 4 includes vital 
matters such as education, health, welfare services, housing, cultural matters, agriculture, environment, 
tourism, trade and development.’ Gloppen (note 8 above) 220.  
23 Henrard (note 8 above) 113.  
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national policy making.24 Not all these potentials of the NCOP have, however, been put 
into reality as it has yet to establish its influence and gain political recongition as one of 
South Africa’s mainstream political structures.  
 
The constitutional requirement of proportional representation applies to the provincial 
level of the state system as well. Consistent with the framework adopted in this study, 
FC s 105(1)(d) accordingly provides for a provincial legislature that consists of 
members elected by an electoral system that results, in general, in proportional 
representation.25 Thus, even at the regional level the winner-takes-all system does not 
apply. As is the case at the national level, the application of the requirement of 
proportional representation to provincial government can be seen as offering a 
mechanism for ensuring representation and accommodation of the diversity that is 
characteristic of the various provinces. 
 
The FC renders the representation of various parties espousing the interests of various 
sections of society more meaningful with the high degree of significance that it attaches 
to a strong participatory and deliberative system of legislative processes with respect to 
all the three levels of government.26 FC s 57(2)(b) requires that the rules and orders of 
the NA provide for ‘the participation in the proceedings of the Assembly and its 
committees of minority parties represented in the national assembly, in a manner 
consistent with democracy’. The reading of FC s 70(2)(c) together with s 70(2)(b) and s 
61(3) also entails that minority parties are able to participate in the proceedings and the 
committees of NCOP.27 Similarly, FC s 116(2)(b) stipulates that the rules and orders of 
a provincial legislature must provide for the participation of minority parties represented 
in the legislature in the proceedings and committees of the legislature. At the local level, 
s 160(8)(a) guarantees participation in the proceedings and committees of municipal 
                                                 
24 For details on this see Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (6) SA 
416 (CC), 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC)  particularly paras. 79-134. [Doctors for Life] 
25 See T Madlingozi & S Woolman ‘Provincial legislative authority’ in Woolman et al (note 13 above) 
Chapter 19, 19-1 – 19-2.  
26 For a robust analysis of this see T Roux ‘Democracy’ in Woolman et al (note 13 above) Chapter 10, 10-
37 – 10-43.  
27 Ibid 10-39.  
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councils in a manner that ‘allows parties and interests reflected in the council to be fairly 
represented’.28  
 
Moreover, the articulation of a very strong right of public participation under FC ss 19, 
59(1), 59(2), 72(1) and 118(1)29 is also meant to ensure that the different levels of 
government sufficiently consult and accommodate the views and concerns of members 
of various communities on all matters, but particularly on those that are of concern to 
their rights and interests.30 Indeed, according to Sachs J, ‘[t]he principle of consultation 
and (public) involvement has become a distinctive part of our national ethos’.31 From 
the perspective of this study, this constitutional requirement of ‘active and on going 
public involvement’ has at least three important elements. Firstly, as Sachs J puts it, the 
importance that majoritarian democracy has for transformation ‘in no way implies that 
only the most numerous and politically influential voices of our diverse society are 
entitled to be heard’.32 As he further explains, since ‘public involvement may be of 
special importance for those whose strongly held views have to cede to majority opinion 
in the legislature’, minorities and historically marginalised groups should have not only 
a chance to have their say but also the assurance that they will be listened to.33 Secondly, 
it expresses a constitutional commitment that all members of society, particularly 
minorities, ‘should feel that they have been given a real opportunity to have their say, 
that they are taken seriously as citizens, that their views matter and will receive due 
consideration’.34 Finally, by making the democratic process sensitive to and 
accommodative of the voices of minorities, public involvement will ‘enrich the quality 
of our democracy, help sustain its robust deliberative character and, by promoting a 
sense of inclusion in the national polity, promote the achievement of the goals of 
transformation’.35 
                                                 
28 Note however that in Masondo (note 7 above) the CC held that the principle of fair representation does 
not apply to the mayoral committee of the municipal council. For more discussion on this see Roux (note 
26 above) 10-40 – 10-43.  
29 The right to public participation is given its most robust articulation by the CC in Doctors for Life (note 
24 above).  
30 For details on public participation in deliberative legislative bodies see J Brickhill & R Babiuch 
‘Political Rights’ in Woolman et al (note 13 above) Chapter 45.  
31 Doctors for Life (note 24 above) para. 227.  
32 Ibid para. 233.  
33 Ibid para. 234.  
34 Ibid para. 235.  
35 Ibid.  
 179 
 
It is clear from the above that although the FC upholds majoritarian democracy, the 
constitutional enunciation of the principle of proportionality as well as robust forms of 
public participation entails that ‘the constitution does not envisage a mathematical form 
of democracy, where the winner takes all’.36 It is rather a pluralistic and participatory 
democracy that is based on the representation of minorities in deliberative decision-
making processes (albeit indirectly, through parties) and ‘the rights of all to be heard 
and have their views considered’.37 Such a system of democracy does not aim only at 
offering minorities representation and the opportunity to have their say to allow them 
contribute in shaping public policy.38 In providing for the representation of the diverse 
groups constituting South Africa in the deliberative organs of the state and guaranteeing 
their right to have their say, the principles of proportional representation and public 
participation also offer a framework for meaningful interaction and constructive 
engagement among members of various groups, which is the basis on which ‘a genuine 
sense of shared identity, social integration, in multicultural and multiethnic societies’ 
may be developed.39 Accordingly, South Africa’s inclusive and participatory 
democracy, based on respect for and representation of diversity, has the additional aim 
of ‘achieving a just society where, in the words of the Preamble, “South Africa belongs 
to all who live in it…”’.40  
 
As we have seen in Chapter IV, the principle of proportional representation is important 
not only in deliberative elected bodies of the state, but also in the public service. This is 
also provided for in the FC. The FC has rendered proportional representation one of the 
principles that govern public administration. FC s 195(1)(i) stipulates:  
 
Public administration must be governed by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the 
constitution, including the following principles: …(i) Public administration must be broadly 
representative of the South African people, with employment and personnel management 
                                                 
36 Masondo (note 7 above) para. 42.  
37 Ibid.  
38 See Chapter V.  
39 A Addis ‘On Human Diversity and the Limits of Toleration’ in I Shapiro & W Kymlicka (eds) Nomos 
XXXIX: Ethnicity and Group Rights (1997) 112, 128.  
40 Masondo (note 7 above) para. 43.  
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practices based on ability, objectivity, fairness, and the need to redress the imbalances of the past 
to achieve broad representation (my emphasis).  
 
This principle has also been given application, not only in the public sector, but in the 
private sector as well, through such measures as the Employment Equity Act of 2000, 
the Broad Based Black Empowerment Act of 2003 and the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of 2000. In order to diminish the socio-
economic inequalities along racial lines and achieve a workforce that reflects the 
composition of the whole population in racial terms, the Employment Equity Act 
requires employers to devise equity strategies and to report on them annually to the 
Department of Labour.  
 
Once again this expresses the commitment of the Final Constitution to promoting 
equality among different sections of the population by creating structures of government 
and public administration that are representative of the South African people. There is 
no doubt that this brings inclusivity and enhances the sense of identification of members 
of different racial and ethnic groups with the state and its institutions. In other words, it 
has the multiple effects of promoting diversity and nurturing peaceful coexistence, 
social harmony, and mutual respect and understanding. From the perspective of this 
study, it also has the additional value of contributing to the constitutional aim of 
‘healing the divisions of the past’ and achieving a society where ‘South Africa belongs 
to all living in it, united in our diversity’.41  
Achievements and limitations  
 
The application of the principle of proportional representation in the choice of the 
electoral system as well as in the structures and operations of the national and provincial 
legislatures has been successful in various ways. It has enabled significant groups and 
minority parties such as the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP) to achieve representation and participation in the political processes. It is also one 
of the important dimensions of the constitutional design that delivered South Africa’s 
                                                 
41 Preamble Constitution of South Africa Act 108 1996.  
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peaceful transition to democracy.42 As Simon Bekker and Anne Leildé observe, ‘[w]hat 
has been proclaimed to be the South African miracle is due in no small part to the nature 
and outcome of this multi-party electoral system which clearly identified the winning 
party while facilitating the emergence of minority party rule in a number of provinces, 
and minority party representation in a number of “governments-of-unity”’.43 
 
The inclusivity that this principle creates also underlies and nurtures public support 
across ethnic and racial lines for the central values that underpin South Africa’s 
democracy.44 People across racial and ethnic lines have come to identify themselves 
with the Constitution and the institutions of the state that it has established. The various 
initiatives taken to achieve representation in the economic and social spheres have also 
served to contribute to the process of redressing the socio-economic inequalities 
inherited from apartheid and achieve some degree of social transformation.45  
 
The system is not, however, without its limits. Firstly, since a PR electoral system is 
premised on representation through political parties, it does not enable those minorities 
who are not included in, or whose interest is not espoused by any of the political parties 
in operation to be represented. The result is that peripheral minorities such as the San, 
Koi and Nama communities of South Africa might not be sufficiently represented, and 
have little, if any, voice in the national decision-making processes. Reference to this was 
made in the previous chapter, which suggested that to achieve the inclusion of such 
groups, it may be necessary to supplement the PR system with mechanisms that 
guarantee their representation. Given the political history of South Africa, it is, however, 
unlikely that any such mechanism of group-based representation could be a solution 
here.  
 
                                                 
42 As Reynolds rightly observes, ‘[t]he PR system … was crucial to creating the atmosphere of 
inclusiveness and reconciliation which precipitated the decline of the worst political violence and has 
made post-apartheid South Africa something of a beacon of hope and stability to the rest of troubled 
Africa.’ Reynolds (note 15 above).  
43 S Bekker & A Leildé ‘Is Multiculturalism a Workable Policy in South Africa?’ (2003) 5 (2) Int J of 
Multicultural Societies 119-134, 122.  
44 See Doctors for Life (note 24 above).  
45 See R Southall ‘Introduction: The ANC State, More Dysfunctional Than Developmental’ in S 
Buhlungu et al (eds) State of the Nation South Africa 2007 (2007) 1, 6-8.  
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Moreover, the effectiveness of these arrangements and the extent to which minorities are 
able to have meaningful participation and feel reasonably included is often constrained 
by the political and social structures within which they operate. In the current political 
power configuration of the country, South Africa is a one-party-dominant state.46 
Results from the three elections held so far show that the ANC’s electoral support and, 
more accurately, parliamentary representation has shown a significant increase. In the 
last elections, in 2004, the ANC won 69 per cent of the votes cast, which is 7 per cent 
higher than the votes it won in the 1994 elections. This means that the ANC controls 
about two thirds of the seats in the legislature and dominates the institutions of 
government. This essentially renders minority parties and minority groups that are not 
sufficiently represented in the structures of the ANC peripheral to the political processes 
and the structure of government. As one observer puts it, ‘although formal constitutional 
provisions and formalities appear to guarantee a multi-party system, the racial 
polarisation of the electorate decrees South Africa to be, potentially, a one-party 
“dominant” state for the foreseeable future’47 if not until the end of the world as 
arrogantly declared by ANC’s current President Jacob Zuma.  
6.3.2 The system of provincial government: Minority accommodation 
through ‘federalism’  
 
Although FC s 1(1) proclaimed the Republic of South Africa to be ‘one, sovereign state’ 
and nowhere does it refer to South Africa as ‘federal’, the nature of the system of 
provincial government enunciated in the FC has clothed South Africa with the most 
salient attributes of a federal state.48 As in any full-fledged federal system, the provinces 
enjoy legislative and executive authorities.49 Their powers are original and 
constitutionally entrenched. They are represented in the national parliament through the 
                                                 
46 See H Giliomee & C Simkins (eds) The Awkward Embrace: One-Party Domination and Democracy 
(1999); Challenges to Democracy by One-party Dominance: A Comparative Assessment Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung Seminar Report (October 2006). [Challenges to democracy]  
47 L Schlemmer ‘Democracy or Democratic Hegemony: The Future of Political Pluralism in South Africa’ 
in Giliomee & Simkins (ibid) 281, 282. 
48 In this regard, Haysom insightfully observed that ‘[i]f the South African constitutional schema were to 
be analysed against a formal federal checklist it could, with justification, be classified as federal’. N 
Haysom ‘Federal Features of the Final Constitution’ in Andrews & Ellmann (note 8 above) 504-524, 504. 
Also See Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In Re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 
2000 (1) SA 732 (CC)  [Liquor Bill] 
49 See T Madlingozi & S Woolman ‘Provincial Legislative Authority’ and C Murray & O Ampofo-Anti 
‘Provincial Executive Authority’ in Woolman et al (note 13 above) Chapters 19 & 20 respectively.  
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NCOP. They can also adopt their own constitutions.50 Besides, the Constitution and, 
most importantly, the division of powers are not subject to alteration by either the 
national or provincial government alone. Such amendment is subject to the involvement 
of both orders of government.51 And the Constitutional Court serves as umpire to 
oversee the constitutional division of power as well as conflicts involving provinces, and 
those between provinces and the centre.  
 
Provincial boundaries  
 
As noted in the previous chapter, the extent to which regional autonomy or federalism 
can address ethnic claims and accommodate diversity depends upon both the relative 
coincidence between the boundaries of regional governments and the territorial 
concentration of groups, and the nature and degree of autonomy constitutionally vested 
in sub-national governments. Some argue that the demarcation of provincial boundaries 
under the FC represents a rejection of ethnic-based political organisation.52 This is not, 
however, entirely accurate. Although the boundaries of the nine provinces were not 
drawn merely on the basis of territorial concentration of ethno-cultural groups, cultural 
and language realities were among the ten criteria used in the demarcation of provincial 
boundaries.53 The spatial distribution of language groups further shows that many 
provinces have a relatively large concentration of particular ethno-cultural groups.54  
 
In practical terms, this created the necessary territorial space to accommodate the 
interests of the IFP and the NP, who mobilised particular groups in demanding the 
                                                 
50 See S Woolman ‘Provincial Constitutions’ in Woolman et al (note 13 above) Chapter 21.  
51 See FC s 74.  
52 See for example A Egan & R Taylor ‘South Africa: The Failure of Ethno-Territorial Politics’ in J 
Coakley (ed) The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict (2003) 99-117.  
53 Ebrahim (note 5 above); B de Villiers The Future of Provinces in South Africa – The Debate Continues 
KAS Policy Paper Issue No 2 (October 2007) 8.  
54 In the Eastern Cape isiXhosa is first home language to 83,4 percent, in Kwazulu-Natal isiZulu to 80,9 
per cent, in the Northern Cape Afrikaans to 68,0 per cent, in the North West seTswana to 65,4 per cent, in 
the Free State Afrikaans to 64,4 per cent, in the Western Cape Afrikaans to 55,3 per cent, and in Limpopo 
siPedi to 52,1 per cent. In Gauteng and Mpumalanga no single language group constitutes a majority and 
these are the only truly multicultural provinces. See Statistics South Africa Census 2001 (2001) 
<http://www.statssa.gov.za/census01/html/> accessed on 22 November 2007.  
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adoption of federalism to guarantee self-government for these groups.55 In addition to its 
immediate role during the negotiations, the current boundary configuration of provinces 
also has the potential to accommodate the demand that territorially concentrated ethno-
cultural groups may raise for self-government. According to Gloppen, ‘[i]f further 
political divisions should arise between ethnic groups within the African population, for 
instance along linguistic lines, the current provinces could provide several groups with 
provincial strongholds (for instance Xhosa speakers in the Eastern Cape, Sotho speakers 
in the Free State, Pedi speakers in Northern Provinces)’.56 Indeed, notwithstanding that 
most of the ethno-linguistic groups that dominate various provinces have not made any 
such claim so far, the system nevertheless provided their members with the framework 
for political participation and representation, firstly within the structure of the provinces, 
promoting self-rule, and secondly through the NCOP in the NA, promoting shared rule. 
To this extent, it is possible to conclude that the system of provincial government, 
although mainly territorial in its design, serves the accommodation of minority claims to 
self-government and therefore also has important multicultural features. This can 
additionally be gathered from the nature of the division of power set by the Final 
Constitution.  
 
 
 
 
6.3.2.1 The division of power  
 
The matters over which provincial governments have legislative authority are defined in 
the FC.57 Provinces have both exclusive and concurrent jurisdictions.58 The functional 
areas over which provinces have exclusive jurisdiction are set out in Schedule 5. They 
also have the power to pass their own constitutions.59 FC Schedule 4 lists the functional 
                                                 
55 See Henrard (note 8 above) Chapters 3 & 4. In the other provinces, there has not been similar group 
mobilisation for autonomy or self-government.  
56 Gloppen (note 8 above) 252.  
57 See V Bronstein ‘Legislative Competence’ in Woolman et al (note 13 above) Chapter 15.  
58 See Liquor Bill case (note 48 above) paras. 40-52.  
59 S 143 (1). The scope of the constitution-making powers of provinces was a subject of several cases 
decided by the CC. See Woolman (note 50 above).  
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areas in respect of which provincial governments enjoy concurrent legislative 
competence with parliament pursuant to FC s 44(1)(a)(ii) and s 104 (1)(b)(i).  
 
Although the functional areas of provincial exclusive jurisdiction are very limited and 
further subject to the limitations under FC s 44(2),60 some are of particular importance 
to accommodate the claims of territorial minorities.61 They provide a framework for 
promoting and preserving the history and culture of minorities within their localities. 
Similarly, subject to the limitations under FC s 146,62 the functional areas under 
Schedule 4 provide even wider avenues to accommodate the interests and identities of 
minorities through the system of provincial government. These include, in particular: 
‘cultural matters’, ‘education at all levels, excluding tertiary education’, ‘indigenous law 
and customary law (subject to Chapter 12 of the Constitution)’, ‘language policy and the 
regulation of official languages (to the extent that the provisions of section 6 of the 
Constitution expressly confer upon the provincial legislatures legislative competence)’, 
‘media services directly controlled or provided by the provincial government (subject to 
section 192)’, ‘traditional leadership’ (subject to Chapter 12 of the Constitution)’, and 
‘welfare services’. Provinces also have the power to designate as official languages at 
least two languages spoken within their respective jurisdictions. Although the powers 
assigned to provinces are not wide, which reflects the unitary bias of the South African 
‘federal’ system, it is nevertheless clear from this that provinces are vested with 
important powers that allow self-government of territorially concentrated communities 
and promote their identities, including by designating regional languages as their official 
languages.  
                                                 
60 This provides that Parliament may intervene, by passing legislation in accordance with s 76 (1), with 
regard to a matter under Schedule 5, when it is necessary to maintain (a) national security, (b) economic 
unity, and (c) essential national standards, as well as (d) to establish minimum standards required for the 
rendering of services and (e) to prevent unreasonable action by a province which is prejudicial to the 
interests of another province or to the country as a whole.  
61 These include ‘archives other than national archives’, ‘libraries other than national libraries’, ‘museums 
other than national museums’ and the more general area of ‘provincial cultural matters’. See Schedule 5 
of the Constitution.  
62 This section stipulates that national legislation that applies uniformly across the country prevails over 
provincial legislation under certain defined circumstances.  
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6.3.2.2 Achievements and challenges 
 
It can be concluded that from the perspective of this study the system of provincial 
government is one of the devices that the 1996 South African Constitution deliberately 
employs to accommodate diversity. This it has done and continues to do in three ways. 
First, one of the factors leading to the adoption of provincial government was the need 
to avoid conflict and include all significant parties in the constitutional negotiation 
process. Seen from this perspective, the inclusion of the system of provincial 
government can be credited for preventing the possible collapse of the negotiations for 
the constitution.63 It was only after several concessions were made and incorporated into 
the 1993 constitution that the IFP and other parties agreed to participate in the first 
national elections in 1994.64 Secondly, the system is also intended to promote stability 
and national cohesion by creating multiple spheres of government so as to divide and 
share political power and economic resources among various sections of society. In this 
regard, another of the achievements of the system of provincial government in South 
Africa is the degree to which it minimised the centrifugal tendencies prevalent in some 
parts of the country, particularly KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape.65  
 
Thirdly, the system of provincial government is intended to serve as a mechanism to 
accommodate territorially concentrated minorities.66 Despite the weakness of the 
provinces’ powers and the strong centralist tendency of the constitutional framework, 
one would nevertheless agree with Murray and Simeon that it ‘has provided some, albeit 
limited, space for minority empowerment’.67 The system of provincial government also 
not only allowed mobilised ethno-regional minorities in KwaZulu-Natal and the 
Western Cape to form regional majorities and exercise a measure of control over key 
areas of their lives, but also created structure for power-sharing by regional elites and 
                                                 
63 See N Steytler & J Mettler ‘Federal Arrangements as a Peacemaking Device during South Africa’s 
Transition to Democracy’ (Fall 2001) 31 (4) Publius: The J of Federalism 93, particularly 96-99; Gloppen 
(note 8 above) 201-202.  
64 Ebrahim (note 5 above) 155.  
65 C Murray & R Simeon ‘Multilevel Governance in South Africa’ in B Berman, D Eyoh & W Kymlicka 
(eds) Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa (2004) 277, 299.  
66 Henrard (note 8 above) 221. 
67 Murray & Simeon (note 3 above) 725.  
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communities in other provinces as well. Moreover, in the prevailing political reality of 
ANC’s dominance, it cannot be denied that it is a critical avenue for minority parties 
with strong support in these provinces to exercise political power. In effect, it serves as a 
power-sharing arrangement such that, while the party or coalition of the parties that 
constitute the majority in Parliament form the national government, other minority 
parties may form provincial or local governments, individually or by coalition, in those 
provinces where they enjoy strong support.68 This also enhances the depth of South 
Africa’s democracy by creating the opportunity for some provinces to serve as a 
bulwark against the one-party-dominated centre. These possibilities would not exist if 
South Africa were a full-fledged unitary state, where whoever controls the centre takes 
everything. It is clear from this that the system of provincial government has promoted 
both self-government of some groups through provinces, and shared government by all 
through representation and participation in the national legislative process via the 
NCOP. It also offers opportunities to deepen South Africa’s democratic process by 
providing multiple avenues of participation, as well as checks on the power of the 
dominant centre.  
 
The operation of the system of provincial government is not without limits. Currently, 
the ANC controls a staggering 297 seats in Parliament and is the ruling party in all the 
nine provinces. Politically speaking, this has the effect of weakening the constitutional 
scheme of multilevel government and particularly the ability of provinces to develop 
their own policies and experiment with their powers. This may weaken the 
accommodation of diversity through provincial autonomy, particularly in those 
provinces where there have been strong demands for autonomy. This danger is further 
accentuated by centralisation processes that have been witnessed over the course of the 
past decade. These trends are reflected not only in the dominant control that the centre 
has over fiscal sources, but also in the various laws and structures that have come to 
regulate important areas of the organisation and operation of provinces.  
 
                                                 
68 Gloppen notes that KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and the Northern Cape ‘have a demographic 
profile where national (ethnic/linguistic/racial) minorities (Zulus, Afrikaans speakers, coloureds) have a 
fair chance of winning power at provincial levels.’ Gloppen (note 8 above) 252.  
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As in other African states, and probably even more so, there is also high degree of 
disparity among the country’s nine provinces. As recent events surrounding the 
redefinition of provincial boundaries in Khutsong and Matatiele have shown, this 
problem has strong potential to fuel instability. One of the challenges that the system of 
provincial government faces in South Africa is therefore one of minimising and 
ultimately overcoming this disparity. In this regard, the effective, albeit admittedly 
complex, implementation of FC s 214 should receive serious attention.69 Related to this 
are problems of administrative inefficiency and poor service delivery, particularly in the 
historically disadvantaged provinces.  
 
Probably the most serious challenge facing the system of provincial government is the 
uncertainty of its continued existence. In 2007, the national government initiated a 
process for reviewing the system of provincial government.70 Although no firm decision 
has as yet been taken, this has aroused fears of further centralisation and even the 
abolition of provinces.71 Assessment of the operation of the system nevertheless reveals 
that the issue is not whether provinces should be maintained. It is rather how to 
strengthen their administrative and managerial capacity, and allow them to exercise their 
powers independently to address the specific socio-economic and cultural needs of their 
population.72 From the perspective of this study, the danger of a review of the system of 
provinces that involves diminishing or abolishing their role is that it may reverse the 
achievements made in terms of accommodation of diversity and the ‘rainbowism’ that 
has been in the making. This may also unleash ethnic mobilisation, not only in those 
provinces that are historically strongholds of opposition parties associated with 
particular groups, such as KwaZulu-Natal, but also in others, as elites in those provinces 
who benefit from the existing system seek to defend the status quo.73 It may also lead to 
over-centralisation of power in the hands of the ANC, and in times of crisis within the 
party, as witnessed during and after the Polokwane Conference, this would threaten the 
                                                 
69 Haysom (note 48 above) 518.  
70 See Policy Process on the System of Provincial and Local Government: Background: Policy Questions, 
Process and Participation, <http://www.dplg.co.za>, For a discussion on the merits or otherwise of this 
review process see De Villiers (note 53 above).  
71 See ‘Provinces to be Scrapped’ Sunday Times 26 October 2006; Resolution of the 32nd Annual 
Conference of the Inkatha Freedom Party held in Ulundi on 12-14 October 2007.  
72 See De Villiers (note 53 above); Simeon & Murray (note 65 above).  
73 The IFP has already expressed its grave concern over the process of revision. See Resolution No. 11 of 
the 32nd Annual Conference of the Inkatha Freedom Party held in Ulundi on 12-14 October 2007.  
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proper functioning of democratic institutions. As Bertus de Villiers maintains, ‘[w]hile a 
review of the functioning of provinces is justified, the baby should not be thrown out 
with the bathwater; and worse, should not be drowned’.74   
6.3.3 Self-determination  
 
From the discussion in the previous two chapters, it is clear that the institutional 
arrangements of representation and participation examined above, as well as the system 
of provincial government, constitute mechanisms of institutionalising internal self-
determination. The only difference, in the context of the 1996 Constitution, is that these 
institutional arrangements are not directly intended to acknowledge, and do not seek to 
give express institutional recognition to, the various ethno-cultural groups as 
collectivities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not either totally close the door on this 
possibility. Accordingly, FC s 235 recognises what it calls ‘the notion of the right of 
self-determination of any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage 
within a territorial entity within the Republic or in any other way, determined by 
national legislation’.  
 
The fact that this provision does not form part of the Bill of Rights and that it only 
recognises the notion of the right of self-determination indicates that self-determination 
is not recognised as a constitutional right, but enjoys only the status of a non-justiciable 
constitutional principle.75 This marginal and ambivalent recognition is further reinforced 
by the incorporation of this provision, like a footnote at the end of the Constitution, in a 
chapter entitled ‘General Provisions’. Moreover, despite some views to the contrary,76 
this provision does not impose obligations but simply creates for parliament a 
constitutional discretion to operationalise it. As Nico Steytler and Johan Mettler point 
out, ‘[a]ny federating process along the route of self-determination would not be in the 
                                                 
74 De Villiers (note 53 above) 30.  
75 See Steytler & Mettler who argued that self-determination in the legal sense was reduced to, at most, a 
political claim (note 63 above) 100. But the clear enunciation of self-determination in the Constitution 
should surely be seen as making it more than a mere political ideal, hence the characterisation here as a 
non-justiciable constitutional principle.  
76 H Strydom H. International Standards for the Protection of Minorities and the South African 
Constitution (2002) 
<http://www.fwdklerk.org.za/download_docs/02_05_Int_Standard_Minorities_Publ_  PDF.pdf> 
accessed on 3 October 2007.   
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hands of any self-selected community, but will be governed by parliament’.77 In legal 
terms, one can however, say, following the Supreme Court of Canada, that in the 
unlikely but not impossible event that the majority of members of a ‘community sharing 
common culture and language’ demand self-determination under FC s 235, it can be 
considered that this would impose on Parliament an obligation at least to negotiate. 
Obviously, the CC has a role to play in ensuring that constitutional procedures are duly 
followed and rights are respected in any such process. Nevertheless, there is no evidence 
currently that any group would in the foreseeable future successfully initiate this 
process.  
6.4 Language policy and the accommodation of linguistic diversity  
6.4.1 Official languages  
 
‘Only in the imaginative provisions for the recognition of official languages,’ Iain 
Currie insightfully observes, ‘did the interim Constitution go beyond the minimum by 
specifically requiring positive action by the state to ensure the maintenance and 
development of minority languages.’78 Indeed, the way the FC resolved the issue of the 
status of official languages is one of its few, if not necessarily the only, highly ingenious 
features of the FC with respect to the accommodation of diversity in South Africa. 
Arguably, as much as, if not more than, other aspects of the constitutional design, this 
plays a crucial role in resolving the challenges of ethnic diversity by comprehensively 
institutionalising in the public domain the recognition of the language diversity of the 
country. The FC s 6 (1) recognises 11 official languages of the Republic.79 Of these, 
nine are indigenous languages that were subject to discrimination and neglect during 
apartheid. The official recognition of these languages reflects the arguments advanced in 
this study regarding recognition of the culture of groups within the post-colonial African 
state, in that it is not only a commitment to remedy their past disadvantages, but also a 
guarantee for their survival and development in the political/public domain in addition 
to the social/private sphere.  
                                                 
77 Steytler & Mettler (note 63 above) 100.  
78 I Currie ‘Minority Rights: Education, Culture and Language’ in Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa (1996) Chapter 35, 35-4.  
79 The official languages are ‘Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, 
English, isiNdebele, isiXhosa and isiZulu’.  
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FC s 6(1)’s main value is the recognition and institutional expression of the multi-
linguistic and multicultural composition of South Africa. It symbolises the constitutional 
commitment to uphold and promote the diversity that is characteristic of the country.80 
This commitment is, however, not just symbolic. It is also substantive. Accordingly, FC 
s 6(2) encumbers the state with a constitutional duty ‘to take practical and positive 
measures to elevate the status and advance the use of these (indigenous) languages’ 
having regard to their ‘historically diminished use and status’. When read with FC s 
6(4), which requires that all languages be treated equitably, this demands that the state 
provide special support to the indigenous official languages.81 Not only does this serve 
to achieve substantive equality among speakers of these historically marginalised 
languages, it also facilitates the process of national integration and transformation.  
 
Other than the 11 languages designated as official, the FC additionally recognises other 
languages, such as the indigenous Khoi, Nama and San languages. As the CC has 
observed, these indigenous languages ‘have suffered great historical neglect and are 
threatened with extinction’.82 Accordingly, FC s 6(5)(a) requires the Pan South African 
Language Board (PSALB) to take special steps to ‘promote and create conditions for the 
development and use of’ these languages in addition to the 11 official languages.83 A 
lower level of recognition and protection is extended to other languages, including the 
principal Indian languages.84  
 
FC s 6(3) has two functions. The first is to tell us that the effect of the designation of the 
11 languages as official is to make them languages that are to be used ‘for the purpose 
of government’. According to Iain Currie, the phrase ‘purposes of government’ 
encompasses the various activities of government including, in particular, legislation 
                                                 
80 The preamble of the 1996 Constitution describes South Africa as belonging to ‘all who live in it, united 
in diversity’ (my emphasis).  
81 See Henrard (note 8 above) 119.  
82 First Certification Judgement (note 20 above) para. 211.  
83 The CC seems to interpret this as mandating the Board to take special measures to protect those 
especially vulnerable indigenous languages. Ibid.  
84 FC s 6 (5) (b) uses the weaker formulation of ‘promote and ensure respect for’, compared to s (5) (a)’s 
‘promote and create conditions for the development and use’ (my emphasis). Under the Pan South African 
Language Act of 1995, this distinction applied only between the 11 official languages and all other 
languages. This is nevertheless revised by the FC. See Henrard (note 8 above) 119-120.  
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and administration.85 This means that these 11 are the languages to be used in the 
making of laws, in communication with state agencies and for accessing public services. 
Since ‘[i]t will too often be practically and financially impossible to provide every type 
of service’,86 the second function of FC s 6(3) is to institutionalise the principle of the 
sliding-scale approach adopted in this study, by defining the considerations to be taken 
into account in determining the use of particular languages by the national and 
provincial governments. These are ‘usage, practicality, expense, regional circumstances, 
and the needs and preferences of the population as a whole or in respective provinces’.87 
Like the sliding-scale approach, the effect of these considerations is that it is not 
constitutionally required for both national and provincial governments to use each of the 
official languages for all purposes of government. Accordingly, provinces can designate 
as official languages, on the basis of usage, from among the official languages that are 
principally spoken in the province. The national government can similarly decide the 
particular official languages for purposes of government. At the same time, to counter 
the possible dominance of one language in the public sphere at the national or provincial 
levels, this sub-section also provides that ‘no national or provincial government may use 
only one official language’. It is clear from this that the FC seeks to accommodate 
language diversity through a policy of multilingualism at both national and provincial 
levels, but subject to the sliding-scale considerations for its application.  
 
Admittedly, the considerations under FC s 6(3) offer both national and provincial 
governments relatively wide discretion to determine the use of languages for 
government purposes. As far as legislation is concerned, I share the view that the 
importance of language for public participation and the principle that laws ought to be 
intelligible to the people to whom they apply entail that ‘[l]egislation at the national 
level should, in principle, be published in all the principal languages of the state. 
Similarly, legislation at the provincial level should be published in the principal 
languages spoken in the province.’88 This same logic dictates that legislative 
proceedings should take place in the principal languages of the state or of the province, 
                                                 
85 See I Currie ‘Official Languages and Language Rights’ in Woolman et al (note 13 above) Chapter 65.  
86 Ibid 65-14. 
87 It also provides that ‘[m]unicipalities must take into consideration the language usage and preferences 
of their residents’.  
88 Currie (note 85 above) 65-10.  
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as the case may be. Consistent with this account, the National Language Policy 
Framework (NLPF) envisages the use of all the official languages in ‘all legislative 
activities’ (publication of legislation and the conduct of legislative proceedings), 
including in Hansard publications, as a matter of right, provided that in the case of 
provincial legislatures, regional circumstances will determine the language(s) to be 
used.’89 90 
 
For purposes of administration (in the provision of public services and communication 
involving government agencies), the various considerations under s 6(3) have more roles 
to play, but in the NLPF the general approach is in favour of using most of the official 
languages. Firstly, the NLPF envisages that official correspondence must be in the 
official language of the recipient’s choice.91 Secondly, ‘[w]here the effective and stable 
operation of government at any level requires comprehensive communication of 
information’, government documents must be published in all the 11 languages or in all 
of the official languages of the province.92 Thirdly, where this is not required, such 
documents should be published based on the principle of functional multilingualism.93 
Accordingly, based on the purpose of the communication, its public importance and its 
target audience, national government departments should publish communications in at 
least six languages simultaneously.94 Consistent with this framework, the draft South 
African Languages Bill provides for publication of official documents in all 11 
languages and where this is not possible in at least six languages, as laid down in the 
NLPF.  
 
The aim of the official language policy is not only to protect the diversity of languages 
in South Africa, as required by CP XI, but also, by promoting the use of these languages 
for ‘government purposes’, to promote the participation of the public in the management 
of public affairs and to increase their access to public services. It also expresses the 
constitutional commitment to take the most important dimension of the identity of South 
                                                 
89 NLPF para. 2.4.4.  
90 On the details of the implementation of this see National Language Policy Framework (2002). For a 
comprehensive analysis of official languages and language rights see Currie (note 85 above).  
91 NLPF para. 2.4.6.2.  
92 NLPF para. 2.4.6.4.  
93 NLPF para. 2.4.6.3.  
94 NLPF para. 2.4.6.5.  
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Africans seriously and use it to ensure that speakers of the various languages have equal 
opportunities in various aspects of public life.95 In this sense, multilingualism constitutes 
part of the overall constitutional scheme whose objective it is to ‘heal the divisions of 
the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and 
fundamental human rights’.96  
 
Notwithstanding the symbolic importance of the multilingual approach of official 
language policy and the rather wide language-policy framework, no adequate practical 
steps are being taken by the national government to give effect to the constitutional 
guarantees and this ambitious policy framework. The law that is supposed to give effect 
to important aspects of FC s 6 has not yet been passed by Parliament, although the draft 
bill has been around for some years now. At the political level, there seems to be little 
interest in and commitment to the constitutional promise of multilingualism. This 
problem is further compounded by the de facto dominance of English as lingua franca in 
the public domain, which is reinforced by the decision of the government in 2002 that 
state departments had to choose a single language for inter- and intra-departmental 
communication, which is inevitably English. This has given rise to a perception on the 
part of speakers of some languages, particularly Afrikaans, that the role of their 
languages is being diminished. Coupled with a general sense of powerlessness, this 
tends to engender a sense of alienation, particularly on the part of the Afrikaans-
speaking population.97 Naturally, this would undermine the constitutional objective of a 
South Africa that belongs to all who live in it, united in diversity. This is accordingly an 
area where there is clear divergence between the theory and practice of South Africa’s 
constitutional design for accommodation of diversity.  
6.4.2 Other language guarantees  
 
 
                                                 
95 According to the NLPF, the development of African languages is crucial to correct the imbalance that 
affects the speakers of these languages in terms of their communication with the government, and their 
access to government services, justice, education and jobs. See 
<http://www.saps.gov.za/saps_profile/components/language_management/downloads/implem_plan__english.pdf> [NLPF] accssed on 17 October 2007.  
96 Preamble to the FC.  
97 See M Schönteich & H Boshoff ‘Volk’, Faith and Fatherland: The Security Threat Posed by the White 
Right ISS Monograph No. 81 (March 2003) 97-99. 
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One of the contentious issues that arose during the negotiations for the FC and continued 
to be an issue post-adoption of the FC is the status of single-medium public schools. 
This is addressed under FC s 29(2). The most important aspect of this sub-section from 
the perspective of this study is that it guarantees the right of everyone to ‘receive 
education in the official language or languages of their choice in public educational 
institutions where that education is reasonably practicable’.98 Although this is not a 
membership right, it nevertheless creates for members of the groups represented by the 
11 official languages the right to education in their language if they so wish.  
 
The controversy surrounding the use of language in education that continues to 
dominate the case law on the right to education relates to whether the right to education 
in a language of one’s choice includes the right to single-medium institutions. Clearly, 
the FC envisages that this right may be given application through, among other means, 
single-medium institutions. According to Murray and Simon, ‘[t]his clause attempts to 
straddle the interests of Afrikaners, by expressly permitting “single-medium 
institutions” … and the interests of the ANC, by emphasising equity and “the need to 
redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices”’.99 In situations 
where a previously privileged group is now non-dominant in political and cultural terms, 
and seeks protection for its language by maintaining single-medium public schools, the 
challenge is to find the right balance between the rights of that group and the need, at the 
same time, to ensure equality of access to public schools for members of previously 
disadvantaged groups in the official language of their choices.100 It is nevertheless clear 
from the provisions of the Constitution, as confirmed by the jurisprudence on the right 
to education,101 that there is no right to a single-medium institution. Single-medium 
institutions are mentioned in the Constitution only as one means, among many others, of 
giving effect to the right to receive education in a language of choice subject to 
considerations of practicability, equity and the need to redress discriminatory practices.  
 
                                                 
98 Practicability depends on, among other things, the number of students requesting teaching in the 
particular language and the availability of institutions providing education in the language.  
99 Murray & Simeon (note 3 above) 699.  
100 For a discussion on the court cases relating to education in minority languages, see S Woolman and M 
Bishop ‘Education’ in Woolman et al (note 13 above) Chapter 57.  
101 See for example, Laerckool Middlburg & ‘n ander v. Departementshoof, Mpumalanga Van Ondrways, 
& andre 2003 (4) SA 160 (T). 
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From the perspective of this study, this is a model formulation that has given a robust 
constitutional expression to the vague, generally weak and highly qualified formulation 
of the rights of members of minorities to education under international law. It has also 
gone a step further than these international standards in that it envisages a positive 
obligation, under certain circumstances, to provide schools in minority languages. 
Unlike those international standards, however, under FC s 29(2) the right is couched as a 
purely individual right without any group dimension. This can be contrasted with FC s 
31 which guarantees membership-based rights.  
 
Consistent with the framework of minority rights adopted in this study, FC s 29 further 
provides communities with the right to establish and maintain, at their own expense, 
independent educational institutions. Accordingly, religious and cultural communities 
can establish and maintain educational institutions on the basis of their religion, culture 
and language, subject to non-discrimination on the basis of race.102 Other requirements 
are registration and possession of standards not inferior to those at comparable public 
educational institutions.  
 
The FC provides additional language guarantees in the form of the prohibition of unfair 
discrimination against anyone on grounds of language under FC s 9. Discrimination on 
the basis of language in relation to the medium of schooling has been a subject of 
several cases.103 These cases reveal that language cannot be used to exclude learners 
from access to public schools and that FC s 29 does not guarantee a right to a single-
medium school. Moreover, the fact that the Bill of Rights is binding on both public 
authorities and private persons (both natural and juristic persons), by virtue of FC s 8(2), 
means that no entity that exercises public authority nor any private person can prohibit 
                                                 
102 Kriegler J in this regard noted that this is the first qualification to the right of religious, cultural and 
linguistic minorities to establish and maintain educational institutions for the preservation of their religion, 
culture or language: ‘A common culture, language or religion having racism as an essential element has 
no constitutional claim to the establishment of separate educational institutions. The Constitution protects 
diversity, not racial discrimination.’ Ex Parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature: In re Dispute Concerning 
the Constitutionality of the Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995 1996 (3) SA 165 (CC), 1996 (4) 
BCLR 537 (CC) para. 40. (Constitutionality of the Gauteng School Education Bill) 
103 See Constitutionality of the Gauteng School Education Bill (Ibid) paras. 71 & 74; Western Cape 
Minister of Education & Others v. The Governing Body of Mikro Primary School 2006 (1) SA 1 (SCA), 
2005 (10) BCLR 973 (SCA); Laerckool Middlburg & ‘n ander v. Departementshoof, Mpumalanga Van 
Ondrways, & andre 2003 (4) SA 160 (T).  
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any person from using her language, or even any other language of her choice (FC s 30), 
in communication with others in public fora, in the media, in educational institutions, or 
in business.  
 
Finally, FC s 6 establishes the PSALB. This institution is charged with two tasks. With 
respect to the official languages and the marginalised Khoi, Nama and San languages, as 
well as sign language, it has the responsibility to promote and create conditions for their 
development and use. As far as other languages used by various other linguistic 
communities and religious groups are concerned, the PSALB’s role is to promote and 
ensure respect for them.  
6.5 Rights of religious and cultural communities  
6.5.1 The relationship between s 30 and s 31 
 
FC s 30 provides for the right of everyone ‘to use the language and to participate in the 
cultural life of their choice’, subject to the Bill of Rights. It corresponds more with 
Article 15 of the ICESCR or Article 27 of the UDHR than with the minority rights 
guarantee under Article 27 of the ICCPR. This means that the right guaranteed under 
this section is essentially the freedom of individuals to be associated with a language or 
culture of their choice in general. Thus, unlike Article 27 of the ICCPR, it is not a right 
specific to members of specific ethno-cultural groups to their culture or language, 
although the choice involves that. In effect, it is a right that allows individuals to use 
even a language other than the language of their group or participate in the culture of a 
group other than their own.104 As such, it is a right that guarantees individuals the 
freedom to determine which language to speak and which culture to be associated with, 
whether or not that language or culture is their own. In this sense, this is also a right that 
recognises the capacity of individuals to change their cultural or linguistic associations. 
One can conclude from this that as FC s 15 is to freedom of religion and belief, so FC s 
                                                 
104 See Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC), 2000 (10) BCLR 
1051 (CC) para 26. For a contrary view see S Woolman ‘Community Rights: Language, Culture & 
Religion’ in Woolman et al (note 13 above) Chapter 58, 58-49. He argues that FC s 30’s ‘primary purpose 
is to regulate the horizontal relationships between individuals and other members of linguistic and cultural 
communities’.  
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30 is to language and culture. Accordingly, the relationship between FC s 30 and FC s 
31 is similar to that between FC s 15 and FC s 31.  
6.5.2 S 31 rights  
 
The formulation of FC s 31 to a large extent mirrors Article 27 of the ICCPR. Unlike FC 
s 30 rights, the rights under this section, like the rights under Article 27 of the ICCPR, 
are specifically applicable only to those who belong to a cultural, religious or linguistic 
community.105 One can conclude from this that whereas FC s 30 rights are choice rights, 
FC s 31 rights are, by contrast, membership rights. Although the nature of the 
formulation of the rights under FC s 31 can further be examined, since that has in many 
ways been sufficiently addressed106 it is important now to consider the ways in which 
FC s 31 rights serve to accommodate the linguistic, cultural and religious diversity of 
South Africa.  
 
As we have seen in chapter IV, the recognition of cultural groups can be approached 
from two perspectives. The first is the argument about culture. This is the argument that 
culture is central to defining an individual’s identity and serves as an important source 
of meaning and framework for making meaningful choices in life. The right of people to 
be who they are is affirmed by various constitutional provisions. In particular, FC s 31 
entails that people are not ‘forced to subordinate themselves to the cultural and religious 
norms of others’ and are ‘able to enjoy what has been called “the right to be 
different”’.107 Moreover, as the CC has held, ‘if society is to be open and democratic in 
its fullest sense it needs to be tolerant and accepting of cultural pluralism’.108 In other 
words, if individuals are to be free to pursue their life goals and make meaningful 
choices, their cultural attachments need both toleration and accommodation. Without 
this, members of minorities, in particular, cannot pursue, not only their cultural or 
religious commitments, which would be against their identity and dignity, but also their 
conception of the good life in general, which would be contrary to their freedom. 
                                                 
105 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 23, Article 27 (fifth Session, 1994) UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 1 at 38 (1994) para. 14. [General Comment 23] 
106 See Woolman (note 104 above); P Lenta ‘Religious Liberty and Cultural Accommodation’ (2005) 122 
SALJ 352.  
107 Christian Education (note 104 above) para. 24.  
108 Ibid para. 23.  
 199 
 
The second perspective is the ‘equality in difference’ argument – that in multi-ethnic 
societies minorities can feel and be treated with equality only where their culture and 
religion are treated with equal concern and respect.109 The implication of this is that the 
laws, practices and decisions of the state should be sensitive to and accommodative of 
the dictates of such religions and cultures on their members. Without this tolerance and 
accommodation, members of such religions or cultures cannot properly enjoy their FC s 
9 right to ‘equal protection and benefit of the law’. In this context, as Sachs J pointed 
out, ‘equality lies not in treating everyone the same way, but in treating everyone with 
equal concern and respect’.110 Accordingly, ‘the state should, wherever reasonably 
possible, seek to avoid putting believers to extremely painful and intensely burdensome 
choices of either being true to their faith or else respectful of the law’.111  
 
FC s 31 directly expresses a commitment on the part of the FC that it not only permits 
and affirms cultural, linguistic and religious diversity, but also ‘promotes and celebrates 
it’.112 This is given effect under the 1996 Constitution in at least two ways. As argued 
elsewhere in this study, one of the ways to give effect to the right to one’s culture is 
through the legal recognition of customary laws. Accordingly, the recognition of 
customary law under the 1996 Constitution is an aspect of the ways by which the right 
to participate in one’s culture under FC s 31 is given effect. The other one is through 
exemption from general rules that prohibit the pursuit of a certain religious or cultural 
commitment.  
6.5.2.1 The right to participate in one’s culture and the recognition of 
customary law  
 
As in other African countries, one of the issues that arose in South Africa with respect to 
the right to culture is the constitutional status of customary laws and traditional 
                                                 
109 See A Addis ‘On Human Diversity and the Limits of Toleration’ in I Shapiro & W Kymlicka (eds) 
Ethnicity and Group Rights (1997) 112, 121. Also see D Miller ‘Liberalism, Equal Opportunities and 
Cultural Commitments’ in P Kelly (ed) Multiculturalism Reconsidered: Culture and Equality and its 
Critiques (2002) 45, 48.  
110 Christian Education (note 104 above) para. 42. Sachs J made reference in the body of the judgement to 
Prinsloo v. Van der Linde and Another 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC), 1997 (6) BCLR 759 paras. 32-33.  
111 Christian Education, ibid para. 35.  
112 See Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project 
and Others 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC), 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC) para. 65. (Fourie)  
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institutions. Although colonialism deformed the customary law and traditional 
authorities of most African communities,113 these institutions have continued to play 
important roles in the lives of the majority of peoples in South Africa, as in most 
African countries.114 As noted previously, the recognition of customary law and 
traditional institutions facilitates the integration of people who continue to rely on them 
into the processes of the state to the extent that they embody the culture, social values 
and traditions of such groups. 115  
 
Under the FC, customary laws and traditional institutions are given express recognition 
under Chapter 12. FC s 211(3) stipulates that ‘the courts must apply customary law 
when the law is applicable, subject to the constitution and any other legislation that 
deals with customary law’. Moreover, in FC s 39(2) and (3) courts are called upon to 
develop customary law, along with common law, in accordance with ‘the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights’. This constitutional recognition elevates the status of 
customary law to be an integral part of the legal system of South Africa with its own 
independent standing.116 Accordingly, the courts (and legislature) are under a 
constitutional obligation to respect and accommodate customary law in the South 
African legal system. Similarly, the recognition of traditional authorities is a 
manifestation of the recognition of the structures of constituent ethno-cultural 
communities as forming part of the larger political system. But, as Gloppen notes, ‘these 
structures are supplements to the democratically elected bodies, not alternative channels 
of government or of political representation’.117 
 
Seen in the light of FC s 31, the importance of this is that it enhances the rights of 
members of indigenous cultural communities to participate in their culture by protecting 
                                                 
113 For details see GBN Ayittey Indigenous African Institutions (1991) Chapter 9; M Mamdani Citizen 
and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (1996) 35-180; T Bennett & C 
Murray ‘Traditional Leadership’ in S Woolman et al (note 13 above) Chapter 26, 26-8 – 26-15.  
114 See Bhe v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha & others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC), 2005 (1) BCLR (CC) para. 45 
[Bhe] ; also see A Donkers & R Murray ‘prospects and problems facing traditional leaders in South 
Africa’ in B de Villiers (ed) The Rights of Indigenous People: A Quest for Coexistence (1997) 39, 43-44.  
115 Bhe (ibid) paras. 41 & 45.  
116 See Alexkor Ltd & another v. Richtersveld Community & Others 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) para. 51, 
(stating that ‘[w]hile in the past indigenous law was seen through the common law lens, it must now be 
seen as an integral part of our law’ and that ‘the Constitution acknowledges the originality and 
distinctiveness of indigenous law as an independent source of norms within the legal system’). 
[Richtersveld]  
117 Gloppen (note 8 above) 237.  
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the institutions that support such culture. For those people who run important aspects of 
their lives on the basis of customary law, its constitutional recognition and promotion 
marks a promise to a possible end of their historical alienation and marginalisation by 
and from the state, and opens an opportunity for their inclusion. It constitutes an 
important manifestation of the constitutional promise that ‘South Africa belongs to all 
who live in it, united in our diversity’.  
 
The recognition of customary law and the affirmation of its validity in the jurisprudence 
of the CC, even in cases in which a particular rule of customary law was found to be 
unconstitutional, as in Bhe, strengthens the right to participate in one’s culture in more 
than one way. By affording a certain degree of constitutional solicitude to customary 
law, it gives legal support to the institutions in which the culture and heritage of the 
community are embedded. This has the additional value of guaranteeing the preservation 
of this culture and heritage, and its transmission to future generations. Moreover, it 
expresses the commitment of the FC to take seriously and treat with equal concern and 
respect those cultures and ways of life that have historically been denigrated and 
undermined. It is, in a way, one of the ways by which the FC seeks to promote equality 
in difference, a concept of equality accepted under South African constitutional law.118  
 
The extent to which the constitutional promise to take the culture and institutions of 
hitherto marginalised communities seriously can make a meaningful contribution to 
enhancing the quality of life of those communities that rely on it depends on how courts 
define the relationship of customary law to the Constitution, and in particular the Bill of 
Rights. As the CC warned in the First Certification Judgement, the ‘confrontation 
between the Bill of Rights and legislation on the one side and indigenous law on the 
other need not take place in the manner that’ frustrates the development of the latter.119 
One possible way of approaching the tension without undermining or threatening the 
survival of customary law is to treat it as a conflict between one right, often equality 
and/or dignity, and another right, the right to culture.120 Accordingly, the process of 
                                                 
118 See Christian Education (note 104 above); Fourie (note 111 above).  
119 First Certification Judgment (note 20 above) paras. 200, 202.  
120 See V Bronstein ‘Reconceptualizing the Customary Law Debate in South Africa’ (1998) 14 (3) SAJHR 
388-410.  
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defining this relationship is also a matter of reconciling and balancing the competing 
interests, wherever possible, in a way that permits the survival and development of 
indigenous law as recognition of the rights of those communities, hitherto marginalised, 
who depend on and wish to live under it, to be governed by their indigenous law.121 This 
rests within the South African constitutional framework more on the rights to culture, as 
enunciated under s 31, and equality, under s 9, than on self-determination.  
6.5.2.2 Exemptions from general rules 
 
Another important issue that arises with respect to FC s 31 is the question of how to 
accommodate and afford protection to those aspects of the identity of individuals and 
groups that do not conform to the standards of the mainstream society. One of the ways 
by which FC s 31 can give practical effect to this commitment is by requiring the state 
to accommodate even those aspects of the culture or religion of a community that 
mainstream society regards as unusual, bizarre or even threatening.122 This is generally 
established through judicial pronouncements.  
 
As the internal limitation of FC s 31 and the general limitation under FC s 36 reveal, the 
rights guaranteed are not without limits. Accordingly, although the protection of the 
rights under this section entitles members of religious or cultural minorities to be 
exempted from general laws that interfere with the pursuit of their religion or culture, it 
does not do so all the time. The various cases decided by the CC reveal that exemption 
on the ground of culture or religion is justified where certain conditions are fulfilled. 
First,  the practice with respect of which exemption is requested has to be a cultural or 
religious practice. However, as the CC held in Pillay,123 it is not required that such a 
practice be obligatory. It suffices that it forms part of the culture or religion of the 
community to which the claimant belongs. Secondly, the practice must be one that is 
genuinely held by the claimant to be an important part of her religion or culture. 
Accordingly, as the CC held in Pillay, a claimant who merely appears to adhere to a 
religious or cultural practice, but is willing to forgo it if necessary, cannot demand the 
                                                 
121 Consider the argument presented by Ngcobo J in Bhe (note 114 above).  
122 See Prince v President, Cape Law Society, & Others 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC), 2002 (3) BCLR 231 (CC) 
para. 172; Christian Education (note 104 above) para 25; Fourie (note 111) para. 60.  
123 MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal & Others v. Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC). (Pillay case) 
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same adjustment from others as those whose identity will be seriously undermined if 
they do not follow their belief.124 Thirdly, it must be impossible for the claimant to 
practice her strongly held culture or religion while respecting the law in question. In 
Christian Education, part of the reasoning of the CC for declining exemption seems to 
be that parents can follow the religious practice in question while respecting the 
particular law challenged. Similarly, as the CC in Pillay pointed out, the infringement 
that the law or the decision in question causes to the right of the claimant should be 
severe enough to require the exemption.125  
 
The fourth condition, as envisaged under FC s 31(2), is that exemption should not lead 
to a violation of the rights of others. In Christian Education, the applicants challenged 
the law that prohibits corporal punishment of children in schools on account of their 
religious beliefs, and requested exemption from its application. In declining the request 
for exemption, one of the important considerations for the CC was the rights of children 
to personal security and dignity.126 In the Prince case,127 Sachs J puts this more broadly 
when he says in a strong minority judgement that ‘where there are practices that might 
fall within a general prohibition, but that do not involve any violation of the Bill of 
Rights, the Constitution obliges the state to walk the extra mile’128 in order to 
accommodate the religious or cultural commitments of minorities.  
 
The fifth is that the law or practice can achieve its legitimate purpose while 
accommodating the religious or cultural commitments of minorities. In other words, 
where the law can achieve its purpose with less restrictive means, the claimant should be 
given exemption. In granting the exemption, the Pillay Court held that: 
 
the admirable purposes that school uniforms serve do not seem to be undermined by granting 
religious and cultural exemptions. There is no reason to believe, nor has the school presented any 
evidence to show, that a learner who is granted an exemption from the provisions of the school 
                                                 
124 Ibid para. 86.  
125 Ibid para. 85.  
126 See Christian Education (note 104 above) pars. 39-49.  
127 Prince (note 121 above)  
128 Ibid para. 149. (my emphasis) 
 204 
(uniform) Code will be any less disciplined or that she will negatively affect the discipline of 
others.129  
 
The sixth condition is that the costs of the exemption should not be so great as to 
frustrate the legitimate aims of the law in question. Such a cost can be weighed in terms 
of both resources and the possibility of effective regulation. In the Prince case, for 
example, the majority held that the cost of exemption of Rastafarians from the Drugs 
and Drug Trafficking Act to allow the use of cannabis for their religious purposes was 
that it could not be effectively regulated, a cost found by the majority to be so high that 
it could frustrate the legitimate aim of the law, and hence declined the requested 
exemption. Sometimes the determination of the cost can be affected by the religious or 
moral convictions of sitting judges and/or, as in the Prince case, the court may not 
always get the assessment right. 130 It is important to note here that there could be cases 
where any form of exemption from the measures set by the law could seriously negate 
the legitimate purposes of the law. This is the case, according to the CC, where such 
measures ‘have principled foundations and are deliberately designed to transform 
national civic consciousness in a major way’.131 That is the case where the purpose of 
the law is to ban all instances of the act in question. In Christian Education, the court 
accordingly held that ‘the whole symbolic, moral and pedagogical purpose of the 
measure (of prohibition of corporal punishment) would be disturbed, and the State’s 
compliance with its duty to protect people from violence would be undermined’132 if 
religious exemption from the prohibition of corporal punishment in schools were 
allowed.  
6.6 The CRCRLC 
 
In addition to the generally common constitutional arrangements and protection 
mechanisms considered above, the FC has additionally provided for the establishment of 
a Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and 
Linguistic Communities (CRCRLC or the Commission) as one of the Chapter 9 
                                                 
129 Pillay case (note 122 above) para. 101.  
130 For a critique of the failure of the CC to allow the exemption see Lenta (note 105 above) 356-358, 371-
375. 
131 Christian Education (note 104 above) para. 50.  
132 Ibid.  
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institutions supporting constitutional democracy. According to FC s 185(1), the primary 
objectives of the CRCRLC are  
 
(a) to promote respect for the rights of cultural, religious, and linguistic communities  
(b) to promote and develop peace, friendship, humanity, tolerance, and national unity among 
cultural, religious, and linguistic communities, on the basis of equality, non-discrimination, and 
free association; and 
(c) to recommend the establishment or recognition, in accordance with national legislation, of a 
cultural or other council or councils for a community or communities in South Africa.  
  
In 2002, Parliament established the CRCRLC under the Commission for the Promotion 
and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities Act No 
19 of 2002. In addition to those listed under FC s 84 (1), s 4 of the Act includes as the 
objectives of the CRCRLC: 
 
To foster mutual respect among cultural, religious and linguistic communities;  
To promote the right of communities to develop their historically diminished heritage.  
 
To this end, the Commission is vested with promotional, investigative, educational, 
conciliatory and advisory powers and functions necessary for achieving its objectives as 
set out in the Constitution and the enabling act. According to s 5 of the Act, the 
Commission is the body responsible for conducting various programmes for the 
promotion of both awareness of the various cultural, religious and linguistic 
communities and respect for and protection of their rights. As part of its promotional 
mandate, the Commission can recommend the establishment of community councils and 
recognise such councils, who can apply for financial assistance to the Commission or 
any other organ.133 In addition to monitoring, investigating and researching on any 
issues concerning the rights of these communities, it also can recommend on any 
legislation that impacts on the rights of those communities, and inform the appropriate 
organs or authorities of the state on any relevant matter, and make recommendations for 
dealing with such matters. Most importantly, the Commission is mandated to facilitate 
the resolution of what the act calls ‘frictions’ between and within such communities or 
                                                 
133 S 36 & 37 of the act.  
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between any such community and an organ of a state, as well as to receive and deal with 
the requests related to their rights.  
 
The availability of such an institution with such powers and functions is of particular 
importance to the achievement of the multicultural commitments of the FC. It provides a 
framework for promoting the rich cultural, religious and linguistic diversity of South 
Africa as an important source of meaning in the lives of many South Africans, and as a 
resource for overcoming the divisions of the past and building a common South African 
identity. One of the ways in which it can achieve this is by providing direct and easy 
access to people who wish to air their concerns and fears with respect to the enjoyment 
and preservation of their culture, religion or language. It is also more suited than the 
ordinary judicial process to address promptly situations of conflicts within and between 
communities, or between such communities and the state, as it is empowered to conduct 
investigation on its own motion. It is clear from this that the establishment of this 
Commission is part of the general commitment of the Constitution to accommodate 
South Africa’s ethno-cultural diversity. As such, it serves a particular constitutional 
purpose whose pursuit could have been overlooked and could not have been effectively 
realised if it were under the Human Rights Commission, whose main object is to address 
mainstream human rights issues.  
 
The extent to which it can serve its purposes and discharge its mandates, however, 
depends not only on how effectively the CRCRLC executes its mandate, but also on the 
degree of financial, resource and political support it gets from government. 134 If the 
experience so far is anything to go by, the political will for the effective operation of the 
CRCRLC leaves much to be desired.  
 
6.7 Conclusion  
 
 
                                                 
134 For a rather harshly critical review of the role of CRCRLC see S Woolman & J Soweto Aullo 
‘Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic 
Communities’ in Woolman et al (note 13 above) Chapter 24.  
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This chapter is an attempt to explore the form that the proposed constitutional minority 
rights regime, in the robust sense defended in this study (constitutional design for 
accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity), takes in the context of the specific historical 
and political situation of particular countries and how it operates in practice. As the 
foregoing discussions revealed, at the political level, while rejecting group membership 
as a basis of political representation and participation, the FC has nevertheless 
established an inclusive democratic system that reflects the most important components 
of the constitutional design for accommodation of diversity outlined in the previous 
chapter and defended in this study in general. As reflected in the design of South 
Africa’s democracy as set out under the FC, it has been identified above that this 
accommodative constitutional design has three important dimensions. The first is 
expressed by the principle of proportional representation which shaped not only the 
design of the electoral system but also the organisation and operation of the national and 
provincial legislative processes and the character of the public service. The second 
dimension relates to the principle of public participation which is interpreted by the CC 
as endowing South Africa with a deliberative form of democracy which guarantees all 
members of society a say in national policy-making processes. Last but not least, the 
aspect of the FC that also manifests the model defended in this study is the system of 
provincial government and the reference to the right to self-determination for a 
community sharing a common cultural and language heritage.  
 
Consistent with the model defended in this study, the FC additionally provides certain 
rights and protection mechanisms for the identity of what it calls ‘cultural, religious and 
linguistic communities’. Firstly, it adopts a multilingual policy regime. Accordingly, it 
designates 11 languages as official languages, which serve for government purposes at 
the national and provincial levels. It also recognises other languages and mandates their 
promotion and development. Moreover, the FC guarantees to everyone the right to 
receive education in the official language of one’s choice. Finally, it prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of language both in the public and private spheres. Secondly, 
it also provides for the promotion of the cultural and religious identity of members of 
various cultural and religious groups. This is expressed within the framework of FC s 31 
not only in the recognition of customary law and the institution of traditional leadership 
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but also in exemptions from general rules elaborated in the jurisprudence of the CC. 
Thirdly, the FC establishes institutions for the promotion and enforcement of these 
various guarantees. Accordingly, apart from the CC, it established the PSALB and the 
CRCRLC with mandates to promote the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic 
communities.  
 
Although this chapter did not investigate the actual operation of this system in depth, it 
has nevertheless concluded that these various institutional arrangements and guarantees 
have been instrumental in the process towards achieving a South Africa that ‘belongs to 
all who live in it, united in our diversity’.135 Nevertheless, some of the issues identified 
also clearly illustrate that the constitutional design defended in this study is only a 
necessary, and not a sufficient, condition for a successful accommodation of ethno-
cultural diversity. Political, social and economic conditions determine the extent to 
which the constitutional framework can operate optimally to achieve this objective. In 
the South African context, for example, notwithstanding their representation, minority 
groups and minority parties seem to have become peripheral to the processes of the 
state. This is not, however, due to the failure of the PR system. It is rather attributable to 
the South African political context that led to the evolution of a de facto one-party 
democracy. Given ANC’s historical ambivalence towards some of the important aspects 
of the constitutional design, including the system of provincial government, this is 
making not only the implementation of some of these accommodative devices, but also 
their future, uncertain.  
 
This greatly increases the importance of the CC’s role in actively scrutinising the actions 
or inactions of the political organs of government that may threaten the application of 
the constitutional principles aimed at an inclusive and participatory democratic system. 
In this regard, the articulation of the nature of South Africa’s democracy under the FC as 
being based on deliberation, with respect for and accommodative of the voices of 
minorities, such as in Masondo and Doctors for Life, among others, is a highly 
commendable development, which, if fully embraced by the CC, will help to rectify the 
functional deficits of South Africa’s one-party-dominant democracy.  
                                                 
135 See Preamble to the FC.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
The case of Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism  
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
Although the origin and process of the making of Ethiopia starkly differ from those of 
most African states, it is similar to those states in facing the challenge of managing its 
ethno-culturally diverse population.136 One of the dominant features of its political 
history, particularly since World War II, has been the struggle between the forces of 
centralisation and unity, on the one hand, and ethno-regional minorities that sought 
equal recognition of their cultures, political representation and participation, and, most 
of all, territorial autonomy on the other. This struggle precipitated a civil war involving 
numerous armed liberation movements organised along ethnic lines.137 When these 
movements, led by the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), 
ousted the military regime of Mengistu Haile-Mariam in 1991, the most dominant 
agenda was the resolution of the so-called nationality question (the problem of 
minorities) through the structural and democratic transformation of the Ethiopian state. 
Although there was no agreement more on mechanisms for addressing the problem than 
on the nature of the problem itself,138 the major political forces of the time considered it 
critical to deploy ethnicity, expressed in terms of national self-determination, as a 
principle of political organisation.139 This led to the adoption of one of the most radical 
constitutions in Africa, if not in the world, in terms of the extent of its 
institutionalisation of ethnic diversity.140  
                                                 
136 On the nature of ethno-cultural diversity in Ethiopia, see D Levine Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of 
a Multiethnic Society (2000); A Habtu ‘Ethnic Pluralism as an Organizing Principle of the Ethiopian 
Federation’ (2004) 28 Dialectical Anthropology  91, 93-97; K Tronvoll Ethiopia: A New Start? (2000) 6-
11. 
137 On the eve of the fall of the military regime, there were about 17 armed movements mobilised for the 
recognition and protection of the rights and distinct identity of particular communities. See Be Ethiopia Ye 
Dimocraci Sirat Ginbata Gudayoch (Ginbot 1994 E.C.) 26.  
138 Assefa Fesseha offers a comprehensive analysis of the various perspectives, their convergence and 
divergence. A Fiseha Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study 
(2005/2006) 52-79.  
139 See L Aalen Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000 
(2002) 39-41.  
140 See Habtu (note 1 above) 91-123. Will Kymlicka notes in this regard that what makes Ethiopian 
federalism strikingly distinct from other multi-nation federal systems is the ‘explicitness, at constitutional 
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If there is one overriding concept discernible throughout Ethiopia’s 1994 
Constitution,141 it is the concern with the rights of what it calls the ‘nations, 
nationalities, and peoples’ of Ethiopia.142 In a word, ethnicity is the one issue to which 
the Constitution primarily addresses itself and it constitutes the epicentre of the 
constitutional framework. According to the Preamble to the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution, the objects of the federalisation of Ethiopia, 
with the rights of ethnic minorities as its main organising principle, are, among others, 
to build ‘a political community … capable of ensuring lasting peace, guaranteeing 
democratic order, and advancing our economic and social development’143 and to rectify 
historically unjust relationships.144 Against the background of these objectives and the 
general framework established in Chapter V, this chapter examines Ethiopia’s 
constitutional design for the accommodation of diversity. This serves not only as a 
further illustration of the practical institutionalisation and operation of the constitutional 
design defended in this study, but also to point to the form that this design should not 
take and the pitfalls that must be avoided.  
7.2 Federalism as the only viable option  
 
Unlike South Africa, for Ethiopia a unitary form of state structure was not an option at 
all. There were at least two reasons for this, one conceptual and another practical. 
Firstly, a unitary system cannot coexist with sub-national communities that possess 
sovereignty and retain the right to withdraw unilaterally from the union. Thus, Dr 
Samuel Assefa of Rutgers University, now Ethiopia’s Ambassador to the United States, 
aptly captures the incompatibility between unitarism and sub-national sovereignty: 
 
                                                                                                                                               
level, of its affirmation of the national self-determination and the logical consistency with which it 
attempts to institutionalize that principle’. W Kymlicka Emerging Western Models of Multination 
Federations: Are They Relevant for Africa? Paper delivered at the Seminar on Ethnic Federalism: The 
Challenges for Ethiopia held on 14-16 April 2004 in Addis Ababa.  
141 Proclamation No. 1/1995 Proclamation of the Constitution of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
Federal Negarit Gazeta 1st Year No. 1 Addis Ababa 21st August 1995 adopted on 8th December 1994, 
came into effect on 21st August 1995. [FDRE Constitution] 
142 At least 23 articles of the Constitution, including the Preamble, make direct or indirect reference to 
‘nations, nationalities and peoples’.  
143 See Preamble to FDRE Constitution.  
144 Ibid.  
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The attempt to combine these discrepant constitutional commitments – to vest all authority 
permanently in the centre, on the one hand, and, on the other, to recognize the right of some or 
all local units to secession and independence – would yield a most unwieldy hybrid, a genuinely 
neurotic constitution, one might say.145  
 
Secondly, central to the war that various groups fought against the military regime was 
the high degree of concentration of power at the centre and the corresponding political 
and economic marginalisation and cultural domination of the various population groups 
constituting Ethiopia.146 After the fall of the Dergue, the mood of the new forces was 
decidedly for making a sweeping break from this politically unitarist and culturally 
exclusive past and creating a new political system.147 One is inclined to agree with 
Samuel Assefa’s categorical statement that a unitary system ‘is not a live option for 
Ethiopia – it does not lie within the horizon of what is actually possible, given where we 
[in Ethiopia] stand today’.148 There has been general agreement across the political 
divide that there is no alternative to federalism.149  
 
As a result, the FDRE Constitution ‘establishes a Federal and Democratic State 
structure’.150 As Fasil Nahum observes, the formula ‘We the nations, nationalities and 
peoples of Ethiopia’ is applied ‘to its fullest extent in the Constitution’ to create a 
multinational federation with the constituent ethnic groups as its foundation.151 Whereas 
                                                 
145 S Assefa ‘Of Federalism and Secession’ in Constitutionalism: Reflections and Recommendations, 
Symposium on the Making of the New Ethiopian Constitution (1993) 113-125, 115. 
146 See Habtu (note 1 above) 96-101; Fiseha (note 3 above) 11-79; K Abraham Ethiopia from Bullets to 
the Ballot Box (1994); K Mengisteab ‘New Approaches to State Building in Africa: The Case of 
Ethiopia’s Ethnic Based Federalism’ (1997) 40 African Studies Review 111-132; J Abbink ‘Breaking and 
Making the State: The Dynamic of Ethnic Democracy in Ethiopia’ (1995) 13 Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies  149-163.  
147 At the Constituent Assembly the dominant view was that, given the history of the country, the 
constitutional empowerment of the constituent ethnic groups through the right to self-determination was 
the only way to redeem and rectify the wrongs of the past. See Minutes of the Constitutional Assembly 
(Nov. 1994), Minutes No. 20 of Hidar 12 and 13, 1987 E.C. For more see also Be Ethiopia Ye Dimocraci 
Sirat Ginbata Gudayoch (note 2 above) 23-30. According to EPRDF, the policy on the rights of ethnic 
communities is essentially an expression and guarantee of the freedom and equality of the diverse groups 
that together constitute Ethiopia. Ibid 23-41.  
148 Assefa (note 10 above) 115.  
149 There is, however, disagreement among various sections of society and political parties as to the form 
that federalism should take. Many reject ethnicity as the basis for federalising Ethiopia. The only political 
parties that opposed the federalisation of Ethiopia were the All Amhara Peoples Organisation and 
Ethiopian Democratic Union Party. Aalen (note 4 above) 42-43.  
150 Article 1. Proclamation No. 1/1995 Proclamation of the Constitution of Federal Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia Federal Negarit Gazeta 1st Year No. 1 Addis Ababa 21st August 1995.  
151 F Nahum A Constitution for a Nation of Nations: The Ethiopian Prospect (1997) 52. 
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under the South African Constitution provinces are not created merely on the basis of 
ethnic boundaries and enjoy only very limited, albeit not insignificant, competences, 
under the FDRE Constitution the member states of the federation are constituted mainly 
on the basis of ethnic boundaries, and ethnic groups form the foundation of the 
federation and are entitled to substantial political rights. This is further outlined below.  
7.2.1 The founding principles and peculiar features of Ethiopia’s 
federation  
 
It has been noted above that ethnicity is probably the most important issue to which the 
FDRE Constitution addresses itself. This is also reflected in the normative premises of 
the federation that this Constitution establishes. One of these is the constitutional 
importance of ethnic groups. The Preamble to the FDRE Constitution distinctly depicts 
the place of honour that the numerous ethno-linguistic groups of the country occupy in 
the new constitutional order. It is not with the familiar words ‘We the people…’ that the 
Preamble commences, but rather with ‘We the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of 
Ethiopia ...’ 
 
The difference between the two formulations is not one of terminology alone; there is a 
qualitative and even paradigmatic difference. Whereas ‘We the people’ signifies the 
existence only of one demos, ‘We the nations, nationalities and peoples’ suggests the 
existence of more than one demos constituting Ethiopia. This is essentially a rejection of 
the monolithic conception of the state as a nation-state – a state with a singular and 
homogenous identity.152 As Fasil Nahum puts it, these words signify that the 
Constitution ‘is not a constitution of the Ethiopian citizens simply lumped together as a 
people’. Elaborating on this, he writes that ‘the Ethiopian citizens are first categorized in 
their different ethno-linguistic groupings and then these groupings come together as 
authors of, and beneficiaries from, the Constitution of 1994’.153  
 
 
Moreover, whereas in the nation-state model individual citizens are the foundation of 
the society and hence the constitutional order, in this case the various ethno-linguistic 
                                                 
152 Nahum  writes: “‘We the nations, nationalities and peoples’ recognizes Ethiopia as a Nation of 
Nations.” Ibid 51. Also see Habtu (note 1 above) 102.  
153 Nahum, ibid.  
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groups are the point of departure. This changes the definition of the state-society 
relationship from that between the individual and the state (as in the dominant liberal 
constitutional tradition) into a relationship mainly between ethnic minorities and the 
state. Consequently, in contrast to the liberal constitutional tradition in which the 
individual takes a central place,154 in the Ethiopian constitutional model ethnic 
communities are the ultimate agents and bearers of rights. It is clear from this that the 
Ethiopian Constitution is more communitarian in its theoretical premises and content 
than libertarian and egalitarian.  
 
In consonance with this, Article 8 provides: ‘All sovereign power resides in the Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia’. Reaffirming that the Constitution is a covenant 
among the various ethnic communities rather than among citizens as individuals, the 
second paragraph of this article states that ‘the Constitution is an expression of their 
sovereignty’. Once again, it departs from the dominant constitutional paradigm of the 
liberal nation-state. Conventionally, popular sovereignty is formulated in a way that 
ascribes sovereignty to the entire people of a state, made up of individual citizens and 
their shared will.155 In the formulation of Article 8, sovereignty does not reside in the 
Ethiopian people in their entirety. Instead, it is shared, to use the terminology of the 
Constitution, among the ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ of Ethiopia.  
 
Another distinguishing feature, which underlies all the above, is the principle of national 
self-determination. It was first introduced as a constitutional principle into the Ethiopian 
legal order under the 1991 Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia. According to the 
Preamble of this Charter, ‘self-determination of all peoples shall be one of the governing 
principles of political, economic and social life’. As set out under Article 39 of the 
FDRE Constitution, ‘every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an 
unconditional right to self-determination including the right to secession’. This gives the 
                                                 
154 The concern of liberal constitutionalism is securing the rights and liberties of individuals. See G 
Walker ‘The Idea of Nonliberal Constitutionalism’ in I Shapiro & W Kymlicka (eds) Ethnicity and Group 
Rights (1997) 154. As a result, its preoccupation is that of defining the nature of the relationship between 
the individual and the state. In the words of Buchanan, therefore, ‘the problem of constitutional design 
was thought to be that of insuring that such (state) power would be effectively limited’ to secure the 
maximum possible freedom for the individual. See JM Buchanan ‘Notes on the Liberal Constitution’ 
(1993) 14 The Cato Journal <http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj14n1-1.htm>.  
155 See, for example, the popular sovereignty clause of the US Constitution and that of the Republic of 
South Africa.  
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various ethno-linguistic communities in the country the highest possible level of 
constitutional recognition and right. Viewed from this perspective, ethnicity is 
established as a constitutionally valued main basis for political organisation. Thus, the 
legitimacy of the structures and processes of the state largely depends on the extent to 
which they reflect the demands of ethno-linguistic diversity in the country. Accordingly, 
the federal system is designed as a means for recognising and accommodating the 
interests and distinct identity of the various groups, the foundation of the constitution. 
To say that this is one of the most controversial clauses of the Ethiopian constitution 
may be an understatement. 156  
 
It is within this framework that the Constitution sets up the structure of Ethiopia’s 
federation.157 One of the consequences of these normative premises is the assignment of 
the power of constitutional adjudication to a political body, the House of the Federation 
(HoF).158 
7.2.2 Member states of the federation  
 
As noted previously, the capacity of a federation to accommodate territorially based 
ethno-cultural diversity depends upon the delimitation of the boundaries of constituent 
                                                 
156 For some, Article 39 is laid down to legitimise constitutionally the eventual dismemberment of 
Ethiopia as a state. See M Haile ‘The New Ethiopian Constitution: Its Impact upon Unity, Human Rights 
and Development’ (1996) 20 Suffolk Transnational LR 1-84; Assefa (note 10 above); YC Metiku, 
‘Ethiopia's Right to ‘Life’ in International Law’, (1994) 2 New Trends in Ethiopian Studies 205, 208-210; 
B Haile-Selassie Ethiopia: A Precarious Ethno-Federal Constitutional Order (Unpublished SJD 
dissertation, University of Wisconsin Law School, 2002); JW Harbeson ‘A Bureaucratic Authoritarian 
Regime’ (October 1999) 9 Journal of Democracy 62. For the protagonists of this article it is a guarantee 
against abuse by the state. Nahum (note 14 above) 53; PH Henz ‘A Political Success Story’ (October 
1999) 9 J of Democracy 40. But one cannot understand why secession was included in the first place 
without examining the political reality of Ethiopia immediately after the fall of the Dergue regime and its 
historical origins in the political history of the country. That was a time when the different parts of the 
country were under the control of various ethnic-based armed liberation fronts, and one cannot be certain 
that without the right to secession these forces would have been willing to participate in the ‘Democratic 
and Peaceful Transitional Conference’ of July 1991 which established the transitional government. In a 
way, it was a necessary condition to bring all the armed struggle movements to the negotiating table and a 
means for building their lost confidence and trust in the central government. See A Eshseté ‘Ethnic 
Federalism: New Frontiers in Ethiopian Politics’ in First National Conference on Federalism, Conflict 
and Peace Building (2003) 142, 150-159 [First National Conference]; A Habtu ‘Multi-Ethnic Federalism 
in Ethiopia: A Study of the Secession Clause in the Constitution’ (2005) 35(2) Publius: The J of 
Federalism  313-337.  
157 On self-determination and federalism under the FDRE Constitution see PH Brietzka 'Ethiopia's "Leap 
in the Dark": Federalism and Self-determination in the New Constitution' (1995) 39 (1) J of African L 19.  
158 This is one of the two houses of parliament in which ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ are 
represented.  
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units along ethno-cultural lines. Article 47 of the Constitution of Ethiopia designates as 
member states of the federation nine states or regional states,159 varying enormously in 
population size, level of development, geographic area and level of diversity.160 We 
have noted above that the main purpose of Ethiopia’s federal system, according to the 
Constitution, is to prevent the recurrence of the civil war which was caused by what it 
calls ‘unjust historical relationships’, through accommodation of diversity. Ethnicity has 
therefore been the main, if not the only, consideration in the demarcation of the 
boundaries of the regional states. Article 46(2) provides that the states are to be 
constituted ‘on the basis of the settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the 
people concerned’. These factors to a large extent reflect ethnicity. Thus, they are 
substantially similar to the elements of the definition of ‘nations, nationalities and 
peoples’ under Article 39(5) of the Constitution.161 In accordance with these provisions, 
Article 47 established the nine regional states. Many of the federal states are designated 
as ‘mother states’ for the majority ethnic group inhabiting them. The names of the six 
major groups to which six of the nine states are designated are reflected in their 
nomenclature.162 The remaining three are multicultural states inhabited by a variety of 
ethnic groups.  
 
As several states are composed of diverse groups, to actualise the right of all groups to 
self-government and the constitutional requirement that autonomous units of 
government be established at lower levels of government, some of the administrative 
structures within these states are recognised to serve as self-government structures for 
the groups that individually constitute them. These self-government structures take two 
forms: for relatively large groups at Zonal level, and for smaller groups, of not less than 
100 000, at Woreda (district) level. As they have political power vested in executive and 
legislative bodies for the self-government of the particular community, these specific 
Zones and Woredas are qualitatively different from others, which simply serve as lower 
                                                 
159 This is a reduced number from 14 at the time of the Transitional Period. See Proclamation No. 7/1992 
A Proclamation to Provide for the Establishment of National/Regional Self-Governments Negarit Gazeta 
51st Year No. 2 Addis Ababa 14th January 1992   
160 Aalen (note 4 above) 65-74.  
161 The elements of the definition of ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ under Article 39 are a) a group of 
people; b) possession of common culture or similar custom; c) language; d) identity; e) psychological 
makeup; and f) territory.  
162 These are Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Harari and Somali.  
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administrative entities of the regional states.163 They are therefore called special Zones 
and Woredas.  
 
Although the basis for defining the boundaries of the regional states was mainly 
ethnicity, there is no congruence between the nine states and the constituent ethnic 
groups. All nine states are multicultural, although the degree of diversity of each varies. 
Notwithstanding this, it is clear that Ethiopia’s federalism is a full-fledged multinational 
federalism and stands in the rank of the federations of Canada, Switzerland, Belgium 
and India, although the degree and nature of its explicit institutionalisation of ethnicity 
differs tremendously from theirs. The way the federal units have been designated has 
served to fulfil the aspirations of those groups seeking self-government and thus 
addressed their historical need for their recognition through the provision of such 
structures. As these structures are instituted on an egalitarian basis, many believe that 
the arrangement rectifies what the Constitution calls ‘unjust historical relationships’.164 
But, as we will see below, Ethiopia’s federalism has structural flaws and other limits.  
 
 
7.2.3 Division of powers  
 
 
Unlike the federal constitutions of many states, the Ethiopian Constitution has 
engendered little agreement among scholars regarding the nature of the balance of 
power between the federal and state governments. Broadly speaking, one can discern 
two dominant but opposing perspectives in the literature. On the one hand, some 
scholars argue that the power vested in the member states of the federation is so wide 
that Ethiopia’s is not a proper federation.165 These scholars approach the issue of federal 
division of powers through the prism of the Constitution’s commitment to very wide 
ethnic rights, such as, in particular, the right to self-determination, including secession. 
 
                                                 
163 The nine regional states consist of 70 Zones. The Zones are further divided into about 600 Woredas. 
Only some of them serve as self-government structures. Mostly, they are administrative entities without 
any autonomous political power.  
164 Preamble to the FDRE Constitution para. 5.  
165 See Haile (note 21 above); Assefa (note 10 above).  
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In the first place, the authors of the Constitution are the ‘nations, nationalities and 
peoples’ of Ethiopia. Secondly, Article 8 provides that ‘[a]ll sovereign power resides in 
the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia’. The second paragraph of this article 
further states that ‘the Constitution is an expression of their sovereignty’. In this 
formulation, sovereignty does not reside in the Ethiopian people in their entirety.166 
Instead, it is shared among the ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’. This entails that the 
primary and ultimate bearers of sovereignty are the various constituent ethnic groups. 
The sovereign power with which the Ethiopian state is clothed is a delegated one. And 
yet, even the delegation is only partial as the constituent units reserve part of their 
sovereign power when joined together to constitute the Ethiopian state anew.167 Thirdly, 
and most importantly, the Constitution guarantees to the various groups the right to self-
determination, including secession.168 Fourth, contrary to the conventional 
understanding of federalism and the practice of almost all federal countries, including 
South Africa, the power of constitutional adjudication is assigned, not to an independent 
judicial body, but to the House of Federation (HoF), a political body of the federal 
government in which ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ are represented.169 Moreover, 
as a further expression of the sovereignty of the states, in the federal division of powers, 
residual powers are allocated to the states.170 
 
These aspects of the Ethiopian federal system are expressions that the states hold 
ultimate powers and make the union the Constitution envisages subject to the will of 
each state singularly for its survival. In such a system the political and legal bond of the 
                                                 
166 Haile (ibid) 21.  
167 This seems to imply that Ethiopia’s is a ‘coming together’ federation, a federation formed from 
previously independent entities, although this has not actually been the case. In reality Ethiopia’s is very 
much like a ‘holding together’ federation, a federation formed from a previously unitary state. On the 
distinction between ‘holding together’ and ‘coming together’ federations see A Stepan ‘Federalism and 
Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model’ in D Karmis & W Norman (eds) Theories of Federalism: A Reader 
(2005) 255, 257-258.  
168 The procedure for exercising this right is laid down under Article 39 (4). This is the most controversial 
aspect of the Constitution among both academics and citizens of the country. See Habtu (note 1 above) 
92. Also see note 21 above.  
169 Some argue that the nature of the composition and political attributes of the HoF is such that where a 
dispute arises over distribution of power between the centre and the states, ‘its propensity is likely to 
favour the augmentation of the power of the state at the expense of federal power’. Haile (note 21 above) 
28. Indeed, Haile considers the assignment of the power of constitutional interpretation to the HoF as a 
further confirmation that ‘there is no genuine federalism under the constitution and that the subunits are 
the real sovereigns’. Ibid. On the political implications of the nature of the composition of this body see 
Haile-Selassie (note 21 above) 154-160.  
170 Article 52(1).  
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units to the centre is too weak as states can unilaterally walk out of the union. This 
clearly makes it akin to a confederation, for it is only in a confederation that the 
constituent units can unilaterally withdraw from the union.171 Hence the conclusion that 
the balance of power is strongly in favour of centrifugal forces, and the characterisation 
that Ethiopia’s is too weak a union to qualify properly as federal.172 Some have gone 
further and stated that ‘the constitution can be said to have juridically extinguished 
Ethiopia as a sovereign entity and created nine sovereign tribal entities in its place in the 
same territory’.173  
 
Scholars in the second category maintain that the power constitutionally assigned to 
states is so minimal that Ethiopia’s is a system in which the centre is tremendously 
predominant.174 For these scholars, the main focus of the analysis is the content of the 
division of federal power and the political and socio-economic framework within which 
that federal division of power operates. Firstly, although the Constitution under Article 
52 (1) assigns to the states all powers that are not assigned to the federal government, 
either exclusively or concurrently with the states, the analysis of the exclusive powers of 
the federal government reveals that what is left for the states is essentially a very 
limited, one can say secondary, legislative space. Accordingly, Article 51 (2) & (3) 
empower the federal government to ‘formulate and implement the country’s policies, 
strategies and plans in respect of overall economic, social and development matters’ and 
to ‘establish and implement national standards and basic policy criteria for public health, 
education, science and technology as well as for the protection and preservation of 
cultural and historical legacies’. It is clear from this that the federal government is the 
one with powers to determine economic, social, health and development policies and 
laws.175  
                                                 
171 As Duchacek argued, when the constituent units can unilaterally withdraw from the union, the political 
arrangement between the centre and the constituent units is more similar to a confederation without strong 
sub-national control than a federation. ID Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension 
of Politics (1987) 207. 
172 Assefa (note 10 above) 121-125.  
173 Haile (note 21 above) 21-22.  
174 Esheté (note 21 above); EJ Keller ‘Ethnic Federalism, Fiscal Reform, Development and Democracy in 
Ethiopia’ (2002) 7 (1) African J of Political Science  21-50; Brietzka (note 22 above) 26-30.  
175 In practice the economic, agricultural, health, education and population policies of the country have 
indeed been formulated by the centre, and many of them are so detailed that they leave almost no room for 
the states.  
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Secondly, the power to legislate on commercial, labour, intellectual-property and 
criminal matters is entirely assigned to the federal government,176 which can also enact 
civil laws that the HoF deems necessary to establish and sustain one economic 
community.177 As far as land and natural resources are concerned, states only have the 
power to ‘administer’, while the federal government is empowered to enact laws on their 
utilisation and conservation.178 Thirdly, the federal government also has the power to 
intervene in a regional state when such state is unable to maintain peace and order or 
where any state, in violation of the Constitution, endangers the constitutional order.179 
Although states enjoy some fiscal authority, the distribution of fiscal authority set out 
under the Constitution and Proclamation 33/1992 shows, according to Andreas, that ‘the 
richest sources of revenue belong to the central government: all international trade and 
88 percent of indirect taxes’. He further observes that ‘[t]he federal state controls more 
than 80 percent of domestic revenue, and with control of most external assistance, and 
90 percent of total revenue’.180 The Constitution also expresses deep commitment to 
building a common political community and maintaining one economic community.181 
A further manifestation of the centralist bias of the Ethiopian federation is that – 
contrary to the principle of federalism and the practice of almost all federal systems, in 
which federal units share policy-making power with the centre through representation in 
an upper house of parliament, and unlike the provinces in South Africa that participate 
in national policy making through the NCOP – the states of the Ethiopian federation are 
                                                 
176 See Articles 55 (2) (g), (3), (4) & (5).  
177 This qualification is wide and leaves for states, from the sphere of civil laws, only family-law matters 
and probably succession. In its opinion on a petition from the Ethiopian Justice and Legal System 
Research Institute, the CCI held that since such civil laws as the law of contract and the law of deeds and 
acts are necessary for one economic community and hence should be regulated on a nationwide basis, the 
making of such laws is not within the jurisdiction of states. Opinion of the CCI on the Making of the Law 
on Deeds and Notorial Acts (Unpublished) 3-5.  
178 Despite this clear stipulation of the Constitution, when the CCI in one case was requested to determine 
whether the regional state had the power to legislate on land rights, it ruled that since this power forms 
part of the residual power of states, the land-law proclamation made by the Amhara state is not 
unconstitutional. Biyadglegn Meles & Others v The Amhara Regional State 30 Miazia 1989 E. C.   
179Article 55 (16) and Article 62(9). See H Tewfiq ‘Conflict Management Structures and Intervention 
under the Ethiopian Constitution’ in First National Conference (note 21 above) 226-242.  
180 Esheté (note 21 above) 166.  
181 See Issues in the Ethiopian Democratization Process, a publication that sets out the policy of the 
government which articulates the powers and rights of ethnic groups guaranteed under the Constitution as 
instruments for democracy, individual and group equality, and, most of all, for building a common 
political community and one economic community.  
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not involved in federal law making as the HoF does not participate in the law-making 
process.182  
 
It is clear from the above analysis that it is only with respect to matters that deeply 
implicate the culture and religion of groups that many of the powers assigned to states 
apply.183 Accordingly, with respect to civil law matters, except in those cases regarded 
by the HoF to be necessary to establish and maintain one economic community, states 
have the main legislative authority.184 Other important matters for state regulation in this 
area include customary and religious laws, subject to the limitations of the federal 
constitution.185 Most importantly, states are empowered to determine their own official 
language/s.186  
 
Against the foregoing, Andreas concludes: ‘[E]thnic federalism, aside from the 
protection of ethnic equality and diversity, consists chiefly in administrative 
decentralisation. What is dispersed to regional states is executive power.’187 Similarly, 
Keller concluded: 
 
In spite of the fact that the Constitution gives a great deal of power and administrative authority 
to regional states, the overwhelming amount of political power in this system rests with the 
central government. Because of this, in practice, Ethiopia operates more like a unitary state, with 
regional states closely following the policy lead of the center, mainly as represented in the 
                                                 
182 See, for more on this, Fiseha (note 3 above) Chapter III; Aalen (note 4 above) 61.  
183 See J Abbink ‘Ethnicity and Constitutionalism in Contemporary Ethiopia’ (1997) 41 J African L 159-
174, 168. Even in this instance, on important matters such as education, one of the most crucial tools for 
preserving and promoting the culture of groups, the federal government enjoys the main policy-making 
authority. As far as the formulation and implementation of economic and development policies are 
concerned, Abbink maintains that ‘the present-day regional states may not be the most effective’. Ibid.  
184 See Ruling of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry on the Petition from the Prime Minister’s Office 
Miazia 26 1994 E. C. (unreported). In this ruling on a petition from the Office of the Prime Minister on 
whether the federal government has the power to legislate a family law with nationwide application, the 
CCI, the body responsible for advising the HoF on matters of constitutional interpretation, held that the 
power to enact family law is a state power. One of the reasons for this finding was that family law is very 
much intertwined with the culture, tradition and religion of communities, which express the diversity 
whose regulation is, in the overall scheme of constitutional division of powers, left to the states.  
185 Article 91 of FDRE Constitution envisages the cultures and traditions of the various communities to be 
‘compatible with fundamental rights, human dignity, democratic norms and ideals, and the provisions of 
the Constitution’. 
186 See Article 5 (3) FDRE Constitution.  
187 Esheté (note 21 above) 167.  
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TPLF's [Tigray Peoples Liberation Front’s] Five Year Program, rather than asserting their policy 
independence.188 
 
This same view is also expressed by, among others, Brietzka.189  
 
These opposing perspectives partly reflect the attempt on the part of the architects of the 
Constitution to balance out two seemingly opposing political ideals and forces: 
sovereignty of ethno-national groups and a political union through a federal compact. 
On the one hand, they sought to institutionalise the self-determination and sovereignty 
of the ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ and to make this the foundation for the new 
political order. On the other hand, they also tried to create a political union, tying these 
constituent groups together through a federal compact. The result is that, based on 
analysis of the text of the Constitution, the position of scholars on both sides of the 
debate is not inaccurate. The conclusion that naturally flows from this is that the 
determination of the balance of power between the centre and the states depends upon 
the power configuration that exists at any point in time. Developments during the past 
14 years show that by almost all standards the balance tilts too much away from states, 
in favour of the centre. To begin with, like South Africa, Ethiopia is a one-party-
dominant state.190 Like the ANC, the ruling Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) not only controls both levels of government, but also 
operates on the basis of the principle of democratic centralism.191 This has left the states 
totally subservient to the centre, with no substantively real autonomy for independent 
policy making. Secondly, as important sources of revenue are assigned to the centre and 
the states lack the capacity to raise sufficient revenue, they are dependent on the centre 
for their fiscal needs.192 As a result states have been conducting themselves as if they 
were administrative structures of the centre, mimicking the policies and plans of the 
                                                 
188 Keller (note 39 above) 34.  
189 See Brietzka (note 22 above) 29. 
190 Aalen (note 4 above); Esheté (note 21 above) 167-168.  
191 See Aalen, ibid 81-85; Fiseha (note 3 above) 378-379. According to Ivo D Duchacek, under a federal 
constitution, if lawmaking ‘is fully controlled by a monolithic authoritarian party that does not permit 
dilution of its powers, obviously, any decentralization in favour of another group, territorial, or political is 
severely limited or outrightly excluded’. I Duchacek, Power Maps: Comparative Politics of Constitutions 
(1973) 131.  
192 Keller (note 39 above) 35-38; Aalen (note 4 above) 74-81; Fiseha (note 3 above) 156-157; Esheté (note 
21 above) 166-167. 
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centre and executing them. Nevertheless, given that none of the states had any historical 
experience of self-government, this dependence is also not entirely structural.  
 
It seems that it is how the federal system evolves that will eventually determine whether 
the overall constitutional division of power will result in a cohesive democratic order. 
Although for now, because of the historical and political situation of the country, it is 
operating in favour of the centre, as many have rightly pointed out, and the experience 
of India attests, with the emergence of parties with strong regional support this may 
entirely change. This is especially so given that, unlike in India, states under FDRE 
possess the ultimate right of secession.193  
7.3 Representation and participation  
 
We have seen earlier that the South African Constitution provides for an indirect system 
of representation and very wide avenues for public participation. In Ethiopia, consistent 
with the constitutional principle on the rights and equality of ‘nations, nationalities, and 
peoples’ as the basis of the new political order, the system of representation is based on 
the right of ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ to equitable representation in federal and 
state governments.194 As the highest organ of the federal government, arguably the most 
important body in which the various communities need representation is the legislature. 
The federal Constitution establishes two Houses of Parliament: the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives (HPR) and the HoF. Article 50(3) proclaims that the HPR is the highest 
authority of the federal government. It is the only house with legislative power on 
matters assigned to the federal government.195 We turn now how the issue of 
representation in these bodies of national policy making, particularly the HPR, is 
addressed under the FDRE Constitution. This is essentially a function of the electoral 
system.  
 
The most important provision of the Constitution on the design of the electoral system is 
Article 54(2). According to this provision, ‘[m]embers of the House (Peoples’ 
Representatives) shall be elected from candidates in each electoral district by a plurality 
                                                 
193 Assefa (note 10 above); Esheté (note 21 above) 168; Haile-Selassie (note 21 above) 7.  
194 Article 39(3) FDRE Constitution.  
195 Article 50(3) FDRE Constitution.  
 223 
of the votes cast’ (my emphasis). It is clear from the words emphasised that the electoral 
system chosen by the framers of the Constitution is what is known as the ‘first-past-the-
post system’ (FPPS). In this system, elections are held in single-member districts, and 
the winner is the candidate who receives the support of the largest number of voters in a 
constituency. This is provided for under Article 13(2) of the electoral law:196 ‘A 
candidate with more votes received than that by other competitors within the 
constituency shall be declared the winner.’  
  
As far as the representation of ethno-cultural groups is concerned, this system works 
best if electoral districts are constituted on the basis of the settlement patterns of the 
various groups. Given the requirement of Article 39(3) for equitable representation of all 
groups, it is imperative that electoral districts are constituted to ensure equitable 
representation of all the various ethnic groups.197 According to Article 15(1) of the 
electoral law, the country is divided into permanent electoral constituencies by taking 
the Woreda (district) as its basis. What this means is that outside of Addis Ababa and 
other ethnically mixed major cities, electoral districts either coincide with the self-
government unit of minority ethnic groups within the multi-ethnic regions, or are drawn 
within ethnically defined constituencies. Since representatives to the HPR are elected 
from districts which are mostly inhabited by members of a particular ethnic group, the 
composition of the HPR accordingly mirrors the ethno-cultural diversity of the 
                                                 
196Proclamation no. 111/1995 Proclamation to Ensure the Conformity of the Electoral Law of Ethiopia 
Proclamation with the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Federal Negarit 
Gazeta 54th Year No. 9  (hereinafter the Electoral Law). 
197 Fiseha argues that the requirement of Article 39 (3) for equitable representation at the federal level 
does not apply to the legislature. He says: ‘Although the Constitution guarantees the various nationalities 
equitable representation in the federal government, close observation of Article 39 (3) and 62 reveals that 
the right to equitable representation in federal government only ensures the various nationalities in the 
federal executive, in the mostly non-legislative House of the second chamber and perhaps the other 
agents, but not in the federal legislature.’ It is not, however, clear why the requirement of equitable 
representation does not apply in particular to the body which is, according to the Constitution, ‘the highest 
authority of the federal government’. If at all there is a body in which the various ethnic groups, 
particularly the smaller ones, need representation it can only be such a body, with the highest authority of 
the federal government. This is indeed the message that one gathers from Article 54 (3) of the 
Constitution which reserves 20 seats for ‘minority nationalities and peoples’. It is to ensure the 
representation of those population groups whose size is not large enough to constitute an electoral 
constituency that the Constitution provides for their special representation. See Aalen (note 4 above) 56. 
Given that Article 39 (3) speaks of equitable representation in federal government (clearly in its entirety) 
and that the HPR is the highest authority of the federal government, it only logical that Article 39 (3) 
applies to the HPR as well.  
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country.198 To provide for the representation of those ethnic groups whose population 
size is smaller than the size of an electoral district,199 the Constitution and electoral law 
envisage special representation.200 So, although the Constitution declares that members 
of the legislature are representatives of the Ethiopian people as a whole, it is clear from 
the above that the electoral system effectively makes members of the HPR accountable 
to the constituency from which they are elected, which are formed by members of 
particular ethnic groups. This is sanctioned by the Constitution itself. Article 12(3) 
guarantees the people the right to recall an elected representative in case of loss of 
confidence. Similarly, it is provided that a member of the HPR may lose her mandate of 
representation upon loss of confidence by the electorate.201 In legal, if not in political, 
terms this means that members of the HPR ultimately represent and are accountable to 
the particular communities that voted for them. Politically, they are mainly responsible 
for the party that they represent.  
7.4 Language and culture  
 
 7.4.1 Official language  
 
Given the centrality of culture and language in the historical development of the 
Ethiopian state and the resultant ethnic claims for recognition and equality underlying 
the conflicts that led to the current constitutional order, language and culture receive 
particular attention in the Constitution. In general terms, as indicated earlier, language is 
one of the defining elements of a ‘nation, nationality or people’ as defined under Article 
39(5) of the Constitution. Specific recognition and protection of languages is envisaged 
                                                 
198 If one looks at the representation of ethnic groups at the federal level by reference to regional states, it 
takes the following proportions: the 547 seats of the HPR are filled by 40 representatives from Tigray 
(including from Addis Ababa), 8 from Afar, 149 from Amhara (including from Addis Ababa), 185 from 
Oromia (including from Addis Ababa), 123 from the SNNPRS (including from Addis Ababa), 19 from 
Somali, 6 from Benshangul  Gumuz, 3 from Gambela, 1 from Harari and 13 independent representatives.  
199 Although the National/Regional Self-Government Establishment Proclamation No. 7/1992 is no longer 
in force, it is the foundation for the division of the country into various self-government units. According 
to this Proclamation a Woreda, which constitutes an electoral district, is comprised of 100 000 people.  
200 See Article 54(3) of the Constitution & Art. 2(5) & 15(3) of the Electoral Law. One notes here that the 
Constitution makes a distinction between the term ‘nation’ and the words ‘nationalities and peoples’. 
Nations are apparently groups with a large enough population size not to need special representation, 
whereas nationalities and peoples are generally numerically inferior to nations, hence their minority 
status.  
201 Article 54(7).  
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in several constitutional provisions. Article 5(1) states: ‘All Ethiopian languages shall 
enjoy equal state recognition.’ Unlike s 6 of the South African Final Constitution (FC), 
which outlines in detail the obligations that arise from the different forms of recognition 
of languages (official and non-official languages), no where does the Ethiopian 
Constitution define the obligation that ‘equal state recognition’ entails. According to 
Nahum, however, ‘state recognition of every Ethiopian language means that efforts for 
its development – i.e., the preservation of its literature; the provision for a script, where 
such does not exist; the documentation of its oral literature; and the further study of each 
language via grammatical, vocabulary and overall publication and enhanced use of the 
language – will be done with both state blessing and state support to the extent 
possible’.202 Nevertheless, given the practical differences and distinctions among the 
various languages spoken in the country, the declaration that all languages enjoy equal 
state recognition is a rhetorical one that cannot in practice be attained.  
 
Where the determination of the use of languages for official purposes is concerned, 
Article 5(2) designates Amharic as ‘the working language of the Federal Government’. 
The effect of this is that Amharic becomes the language in which federal organs conduct 
their activities. Similarly, all interactions between the federal and state governments are 
to be conducted in Amharic. One would logically expect that regional states should use 
Amharic in the discharge of federal functions delegated to them, although this is not 
clearly provided for in the Constitution. As is happening in practice, it may as well be 
the case that Amharic serves as a medium of communication in inter-state relations. This 
is attributable to various factors, in addition to the constitutional status of Amharic as 
the working language of the federal government. It manifests the demographic utility of 
the language as a medium of communication for a large number of peoples belonging to 
different ethnic groups, and seems to be largely dictated by the need for a common 
language.203 Since Amharic is the most widely spoken language in the country and thus 
                                                 
202 Nahum (note 16 above) 55.  
203 Of course, for those whose language is Amharic, its choice as the working language gives it the further 
advantage of getting additional support not available for those that are not working languages. It also 
offers original speakers of Amharic more chance for federal employment and of reaching the higher 
echelons of the state structures. From the perspective of national unity and integration, however, the 
provision of one common, preferably neutral language is important. In the case of Amharic, although it is 
not neutral as between the various groups, since it has, as a result of the accident of history, established 
itself to be a lingua franca for members of different language groups in the country, it has the distinct 
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serves as the principal medium of communication for members of different ethnic 
groups, it has already achieved the status of the lingua franca of Ethiopia. This can be 
gathered from, among other things, the fact that it serves as the official language not 
only at the federal level, but also in five of the nine regional states. From the perspective 
of this study, the existence of one common medium of communication in the form of 
Amharic is necessary for national integration and to prevent the emergence of the Tower 
of Babel that some fear might happen in the future.204  
 
Not everyone is happy with this choice. There are thus those who argue that Oromiffa, 
as the language of the largest group in the country, should be accorded the status of a 
working language of the federation. However, it is not clear how this can be normatively 
defended. Oromiffa is no more disadvantaged than other languages of the country. 
Indeed, it has been one of the few to receive public support as it is among the few for 
which public broadcast frequencies have been allocated. Furthermore, in terms of 
continued survival, Oromiffa is no more endangered than many of the other languages. 
It is rather one of the few languages whose continued survival is guaranteed, by virtue of 
the fact that it serves as official language in Oromia and Harari states. From a normative 
and international minority rights perspective, there is little to support the view that a 
minority’s size alone can justify the recognition of its language as an official or national 
language.205 If Oromiffa claims such status, there seems little to prevent other languages 
from doing the same. Accordingly, although within the framework of this study the 
claim for the use of a minority language for public purposes may be legitimately 
defended, this does not necessarily entail granting such a language official or national 
status.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
advantage of being accepted by members of most of, if not all, of the language groups. This can, for 
example, be gathered from the decision of many of the regional states to adopt Amharic as their working 
language.  
204 Haile (note 21 above) 36.  
205 The literature and the practice in this area show that although size is one of the considerations, by 
itself alone it is not decisive to support a claim for official recognition of a language. See Francesco 
Capotorti Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1979) 
Sales No. E. 78XIV. 1; F De Varennes Language, Minorities and Human Rights (1996); K Henrard 
Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Rights, Minority Rights and the Right to 
Self-Determination (2000); A Addis ‘Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic 
Minorities’ (1992) 67 Notre Dame LR 615. 
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Space is provided for the recognition of languages at the regional state level. Article 
5(3) gives member states of the federation the power to determine by law their 
respective working languages. Accordingly, those other languages designated by regions 
as working languages would, like Amharic, enjoy state support, albeit only at regional 
levels. The choice of working language by the nine regional states reveals three patterns. 
The first includes states that have chosen the working language of the federal 
government, Amharic, as their working language. Five have adopted this approach. For 
Gambella, Benshangul-Gumuz and the South Nations Nationalities and Peoples 
Regional State (SNNPRS), the choice of Amharic as a working language is motivated 
by their multi-ethnic composition. The State of Afar has chosen Amharic as a temporary 
measure, until its own Afar language is developed in its script form to render it suitable 
for running the bureaucracy. For the state of Amhara, the rationale for choosing 
Amharic, the major language of the region, as a working language is no different from 
those states that follow the second pattern, which is to choose the major language of 
their respective territories. This is what Tigray, Oromia and Somali have done. Of the 
nine regional states, Harari has the distinction of choosing two languages, Harari and 
Oromiffa, as its working languages, and represents the third pattern. In all of these 
states, consistent with Article 39(3), the various ethnic groups are entitled to use their 
languages at least for primary education, and in Zonal or Woreda councils and 
administration. However, the use of nationality languages at these lower levels as a 
medium of instruction or in administrative communications is often limited by 
availability of resources in terms of finance, manpower and materials, as well as the 
level of literary development of many of the languages.  
 
As previously mentioned, some fear that this multilingual approach may hinder national 
integration and lead to a Tower of Babel situation. For this reason, Minassie advocates 
for the general use of Amharic, with the eventual aim of making it the national 
language.206 The problem with this view is not only that the fear is not born out by 
events, but also that it ignores the interest of speakers of other languages in using their 
language for government purposes. It must, however, be admitted that the language 
arrangement envisaged by the Constitution has its drawbacks. It wrongly assumes that 
                                                 
206 Haile (note 21 above) 36.  
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there is an exact fit between regional boundaries and language boundaries, and as a 
result overlooks the need to address the situation of those members of society who might 
not speak, or who choose not to speak, the designated official languages of their federal 
units. For purposes of both addressing the lack of ‘fit’ between regional and linguistic 
boundaries and promoting the constitutional objective of building one political and 
economic community, it may be necessary to encourage and even require the use of 
Amharic along with regional languages. This situation reflects some of the important 
principles that should regulate the operation of multicultural federal systems, including 
equality and non-discrimination.  
7.4.2 Language and education  
 
As far as language use for educational purposes is concerned, unlike in the South 
African Constitution, the matter is not specifically addressed in the Ethiopian 
Constitution. The only clause that may be said to have an effect on it is Article 39(2), 
which provides that ‘[e]very nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has the right to 
speak, to write and to develop its own language’. It cannot be doubted from this that 
minorities have a right to establish educational institutions that offer education in the 
minority language. One can also conclude from this and the granting of the right to self-
government to all minorities that government bears some obligation to provide 
education in minority languages, at least at primary school level. This is particularly so 
where the language is represented by a large enough number of speakers, and they 
demand the provision of education in their language. Indeed, under the current education 
policy, each regional state can choose its own language of instruction in primary 
schools. Further, within each regional state, municipalities, zones and districts can 
choose their own language(s) of instruction.  
 
Available information indicates that due to low levels of development of local 
vernaculars, including a lack of writing systems, adequate teaching material, and 
teaching staff in the local language, as well as to pragmatic considerations such as 
prospects of employment and social mobility, many communities have chosen Amharic 
as their language of instruction. Despite this dominance of Amharic, of some 80 local 
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languages spoken in the country, 22 are now in primary school use.207 These include the 
eight local languages chosen as medium of instruction in the multi-ethnic SNNPRS.208 
The various limitations mentioned above and financial constraints have in other cases 
led to the imposition by authorities of artificially constructed languages. In the 
SNNPRS, the attempt by regional authorities to homogenise the languages of four ethnic 
groups into one language to be used in education was rejected, particularly, by one of 
those groups as a threat to their distinct identity as recognised in the Constitution. This 
development clearly illustrates the imperative to give members of the various language 
communities sufficient opportunity to express their views and their interests, and for 
authorities to inform and consult them sufficiently before implementing language 
policies.  
  7.4.3 Rights to language and culture  
 
Like FC s 31, the 1994 Ethiopian Constitution guarantees the rights to language and 
culture. Article 39(2) guarantees every nation, nationality and people the right to speak, 
write and develop their own languages. This article is nevertheless different from FC s 
31, under which the right is essentially an individual right. Under the 1994 Ethiopian 
Constitution, the right is vested in the various ethnic groups qua groups. Despite this, 
there is no substantive difference in the nature of the protection these two provide. This 
is partly because FC s 31 gives recognition to the group context in which speakers of a 
particular language can use their language. Thus, since both FC s 31 and Article 39(2) 
seek to recognise and protect language as an attribute of the identity of members of 
particular language groups, they provide more protection to languages than what 
freedom of expression or the press alone could provide.  
 
The right to culture is also recognised and guaranteed in various ways. According to 
Article 39(2), every nation, nationality and people has the right ‘to express, to develop 
and to promote its culture and to preserve its history’. This provision identifies different 
dimensions of the right to culture. The right to express one’s culture involves, among 
                                                 
207 Habtu (note 1 above) 104.  
208 See GPE Cohen ‘Language and Ethnic Boundaries: Perceptions of Identity Expressed through 
Attitudes Towards the Use of Language Education in Southern Ethiopia’ (2000) 7 (3) Northeast African 
Studies 189-206, 190.  
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other things, the performance of the rituals and cultural practices and the use of the 
cultural symbols, jewellery, cosmetics and dress of one’s group. Development may 
consist in the adoption and production by members of a group of the various aspects of 
its culture in new and modified forms, adapted to changing circumstances and needs. 
Promotion involves the recording, reproduction and communication of the way of life 
and the cultural norms and values of the community concerned. The right to culture is 
given further support under Article 91(1). According to this article, ‘[g]overnment shall 
have the duty to support, on the basis of equality, the growth and enrichment of cultures 
and traditions’. However, an issue left unaddressed under the FDRE Constitution is 
whether and what kind of language rights regional minorities who do not speak the 
official language of the region may have. This is particularly important given that the 
use of the working language of the federation by states is not constitutionally 
sanctioned.  
 
Unlike under FC s 31, no internal limitation is attached to the various components of the 
right to culture as stipulated under Article 39(2). One area of serious concern that this 
commonly gives rise to is whether the right to culture, articulated as the right of a group 
qua group, can be made consistent with individual rights of members of the group, 
particularly women. A holistic reading of the Constitution seems to warrant a strong 
conclusion that the right to culture under Article 39(2) cannot be exercised in a manner 
inconsistent with the rights of individuals. One can deduce this from paragraph two of 
the Preamble,209 Article 10(1),210 the interpretation clause under Article 13(2),211 and the 
guarantees on the rights of women under Article 35.212 Article 91(1), in particular, limits 
the obligation of government to support cultures and traditions only to those ‘that are 
compatible with fundamental rights, human dignity, democratic norms and ideals, and 
                                                 
209 This paragraph emphasises full respect for human rights as the basis of the new constitutional order.  
210 This article stipulates that ‘human rights and freedoms, emanating from the nature of mankind, are 
inviolable and inalienable’. This is as distinct from Article 10 (2), which merely calls for respect for the 
democratic rights of citizens and of peoples.  
211 This provides that the rights under Chapter III shall be interpreted in a manner conforming to the 
principles of the UDHR, International Covenants on Human Rights and international instruments adopted 
by Ethiopia.  
212 This article guarantees the equality of women in marriage; in the acquisition, administration, control, 
use and transfer of property, including land; and in the inheritance of property. It further enjoins the state 
to enforce the right of women to eliminate the influences of harmful customs, and prohibits laws, customs 
and practices that oppress or cause bodily or mental harm to women.  
 231 
the provisions of the Constitution’. It is clear from this that although the right to culture 
is vested in ethnic groups, it does not entitle any part of these groups to use this right for 
limiting the rights and freedoms of their members or the rights of others.  
 
7.5 Assessment of the constitutional design   
7.5.1 The limits of the constitutional design  
7.5.1.1  The flaws in its paradigmatic basis   
 
It is clear from the foregoing that Ethiopia’s federation suffers from multiple structural 
limitations. The country’s constitutional design has many flaws, the most fundamental 
of which is its communitarian foundation and characteristics, from which flow all other 
limitations discussed below. This is expressed by the Constitution’s conception of the 
nature of ethnic groups in general, and those in Ethiopia in particular. It defines ethnic 
groups in absolute communitarian terms as natural communities that are internally 
homogenous, possess defined boundaries and exist independently of each other (not just 
in cultural terms, but territorially as well). The conception of groups in such essentialist 
terms tends to see difference as given and static, rather than as relationally 
constructed.213 Most disturbingly, unlike the framework adopted in this study, which 
merely recognises the important role of communities in the lives of people, the 
necessary implication of the Constitution’s communitarian conception is that it assumes 
the primacy of the community over the individual, and does not consider that individuals 
can abandon their cultural or communal attachments. It rather assumes that each 
Ethiopian fits neatly within a particular ethnic group and necessarily identifies herself 
with that group. The institutional implication of such a conception of community is ‘the 
emergence and proliferation of insulated and exclusionary communities’.214  
7.5.1.2 Discrepancy between theory and fact: The neglect of regional 
minorities  
 
Contrary to the Constitution’s essentialist view that Ethiopia’s ethnic groups inhabit 
ethnically homogenous territories, a long history of population movement and inter-
                                                 
213 Addis (note 70 above) 648.  
214 Ibid 646.  
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ethnic interactions of various kinds means that all regions of the country are multi-
ethnic, albeit to varying degrees. In such circumstances, where elements of diversity 
within a federation do not fall neatly and precisely into geographical units,215 for the 
Constitution to define federal units expressly as belonging to particular ethnic groups 
endangers residents of those units who are not members of the group to which the unit is 
constitutionally recognised to belong. Depriving these regional minorities of legal 
recognition and political membership, this renders them second-class citizens at best and 
unwelcome aliens at worst. As Assefa notes, ‘[T]he danger is that the respective regional 
states and the dominant ethnic groups consider themselves “owners” of the “mother 
state”. Other citizens of different ethnic background or those who do not like to 
associate themselves with any ethnic group have politically no place.’216 Consequently, 
regional minorities constantly face the danger of domination, exclusion and even 
persecution by regional authorities, a situation characterised by some as the threat of 
local tyranny.217  
 
What is troubling is not just that the Constitution assigns particular regions for particular 
ethnic groups, but rather its failure to recognise and address the situation of intra-
regional diversity that results from the discrepancy between regional and cultural 
boundaries. As Paul Henze notes, one manifestation of this is that ‘the resolution of 
conflicts between individual rights and ethnic pressures, including the protection of 
individuals within “nations, nationalities and peoples” is not specifically considered’.218 
Similarly, unlike many federal systems, the Constitution does not envisage rights for 
                                                 
215 RL Watts ‘Federalism and Diversity in Canada’ in Yash Ghai (ed) Ethnicity and autonomy (2001) 29, 
41. This can also be seen from the composition of the members of the Ethiopian federation. The Oromo 
region is inhabited by a large number of Amhara and people from the South, in addition to intra-group 
cultural and regional variations among the Oromo. Amhara, apart from the majority Amhara (who have 
different province-based historical identities as Wollo, Gonder, Gojam and Showa), is inhabited by Agaw, 
Oromo and Argoba peoples. Tigray is composed of the Kunama, Erob and the majority Tigrayan people. 
The predominantly homogenous Afar and Somali regional states (whose principal populations also have 
clan-based identities) also have significant numbers of people belonging to other ethnic groups. 
216 Fiseha (note 3 above) 266.  
217 Fiseha (note 3 above) 260-276; D Turton ‘Four Questions about Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federalism’ (2005) 
1 (2) STAIR 88-101. This danger has already materialised in the Oromia Regional State. According to 
some reports, several lives and properties were lost when the regional authorities employed force to 
extricate from Wollega members of the non-indigenous highland communities, who are largely people of 
Amhara origin. See A Kefale ‘Federalism: Some Trends of Ethnic Conflicts and their Management in 
Ethiopia’ in AG Nhema (ed) The Quest for Peace in Africa (2004) 51, 61-62; T Girshaw ‘Conflict 
Mapping in the FDRE for the Year 1994 (E.C.)’ in First National Conference (note 21 above) 66.  
218 P Henze ‘Comments on the Ethiopian Draft Constitution of 1994’, Washington, D.C. Unpublished 
paper quoted in Abbink (note 48 above) 171.  
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regional minorities and how they can be reconciled with the power of regional 
majorities. Clearly, one of the structural limitations of Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism is its 
utter failure to provide mechanisms for the protection of the regional minorities that its 
institutionalisation has created. Seen from the perspective of this study, this obviously 
does not cohere with the limits of minority rights and the principles that regulate their 
operation.  
7.5.1.3 Threat to individual rights  
 
As can be gathered from the above, the sovereignty of states and the right to secession, 
coupled with the assignment of ownership of federal units to particular ethnic groups, 
pose even greater dangers to fundamental rights and the bonds of common citizenship in 
ways contrary to the framework adopted in this study.219 Rights that are particularly at 
risk include equality and non-discrimination, freedom of movement and political 
participation. Since state power is assigned on the basis of ethnicity, there is a fear that 
the exercise and enforcement of many individual rights become dependent upon group 
membership. The regional majority ethnic group may be disposed ‘to frame and enforce 
rules and practices calculated to enhance its status as a political community and 
privilege its members as individuals’.220 Employment opportunities, access to public 
resources, and other opportunities might also be limited to the ‘sons of the soil’ or 
members only, although in the case of disadvantaged regions this can operate as an 
important aspect of justified special measures. 
 
Since non-members have no guarantee of equal access to jobs and other opportunities, 
their right to move freely across regional boundaries and freely determine their 
residence is far from secure. Individuals living in a state controlled by an ethnic group to 
which they do not belong ‘face the prospect of being expelled from their lands, fired 
from their jobs, and forced to return to their “homelands”’.221 Non-indigenous groups in 
Oromia, Gambella and Benshangul-Gumuz states have at different times been victims of 
                                                 
219 See A G Selassie ‘Ethnic Federalism: Its Promise and Pitfalls for Africa’ (Winter 2003) 28 Yale J of 
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violent attacks, forcible expulsion from their lands and exclusion from opportunities, 
including access to jobs.222 There are, however, no available data to show the extent of 
this problem and its effect in restricting peoples’ movement across regional boundaries.  
 
In many of the regional states, non-indigenous peoples have no political right to 
representation at the regional level. While in some regions they are disqualified on 
account of language requirements, in others they do not have any political recognition or 
representation as they are not taken to belong to the region by membership. In 
Benshangul-Gumuz, the indigenous ethnic groups which account for 53 per cent of the 
total population constituted 100 per cent of those with political recognition and regional 
government representation. The other 47 per cent are individuals belonging to non-
indigenous ethnic groups, who apparently had no political recognition and 
representation in the regional government at all. In Oromia, Amhara, Tigray, Somali and 
Harari, members of non-indigenous groups who are not conversant with the language of 
the regional governments do not have political representation and cannot stand for 
election. As a result, contrary to international norms and the principle of mutual 
recognition or reciprocity as discussed in Chapter IV, a large percentage of people are 
effectively disenfranchised.  
 
 
The recognition and institutionalisation of ethnicity as the main marker of peoples’ 
identity also has the effect of forcing people into identifying themselves with a 
particular ethnic group and hence restricting freedom of self-identification and 
association. Samuel Assefa rightly observes that ‘it is fair to say that the institutions 
presently in place accommodate only’ one type of diversity and Ethiopian nationalism, 
the nationalism predicated upon particularist attachments to a given ethnic group.223 The 
essentialist assumption of this framework that all individuals belong to a particular 
group, and necessarily identify with it, denies recognition to the identity of a substantial 
portion of the population that ‘is of mixed ethnic background or unsure of which ethnic 
                                                 
222 See Kafale (note 82 above); Fiseha (note 3 above).  
223 S Assefa ‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty’ a paper prepared for a Symposium held in Mekelle on the 
occasion of the 25th anniversary of the TPLF, February 2000 7.  
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group they belong to or wish to identify with’.224 Even for those who identify with 
particular groups, it closes for them the possibility of choosing not to be identified by 
their group membership, and, by tying them to their particular groups, it restricts their 
freedom of association.  
 
There are, however, no data to substantiate these fears and provide conclusive evidence. 
Indeed, not all of them have been borne out by events. This is partly attributable to the 
existence of a dominant party, as well as the high degree of dependence of states on the 
federal government, which commits them simply to pursuing federally formulated 
policies.225 Notwithstanding the constitutional framework, in practice, therefore, the 
political system operates in a way that favours the development of a common political 
community.  
7.5.1.4 Threat of the fragmentation of the political system and the 
common national economy 
 
The constitutional promise of self-government structures coupled with the right of 
secession to all ethnic groups is also an invitation for the fragmentation of the country 
along ethnic lines.226 This is a classic case of the problem of  opening Pandora’s Box. It 
encourages further divisions as ‘citizens who might not have been aware of their 
ethnicity regroup under its banners purporting to be a distinct people’227 and demand 
their own self-government structures. This is exactly what has happened in the three 
multi-ethnic states.228 Thus, for example, although the SNNPRS originally had only nine 
Zones (a self-government structure below states) this has since increased to 13 Zones 
and five special Woredas. The danger of this is that as more and more groups claim their 
own self-government structure, the political process becomes more and more 
fragmented.  
 
                                                 
224 C Clapham ‘The Political Framework: Controlling Space in Ethiopia’ in W James, D Donham, E 
Kurimoto & A Triulzi (eds) Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and After (2002) 9-30, as quoted in Fiseha 
(note 3 above) 246.  
225 Assefa (note 88 above) 5.  
226 Haile (note 21 above) 32-35; Ejobowah (note 219 above), 305-308.   
227 G. Selassie (note 84 above) 86; Ejobowah (note 219 above) 305.   
228 These are Gambella, Benshangul-Gumuz, and the SNNPRS. In the SNNPRS, the most diverse of all 
the states, it is believed that there are more than 50 ethnicities.  
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This entails the danger of fragmenting society into different ethnic islands and 
permanently freezing such divisions, and creates further administrative complications. 
Contrary to the minority rights framework articulated in this study, the Ethiopian 
framework restricts the capacity of individuals to associate freely with others and think 
outside of their ethnic group. Instead, it forces them into associating themselves with 
their kin and seeing things only through the prism of their ethnicity. This makes it 
impossible not only to maintain a uniform system of human rights for all, but also to 
maintain a common citizenship. Under such circumstances, it is clear that the project of 
building a common political community envisaged by the Constitution becomes an ideal 
that might never see the light of the day.229 And it would indeed be admirable if it were 
possible to maintain the integrity of the country. So far, what seems to have helped to 
hold the centre are the existence of a dominant party and the high degree of state 
dependence on the federal government. It is not impossible to imagine the 
materialisation of the threat of fragmentation should the ruling party lose control of any 
of the federal units, particularly the major ones.  
 
One consequence of using ethnicity as the principal basis for designing the federation is 
the creation of hugely unequal units. The federation includes regional units ranging from 
the large Oromiya state, with more than 20 million people and an area of 360 000 square 
kilometres, to the tiny Harari state, which includes less than 150 000 people dispersed 
over 300 square kilometers. The two largest regional states, Amhara and Oromiya, 
account for 30 per cent each of the total population. In the long run, therefore, one axis 
of division or fragmentation might be that which involves the rivalry between these two 
states as they seek to gain the support of smaller ethnic groups.  
 
                                                 
229 It is on this account that many doubt if the kind of ethnic federalism adopted in Ethiopia coupled with 
the right of secession could succeed in addressing the country’s ethnic problems. Markakis concludes that 
‘it remains to be seen if it will succeed’. J Markakis Resource Conflict in the Horn of Africa (1998) 139. 
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come to power in regional states’. Note 88 above, 6. Brietzke considers the constitutional design to be ‘a 
recipe for disaster’. Note 22 above, 35. Cohen fears that it may even encourage demands for secession. J 
Cohen ‘Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia’ (New Series 1995) 2 (2) Northeast African Studies 168. For 
Ehrlich, as for Brietzke, Ethiopia’s experiment is as bold as it is suicidal. C Ehrlich ‘Ethnicity and 
Constitutional Reform: The Case of Ethiopia’ (1999) 6 IALSA J Int & Comparative L 51, 62.  
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The current arrangement has the additional danger of fragmenting the national economy 
or preventing the emergence of a common economic community, as envisaged by the 
Constitution, by creating regional barriers on the basis of ethnicity. As Selassie points 
out, ethnic federalism ‘has the potential to restrict the mobility of labour, goods, and 
capital across subnational jurisdictions, and thus to undermine the notion of a common 
market’. 230 Despite the constitutional guarantees of freedom of movement, and freedom 
to choose residence231 and pursue an economic activity of one’s choice in any part of the 
national territory,232 the requirement of free movement of capital and labour, on the one 
hand, and the ethnic-based federal arrangement, on the other, have shown competing 
tendencies. The main reason for this has been that regional authorities, with their newly 
achieved powers, seeking to create economic enclaves of their own, have sought to view 
everything through the prism of ethnicity, consequently discriminating in favour of their 
members in terms of access to economic resources and facilities such as land, credit and 
licences to operate businesses.233 Federal officials have admitted that this has indeed 
been one of the challenges that the Ethiopian federation experienced. GebreAb 
Bernabas, who was State Minister of the Ministry of Federal Affairs, stated:  
 
There were incidents of conflict where some sectarian elements of some states slowed down or 
even arrested the free flow of capital within Ethiopia. In the name of giving priority to 
indigenous peoples, Ethiopian investors were either prevented from transferring their capital to 
the states or sabotaged once they did so.234  
 
It is clear that under these circumstances the constitutional project of building one 
economic community would be a dream that could never be realised.235 As Bernabas 
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observes, ‘the phenomenon is inimical to our ideal of creating a common economic 
space’.236  
7.5.1.5 Horizontal relationship between various groups: The 
unregulated domain  
 
With the exception of the inadequately defined principle of equitable representation 
enshrined under Article 39(3), the Constitution provides no sufficient mechanisms to 
regulate relations between minorities. The creation of new centres of power without 
sufficiently defining how they are to be shared among the various minorities 
constituting, particularly, the four multi-ethnic states, has induced rivalry for control of 
these new political structures, leading in many instances to violence. It has also led to 
the transformation of existing resource-based and territorial conflicts between 
neighbouring ethnic groups into a conflict for the control or a share of political power at 
the local level.237  
 
Post-1991 Ethiopia has therefore witnessed escalation in regional conflicts within these 
states. The SNNPRS, and more particularly Gambella, are the worst hit.238 In 
Benshangul-Gumuz Regional State (BGRS), the disproportionately small number of 
Woredas and percentage of representation provided for the Berta, the largest ethnic 
group in the region, gave rise to a tension between the Berta and the regional 
government. This ultimately led to violence, and the Berta withdrew from the regional 
government and threatened to secede from it.239 With mediation from the HoF, the 
immediate tension was resolved with the agreement of the parties provisionally to 
allocate additional representatives to the Berta in the regional council, in return for their 
return to the legislature.240  
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7.5.1.6 Lack of effective and independent constitutional adjudication 
mechanism 
 
As the experience of multicultural societies, particularly Canada, Spain, South Africa 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, shows, the existence of an independent constitutional 
adjudication body is the key to the success of a constitution that seeks to accommodate 
diversity. Such a body is clothed with all the necessary qualities for ‘facilitating 
adaptation of the federal system without resort to constitutional amendment’.241 
Moreover, constitutional adjudication through a judicial body allows a principled, 
transparent and coherent interpretation and elaboration of the constitution, which is a 
necessary condition for building and enhancing public confidence in the system and, 
most importantly, for keeping the diverse groups participating in the political process 
committed to the rules of the constitution. Experience in South Africa,242 Canada243 and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina244 also shows that independent constitutional adjudication is 
important to provide authoritative frameworks that help resolve sensitive politico-legal 
disagreements that arise under a constitution, and to rectify the limits or omissions of the 
constitution in a coherent and constitutionally and morally defensible way. From the 
perspective of this study, without such a body, the constitutional design for 
accommodation of diversity becomes susceptible to the dictates of political expediency 
and even manipulation. In other words, it becomes a constitution without sufficient 
mechanisms for its proper enforcement or constitutionalism.  
 
This is another area that makes the Ethiopian approach to the accommodation of 
diversity once again distinct from that of South Africa. Under the FC, the CC is an 
important component of the constitutional design for accommodation of diversity. 
Indeed, the various guarantees provided in the text of the FC aside, the CC is the key 
institution that has made South Africa’s transition to democracy a success and the 
process of transformation legitimate. In the case of Ethiopia, no comparable body is 
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available. Another outcome of the constitutional entrenchment of ethnicity as the main 
organising principle was the assigning of the role of constitutional adjudication to a 
political body. According to the framers of the Constitution, since it is the expression of 
the sovereignty of ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ of Ethiopia, it is only they, as 
authors, who should be vested with the power of interpreting the Constitution.245 
Accordingly, the body that is charged with the power of constitutional interpretation is 
the HoF, the second house of parliament, which is constituted by representatives of the 
‘nations, nationalities and peoples’.246 Under Article 62(2) of the Constitution, the HoF 
has the power to interpret the Constitution. Article 83, the clause on interpretation of the 
Constitution, further provides that all constitutional disputes shall be decided by the 
HoF.  
 
The consequence of this is that not only disputes involving ethnic rights provided for in 
the Constitution and disputes involving the various spheres of government, but also 
those cases involving fundamental rights, are to be decided by the HoF. Article 84(3) 
envisages that where an ordinary court is seized of a matter the disposition of which 
requires the interpretation of the Constitution, it should refer such matter to the Council 
of Constitutional Inquiry (CCI), the body with the power to investigate constitutional 
disputes and submit its recommendations thereon to the HoF for final decision.247 
Similarly, Article 21(2) of Proclamation 250/2001 stipulates that ‘the Court handling the 
case shall submit it to the CCI only if it believes that there is a need for constitutional 
interpretation in deciding the case’.  
 
The problem is not just that the power of judicial review is assigned to a non-judicial 
body. It is rather, first, that the HoF lacks the qualities of a judicial body that are 
necessary for properly enforcing the rules of the Constitution. According to Article 
61(1), the HoF is composed of ‘representatives of nations, nationalities and peoples’. By 
its composition, it is clear that the main purpose of the HoF is not the enforcement of the 
                                                 
245 See Ye Ethiopia Hige Mengist Gubae Vol. 4 Hidar 14-20, 1987 E. C. (Minutes of the Constitutional 
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rules of the Constitution, but the protection of the interests of the groups it represents.248 
Moreover, its members are to be elected by the State Councils, the highest organ of 
member states of the federation.249 Given that the State Councils are controlled by 
political parties, and more particularly the ruling political party, the representatives that 
they elect to the HoF are accordingly members of the ruling party. Even if members of 
the HoF are in constitutional terms representatives of ‘nations, nationalities, and 
peoples’, as members of the ruling party, politically speaking they are also essentially its 
representatives. This means that, at least in political terms, the power of constitutional 
interpretation is in the hands of the ruling party. It is clear from this that the HoF does 
not have the requisite independence and impartiality for enforcing the constitutional 
design for accommodation of minorities in an independent, normatively coherent and 
principled way. Unfortunately, the existence of the CCI does not at all rectify this 
deficiency since it has only an advisory role and at any rate itself lacks the qualities of a 
judicial body.  
 
The second problem with the existing arrangement for constitutional interpretation is the 
need for constitutionalism, rule of law and, most importantly, the protection of 
fundamental rights. As part of its power to interpret the Constitution, the HoF is the 
main body that has the responsibility to enforce the Chapter on the Bill of Rights 
through constitutional interpretation. Indeed, this is explicitly provided for under Article 
23(1) of Proclamation 250/2001: ‘Any person who alleges that his fundamental rights 
and freedoms have been violated by the final decision of any government institution or 
official may present his case to the CCI for constitutional interpretation.’250 The result is 
that the interpretation of fundamental rights is taken away from the judiciary and placed 
in the hands of a purely political body. Whatever role that courts have is very minimal 
and of negligible importance.251 This renders the enforcement of human rights to be a 
matter mainly in the hands of the political organs of the state. At least politically 
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speaking, to the extent that the body interpreting the constitution is under the control of 
the ruling party one can legitimately conclude that Ethiopia’s is a constitution without 
sufficient constitutionalism. From the perspective of this study, the problem with this is 
that it leaves fundamental rights without sufficient mechanism for judicial enforcement 
and undermines constitutionalism and rule of law, which are all the necessary conditions 
for an effective operation of the constitutional design for accommodation of minorities.  
7.5.2 Achievements  
 
Notwithstanding the above limitations, Ethiopia’s constitutional design has achieved 
important successes in terms of accommodation of diversity that would not otherwise 
have been possible. The Ethiopian federal system has at least five achievements to its 
credit. First, not only has it ended the decades of civil war that afflicted the country but 
it also prevented the danger of disintegration facing Ethiopia after the fall of the military 
regime of Mengistu Haile-Mariam.252 Kidane Mengisteab thus argues that EPRDF’s 
policy measures, such as ethnic-based federalism, were ‘essential to stop the perpetual 
bloodshed, to avert the country’s total disintegration and to mend ethnic relations’.253 It 
was a crucial condition for many of the dominant ethnic-based forces of the time to 
abandon armed struggle and accept participation in the unfolding new political system. 
By dispersing the centres of power, it also contributed to the diffusion of conflicts to 
regions, thus preventing the recurrence of the nation-wide civil war characteristic of the 
military era. According to David Turton, ‘it has provided peace and security for the 
majority of the population following a violent civil war and laid down, for the first time 
in the history of Ethiopia, “the legal foundation for a fully fledged democracy”’.254  
  
Secondly, the egalitarian orientation of Ethiopia’s ethnic pluralism is also expected to 
enhance social cohesion and national integration, notwithstanding the suggestion of 
some aspects of the constitutional design to the contrary. Alem Habtu is among those 
who hope that ‘the drive toward egalitarian ethnic pluralism has the potential to enhance 
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ethnic harmony based on mutual respect and reciprocity’.255 Indeed, some studies have 
concluded that ‘the EPRDF government is making some headway in engendering a 
sense of Ethiopian identity that either transcends or coexists with a clear sense of ethnic 
identity among the country’s nationality groups’.256  
 
Thirdly, Ethiopian federalism also served to end the political and cultural hegemony of 
the dominant culture. This entailed the demise of the many years of patterns of 
domination, ethno-cultural assimilation and centralisation. It also marked a rejection of 
the denigration of the cultures, languages and histories of minorities and the resultant 
damage to the dignity and self-respect of their members. Most importantly, it also 
rejected the uneven patterns of development and the socio-economic neglect or 
marginalisation of many of the minorities in the country.  
 
Corresponding to this is the political recognition and institutional affirmation of the 
cultures, languages and histories of hitherto marginalised minorities, and their equality. 
An important feature of the new constitutional order is its complete break from the 
centrally imposed singular Ethiopian identity, and the redefinition of Ethiopia as a 
multicultural state committed to the accommodation its diversity. Leenco Leta, 
prominent figure of the separatist Oromo Liberation Figure, captures this paradigmatic 
change as follows:  
 
The recognition of the right of self-determination of nationalities was conceptualised and the 
reconfiguration of the Ethiopian state was to bring about wide-ranging changes. The policy of 
Ethiopian identity, which was traditionally projected to coincide with Amhara identity, was to 
undergo fundamental changes. The previous policy of gradual homogenisation through 
amharaization was to be abandoned. Instead of imposing a single Ethiopian identity, a mosaic 
was to be projected. Contrary to the previous practice of defining Ethiopian identity in a manner 
that excluded or failed to embrace the identities of the various nationalities, a more inclusive 
image was to be projected.257  
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The fourth achievement is the high level of representation of minorities in the political 
structures of the state. Mainly on account of the group-based politics of recognition, 
unlike the imperial and the military regimes, under the current federal system almost all 
minorities constituting the country are represented in the national political processes. 
This can be seen in the composition of the Parliament and the federal executive. For the 
first time in the history of the country, it has now become possible to find members of 
all linguistic, religious and cultural groups in the federal Legislature and, more directly, 
in the HoF. Similarly, despite the perceived or real dominance of some groups, the 
executive in its entirety is more vividly diverse in its linguistic, cultural and religious 
composition than at any other time in the history of the country. Institutions of the 
federal government and the civil service are more and more mirroring the diversity of 
the country.  
 
Despite many problems and its downsides for inter-ethnic relations, particularly due to 
the perceived dominance of some groups in national politics, constitutional change has 
at some level contributed to inter-group relations and mutual recognition. It has also 
brought about on the part of most, if not all, minorities a sense of being included and 
accommodated in the national project. As a result, many are now able to see themselves 
as full Ethiopian citizens with equal rights and entitlements. As Assefa rightly points 
out, this has contributed to members of the various ethnic groups regaining group pride 
and a sense of self-respect and dignity.258 Obviously, for those whose Ethiopian identity 
is intimately associated with their group membership, this has increased their sense of 
belonging to and identification with the state. This is expressed not only during peace, 
but also at times of national emergency. For example, some reasonably maintain that 
‘the sentiment of Ethiopian nationalism exhibited by many volunteers (during the 
Ethiopia-Eritrea war in 1998-2000) owes a great deal to the institutional recognition and 
protection that is extended to particularist identities under the new federal 
arrangement’.259  
 
Finally, at the local level, it has created a framework for the political empowerment of 
minorities on the basis of self-government, which also serves as a basis for equitable 
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access to resources and the socio-economic empowerment of historically disadvantaged 
minorities. According to Dereje, who studied the effect of Ethiopia’s constitutional 
change in one of the historically disadvantaged states, the Gambella Peoples National 
Regional State (GPNRS), ‘the implementation of ethnic federalism has created a new 
political space and institutional design to further promote local empowerment …. the 
creation of [the GPNRS] appears to be one of the most visible political steps ever taken 
by the Ethiopian state to integrate its historic minorities’.260 There is also hope that this 
could enhance the democratic space and enable people actively to participate in the 
political processes. Thanks to the federal scheme and the constitutional requirement of 
equitable distribution of resources,261 for the first time in the history of the country, not 
only people at the centre but also those at the periphery are more equitably taking part in 
and benefiting from the development processes of the country.  
 
More and more communities are now beneficiaries of social services, including health, 
sanitation and education. Indeed, education is one area that has shown huge expansion 
in the various regional states. Many minority languages that have achieved the required 
degree of literary development have been given support to become medium of 
instruction, particularly at elementary levels. In the Afar, Somali, Benshangul-Gumuz, 
Southern, and Oromia regional states, pilot nomadic schools and boarding schools have 
been established and/or are planned in order to provide educational access to children in 
pastoral communities, in most cases for the very first time.262 Plans are also under way 
for Regional Education Media Units to design and transmit educational programs in 
local languages.263  In addition to this, the coverage of secondary and higher education 
has been expanded, and Ethiopia’s higher education institutions are now becoming 
increasingly diverse in terms of their ethno-cultural representation.  
 
7.6 Conclusion  
 
This case study, like the previous one, shows that the issue of minorities may be 
addressed through the provision of constitutional guarantees and mechanisms for the 
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accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity. Unlike the constitutional design of South 
Africa, which is mainly inspired by the liberal constitutional framework, Ethiopia’s 
reflects a huge communitarian influence. This chapter illuminates the effect of this 
difference, in terms of the nature of the constitutional guarantees and institutional 
mechanisms, on the constitutional accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity. In this 
regard, it has been noted that some of the institutional limitations identified with the 
Ethiopian constitutional design are attributable to the ethno-nationalist or 
communitarian paradigmatic foundation of the Constitution. Generally, this case study 
illustrates the limits of constitutional accommodation of minorities and the pitfalls that 
must be avoided in institutionalising mechanisms for accommodation of ethno-cultural 
diversity.  
 
Unlike the case of South Africa, ethno-cultural conflict in Ethiopia has mainly involved 
the struggle of members of various ethno-linguistic groups for the reogniton of their 
equality not just as individual citizens but as members of their respective groups. As it 
can be concluded from the foregoing discussion, in such cases the group-rights approach 
of constitutional design for accommodaiton of ethno-cultural diversity may not only 
provide a framework for achieving ethno-cultural justice but also lead, as a result, to a 
fair amount of political instability.   
 
It can also be gathered that generally, the use of the group-rights approach of 
constitutional design for accommodation of minorities creats tension between group 
rights and individual rights or the rights of regional minorities. In the case of the 
Ethiopian constitutional design, it is true that this approach both arrested the violent 
conflict that raged in the country for over three decades and contributed to the 
prevention of its disintegration. Nevertheless, it clearly came out that the lack of 
sufficient attention to this fundamental tension and the flaws in the Constitution’s 
conception of the nature of group rights resulted in a seemingly unresolvable structural 
tension between group-rights and individual rights and/or the rights of regional 
minorities. Accordingly, evenif it brought ethno-cultual justice for the country’s 
historically marginalised groups and achieved fair amount of stability, it has created new 
threats to individual rights and the rights of regional minorities.  
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At least three conclusions can be drawn from this. First, if ethno-cultural justice and 
peaceful co-existence are to be achieved between members of various groups in a 
multiethnic society with a conflict history of the type in Ethiopia, it might be imperative 
to use the group-rights approach to constitutional accommodaiton of minorities.  
Second, where the group-rights approach is used, it is almost inevitable that there will be 
tension between group rights and individual rights, albeit such tension is not necessarily 
irresolvable. Finally, the requirment of justice for and peaceful co-exstence between 
members of different ethno-cultural groups may not in some cases be achieved without 
limiting the rights of individuals and/or regional minorities. It is clear from this that any 
constitutional design committed to both these objectives and those implementing such a 
constitution should pay equal attention to these two requirments to achieve a balance in 
such a way that the limits that the requirments of justice and stability put on individual 
rights is not of such a nature that furstrates the fundamentals of the protection of 
individual rights or regional minorities.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations   
 
In many poor countries at war, the condition of poverty is coupled with sharp ethnic or religious 
cleavages. Almost invariably, the rights of subordinate groups are insufficiently respected, the 
institutions of government are insufficiently inclusive and the allocation of society’s resources 
favours the dominant faction over others. The solution is clear, even if difficult to achieve in 
practice: to promote human rights, to protect minority rights and to institute political 
arrangements in which all groups are represented.      Kofi Annan, ‘We the Peoples’, Millennium 
Report (2000) paras. 203-204 
8.1 Introduction  
 
 
In this age of multiculturalism, the issue of minorities is a topical subject in the political 
and legal discourse of many states and international organisations and one that has 
received wide scholarly attention in various fields, including philosophy, social sciences 
and law. Despite its currency and its centrality to the institutional crisis that currently 
afflicts the post-colonial African state, manifested by ethnic conflicts and civil wars that 
have caused the loss of countless human lives and resources, the issue of minorities has 
received scant attention in the legal literature and the constitutional framework of 
African states. There are also no studies that have comprehensively examined and 
elaborated the role that minority rights (particularly in the broad sense, as defended in 
this study) can play, and the kind of constitutional guarantees and institutional 
arrangements that are necessary to translate them into an adequate constitutional 
framework for the accommodation of diversity in Africa.  
 
The central aim of this study has been to examine and defend the nature and content of a 
robust minority rights framework that can serve in Africa as a basis for the constitutional 
accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity and for achieving a (more) legitimate 
political and socio-economic structure of social co-operation. To address this, the study 
employed three lines of investigation. The first focused on the background and 
problematisation of the subject of the study. This was addressed in the first three 
chapters. The second line of investigation consisted of the resolution aspect of the study. 
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This involved examination of normative political theory and the relevant norms of 
international human rights law, within which aspects of constitutional design necessary 
for addressing the issue of minorities in Africa were identified, analysed and elaborated. 
The third line of investigation examined the actual institutionalisation and operation of 
such constitutional designs in Africa. To this end, the study employed the case studies of 
South Africa and Ethiopia. This chapter restates the problem and presents the arguments 
and findings of the study and outlines the conclusions and recommendations.  
 
 
 
 
8.2 The core arguments and findings of the study 
 
The post-colonial African state has continued to experience severe crises of governance, 
legitimacy and institutional fragility often precipitating violent conflicts of varying 
proportions and in several occasions the explosion or collapse of the state itself. 
Although the issue of minorities as eleborated in this study is an essential part and 
among the most important causes of these crises, insufficient attempt has been made, 
both in mainstream scholarship and in policy and the institutional design of the African 
state, to adapt existing international and regional norms on minority rights to design an 
effective constitutional framework for addressing the crises.  
 
Based on an investigation of the historical, political and socio-economic processes that 
led to the genesis of the issue of minorities, this study showed that the issue of 
minorities in Africa is not about ethno-cultural diversity or identity per se. It is, rather, a 
product of the process by which the post-colonial African state was made, and the 
failure of its basic structure to establish a common framework of social co-operation 
acceptable to all members of the various ethno-cultural communities that were forcibly 
brought together to constitute the state. In other words, the issue of minorities in Africa 
is rooted in the unequal and discriminatory patterns of power relations and the failure of 
state structures to reflect, embody and protect fairly and equitably the interests and 
cultural attachments of members of all sections of society.  
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In more specific terms, the study identified and analysed the nature and types of claims 
that define the issue of minorities in Africa. Although minority problems specific to 
particular groups may have additional other characteristics or display more than one of 
the types of claims discussed here, the study found that one can identify four types of 
minority claims in Africa. The first is the claim of what I call ethno-political minorities. 
These are groups who seek to take part and have their say in the political structures and 
processes of the state. This is often expressed by the contention of members of various 
groups, through either political parties or armed struggle, for control or a share of 
political power. The second is the claim of cultural minorities for legal and political 
recognition of their cultural traditions and languages, and the institutionalisation of those 
cultures and languages as part of the character that defines the state in which they live. 
This is not simply a claim for the freedom to use and develop one’s culture and 
language. It is mainly about achieving cultural and language equality in public life. 
Thirdly, there is the related but qualitatively different claim of peripheral minorities, 
such as those identified as indigenous peoples of Africa who, having historically been 
left out of state processes, experience a high degree of political, socio-economic and 
cultural marginalisation. Their situation raises seemingly irreconcilable claims of 
integration into, or more accurately inclusion within, the processes of the state and, at 
the same time, the recognition and protection of their distinct way of life and the 
interests associated with it – most importantly, protection of their attachment to and 
dependence on their territories and the resources therein. Finally, there are those ethno-
national/regional minorities, who, due to various historical and political processes 
particular to the countries to which they belong, have developed a separate socio-
political and cultural identity attached to the territory they historically inhabited. These 
groups seek and demand self-government, and sometimes even secession. 
 
It was revealed that these are not claims merely about the interests of individuals as 
individuals. They are, in the main, membership based claims and are, as such, about the 
interests of individuals as members of particular groups. In other words, by their nature 
they are group specific or group oriented claims. This discates that any mechanism for 
effectively addressing these cliams has to involve the institutionalization of some form 
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of group-regarding rights or guarantees. These are also claims that go beyond culture 
and identity, and are most importantly about social justice and political equality among 
members of various communities constituting the African state. As such, these claims 
directly reflect on the nature of the structure and organization of socio-economic and 
political power of the African state and its governance. This implies that the issue of 
minorities in Africa is amenable to solution if these characteristics are duely recognised 
in designing the institutions and processes of the state. It also rejects the prejudicial view 
that ethnic conflicts in Africa are irrational expressions of ancient or atavistic enemity 
between groups. Moreover, it maintains that the recognition and accommodation of the 
interests and the cultural attachments of members of different groups in the processes of 
the state is not necessarily antithetical to national cohesion.  
 
The approach of the post-colonial African state involved a homogenizing nation-
building process and a constitutional design that not only rejected ethnic identity from 
the public sphere but also sought to actively sweep it away, sometimes by coersion or 
through assimilitionist cultural, linguistic and development policies. This significantly 
contributed to the emergence of one party states, military or one person dictatorships. 
Most importantly, it not only failed to overcome peoples’ attachment to their ethnic 
membership, it even further accentuated group inequalities and rivalry often leading to 
the eruption of violent conflicts. It entrenched the illegitimacy of the post-colonial state, 
further weakening it and in worst cases precipitating its implosion as it happened in 
Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and DRC.  
 
In this context, the study also illustrated the inadequacy and adverse impact of the 
liberal individual-rights centric and unitarist constitutional model as a framework for 
addressing the issue of minorities in Africa. It was accordingly maintained that although 
national integration, electoral democracy and common citizenship are necessary, 
maintaining difference-blind structures and guaranteeing individual rights, including 
formal equality and non-discrimination, are not sufficient to address the socio-economic 
and political marginalisation of many minorities and/or their vulnerability to such 
marginalisation, nor do such mechanisms guarantee the equal recognition in public life 
of the cultures and languages of all minorities forming the post-colonial African state. 
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The recognition of this fact means that the constitutional recognition of ethno-cultural 
diversity and the provision of mechanisms for its accommodation are necessary, not 
only to address adequately the issue of minorities within a democratic framework, but 
also to achieve legitimate structures of government necessary for a fair distribution of 
the burdens and benefits of social co-operation within the post-colonial African state. 
 
Against this background, the study identified, eleborated and defended a robust minority 
rights framework (combining liberal individual rights and additional other group-
regarding institutional guarantees and cultural and linguistic rights) that provides the 
basis for developing the necessary constitutional design for an effective accommodation 
of minorities in Africa. To this end, the study employed an empirical analysis of 
contemporary minority rights standards at the international and regional levels, as well 
as the constitutional practice of states and contemporary normative political theory on 
minority rights. This analysis revealed that the concept of minorities, as commonly used 
within the framework of international law, needs to be refined in order to properly 
reflect the peculiarities of the issue of minorities in Africa. Most importantly, the 
analysis showed that although minority rights currently guaranteed under international 
law are necessary, they have also proved to be insufficient. Accordingly, using a critical 
approach towards existing international norms (both hard and soft) on minority, 
indigenous peoples and peoples rights, the study defended and articulated a robust 
framework of minority rights. As elaborated in this study, these rights are regarded as 
group rights in the sense that they are membership rights and the interests that they 
protect are membership based interests rather than the interests of individuals as 
individuals per se.  
 
Based on an analysis of normative political theory and international law relevant to the 
subject, I identified that such a robust minority rights framework, particularly relevant to 
the African context, has three elements. The first is the recognition of cultural identity. 
Based on a defence of the importance of cultural membership to the identity of 
individuals and to their capacity to make meaningful choices, and of the need to rectify 
the colonial and post-colonial non-recognition and denigration of minority cultures and 
languages, the study contended that an effective constitutional design for the 
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accommodation of diversity should provide guarantees and policy frameworks that 
recognise the use of indigenous languages, not only in the private domain, but also in 
the public sphere, including in communication with state agencies. It should also give 
institutional expression and support to the cultures and religions of the various 
minorities. This was shown to be a necessary condition if members of such minorities 
are to have their identity duly recognised and respected, and to be treated with equal 
concern and respect. 
 
The second component of the required minority rights framework defended in this study 
is equality. Considering the nature of the issue of minorities in Africa, a distinction was 
made between universal equality and substantive equality. While universal equality, 
involving the provision of the same rights and status universally to individuals, provides 
the basis for a common bond of citizenship, substantive equality is concerned with the 
membership rights of minorities necessary both to offset their political and socio-
economic vulnerabilities and to prevent their future exclusion, as well as to recognise 
and affirm their particularity or cultural distinctness. Here, equality operates not only as 
a justification for recognising the particular cultural attributes of minorities that give 
meaning to the lives of their members, but also for developing constitutional guarantees 
and mechanisms for addressing structures and patterns of socio-economic and political 
inequalities among various groups and ethno-regions. In the political field, this dictates 
that states adopt institutional arrangements that provide fair and adequate representation 
and participation for members of all groups. It is also important that there exists a socio-
economic regime that rectifies past patterns of socio-economic marginalisation or 
deprivations, and institutionalises a fair system of distribution of the burdens and 
benefits of living under a common government.  
 
The third component of the minority rights framework (broadly understood in this study 
as various policies and mechanisms for accommodation of diversity) is self-
determination. Self-determination mainly captures the historical and political context of 
the issue of minorities. Accordingly, a certain formulation of self-determination was 
examined and defended to address the illegitimate historical process of the making of 
the state and the failure of its basic structure to reflect, embody and serve the interests of 
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members of all groups equitably, as well as the continuing alienation of members of 
various groups from state processes. This is based on James Anaya’s distinction 
between substantive self-determination and remedial self-determination.  
 
Substantive self-determination, which applies to the institutions of government under 
which human beings live, entails that the governing institutional order of a society be 
one that is (a) a product of the equal and free participation and consent of individuals 
and groups constituting the society (constitutive aspect) and (b) managed on an ongoing 
basis through the equal participation and freely and equally expressed will of the 
people/peoples concerned (ongoing aspect). Within this framework, we considered the 
institutions of colonial rule that deprived the state’s constituent minorities of their 
freedom to exist independently, and the continuing alienation of members of minorities 
from the processes of the post-colonial state under which they live, as a violation of self-
determination.  
 
Remedial self-determination, which refers to the particular form by which self-
determination is given application, is accordingly employed to identify and develop 
mechanisms that rectify such violation. This can include various mechanisms and 
guarantees identified on the basis of culture and equality. But in addition, it includes 
providing ethno-national/regional minorities with self-government structures and 
recognising and protecting the interests of peripheral minorities, such as indigenous 
peoples, over the land and resources to which they have cultural and socio-economic 
attachment. Beyond rectifying such violations, the application of self-determination in 
these various forms in redesigning the governing institutional order of the post-colonial 
African state also constitutes a way of giving proper application to the right of self-
determination in its internal dimension, which is in the process of recognition under 
international law.1  
 
                                                 
1 Okafor calls this the ‘righting of the post-colonial African state’. This, according to Okafor, ‘refers 
primarily to the international legal imperative of utilizing and adhering to international human rights law 
norms (especially those relating to self-determination and minority rights) in the process of state-
formation or even state-disintegration in Africa (as elsewhere).’ Brackets in the original. OC Okafor 
‘“Righting,” Restructuring, and Rejuvenating the Post-Colonial African State: The Case for the 
Establishment of an AU Special Commission on National Minorities’ (2007) 13 African Yearbook of Int L 
2005 43.  
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Going a step further, the study outlined the constitutional arrangements and guarantees 
that translate the robust minority rights framework into actual institutional and 
normative designs. Several institutional and normative mechanisms are identified and 
elaborated here. These include: institutional mechanisms that guarantee minorities 
adequate representation and participation in national policy-making structures; self-
government, particularly in the form of federalism; a socio-economic regime that 
redresses historical inequities and institutionalises a fair system of distribution; a policy 
framework that recognises and determines the use of indigenous languages in the public 
sphere, particularly in communication with state institutions, in education and in the 
media; and cultural and religious rights, including the recognition and enforcement of 
customary law and religious family law.  
 
As the issue of minorities is intimately interconnected with the crisis of legitimacy of the 
African state and its governance, in proposing the integration of minority rights into the 
constitutional design of the multiethnic African state the study hopes to address not only 
the issue of minorities but also the overall crisis of legitimacy of the post-colonial 
African state. Accordingly, the constitutional system defended and eleborated in the 
study goes beyond the liberal individual rights and unitarist constitutional model and 
introduces designs for an effective accommodation of ethnic diversity. It also proffers a 
multicultural democracy that combines both self-rule (diversity) and shared rule through 
representation and participation in shared national institutions and processes (common 
citizenship) and universal individual rights, as well as group-regarding cultural rights, 
linguistic guarantees and arrangements or guarantees for self-government.  
 
Taking this analysis to its logical conclusion, the study used the case studies of South 
Africa and Ethiopia to illustrate how the proposed constitutional design may in practice 
be institutionalized and actually operate in different contexts. Depending on the 
characteristics of the issue of minorities affecting different countries, the nature of the 
institutionalizaiton of the proposed constitutional framework would accordingly differ. 
Equally importantly, the actual operation of such constitutional design depends not only 
on the particular features of the design, but most importantly on the prevailing social, 
economic and political conditions prevailing in the country in question. This implies that 
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the institutional mechanisms and normative guarantees constituting the constitutional 
framework defended in this study are only the necessary conditions for an effective 
accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity and the reconfiguration of the post-colonial 
African state. As the case studies show, the efficacy and success of the constitutional 
design for the accommodation of diversity defended in this study depends as much on 
the particular historical, socio-economic and political contexts within which it operates 
and is given effect.2 
 
Despite the fact that the two case studies represent different approaches to the issue of 
minorities with South Africa’s liberal individualist emphasis and Ethiopia’s 
communitarian excesses, they both sufficiently illustrated that the adoption of relevant 
constitutional mechanisms and guarantees institutionalizing the rights of minorities is a 
prerequisite both for accommodating ethno-cultural diversity and establishing a just 
socio-economic and political order in the multiethnic and multicultural African state. 
More specifically, the South African case study dispelled the often exaggerated fears 
and views prevalent in post-colonial Africa that the recognition of ethno-cultural 
diversity frustrates national integration. It proved that not only can the two indeed be 
pursued together, but also the recognition of diversity in numerous ways supports the 
goals of national integration, although such integration has yet to happen in South 
Africa. Similarly, the Ethiopian case study offered a further illustration that the 
provision of mechanisms and constitutional guarantees for the accommodation of 
diversity is a necessary condition for equality and justice in the multi-ethnic societies 
such as the ones we have in Africa. It revealed that for multiethnic societies with ethno-
cultural conflict of the kind Ethiopia has experienced, a group-rights regarding 
constitutional design is a sine qua non to justice for and peaceful co-existence between 
members of various groups.  
 
                                                 
2 In a recent opinion piece, Prof. Yash Ghai aptly argued that a good constitutional design by itself along 
is not enough. Its success further depends on the external environment within which it operates. ‘It is safe 
to say’, he opines, ‘that constitutions may succeed in setting up institutions and giving them authority, but 
they often fail in the fulfillment of national values or directive principles – for the paradoxical reason that 
those who accede to these institutions may have little commitment to the values.’ Yash Ghai Decreeing 
and Establishing a Constitutional Order: Challenges Facing Kenya’  available at 
http://africanarguments.org/author/yash-ghai/ accessed on 11 August 2009.   
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There are also two very instructive points that the Ethiopian case study reveals. It first 
shows that where group rights are institutionalized alongside individual rights without 
the necessary accommodative devices, conflict between the two categories of rights is 
almost inevitable. In other words, the form that the institutionalization of group rights as 
mechanism for accommodation of diversity takes, determines the inevitability and 
nature of conflict that may arise between group rights and individual rights. As shown in 
Chapter V, as long as group rights are recognized as part of the constitutional design 
required for addressing the issue of minorities in Africa, such conflicts, like conflicts 
between various individual rights, may not be avoided all the time, albeit the nature and 
extent of such conflict depends on how those rights are formulated and given 
institutional expression constitutionally.  As much as conflict between two individual 
rights does not invalidate the value of individual rights, this does not at all diminish the 
normative force or validity of group rights. It is, however, important that group rights 
should not be institutionalized in such a way as to trample upon individual rights and 
democratic principles.    
 
The Ethiopian case study additionally shows that for countries that experianced ethnic 
conflicts similar to that of Ethiopia, multicultural federalism or constitutional design that 
institutionalizes group specific rights and governance structures might do justice for 
marginalized groups and enhance peaceful coexistence. Nevertheless, if strong 
mechanisms that nurture national integration and social cooperation are not properly 
institutionalized, such a system may institutionalize ethnic divisions and lead to 
institutional instability and, in the worst cases, even conflicts. Accordingly, in 
institutionalizing the constitutional design defended in this study, it is emphasised that 
all the necessary caution should be taken and mechanisms put in place to avoid or 
minimize such pitfalls.   
 
Finally, it is emphasized that this study recognizes the centrality of individual rights and 
their importance for minorities. Indeed, the framework that the study identified and 
elaborated is premised upon, and builds on, individual rights. As such, individual rights 
not only form a substantive part of the minority rights framework adopted in this study 
but also serve as a basis for defining the reach of this framework. Accordingly, the study 
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rejected the communitarian thesis that accords priority to groups over individuals or the 
rights of the group over that of the individual.  
 
 
In terms of original contribution in the field, it comes out from the study that the 
integration of minority rights into the constitutional design of African states is presented 
not only as a means for accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity, but also as part of a 
framework for achieving peace and stability and rectifying the illegitimacy of the post-
colonial African state. This and the study’s analysis of the crisis of legitimacy and 
governance afflicting the post-colonial African state through the prism of minority rights 
offers a new and wholistic approach linking problems of peace, security, human rights 
and constitutional governance in Africa. This study is also novel in its multidisciplinary 
approach to the subject and its analysis of the practical institutionalization and operaiton 
of the constitutional design that it eleborated and defended.   
8.3 Overall conclusions and final observations  
 
This study defended a robust minority rights framework involving certain constitutional 
guarantees for the cultures, religions and languages of minorities and institutional 
arrangements that ensure the representation and participation of members of minorities 
in the processes of the state and give them control over some aspects of their 
membership interests. Such a robust minority rights framework provides the necessary 
mechanisms not only to rectify the cultural, socio-economic and political 
marginalisation of minorities, but also to secure the substantive inclusion of their 
members in the management of public life. Minority rights as elaborated in this study 
are accordingly treated as essential components of the requirement of justice in the 
context of the ethno-cultural diversity and inequality that characterise the post-colonial 
African state.  
 
The framework defended in this thesis addresses the various dimensions of the issue of 
minorities in Africa. The institutional arrangements that it dictates, outlined in Chapters 
IV and V, demand the redefinition of the existing structure and distribution of power of 
the post-colonial African state so as to remedy existing ethnic and ethno-regional 
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political and socio-economic inequalities. In other words, they establish the necessary 
conditions for members of all groups to have their fair share in the processes of the state.  
 
Together with the constitutional guarantees accorded to the cultures, languages or 
religions of the various ethno-cultural groups, these institutional arrangements dismantle 
the highly centralised organisation of political power and control of societal resources of 
the post-colonial African state that has entrenched the winner-take-all politics of the 
‘zero-sum game’ which precipitated the violent conflicts witnessed in many African 
countries. They lead to the empowerment of members of all groups, particularly those 
who feel alienated from the state or vulnerable to marginalisation. This helps to diminish 
and ultimately eliminate the alienation of minorities from the state. As the state protects 
the cultural and linguistic identity of minorities and reflects in its structures and 
processes the symbols and relevant social values of members of all groups, it becomes 
possible for all citizens to feel included and identify with the state and its processes. 
This facilitates the integration of the institutions and norms of the state on the one hand 
and the norms and cultures of the diverse constituent groups on the other. Needless to 
say, this also reflects and advances the objective of national integration that all African 
states seek to achieve.  
 
The last three chapters of this dissertation elaborated these constitutional mechanisms 
and guarantees and examined their nature and limits, as well as the principles that 
regulate their operation once they are institutionalised. Some conclusions and general 
observations are made below, particularly with respect to self-government (federalism), 
representation and participation, and constitutional policy and guarantees on language, 
culture and religion.  
8.3.1 Federalism  
 
Federalism is one of the mechanisms through which the minority rights framework 
defended in this study may be translated into an adequate constitutional design for the 
accommodation of diversity in Africa. In its multicultural form in particular, it creates 
structures both for self-government and for members of minorities to be represented and 
to participate in national policy making. It therefore has, so the study argued, the 
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necessary institutions and norms for addressing some of the important claims of 
minorities. Probably its most important value is in dismantling the centralised 
organisation of political power and control of resources that is characteristic of the post-
colonial African state and which often leads to fierce rivalry and even violence among 
various groups and/or ethno-regions. It disperses power and resources territorially, 
allowing members of various groups or regions to have their fair share. The multiple 
centres of power it creates give members of different ethno-cultural groups multiple 
avenues for effective participation. The case study of South Africa, although still in its 
early stage of development, supports most of these conclusions.  
 
The argument for multicultural federalism may also be supported by the fact that other 
alternatives, such as the unitary state which signifies the continuation of the status quo, 
have previously failed and are not better options. This is for example illustrated by the 
Ethiopian case study. The other alternative to federalism, that is the redrawing of the 
borders of the post-colonial African state, is not practical either. This is particularly true 
where there is no demand for independence, as in most of the ethnic struggles and 
conflicts in African states. Besides, except for very limited, exceptional cases, 
addressing minority issues through secession is not considered to be a viable option, 
whether in normative political theory or in international law and the practice of states. 
This study accordingly maintains that, from all angles, federalism, particularly in its 
multicultural form, is probably the most optimal institutional device to provide an 
effective constitutional design for the accommodation of diversity and for 
institutionalizing a workable democratic system combining shared rule (through 
common citizenship and shared institutions as well as equally enforced individual rights 
of all) and self-rule (through group regarding institutions in the form of self-government 
and cultural and linguistic rights) in Africa.   
 
As far as its actual effect is concerned, we have observed that although federalism is 
necessary, it is not sufficient. Its efficacy depends, among other things, on the particular 
form in which it is institutionalised and the political and socio-economic context of the 
country within which it operates. With respect to South Africa, we observed that 
although the constitutional text establishes a system of provincial government suitable 
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for the South African reality, its role as a device for distributing power and 
accommodating diversity has not been optimal due in part to the ANC’s political 
dominance both nationally and provincially. This is also observed with respect to the 
Ethiopian case. Politically speaking, this has the effect of weakening the constitutional 
scheme of multilevel government and particularly the ability of provinces to develop 
their own policies and experiment with their powers.  
 
One observation that can be made in this regard is that in these circumstances, if the 
system of provincial government is to achieve its constitutional purposes, a separation 
must be maintained between party and government. The judiciary can play a great part 
in this. In addition, the provincialisation of the ANC or the emergence of strong 
provincial support for either new or existing opposition parties would also create the 
political space for the effective operation of the system of provincial government.  
 
The most serious challenge facing the system of provincial government in South Africa 
is its possible diminishment or abolition. This is not, however, because provinces have 
become of no use or undermine national unity. There is no evidence to suggest this. 
Although problems of service delivery might have contributed to it, this rather seems to 
be a move for more centralisation. From the perspective of this study and the particular 
reality of South Africa as well, we pointed out that there are very strong reasons to 
maintain the system of provincial government. It has been noted that there is a strong 
view that the policy question should be how to strengthen the capacity of provinces and 
make them more effective, rather than scrapping them. One can suggest in this regard 
that improving the administrative and fiscal capacity of provinces may allow them to 
emerge as critical instruments, not only for continuous accommodation of South 
Africa’s diversity, but also for deepening the process of democratisation and socio-
economic transformation. Moreover, it is also indispensable to rectify existing socio-
economic and administrative imbalances or reduce them to an acceptable level. In 
conclusion, it is fair to say that whether and how the system of provincial government 
would continue to facilitate the accommodation of diversity and actualise its potential 
for enhancing South Africa’s democracy depend on not only addressing these existing 
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difficulties, but also how the political and socio-economic, as well as judicial, 
developments affect its evolution.  
 
We noted that Ethiopia’s constitutional design for the accommodation of diversity has 
some structural limitations. Many attribute these to its full institutionalisation of 
ethnicity. This may well be the case. It was, however, further argued that the limitation 
is attributable to a more fundamental problem. This involves (a) the Constitution’s 
conception of the characteristics of ethnic groups in general and the nature of Ethiopia’s 
ethnic diversity in particular, and (b) the particular characteristics of the institutional 
mechanisms and constitutional guarantees. First, the Constitution defines ethnic groups 
in absolute communitarian terms as natural communities that are internally homogenous 
and possess defined boundaries and exist independently of each other (not just in 
cultural terms but territorially as well). It also assumes that each Ethiopian fits neatly 
within a particular ethnic group and necessarily identifies herself with that group. These 
are all assumptions that fly in the face of the interdependencies and overlaps between 
the different cultures and the possession by individuals of multiple layers of 
identification whose importance differs from individual to individual. Secondly, the 
Constitution prescribes radical constitutional forms, including the legal affirmation that 
each ethnic group is sovereign and entitled to the right to self-determination, including 
secession, and an ethnic federation in which major ethnic groups are assigned their own 
homelands.  
 
One can say that the role of Ethiopia’s constitutional design in accommodating the 
country’s diverse population could be enhanced, and even its survival guaranteed, only 
if its multiple structural limitations are rectified through constitutional amendment. It is 
also important in this regard that such a process involves the participation of all sections 
of society for it to gain legitimacy. In terms of the limitations, one point that has 
emerged is that the Constitution has not effectively institutionalised the principles that 
regulate the operation of minority rights (discussed in Chapter V) to ensure that the 
institutions that these rights justify do not undermine individual rights and the 
constitutional objective of maintaining national unity and achieving an integrated 
economic system. This is probably where the reform should start. First, it is imperative 
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to develop effective mechanisms for the promotion and enforcement throughout the 
country of the individual human rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution. 
This may in particular include establishing a commission charged with, among other 
responsibilities, ensuring that federal and state practices and decisions adhere to the 
principles of equality and non-discrimination.  
 
Secondly, the nature of the relationship between group and individual rights, including 
the obligation of regional authorities vis-à-vis, in particular, regional minorities, must be 
clearly defined. Most importantly, there is also a need for reform of the Constitution’s 
conception of Ethiopian society as a collection of distinct communities. This requires 
reducing its communitarian characteristics and emphasising its commitment to building 
a bond of common citizenship as members of one political and economic community. 
The basis of representation and participation in regional authorities should also be 
changed from ethnic membership to residence.  
 
Although some of these reforms require constitutional amendment, many can be 
implemented through judicial pronouncement. But the Ethiopian federal system also 
lacks a proper judicial mechanism for effecting constitutional change – making this one 
of the crucial areas in which the Constitution needs amendment. This can be achieved, 
for example, by transforming the existing CCI into a constitutional court, and the HoF 
into the organ of the legislature in which the interests of members of the federation or 
the various minorities constituting them are to be represented. This would also correct 
the existing lack of regional participation in national policy, which is contrary to the 
principle of federalism.  
 
8.3.2 Representation and participation  
 
The most important dimension of the issue of minorities in Africa is the struggle for a 
meaningful role in state processes. This is essentially a question of representation and 
participation. Given the context of ethno-cultural diversity and existing patterns of 
unequal power relations, it is suggested that a legitimate and sustainable democratic 
system can be achieved only through institutional arrangements and policy-making 
processes that give proportional representation and effective participation to minorities. 
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Existing institutional arrangements and processes in which the winner takes all should 
be abandoned.  
 
This study concluded that the principle of proportional representation and deliberative 
policy-making are best suited to effect the institutional arrangements and processes that 
give members of all groups a stake in the multi-ethnic African state. At the same time, 
the aim is not to entrench ethnic cleavages in the political processes. Accordingly, group 
representation through a quota system or reservation of seats is not regarded as the 
primary option. Rather, emphasis is put on proportional electoral design. It is, however, 
argued that where this happens to be ineffective in ensuring the participation of 
peripheral minorities such as indigenous peoples, the proportional electoral design 
should be supplemented by group representation on the basis of the quota system or 
reservation of seats, or any similar mechanisms, albeit temporarily. Emphasis is also put 
on deliberative processes that ensure that minorities have their say and are listened to. In 
addition, the principle of proportional representation is also given application within the 
public service.  
 
In the South African case study, one of the issues noted was that although there seems to 
be wide agreement on the need for a PR electoral system, the current closed-list system 
is not working optimally. This is partly due to its emphasis on political parties rather 
than representatives or the electorate, and partly to ANC dominance and the recently 
scrapped floor-crossing that increasingly pushed other parties to the margins. Other 
forms of PR system that give more control to the electorate and the removal of the floor-
crossing law may deliver a better result. Another issue raised was that the PR system 
may not guarantee that peripheral minorities such as the Koi, San and Nama 
communities get representation. Although group representation does not seem to be a 
live option in the context of South Africa, it is nevertheless clear that there may be a 
need to rectify the defects in the existing system of representation to give a voice to 
these communities. One possible option could be the provision of technical and financial 
assistance for the establishment and running of organisations by members of these 
communities that articulate and promote their interests.  
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Equally important for ensuring the voice of minorities is the existence of deliberative 
processes. In this regard, the constitutional requirement for a participatory legislative 
process offers the legal basis for elaborating standards on the nature and mechanisms of 
deliberation. The emerging jurisprudence of the CC elaborating these standards is a 
highly commendable development in the right direction. The importance of this lies in 
creating sufficient avenues for minorities not only to have their say, but to be listened to 
as well.  
 
In the Ethiopian case, instead of the proportional electoral system proposed in this study, 
the first-past-the-post system is adopted. Although this system delivers representation of 
the population diversity due to the delimitation of electoral districts following ethnic 
boundaries or within ethnic territories, it was found to be flawed for various reasons. 
First, it tends to emphasise the geography of ethnicity and hence to entrench divisions in 
the electoral system. Secondly, minority parties that genuinely espouse the interests of 
particular groups have not achieved representation, and even if represented they did not 
get parliamentary seats in proportion to their electoral support. In practice this has 
entrenched the dominance of the ruling coalition while the position of minority parties 
has been weakened or has failed to show significant improvement. Thirdly, it has 
limited the thriving of political pluralism and genuine representation of population 
diversity that would have been possible under the PR system. This dissertation 
accordingly suggests that the electoral system be reformed along the lines of PR system. 
This naturally calls for the amendment of the Constitution, which is best effected as part 
of the federal structure reform suggested above.  
 
Within the states of the federation, regional minorities face exclusion and discrimination 
which is expressed in terms of, among other things, a lack of representation and 
participation in regional governments. The conflicts that have emerged within the multi-
ethnic states for control of new centres of power are also partly attributable to the lack of 
a well articulated and fair system of representation. It has accordingly emerged that 
mechanisms that give adequate voice to regional minorities as well as all other 
communities should be developed. This can be given effect through the establishment of 
either (a) bicameral regional legislatures where the second chamber is composed of 
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representatives of all the constituent communities, or (b) consultative bodies in which all 
members of the different communities are to be represented, or (c) one legislative body 
in which members of all the different communities get representation but the group/s 
indigenous to the region would have veto powers over clearly defined cultural matters.  
8.3.3 Language, culture and religion  
 
In terms of language policy, the study advocated a multilingual approach. This should 
be given effect through a language regime that recognises and determines the use of 
indigenous languages in the public domain, including in communication with public 
authorities, in education and in the media. The application of this nevertheless depends 
upon the combination of various factors, including the size of the group speaking the 
particular language, its territorial concentration, the nature of the public service in 
question and the capacity of the state. Accordingly, the larger and the more territorially 
concentrated the group is and the more vital the public good is, the higher the obligation 
of the state to recognise the language as a medium of communication either for all 
public purposes, or for the more vital ones, in the region in which the speakers of the 
language live. This, however, does not mean that even in such regions the local 
vernacular becomes an exclusive medium of public communication. To give people 
living in those regions choices, the local vernacular should be made to operate alongside 
the official language/s.  
 
With respect to South Africa, it has been noted that the FC provides for a robust policy 
framework for multilingualism expressed most significantly in the recognition of 11 
official languages. As envisaged in the FC, this is expected to lead to the enactment of 
relevant legislation to articulate in detail mechanisms for the implementation of the 
framework under FC s 6. A bill drafted in 2000 has not yet been adopted. This 
reluctance to implement the constitutional obligations concerning multilingualism and 
the dominance of English as the lingua franca in various areas of public life has led to 
fears of linguistic marginalisation, particularly on the part of Afrikaans-speakers. If the 
constitutional recognition of the 11 official languages is to be more than a hollow 
gesture, it is imperative that the implementing legislation is adopted. The PSALB and 
the CPPCRLC should also be given adequate financial and political support if they are 
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to implement their mandates contributing to the constitutional objective that South 
Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in diversity.  
 
Under the Ethiopian Constitution, the equality of all Ethiopian languages is recognised 
in Article 5(1). The equality that is envisaged here is merely formal equality. In reality, 
these various languages are unequal, and no obligation is envisaged under the 
constitution to achieve the substantive equality of the different languages. The problem 
with such a policy of formal equality of the languages of the country is that it does not 
address the historical disadvantages and inequalities sufferred by many of the languages. 
At the same time, given the resource implications of substantive linguistic equality in a 
country with more than 80 languages and with very limited resources, the provision of 
substantive equality would not have been realistic.  
 
Notwithstanding the formal equality of all ethiopian languages, for practical reasons 
Amharic is chosen as the working language of the federal government. Regional states 
are authorised to designate as official or working language/s the language/s of their 
choice. To the extent that regional states are not required to use their working languages 
alongside with the working language of the federation, there is a danger that regional 
minorities would suffer various forms of discrimination as the language requirment of 
the federal unit to which they belong would put severe limit on their ability to fully 
exercise many of their basic rights. This is one area where the country may have 
problems in the not-so-distant future if the problem is not addressed.   
8.4 Recommendations  
 
To close this concluding Chapter, the following section draws out some general 
recommendations.  
 
Recognizing the threat that the issue of minorities poses in Africa  
 
This study recommends, as a first step, that African states, regional organizations and 
nationals of these states recognize that the issue of minorities as articulated in this study 
has continued to pose one of the most serious challenges to the survival of the post-
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colonial African state. And in many cases it constitutes, in ways that is not sufficiently 
appreciated, the basis and critical manifestation of violent conflicts witnessed on the 
continent.  
 
Recognizing that the claims that underly the issue of minorities are real and need to 
be addressed  
 
There is also the additional need in Africa to recognize and appreciate that the claims 
that groups make against the post-colonial state and the conflicts that often accompany 
them are not irrational nor are they expressions of the backward past of the ethnic 
groups constituting the African state, which the African state should seek to suppress or 
overcome. These claims should not be dismissed as false consciousness or fabrications 
of Africa’s colonial past. They must rather be acknowledged as having as their roots in 
the post-colonial African state’s illegitimate origin and structure, and that they manifest 
the socio-economic, political and cultural inequalities and marginalization continuing to 
affect the members of many of the groups constituting the African state.  
 
The need for accommodative constitutional mechanisms and guarantees  
 
Consistent with the above, it is also important to aknowledge that the issue of minorities 
and the underlying claims cannot be resolved within the framework of the structures, 
processes and policy appraoches developed or received during the post-colonial period 
and continue to this date, with little or not change. In fact, as illustrated by the crises 
facing it, it must as well be acknowledged that the democratization process started in the 
1990s with its focus on electoral processes and institutional procedures would adequate 
to duly address it.  
 
This leads to the next recommendation that has been extensively defended in this study. 
This is the need for articulating a new constitutional design for the post-colonial African 
state, namely a ‘liberal multicultural’ constitutional model. This involves the 
institutionalization of constitutional mechanisms or structures and normative guarantees 
that duely recognize, and give due expression, in the public sphere the interests and 
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cultural attachments of members of different groups towards democratically 
accommodating diversity and thereby establishing a legitimate constitutional order.  
 
As part of this broad recommendation, it is proposed that attention is paid to designing 
institutions and processes that ensure just participation and representation of members of 
different groups in the processes of the state. These should also include arrangements 
that give all members of society a fair opportunity to have their say and whenever 
possible be heard.  Additionally, there should be structures, principles or guarantees that 
allow members of different groups to pursue the good of their cultural, religious or 
linguistic attachments and to equitably benefit from the socio-economic processes of the 
state and share the burdens of social cooperation. This may take different forms and may 
require the redefinition of the prevailing structures or forms of power relations of the 
post-colonial African state. As defended in this study, at the minimum this involves (a) 
the adoption of just cultural and linguistic policies reflective of the cultural and 
linguistic diversity of the society, (b) reform of electoral system to guarantee 
representation and encourage participation and integration of all members of society, (c) 
the adoption of structures and processes such as self-government arrangements that 
allow the expression of the cultural, linguistic or religious attachments of members of 
those groups whose interests can best or only be accommodated through such structures 
and processes, and finally (d) the provision of principles and mechanisms that ensure 
that all members of society participate in and equitably benefit from the socio-economic 
processes of the state.  
 
It is clear from the above that in addition to individual rights and guarantees of common 
citizenship, through the proposed constitutional reengineering of the African state, the 
study proposes that African states additionally guarantee temporary special measures for 
the highly marginalized sections of society as well as group specific rights. The specific 
characteristics of ethno-cultural diversity as well as tensions or history of conflict should 
however determine the nature of the institutionalization and formulation of such 
guarantees.  
 
The need for institutionalizing and adhering to universal principles  
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In adopting the above constitutional model, there are certain principles that should also 
be adhered to. First, non-discrimination and human rights should form part of the 
foundation on which all constitutional arrangements for the accommodation of diversity 
should rest. There is a general agreement that they serve as the outer limit of such 
arrangements. The rights of ethnic minorities and the constitutional arrangements for 
accommodation of diversity are not and should not be alternative to, or competitive 
with, but rather complementary to non-discrimination and individual human rights. The 
main purpose of the international guarantees for minorities, and their constitutional 
institutionalization through the constitutional and legal arrangements for 
accommodation of diversity eleborated in this study is to ensure that members of ethnic 
minorities can enjoy all human rights and freedoms including their distinct identity on 
an equal basis with others.3 Second, in exercising constitutionally guaranteed cultural 
rights it is necessary that proper democratic processes are followed. Accordingly, 
emphasis should be put on compliance with the rule of law, constitutionalism and 
internationally accepted procedures.  
 
Striking the right balance between the recognition of group rights and the need for 
ensuring individual rights, including the rights of regional minorities  
 
The need for providing mechanisms for protecting minorities at sub-national level 
 
Experience shows that where states make constitutional provisions for accommodating 
diversity particularly through territorial self-government or autonomy, one democratic 
question that arises is the protection of the rights of regional minorities. Most 
specifically, it raises the question of how to guarantee protection for the rights of 
regional minorities including, among others, the rights to equality and non-
discrimination, freedom of movement and the right to political participation. This is 
indeed the basis for one of the most serious objections that critics of multicultural 
                                                 
3 In its advisory opinion on Minority Schools in Albania, the Permanent Court of International Law held 
that one of the purposes of the minority system is ‘to ensure that nationals belonging to racial, religious or 
linguistic minorities shall be placed in every respect on a footing of perfect equality with the other 
nationals of a state.’ Minority Schools in Albania PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 64 (1925) 17. 
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constitutions raise against the use of territorial self-government for accommodating 
diversity.4 Accordingly, when adopting the multicultural constitutional model as 
eleborated in this study, it is imperative that adequate mechanisms for the protection of 
regional minorities are also institutionalised. This may involve, among others, power-
sharing structures at the local level that ensure the representation and effective 
participation of regional minorities and guarantees against discrimination on the basis of 
language or ethnic background.  
 
Moreover, particularly where regional self-government is used as a vehicle for 
accommodating diversity by allowing the exercise of self-government by regional ethnic 
majorities, it is necessary that it is not organized as the exclusive possession of such 
groups.5 In as much as the establishment of such self-government units is meant to serve 
as an institutional expression of the diversity of the whole society, these units should, by 
the same logic, reflect in their structures the diversity of their territory.6 One approach to 
address this problem is to use residence as basis for definition of membership of the 
political sub-units with some special guarantees for weak or highly marginalized groups 
resident in such units. 
 
Additionally, there is also a need for setting internationally recognised limitations to 
group rights and their exercise. Accordingly, it should be expressely provided that the 
recognition of the right to culture or the right to religion does not allow groups or their 
institutions to pursue, in the name of their culture or religion, practices that totally 
negate the core of the individual rights of members. In other words, in institutionalising 
group-rights based constitutional design for accommodating minorities, attention must 
also be paid to a clear and detailed articulation of the principles and the limits that define 
the boundary and regulate the application of group rights or group-based arrangements.  
 
                                                 
4 See Camille A. Monteux ‘Decentralization: The new Delusion of ethnic conflict regulation’ 8(2) 
International  Journal of Multicultural Societies (2006) 162-182;   
5 The explanatory note to the Lund Recommendations provides in its paragraph 21 that ‘[w]here powers 
may be devolved on a territorial basis to improve the effective participation of minorities, these powers 
must be exercised with due account for the minorities within these jurisdictions. Administrative and 
executive authorities must be accountable to the whole population of the territory.’ Lund 
Recommendations at 31.  
6 See James Tully Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (1995).167.   
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The need for putting in place mechanisms that promote national integration and 
inter-group cooperaiton  
 
As the Ethiopian case study shows, one of the dangers of a ‘liberal multicultural’ 
constitutional model is that it may entrench and institutionalise ethnic divisions and 
thereby undermine national cohesion. In designing institutions for accommodating 
ethnic diversity, following the analysis in Chapter V and the two case studies, states 
should strike the right balance between accommodating the interests of their diverse 
ethnic groups and protecting the rights and interests of all citizens irrespective of their 
ethnicity, religion, or any other identity. In other words, states should combine diversity 
and unity in a complementary way. It goes without saying that along side recognition 
and institutionalization of diversity, states should adopt and pursue policies and 
institutions that bind groups together. Such policies may include a just resource-sharing 
regime; the promotion of a common national language along side sub-national use of 
other languages; promoting diversity together with tolerance, mutual cooperation and 
understanding; expanding the opportunities of members of all groups including through 
special measures for the most marginalized members of society for participation in the 
national labour market; and enhancing free movement of people.  
 
The need for implementation and enforcement of constitutional rules and values  
 
Third, we have noted that the mechanisms and regulations referred to above and 
extensively eleborated in this study are institutionalised through constitutional and other 
legislative rules, structures and processes. The efficacy of these rules or processes in 
accommodating diversity and hence addressing minority issues depends upon the reality 
of their implementation and enforcement. It is imperative for this that there exist 
independent democratic institutions and dispute settlement bodies charged with the 
necessary power to implement and enforce these rules. The implication of this argument 
is that a successful constitutional design for accommodation of diversity is not just about 
establishing arrangements, guarantees for minority participation, representation and self-
government. It also requires institutionalising constitutionalism, rule of law and 
generally democratic institutions. Among these democratic institutions, independent 
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electoral administration and political and judicial dispute settlement mechanisms are of 
particularly important in the African context. 
 
The requirment of an independent electoral system  
 
The 2008 violence in Kenya revealed that the existence of an independent and 
democratic electoral administration must form part of the constitutional design for 
accommodaiting of ethno-cultural diversity and institutionalizing a just and democratic 
constitutional order in Africa. It is only if there is such an independent and impartial 
system that the provisions for inclusive and representative elected bodies of government 
can legitimately be applied.  This is because, unless such a body is independent and 
impartial in the administration of elections, the integrity and credibility of elections 
cannot be guaranteed and free and fair elections cannot be delivered. This indubitably 
undermines the chance for members of different groups to be genuinely represented and 
to have credible participation in national or regional processes.  
 
The need for an independent, legitimate and effective dispute settlement mechanism  
 
There is little doubt that the articulation of constitutional design for accommodation of 
diversity is a necessary condition for addressing the issue of minorities in Africa. 
Needless to say, any such constitutional design, however good, would not stop disputes 
from arising. Indeed, such constitutional design does not aim at ending disputes that 
may give rise to ethnic conflicts. It only focuses on offering the necessary institutional 
and normative framework to resolve disputes democratically before they degenerate into 
social conflicts. In other words, for the constitutional design to be successful there has to 
be an independent and impartial mechanism for enforcing the legal principles and norms 
governing it through adjudication of the disputes that may arise under it. This is also 
important to ensure respect for the rule of law and to promote the culture of 
constitutionalism as the necessary basis for a successful and democratic accommodation 
of diversity. This requires the existence of independent institutions charged with the 
responsibility of adjudicating disputes.  
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Given that a constitutional design for accommodation of diversity can create a 
multiplication of centres of powers, as in the case of a federal system of government, 
there is a stronger need for having very strong and competent dispute settlement 
mechanisms. These institutions provide the necessary guarantee against violation of the 
rights of citizens or groups at all levels of government. They also ensure that the 
constitutional compact is observed by all actors, such that all sections of society and 
political actors respect the constitutional order, and that all levels of government are 
kept within the bounds of the power constitutionally assigned to each.  
 
The most common mechanism for adjudication of constitutional disputes including 
those involving ethnic claims is the judicial mechanism. In various multiethnic countries 
including Spain, Canada, India, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Papaua New Guinea, among 
others, the judiciary is the main body for adjudicating disputes including those involving 
ethnic claims.7 What makes courts attractive for this role is the nature of their structure 
and their competence.8 As Tierney puts it, ‘courts, by their institutional detachment from 
the other organs of government, can transcend ordinary party politics and thereby imbue 
their decisions with the credibility that stems both from political independence and legal 
expertise.’ It is indeed an integral part of democratic constitutional systems that courts 
should be structurally independent (in the sense of being free from interference by 
political bodies or any other external actors) and have impartiality and credibility 
necessary to dispense justice.9  
 
These qualities make courts well placed to provide an appropriate mechanism for 
adjudicating even those constitutional disputes involving ethnic claims.  They are, for 
example, most suited to adjudicating disputes in federal systems involving the 
relationship between central government and governments of federal units or between 
governments of federal units. In this, courts can also play the vital role of maintaining 
                                                 
7 See S Tierney Constitutional Law and National Pluralism (2004). 245-283, on the role of the judiciary 
in Canada, Spain and Britain. Yash Ghai ‘Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework For Analysis’ 
Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic states (2001) 20-21.  
8 David Bilchitz include to the list of factors that make courts the more suitable institutions for 
adjudication time, accountability and justification and the distinction between general versus particular 
decision-making. David Bilchitz Poverty and fundamental rights: The justification and enforcement of 
socio-economic rights (2007) 119-125.   
9 See Bilchitz (as above) 120-122.  
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the constitutional balance of power between the federal and sub-unit governments, 
between unity and diversity. As Yash Ghai observes, the experience of several 
multiethnic federations largely supports this. For example, the courts in Papua New 
Guinea were given a limited and residual role in matters involving the central 
government and the provinces. When the autonomy envisaged for the provinces by the 
constitution was invaded by the central government, which had little interest in 
autonomy, it is the judiciary that came to the aid of the provinces.10 The experience is 
the same in India where the judiciary put on hold the ‘arbitrary suspension of regional 
governments by the national government’; similarly, it is the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court in Spain that helped the autonomous communities  maintain their 
autonomy in the face of ‘legislative and bureaucratic obstacles’ continuously engineered 
by the national government.11  
 
An independent and impartial judiciary is also important for providing authoritative 
frameworks that help resolve sensitive politico-legal disagreements that arise under a 
constitution. This is particularly the case where these disagreements could not be 
resolved by the political organs of government resulting in a deadlock. The example of 
the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in Reference Re Secession of Quebec case is 
instructive in this regard.12 This case was a result of a deadlock between the Federal 
Government and Quebec on whether rule of law or the principle of democracy should 
guide the determination of the question of Quebec sovereignty. In a very historic 
judgement, the SCC held that Quebec did not have the unilateral right to secede from 
Canada. Yet, based on international law and the principles underlying Canadian 
constitutional law, the SCC established that if Quebeckers indicated in a referendum by 
a clear majority in response to a clear question that they wished to secede, the rest of 
Canada would have an obligation to negotiate the terms of secession taking into account 
the interests of all parties (Quebec, the rest of Canada, and minorities in Quebec) and the 
fundamental principles of federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of 
law.13 Although this is a landmark judgement for its immense richness and depth in the 
                                                 
10 Ghai (note 11 above) 20.  
11 As above.  
12 [1998] 2 SCR 217.  
13 As above paras 2 & 88.  
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treatment of the subject matter, its most important quality is the manner in which it 
overcame the impasse between the position of the Federal Government and Quebec 
based on a principled engagement with the issue. This helped not only to avoid the 
emergence of a constitutional crisis that would have resulted from the deadlock, but also 
to maintain the commitment of all parties to the constitutional process.14    
 
Tierney’s examination of the role of the judiciary in Canada, Spain and Britain shows 
that, for courts to play such important roles and help resolve ethnic or nationality claims, 
it is necessary that they command the trust and confidence of all sections of society.15  
This depends on, among others, the legitimacy and credibility of the judicial system. It 
is important that the judiciary is seen by all sections of society to be independent, 
impartial and representative. Courts would be incapable of independently and justly 
adjudicating ordinary disputes let alone those involving ethnic claims, where they lack 
independence from the political organs and operate as part of the institutions that 
support the existing political order favouring dominant political actors.  
 
In developing multiethnic societies such as the ones in our continent where courts 
generally lack the necessary infrastructure in terms of manpower and resources as well 
as the required level of independence and power, the constitutional guarantees for 
regional minorities may not be effectively enforced. This and other related factors have 
led India to establish a national commission for minorities.  
 
Despite the safeguards provided in the Constitution and the laws in force, there persists among 
the Minorities a feeling of inequality and discrimination. In order to preserve secular traditions 
and to promote National Integration the Government of India attaches the highest importance to 
the enforcement of the safeguards provided for the Minorities and is of the firm view that 
effective institutional arrangements are urgently required for the enforcement and 
implementation of all the safeguards provided for the Minorities in the Constitution, in the 
                                                 
14 As the longstanding debate over the legitimacy of judicial review shows, the role of the judiciary is not 
uncontroversial. One of the reasons that Waldron, one of the most known critics of judicial review, has 
put forward to deny courts the power of judicial review is the existence of disagreement over issues that 
concern members of society. However, if this case is anything to go by, the existence of disagreement is 
the very reason that makes the judiciary better suited to make decisions. Citing the experience of South 
Africa over the legality of the death penalty, David Blchitz similarly argues that ‘it is important to 
recognise that disagreement …can … be the very reason for assigning final decisions concerning 
fundamental rights to judges.’ (note 12 above) 113.   
15 Tierney (note 11 above).  
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Central and State Laws and in the government policies and administrative schemes enunciated 
from time to time.16  
 
One avenue that can complement the role of the judiciary is therefore the establishment 
of such an institution charged with the necessary power and responsibility for the 
protection of minorities and promotion of national harmony and integration. The South 
African case study offers further credence to this.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 See Official website of the National Commission for Minorities http://ncm.nic.in/genesis.html accessed 
on 17 October 2007.  
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